Opinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-DC-1168
12-30-2021
Corrie L. ANDERSON, Appellant-Respondent, v. Joshua F. ANDERSON, Appellee-Petitioner
Attorney for Appellant: Justin R. Key, Goldberg Simpson, Jefferson, Indiana Attorney for Appellee: Daniel L. Brown, Daniel L. Brown Law Office, PC, Salem, Indiana
Attorney for Appellant: Justin R. Key, Goldberg Simpson, Jefferson, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee: Daniel L. Brown, Daniel L. Brown Law Office, PC, Salem, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issues
[1] The marriage of Joshua Anderson ("Father") and Corrie Anderson ("Mother") was dissolved in May 2021 when the trial court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage ("Decree") addressing, among other things, the custody and support of the parties’ five minor children and Mother's request for maintenance due to her disability. Mother appeals, raising two issues for our review which we expand and restate as three: 1) whether the trial court erred in denying her request for joint custody of the parties’ children; 2) whether the trial court erred in its determination regarding child support; and 3) whether the trial court erred in denying maintenance to Mother. Concluding the trial court did not err in its award of sole legal custody to Father or in denying spousal maintenance to Mother, we affirm those portions of the Decree. However, concluding the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a zero-dollar child support obligation without sufficient findings for such an award, we reverse the child support order and remand for further proceedings on that issue.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and Mother were married in 2000 and had six children, the oldest of whom was born in March 2002 and the youngest of whom was born in 2017. Mother has been disabled since 2003, and receives Social Security disability benefits monthly, as do each of the children. In 2019, Mother purchased a sixbedroom home in her name only in Pekin, Indiana, using money from her father's conservatorship which she administered. The Pekin house was the family home until Father filed a petition for dissolution in July 2020. Upon filing, Father left the Pekin home, taking the children with him, and moved in with his parents in Bedford. At that time, Father was working the nightshift on Thursdays, Fridays, and Saturdays as a registered nurse at a hospital in Louisville, Kentucky.
The parties’ oldest child was eighteen years old at the time the petition was filed and therefore, the issues regarding child support and custody concern only the five youngest children.
[3] Father requested certain provisional orders be made concerning, among other things, the care and custody of the children. Father filed an affidavit in support of his motion for a provisional order alleging that Mother suffered from mental health and addiction problems. See Appellee's Appendix, Volume 2 at 2-4. He also requested that Mother be ordered to submit to hair follicle drug testing. See id. at 5-6.
[4] The trial court held a provisional hearing on August 12, 2020, and subsequently issued a provisional order granting temporary custody of the minor children to Father with Mother having parenting time each weekend while Father worked. The trial court made the following findings relevant to custody and child support:
The provisional hearing was not transcribed.
5. The Father will have temporary custody of the minor children.
6. The Father works as a nurse in Louisville, Kentucky every Thursday, Friday and Saturday night. This would require him to drive ninety (90) minutes from Bedford, Indiana to and from work[.] He has chosen to stay with friends in Jeffersonville, Indiana between shifts. This leaves him dependent upon others to care for the children between Thursday mornings and Sunday mornings.
7. The Mother has not been dependable as a caregiver. She has spent as many as thirty-two (32) weeks a year in Louisiana with her father (sometimes with all children left in Indiana) and she was recently in three (3) different programs for drug treatment and emotional issues and unavailable to care for the children.
8. The Mother has reported to the Court she would be in a rehab program for at least sixty (60) days[ ] but left the program after less than two (2) weeks.
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11. Both parties requested to have the ... Social Security Disability payment associated with each child. The Mother will have the temporary right to receive and apply the funds for the care of the children for, so long as, she complies with this Order and provides personal care during her parenting time.
12. Both parties have asked for custody of the children. They have always shared the care of the children and the Father has complicated that relationship by moving in with his parents in Bedford, Indiana.
