Opinion
No. 1148 C.D. 2011
05-25-2012
Ambridge Area School District, Appellant v. Ambridge Area Education Association, PSEA/NEA
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
The Ambridge Area School District (District) appeals from the May 23, 2011 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County (trial court) denying and dismissing the District's petition seeking to vacate an Arbitration Award (Award). The Award granted a grievance filed by the Ambridge Area Education Association, PSEA/NEA (Association) on behalf of its member, Marie Dewar, claiming that she was removed without just cause from her position as Band Director. We affirm.
The Pennsylvania State Education Association, as amicus curiae, has filed a brief in support of the Association's position in this appeal.
Marie Dewar was hired by the District as a full-time substitute music teacher and assistant band director in 1998. In 2000, Dewar was hired as a full-time music teacher and continued as the assistant band director. Dewar was later named the high school choral director. In 2007, the long-time Band Director left his employment with the District, Dewar applied for the Band Director position, and the School Board approved her application. (Award at 3-4.)
During her tenure as Band Director, Dewar made several changes including increasing the difficulty of the songs performed by the marching band, and the band received numerous accolades. In 2008-2009, the band was invited to perform at the Sugar Bowl in New Orleans on New Year's Day. Dewar prepared an extensive, detailed daily schedule of the various activities in which the band would participate during its trip to the Sugar Bowl, which was approved by the administration and the School Board. The schedule included attending a fireworks display several blocks from the hotel in which the band was staying. However, on New Year's Day, Dewar learned that the buses would not be able to transport the band members from the hotel to the fireworks display, resulting in the band members walking to the event. The assistant principal of the high school, who was acting as a chaperone on behalf of the District, raised concerns to Dewar about the band members walking to the fireworks display because they would be subjected to the party atmosphere of the French Quarter and revelers consuming alcohol. Dewar disagreed and the matter was resolved by Dewar accompanying the band members who wished to walk to the fireworks display and the assistant principal remaining behind with those who did not want to walk. The only reported incident of misconduct during the band trip to New Orleans involved the daughter of a School Board member who was caught smoking and disciplined as a result. (Award at 3-6.)
On February 20, 2009, the high school principal met with Dewar regarding the New Orleans trip and two other incidents. As a result, the District's superintendent sent Dewar a letter dated June 16, 2009, in which the February 20th meeting was referenced, advising Dewar that the Band Director position was reopened, and a new Band Director was hired on May 20, 2009. The letter set forth the following reasons for opening the Band Director position: (1) The New Orleans trip was unorganized and poorly planned; (2) the trip itinerary was not followed; (3) decline in band enrollment; and (4) overall decline in band performance. The letter also advised Dewar that, since February 20, 2009, issues had arisen regarding recently purchased marching band uniforms. The person hired as the new Band Director was also a music teacher already employed by the District. Consequently, the Association filed a grievance on Dewar's behalf. Dewar has continued to be employed as a music teacher in the District at her same rate of pay; however, she has not been paid the additional monies she would have earned as the Band Director, which amounted to approximately $7,600 to $7,700 over the course of the dispute. (Award at 6-7.)
A hearing on the grievance was held before a mutually agreed upon arbitrator. The issues before the arbitrator were: (1) whether the grievance was arbitrable; and (2) whether Dewar was removed from the Band Director position without just cause. In support of the grievance, Dewar testified on her own behalf. In opposition, the District presented the testimony of three witnesses: (1) the assistant high school principal who chaperoned the New Orleans trip; (2) the high school principal; and (3) the superintendent. The District also submitted, without objection, an affidavit of the School Board member whose daughter was disciplined for smoking during the New Orleans trip.
The arbitrator first determined that the grievance was arbitrable. The arbitrator found that the Band Director position is set forth in Appendix B of the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) as an extracurricular or supplemental position; however, the Band Director position was unique in that the duties are significantly and clearly different from other extracurricular positions, such as coaches, enumerated in Appendix B. (Award at 11.) The arbitrator found that the Band Director position: (1) encompasses formal classroom time, during the school day, taught from an approved syllabus; (2) the students are graded and receive credit for successful completion of those subjects taught by the Band Director; (3) the Band Director duties are evaluated yearly as part of the overall evaluation of the employee who is performing the Band Director duties, which are coupled with the music teacher's function; and (4) the Band Director must be a certified music teacher. (Award at 11-12, 17, 21.) The arbitrator determined that it would be impossible to distinguish between the extracurricular activities of the Band Director and music teacher, finding that "it would be impossible for a person to perform the duties of Band Director if they were not a certified music teacher." (Award at 12, 17.) The arbitrator also determined "that the duties that the Band Director performs are within the realm of duties of professional employees which include Music Teachers as defined in the Public School Code of 1949." (Award at 13.)
