Opinion
320 CA 21-00576
07-08-2022
Rhonda L. ANASTASI, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gary R. ANASTASI, Defendant-Appellant.
JAMES P. RENDA, BUFFALO, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. NICHOLAS J. NARCHUS, LOCKPORT, FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
JAMES P. RENDA, BUFFALO, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
NICHOLAS J. NARCHUS, LOCKPORT, FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In this matrimonial action, defendant appeals from those parts of a judgment of divorce that established his maintenance and child support obligations. He contends that Supreme Court abused its discretion in setting the amount and duration of maintenance and erred in failing to articulate a proper basis for applying the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) to the combined parental income in excess of the statutory cap (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [2], [3] ).
"[A]s a general rule, the amount and duration of maintenance are matters committed to the sound discretion of the trial court" ( Mehlenbacher v. Mehlenbacher , 199 A.D.3d 1304, 1307, 158 N.Y.S.3d 450 [4th Dept. 2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]), although "the authority of this Court in determining issues of maintenance is as broad as that of the trial court" ( Reed v. Reed , 55 A.D.3d 1249, 1251, 865 N.Y.S.2d 414 [4th Dept. 2008] ). Where, as here, the trial court gave appropriate consideration to the factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (former [6] [a]), "this Court will not disturb the determination of maintenance absent an abuse of discretion" ( Mayle v. Mayle , 299 A.D.2d 869, 869, 750 N.Y.S.2d 256 [4th Dept. 2002] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wilkins v. Wilkins , 129 A.D.3d 1617, 1618, 12 N.Y.S.3d 451 [4th Dept. 2015] ).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the record supports the court's determination that plaintiff was " ‘unable to work to support herself financially,’ now or at any point in the future" ( Knope v. Knope , 103 A.D.3d 1256, 1257, 959 N.Y.S.2d 784 [4th Dept. 2013] ). Plaintiff testified concerning her diagnosis of multiple sclerosis and its debilitating effects, and submitted voluminous medical records corroborating her testimony (see Murphy v. Murphy , 175 A.D.3d 1540, 1541-1542, 109 N.Y.S.3d 429 [2d Dept. 2019] ; cf. Knope , 103 A.D.3d at 1257-1258, 959 N.Y.S.2d 784 ). Under the circumstances, and considering that defendant never disputed plaintiff's diagnosis and medical condition, plaintiff was not required to call an expert medical witness at trial to establish her inability to work.
Contrary to defendant's remaining contentions concerning the amount and duration of the maintenance award, we conclude that the court considered the relevant factors in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (former [6] [a]). Considering plaintiff's " ‘reasonable needs and predivorce standard of living in the context of the other enumerated statutory factors’ " ( Wilkins , 129 A.D.3d at 1618, 12 N.Y.S.3d 451, quoting Hartog v. Hartog , 85 N.Y.2d 36, 52, 623 N.Y.S.2d 537, 647 N.E.2d 749 [1995] ), we conclude that the court's maintenance award did not constitute an abuse of discretion (see Murphy , 175 A.D.3d at 1541-1542, 109 N.Y.S.3d 429 ; Repetti v. Repetti , 147 A.D.3d 1094, 1096-1097, 47 N.Y.S.3d 447 [2d Dept. 2017] ; cf. Zufall v. Zufall , 109 A.D.3d 1135, 1136-1137, 972 N.Y.S.2d 749 [4th Dept. 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 859, 2014 WL 113961 [2014] ). We note that plaintiff has not worked outside the home since 1998 and that the parties enjoyed a lifestyle commensurate with a substantial income during the marriage. We reject defendant's contention that the court erred in determining his income for the purpose of calculating the amount of maintenance. It is well settled that "[i]ncome may be imputed based on a party's earning capacity, as long as the court articulates the basis for imputation and the record evidence supports the calculations" ( Johnson v. Johnson , 172 A.D.3d 1654, 1656, 101 N.Y.S.3d 497 [3d Dept. 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Sharlow v. Sharlow , 77 A.D.3d 1430, 1431, 908 N.Y.S.2d 287 [4th Dept. 2010] ). Here, the court articulated its basis for determining defendant's annual income, which included averaging the last eight years of self-reported income from the business that he ran with his brother as well as taking into account that the profitable business paid for many items for defendant, such as a motor vehicle, meals, and country club membership.
Finally, we reject defendant's contention that the court erred in failing to articulate a proper basis for ordering child support in excess of the CSSA statutory cap (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [2], [3] ; see generally Martin v. Martin , 115 A.D.3d 1315, 1316, 983 N.Y.S.2d 384 [4th Dept. 2014] ). The court relied upon the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (f) when it determined that application of the CSSA's statutory income cap would be "inequitable" because it would not afford to the child the same standard of living that the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved (see § 240 [1-b] [f] [3] ). Moreover, we conclude that the court's application of the CSSA formula to an income level for defendant that was above the statutory cap but below the income imputed to him for the purpose of calculating the amount of maintenance is supported by the record (see Evans v. Evans , 186 A.D.3d 1684, 1685, 129 N.Y.S.3d 838 [2d Dept. 2020] ; cf. Bandyopadhyay v. Bandyopadhyay , 141 A.D.3d 1099, 1100, 34 N.Y.S.3d 845 [4th Dept. 2016] ).