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16. The Mother will have temporary parenting time with the children each weekend when the Father is working, so long as, she complies with this Order, including:
a. submission to hair follicle testing for drugs at the Father's expense, at a testing lab selected by the Father and testing for drugs named by the Father....
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19. For the reasons stated in this Order, no weekly child support is ordered at this time.
In response to Father's motions, Mother filed a motion for continuance alleging that she was going into treatment and would not be available to appear in court for at least sixty days. See Appellee's App., Vol. 2 at 7.
Appendix of Appellant, Volume 2 at 12-15.
[5] Mother did submit to a hair follicle test on August 26, 2020, which showed the presence of cocaine and oxycodone. During the period between the provisional order in August 2020 and the final dissolution hearing in March 2021, Father did not request additional screens or raise any additional concerns about Mother's behavior with the trial court. In September 2020, Father rented a house across the street from his parents’ home. In February 2021, his work schedule changed, and he began working the dayshift on Saturdays and Sundays only.
[6] At the final dissolution hearing in March 2021, Father testified that because of his job in Louisville, he did not intend to stay in Bedford but planned to eventually find a place closer to work. Father changed his work schedule to weekends so he could be home with the children during the week. He makes $38.29 per hour for his two twelve-hour shifts per week. When asked if he thought he and Mother got along well enough to share joint custody, Father stated his primary physical and sole legal custody of the children would be more appropriate. He proposed Mother have parenting time with the children every other weekend; because he works every weekend, he proposed his parents care for the children on the weekends Mother did not have parenting time. He also requested Mother be ordered to pay child support to him and submitted a child support worksheet with his proposed findings.
[7] Mother testified that between her disability benefits and the children's, she receives approximately $1,500 per month. She also stated that she intends to stay in the Pekin home, which she purchased outright for $425,000, and acknowledged that if she were paying for similar housing, it would cost $1,500 to $2,000 per month. As for her mental health and addiction issues, Mother said she had "busted [her] tail rehabilitating and becoming the best person and version of [herself.]" Transcript, Volume 2 at 104. She stopped therapy in December 2020 but had an appointment to resume in April 2021. Mother requested an order of joint legal custody and for the children to be in her primary physical custody at the home in Pekin and attend school there. Pursuant to the child support worksheet she submitted, she requested Father pay $300.00 per week to her in child support. She also pointed out that following the dissolution, when Father ceases paying the homeowners and her car insurance, her income will not cover her monthly expenses and she requested rehabilitative maintenance based on her disability and Father's superior income to address that shortfall.
The child support worksheet did not factor in the Social Security benefits to the children, leaving that allocation to the trial court. See Tr., Vol. 2 at 112-13.
[8] The trial court conducted in camera interviews with the children and then issued its Decree on May 18, 2021. The trial court incorporated the findings from the provisional order. See Appealed Order at 1, ¶ 2. With respect to the issues of child custody, support, and maintenance, the trial court's order provides:
Findings of Fact
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14. At the time the parties separated, they were living together [in] Pekin, Indiana, in Washington County. That home was purchased in 2019 for $425,000, using proceeds from [Mother's] [f]ather's conservatorship in the State of Louisiana. There is no mortgage. That property was purchased with the intention of bringing [Mother's] [f]ather to Indiana to live with the family.
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17. [ ]Mother has the ongoing use of that residence and her name is on the property. It is a six (6) bedroom and three (3) bath home worth at least $300 weekly.
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25. [ ]Father has enrolled all of the minor children in school or preschool in the Bedford area and has located a nearby facility to address some of the developmental delays in two of the children.
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29. [ ]Father's 2020 gross income was almost $70,000. His income from such work is determined to be $918.96 weekly.... The weekly insurance expense associated with the children is $98.80.
30. [ ]Mother has drawn Social Security Disability Insurance (S.S.D.I.) benefits for many years. Her condition has not prevented her from managing her [f]ather's conservatorship and driving to Louisiana frequently. Her monthly benefit is $1,127.80, which equates to $260.46 weekly.
