Opinion
October 22, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Held, J.).
Ordered that the cross appeal from the resettled judgment entered October 4, 1988, is dismissed, as abandoned; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated June 28, 1988, is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from the judgment dated September 19, 1988, is dismissed, since it was superseded by the resettled judgment; and it is further,
Ordered that the resettled judgment entered October 4, 1988, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated November 23, 1988, is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.
The appeal from the intermediate order dated June 28, 1988, must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from this order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the resettled judgment (CPLR 5501 [a] [1]; Katz v. Katz, 68 A.D.2d 536).
The appeal from the order dated November 23, 1988, is dismissed because the motion which it determined, although denominated one for renewal and reargument, was actually one for reargument. No appeal lies from an order denying a motion for reargument (see, DeFreitas v. Board of Educ., 129 A.D.2d 672; Frank v. Gessel, 108 A.D.2d 896).
It is beyond cavil that CPLR 2005, regarding law office failures, was not intended to routinely excuse defaults. To excuse a default, a party must show both a reasonable excuse for his omission and proof of merit to his claim (see, La Buda v Brookhaven Mem. Hosp. Med. Center, 62 N.Y.2d 1014; Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Andersen Co., 60 N.Y.2d 693; Brusco v. St. Clare's Hosp. Health Center, 128 A.D.2d 390). Even if law office failure had been alleged pursuant to CPLR 2005, such an allegation without supporting facts to explain and justify the failure would be insufficient to establish an excusable default (see, Tandy Computer Leasing v. Video X Home Lib., 124 A.D.2d 530).
In this case, the defendant did not assert law office failure. His bald allegation that he believed that the dispute would be resolved by a religious tribunal cannot absolve him for his failure to timely respond to the plaintiff's complaint. Further, in light of an agreement between the parties, the defendant has utterly failed to establish a meritorious defense to the action. Thus, his cross motion to vacate the default was properly denied.
We have examined the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Harwood, JJ., concur.