The pertinent provisions of the CBA are:
1. RECOGNITION
The Ambridge Area School District recognizes the AAEA, the PSEA, and the NEA as the exclusive bargaining representative for all professional employees, excluding those classified as first-level supervisors and substitute teachers, of the District under the conditions and limitations of Act No. 195. PLRB Certifications are attached and made part of this document.
2. SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT
Nothing contained in this Agreement shall limit the Board and its right to hire or fire, direct or discharge employees for causes consistent with the efficient operation of the School District and in accordance with applicable legislation and applicable provisions of this Agreement.
. . . .
10. FORMAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
It is the mutual objective to the parties to encourage the prompt resolutions of employee complaints regarding the terms and conditions of their employment.
Definitions:
"Grievance" shall be a claim that there has been a violation, misrepresentation, or inequitable application of any of the stated provisions of the Agreement.
"Employee" shall mean a bargaining unit employee.
SECTION II - 4. JUST CAUSE
a. No member of the bargaining unit shall be discharged, suspended, disciplined, given written reprimand, involuntarily transferred, reduced in rank or compensation, deprived of any professional advantages, or given adverse evaluation of professional services, without just cause.
APPENDIX B - COACHES AND STUDENT ACTIVITIES
Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. § 11-1101. Section 1101 of the Public School Code of 1949 (School Code) defines "professional employe" as including, inter alia, "those who are certificated as teachers, supervisors, supervising principals, principals, assistant principals, vice-principals, directors of vocational education. . . ."
Accordingly, the arbitrator found that the Band Director position was protected by all of the applicable provisions of the CBA and that the District, therefore, had to show that it had just cause in order to properly remove Dewar from the position. (Award at 21.) Based on the evidence presented, the arbitrator found that the District did not have just cause to remove Dewar from the Band Director position.
The District filed a petition to vacate the Award, which the trial court denied and dismissed. The trial court agreed that the grievance was arbitrable and rejected the blanket proposition that grievance procedures are never available for disputes over extracurricular work, which the District asserted based on this Court's decisions in Harbor Creek School District v. Harbor Creek Education Association, 606 A.2d 666 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), aff'd, 536 Pa. 574, 640 A.2d 899 (1994) and Apollo-Ridge School District v. Apollo-Ridge Education Association, 799 A.2d 911 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). The trial court also determined that the Award was rationally derived from the CBA, viewed in light of the CBA's language, context and the intentions of the parties. (Trial Ct. 1925(a) Op. at 1-3.) This appeal followed.
"When reviewing an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the proper standard of review for an appellate court is the deferential essence test." Coatesville Area School District v. Coatesville Area Teachers' Association/PSEA, 978 A.2d 413, 415 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 605 Pa. 677, 989 A.2d 10 (2010). "The essence test is a two prong test under which an award should be upheld if (1) the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and (2) the arbitrator's award can be rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement." Id. (citing State System of Higher Education (Cheyney University) v. State College University Professional Association, 560 Pa. 135, 150, 743 A.2d 405, 414 (1999)). "An arbitrator's findings of fact are not reviewable on appeal, and as long as he has arguably construed or applied the collective bargaining agreement, an appellate court may not second-guess his findings of fact or interpretation." Id. (citing City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 5, 717 A.2d 609 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)). "A reviewing court may only vacate an award when it is indisputably without foundation or fails to logically flow from the agreement." Id.
In support of this appeal, the District first argues that the trial court erred by reaching a conclusion that conflicts with the decisions in Harbor Creek, Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical School v. Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical Education Association, 426 A.2d 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), and Apollo-Ridge. The District contends that this Court in, Harbor Creek, held as a matter of law that CBAs covering professional employees of a school district do not apply to supplementary contracts for additional duties because professional employees are acting outside the scope of the CBA when performing extracurricular activities. The District argues that in every instance where this Court has sustained an arbitrator's award regarding extra-duty assignments and teachers, there were explicit provisions in the text of the governing CBA supporting the arbitrator's decisions. The District contends that there is no specific provision in the CBA at issue here which incorporates the terms and conditions of the supplemental contracts for extracurricular work or that provides for the posting and selection of employees for the Band Director position, coaches, or student activities.
The District does not raise any issue with respect to whether it had just cause to remove Dewar from her position as Band Director.
See also Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical School (same holding).
See also School District of Morrisville v. Morrisville Education Association, 644 A.2d 252, 254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (holding that CBAs do not apply to supplementary contracts wherein teachers perform duties not defined in Section 1101 of the School Code).
See, e.g., Cranberry Area School District v. Cranberry Education Association, 713 A.2d 726, 729 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (pursuant to explicit provisions of the parties' CBA, members of the bargaining unit had preference over non-members when filling extracurricular or supplemental positions); Penn-Delco School District v. Penn-Delco Education Association, 754 A.2d 51, 53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (arbitrator found that the school district violated CBA which provided that all extra-pay positions would first be offered to bargaining unit members); School District of the City of Erie v. Erie Education Association, 749 A.2d 545, 550-51 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (CBA provided that supplemental positions were to be filled by an explicit posting procedure).