31. Each minor child's monthly benefit based upon [Mother's] S.S.D.I. is approximately $112.00.
32. [ ]Mother continued to have access to [her father's] conservatorship proceeds during the provisional period. She deposited $5,000 into a Regions Bank account on 8/17/20 and deposited $39,852 on the following day. She wrote on the statement, "trust loan for medical debt." [ ]Mother did not present any evidence of such medical debt. She did not present any evidence of the monies being a loan, or present documentary evidence to indicate that she has paid the money back to the conservatorship.
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35. [ ]Father did not discuss changing the children's school with [ ]Mother, he did not file a notice of relocation with this Court and there is no agreement about where they should live or attend school....
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37. [ ]Mother requested an order for joint legal custody. Although the parties must learn to communicate regarding major issues concerning the children's lives, including educational and medical needs, joint legal custody is currently not workable. [Father] shall consult with [Mother] before making major medical, educational and religious decisions for the children. He must carefully consider and respect her input, but he will have the final right to decide.
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39. With his current work schedule, in order to allow for travel and rest, [ ]Father must leave the children in the care of his family at times each week. [ ]Mother is disabled and has the ability to care for the children during the day from her residence.
40. The Court has now had the opportunity to speak with the children privately on two (2) occasions throughout this case regarding their relationships, observations, needs and wishes.
Conclusions of Law
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43. IC 31-17-2-8 controls the determination of Orders concerning custody and parenting time[.]
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45. The Court can craft an award of maintenance that is appropriate in amount and period of time under the facts and circumstances of the case.
46. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-15-7-2, if this Court finds that one spouse's ability to support himself or herself is materially affected by a physical or mental incapacity, maintenance for the spouse may be appropriate.
Judgment
47. After considering all factors provided by IC 31-17-2-8, the Court now finds [ ]Father is a fit and proper person to be awarded the legal and primary custody of parties’ minor children, subject to [ ]Mother's reasonable right to parenting time which shall exceed the contact set forth by the current Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines[.] That the parties shall arrange parenting time with the children to allow them to have substantial parenting time with [ ] Mother, while still attending classes in person or remotely at the schools selected by [Father].... If the parties cannot agree on a parenting time plan by June 10, 2021, the Court will impose a parenting time order or appoint a parenting time coordinator to be paid by the parties, after considering each party's proposal.
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49. [ ]Mother shall receive the children's SSDI benefit each month currently in the approximate amount of $112.00 each. There shall be no further child support obligation based upon the actual income of each party and the needs of the children.
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52. Due to her disability, [ ]Mother has requested maintenance. That request is denied, for the reasons set out in this Order.
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55. [ ]Father shall maintain health insurance on the minor children. Uninsured medical expenses associated with the minor children shall be paid as follows:
a. [ ]Father shall be responsible for 60%.
b. [ ]Mother shall be responsible for 40%.
56. As long as [ ]Mother is not gainfully employed, [ ]Father shall have all tax benefits associated with all eligible children. Should [ ]Mother become employed, the Court will reconsider this provision and support provisions upon request of either party.
Appealed Order at 1-9. Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[9] Mother filed a written request for the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52. We will not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Campbell v. Campbell , 993 N.E.2d 205, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id. To determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, our review of the evidence must leave us with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
II. Child Custody
[10] Mother contends the trial court's custody determination was clearly erroneous because it incorporated and relied on the findings from the provisional hearing, causing prejudice to her that "affects her ability to exercise joint custody and care of the parties’ children for years to come." Brief of Appellant at 21.
[11] Indiana Code section 31-15-4-8(b)(2) allows a trial court in a dissolution proceeding to issue a temporary order for custody. Such order is, as the statute designates, temporary in nature and "suffice[s] until a full evidentiary hearing can be held." Klotz v. Klotz , 747 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Accordingly, Indiana Code section 31-15-4-13 provides that the issuance of a provisional order in a dissolution case "is without prejudice to the rights of the parties or the child as adjudicated at the final hearing[.]" Mother argues that only evidence from the final hearing should have been considered in the custody determination and that the trial court's incorporation and consideration of evidence from the provisional hearing is contrary to section 31-15-4-13. Although it is improper for a trial court to award permanent custody to a parent solely because that parent had been awarded temporary custody, "it is permissible as part of a determination of the children's best interests for the court to consider the status and well-being of the children pending the final hearing." Trost-Steffen v. Steffen , 772 N.E.2d 500, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. In other words, the trial court can consider as part of its overall determination the facts that led to the provisional order as long as it also considers the evidence of events occurring after. The mere fact that the provisional and final custody orders are the same is not necessarily indicative of error.
[12] In an initial custody determination, both parents are presumed equally entitled to custody and the trial court must enter a custody order consistent with the best interests of the children. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8. The trial court quoted this statute in the Decree and therefore acknowledged the equal presumption and overriding concern applicable to its custody decision. The trial court also quoted the factors section 31-17-2-8 requires to be considered in the initial award of custody and stated that it had considered each of those factors in making its custody determination. See Appealed Order at 8, ¶ 47. There is no indication the trial court treated the custody decision as a modification from the provisional order rather than an initial determination.
The standard applied by the trial court is important because the initial custody determination is a less stringent standard than the modification standard. Kondamuri v. Kondamuri , 852 N.E.2d 939, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
[13] Further, when making an initial custody determination, a trial court is required to consider all factors relevant to the child's best interests, Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8, including "all evidence from the time of [the child's] birth[,]" in determining the custody arrangement that would be in the child's best interests, Hughes v. Rogusta , 830 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (decided in the context of Indiana Code section 31-14-13-2, which is applicable to paternity actions but identical in all material respects to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 ). Mother's position that only evidence from the final hearing should be considered would effectively prohibit the trial court from performing its statutory duty to consider all the evidence relevant to the child's best interests at the time it makes an initial custody determination.
[14] Finally, even if the trial court erred in incorporating the findings from the provisional order into the final decree, the trial court's findings as a whole are rooted in the testimony and evidence presented at the final hearing and primarily reference events occurring after the provisional order was entered. A trial court's custody decision is afforded considerable deference, Kondamuri , 852 N.E.2d at 945, and when considering joint custody, the trial court's main concern is the welfare of the children and not the wishes of the parents, Rasheed v. Rasheed , 142 N.E.3d 1017, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Of primary importance is whether the parties have agreed to an award of joint legal custody. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-15. The trial court must also consider the fitness and suitability of the parents, whether they are willing and able to communicate and cooperate with each other for the child's welfare, the wishes of the child, whether the child has a close and beneficial relationship with both parents, whether the parents live in close proximity to each other, and the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the home of each parent. Id. Father objected to joint legal custody, and although joint custody may be awarded even over the objections of one parent, "a more careful scrutiny of [the] evidence is necessary." Walker v. Walker , 539 N.E.2d 509, 513 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). Father testified that the parties do not work together well enough for joint custody to be successful, the parties live nearly an hour apart, and Mother has had, at the very least, substance abuse issues in the past. The evidence and findings support the trial court's decision that joint custody was not in the children's best interests in this case. And because the trial court did not defer to the provisional decision, applied the appropriate standard for making an initial custody decision, and considered the appropriate factors, incorporation of the findings from the provisional order did not prejudice Mother.
Mother complains that in addition to incorporating the provisional findings, several of the trial court's findings reference "provisional issues[.]" Brief of Appellant at 20 (citing findings 20, 21, 23, 26, 32, 38, and 40). Finding 20, that Father "disclosed his intention to move to Bedford and had done so by the time of the Provisional Hearing[,]" is a statement of fact relevant to the initial custody determination as Father still resided in Bedford at the time of the final hearing. See Appealed Order at 3. Finding 21, that Father "was awarded temporary custody of the children by the provisional order dated August 18, 2020[,]" and Finding 40, that the trial court conducted two in camera interviews with the children, are statements of the procedural history of the case and Finding 21 explicitly acknowledges the temporary nature of that order. See id. Finding 23, that Mother "has a past history of illegal substance abuse and misuse of prescribed substances, all as set forth in the Provisional Order. She failed a hair follicle drug screen and did not follow through with her aftercare for substance abuse issues[,]" does reference evidence from before the provisional hearing but importantly, updates that finding with later evidence. See id. Findings 26 and 32 refer to the "provisional period" – i.e., the period following the provisional order. See id. at 3-4. Finally, finding 38 appears to be part of the judgment rather than a finding. See id. at 5 ("In the provisional order, the Court indicated that the parties’ teenage son ... would continue to live with his uncle ... and would visit the parties at his discretion. That arrangement shall continue.").
III. Child Support
[15] Mother argues the trial court's child support determination was clearly erroneous because the court did not rely on either party's worksheet and did not explain its own calculation. See Br. of Appellant at 14 ("[T]he Trial Court started with no guideline amount ... and the decree is lacking in the necessary reasons for any deviation."). She further argues the trial court abused its discretion in allocating tax exemptions for the children, failing to consider transportation costs, and ordering that she pay forty percent of the balance of the children's uninsured medical expenses each year.
[16] Child support is to be calculated using the income shares model set forth in the Indiana Child Support Guidelines. In re Marriage of Duckworth , 989 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A calculation of child support under the Guidelines is presumptively valid. Id. A trial court may deviate from the Guidelines if it concludes that the amount of the child support award calculated pursuant to the Guidelines is unjust, but it must "enter a written finding articulating the factual circumstances supporting that conclusion." Ind. Child Support Rule 3. This formulation for deviation requires the trial court to first calculate the Guideline amount of child support. See Young v. Young , 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1048 (Ind. 2008) (stating the trial court may deviate from the Guideline amount "if, after calculating the noncustodial parent's child support obligation the court concludes that in a particular case ... the guideline amount would be unreasonable, unjust, or inappropriate") (emphasis added). Only then may the trial court determine that a deviation is appropriate. See Ind. Child Support Guideline 1, Commentary ("Flexibility Versus the Rebuttable Presumption") ("Although application of the Guideline yields a figure that becomes a rebuttable presumption, there is room for flexibility."). We cannot review a support order to determine if it complies with the Guidelines "unless the order reveals the basis for the amount awarded." Vandenburgh v. Vandenburgh , 916 N.E.2d 723, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). This can be accomplished either by specific findings or by incorporating a proper child support worksheet. Cobb v. Cobb , 588 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
[17] The trial court here did not adopt either Mother's or Father's child support worksheet and did not create its own. We are therefore left with reviewing the specific findings the trial court made regarding income and expenses to determine if the support order complies with the Guidelines. The trial court found Father's weekly gross income to be $918.96 and Mother's to be $260.46, based solely upon her own monthly disability benefit of $1,127.80 per month. See Appealed Order at 4, ¶¶ 29, 30. Each minor child receives a Social Security disability benefit of $112 per month. See id. at ¶ 31. Father incurs a weekly insurance expense for the children in the amount of $98.90. See id. at ¶ 29. The trial court did not make an order regarding parenting time, leaving that instead to the parties to work out amongst themselves, although it stated that Mother should have parenting time in excess of that provided by the Parenting Time Guidelines. See id. at 8, ¶ 47. Finally, the trial court determined that Mother should receive the children's monthly disability benefit and have no further child support obligation "based upon the actual income of each party and the needs of the children." Id. at ¶ 49.
Although the trial court included a finding that the home Mother purchased outright is "worth at least $300 weekly[,]" Appealed Order at 3, ¶ 17, and although Father's proposed findings and child support worksheet included that amount in Mother's weekly gross income as an in-kind benefit to Mother, see Appellee's App., Vol. 2 at 16, 22, it does not appear the trial court did so.
[18] We agree with Mother that the trial court's child support award (or lack thereof) was not premised on a proper calculation of the Guideline amount of child support. First, the trial court clearly erred in its treatment of the children's social security disability benefits. The Guidelines provide that when Social Security benefits "are received by a custodial parent, as representative payee of the child, based upon the ... disability of the noncustodial parent[,]" the benefits "shall be included in the Weekly Gross Income of the noncustodial parent and applied as a credit to the noncustodial parent's current child support obligation." Child Supp. G. 3(G)(5)(a)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). The trial court did not include the children's benefits in Mother's weekly gross income, which significantly reduced her weekly gross income figure. The trial court ordered Mother to receive the benefits as the noncustodial parent rather than Father as the custodial parent and "representative payee" of the children. And the trial court then apparently gave Mother a credit for the benefits that she was erroneously ordered to receive against what would be an already significantly reduced amount of child support owed due to an inaccurate weekly gross income figure. Second, because the trial court did not award parenting time in the Decree, no parenting time credit could be calculated for Mother, even though she will clearly be entitled to one. Although it is mathematically possible to reach a zero-dollar child support obligation if the disability benefits are properly allocated and Mother exercises a very specific amount of parenting time, the trial court could not have reached that result on the findings it made. Thus, we can only conclude that any baseline figure the trial court might have calculated based on its findings would be erroneous because the trial court's methodology was erroneous and it did not have all of the information required to properly calculate child support under the Guidelines.
It appears that Mother's overarching argument regarding child support is premised on the belief that she should be awarded child support from Father, notwithstanding the fact that Father was awarded custody. As noted above, see supra ¶ 10, Mother does not advocate on appeal that she should have been awarded sole legal or primary physical custody, only that the trial court should have awarded joint legal custody. In general, the Guidelines do not authorize the payment of child support from a custodial to a noncustodial parent, although "[w]hen there is near equal parenting time, and the custodial parent has significantly higher income than the non-custodial parent, application of the parenting time credit should result in an order for the child support to be paid from a custodial parent to a non-custodial parent, absent grounds for a deviation." Child Supp. G. 3(F)(1).
[19] Even if we assume the trial court calculated a presumptive Guideline child support amount that it did not memorialize in the Decree and determined that amount was unjust, we cannot review a deviation because the trial court did not provide sufficient reasoning. The trial court simply stated it was not awarding "further child support based upon the actual income of each party and the needs of the children." Appealed Order at 8, ¶ 49. The Commentary to Child Support Guideline 3(F) states that "[a] simple finding [regarding a deviation] such as the following is sufficient: ‘The court finds that the presumptive amount of support calculated under the Guidelines has been rebutted for the following reasons.’ " The Commentary to Guideline 1 further explains:
For example, if under the facts and circumstances of the case, the noncustodial parent would bear an inordinate financial burden, the following finding would justify a deviation:
"Because the noncustodial parent suffers from a chronic medical condition requiring uninsured medical expenses of $357.00 per month, the Court believes that setting child support in the Guideline amount would be unjust and instead sets support in the amount of $___ per week."
The trial court's finding regarding child support in this case falls far short of even such a simple statement. The trial court did not find that a presumptive Guideline amount of support was unjust and did not offer any specific facts about the "actual income of each party," the "needs of the children," or how those factors made the presumptive amount inappropriate.
[20] Because the trial court did not undertake the necessary first step in calculating and determining a Guideline child support amount and did not explain why a deviation from a presumptive Guideline amount was warranted, we reverse the zero-dollar child support award and remand to the trial court to 1) properly allocate the children's disability benefits and properly determine Mother's weekly gross income; 2) determine the appropriate credit to Mother based on the agreement of the parties or order of the court regarding parenting time; and 3) calculate the Guideline amount of child support. We stress this is not an opportunity to modify child support and the trial court should not take new evidence on the matter of the parties’ incomes. Once the Guideline amount of child support is calculated, the trial court may order a different amount if it finds deviation is appropriate and makes the proper findings.
As we remand for recalculation of child support, the parties’ percentage share of total weekly adjusted income will likely change and we therefore do not address at this time the uninsured medical expenses finding as it, too, will likely change.
As for consideration of transportation expenses, Mother argues that because Father moved a substantial distance away, the transportation burden on her has been increased and such burden should be taken into account in determining an appropriate child support award. The Parenting Time Guidelines state that transportation responsibilities, including cost, should be shared, and where the distance between the parents’ homes is substantial, "the parents should agree on a location for the exchange of the child[ren]." Ind. Parenting Time Guideline, Section I(B)(1) and Commentary. It appears from the testimony at the final hearing that transportation duties have been shared between the parties and that both parties are amenable to fixing an exchange location other than their respective residences, and Mother offered no evidence of an extraordinary financial cost associated with transporting the children for her parenting time. Although consideration of extraordinary transportation expenses could factor into a deviation from a presumptive child support award, this is not an issue we will independently consider at this time given our decision to remand to the trial court for recalculation and reconsideration of an appropriate child support award.
[21] As for Mother's contention the trial court erred in awarding all the tax exemptions for the children to Father, we see no abuse of discretion. "The federal tax code automatically grants to a custodial parent the dependency exemption for a child but permits an exception where the custodial parent executes a written waiver of the exemption for a particular tax year." Quinn v. Threlkel , 858 N.E.2d 665, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). A trial court may, in its "equitable discretion," order the custodial parent to sign a waiver of the dependency exemption. Id. As the custodial parent, Father is automatically entitled to the exemptions. And Mother testified that she does not "make enough money that they really would make me file [taxes and i]f it's such that I can't file and I won't be able to use [the tax exemptions] then I would absolutely have no problem" with Father claiming all the children on his taxes. Tr., Vol. 2 at 108. Under these circumstances, there is no error.
IV. Spousal Maintenance
[22] Finally, Mother argues briefly that the trial court clearly erred in denying her request for spousal maintenance given her disability and significantly lower income.
[23] A trial court may make an award of spousal maintenance "[i]f the court finds a spouse to be physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent that the ability of the incapacitated spouse to support himself or herself is materially affected[.]" Ind. Code § 31-15-7-2(1). "If the trial court makes that finding, it may order maintenance." Campbell v. Campbell , 118 N.E.3d 817, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. "Because such an award is designed to help provide for the incapacitated spouse's sustenance and support, the essential inquiry is whether the spouse can support herself." Id. "The spouse seeking maintenance has the burden of proving that he or she is entitled to maintenance." Lesley v. Lesley , 6 N.E.3d 963, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[24] It is undisputed that Mother has received disability benefits since 2003. She testified that she has "blown discs and arthritis" and has had surgery due to a spinal injury and that she has not and cannot return to full time work. See Tr., Vol. 2 at 91. But she provided no evidence besides her own testimony about the nature and extent of her injury, her prognosis, or her work restrictions. The trial court found that her disability did not keep her from driving to and from Louisiana frequently to administer her father's conservatorship and further found that she has access to conservatorship funds, through which she purchased a $425,000 home without a mortgage and was able to deposit nearly $45,000 into her bank account while this case was pending. Although not plainly stated in the Decree, it can reasonably be inferred that the trial court found Mother was not physically incapacitated to the point that her ability to support herself was materially affected because she was able to regularly travel long distances and had access to funds to use for her care and support. An award of spousal maintenance is within the trial court's discretion, Campbell , 118 N.E.3d at 819, and it was Mother's burden to prove her eligibility. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding maintenance in this case.
Conclusion
[25] The trial court did not inappropriately carry over the custody decision from the provisional order and did not err in denying Mother's request for joint custody of the parties’ children. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's request for spousal maintenance. However, the trial court did not appropriately calculate or support a deviation from the presumptive Guideline amount of child support, and we therefore reverse the child support order and remand for further proceedings on that issue.
[26] Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.
Riley, J., and Molter, J., concur.