The District argues further that Appendix B removes the position of Band Director from the realm of professional employees and the CBA's Recognition Clause clearly only applies to professional employees. Thus, the District contends, the formal Grievance Procedure cannot be expanded beyond the employees covered by the Recognition Clause. The District asserts that it has reserved the right in Appendix B to eliminate all of the positions listed therein, including the Band Director. The District contends that the position of Band Director is not the position of a professional employee as that term is used in the School Code or the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA), because these definitions do not include any extracurricular or activity assignments. The position of Band Director is also not found in the definition of teacher as set forth in Section 1141 of the School Code. The District contends that teachers who are working in extracurricular capacities are not, in fact, functioning as "teachers" or "professional employees" who can invoke the grievance procedures set forth in the CBA. The District argues that, because the Band Director position is not within the bargaining unit positions covered by the CBA, the Just Cause provision does not apply.
As noted previously, the Recognition Clause provides that:
The Ambridge Area School District recognizes the AAEA, the PSEA, and the NEA as the exclusive bargaining representative for all professional employees, excluding those classified as first-level supervisors and substitute teachers, of the District under the conditions and limitations of Act No. 195. PLRB Certifications are attached and made part of this document.(2010-2011 CBA, R.R. at 40a.)
Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. § 1101.301(7). PERA is also commonly referred to as Act 195. Section 301(7) defines "professional employe" as:
any employe whose work: (i) is predominantly intellectual and varied in character; (ii) requires consistent exercise of discretion and judgment; (iii) requires knowledge of an advanced nature in the field of science or learning customarily acquired by specialized study in an institution of higher learning or its equivalent; and (iv) is of such character that the output or result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time."
24 P.S. § 11-1141(1). Section 1141 defines "teacher" as follows:
"TEACHER" shall include all professional employes and temporary professional employes, who devote fifty per centum (50%) of their time, or more, to teaching or other direct educational activities, such as class room teachers, demonstration teachers, museum teachers, counsellors, librarians, school nurses, dental hygienists, home and school visitors, and other similar professional employes and temporary professional employes, certificated in accordance with the qualifications established by the State Board of Education.
In Harbor Creek, the school district eliminated the supplemental contract position of athletic director and created a new position of assistant principal for student and supplemental activities. Harbor Creek, 606 A.2d at 667. The new position included all of the duties of the athletic director and the former athletic director, who was appointed to the new position, left the bargaining unit and assumed the duties of assistant principal for student and supplemental activities. Id. The union filed a grievance alleging "that elimination of the supplemental contract position of athletic director, and commensurate transferring of bargaining unit work to a non-bargaining unit individual, violated the [CBA]." Id. The arbitrator determined that the grievance was arbitrable and sustained the grievance on the merits. Id. The trial court granted the union's motion to quash the school district's application for vacation of the arbitration award. Id. The sole issue before this Court was the substantive arbitrability of the school district's transfer of the athletic director's duties from a professional employee, and a member of the bargaining unit, to a non-bargaining unit individual. Id.
The school district argued before this Court that the CBA explicitly provided that the grievance procedure was available to professional employees only. Id. The school district contended that the former athletic director was not acting as a teacher or a professional employee "when working under the supplemental athletic director contract." Id. The school district argued further "that even though the salary schedule for the athletic director position was contained in the [CBA], contractual grievance procedures [did] not apply to supplemental positions." Id. at 667-68.
In reversing the trial court's order, this Court held that:
The [CBA] herein specifically states that it covers professional employees. We have held as a matter of law, citing Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical School v. Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical Education Association, [] 426 A.2d 1203 ([Pa. Cmwlth.]1981), that [CBAs] covering professional employees of a school district do not apply to supplementary contracts wherein teachers perform duties not within, but additional to, the realm of professional employees as defined in the [School Code]. In re Grievance by Glover, [] 587 A.2d 25 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1991). In so holding, we are cognizant of previous judicial recognition allowing greater flexibility in the selection of athletic coaches than is allowed in the hiring and firing of teachers. Greater Johnstown. We have also determined that teachers acting in extracurricular capacities are not professional employees as defined in the [School] Code. Moriarta v. State College Area School District, [] 601 A.2d 872 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1992); In re Glover; Greater Johnstown.Id. (footnote omitted). While the District argues that this matter is controlled by Harbor Creek as a matter of law, this Court in Apollo-Ridge disagreed "that Harbor Creek can be used for the blanket proposition that grievance procedures are never available for disputes over extracurricular work." Apollo-Ridge, 799 A.2d at 913. Our Court, in Apollo-Ridge, further cited Cranberry Area School District v. Cranberry Education Association, 713 A.2d 726, 728 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), wherein we "specifically rejected the notion that Harbor Creek created a per se rule that disputes involving extracurricular duties are not arbitrable." Id. This Court in Cranberry further pointed out that our Supreme Court, in affirming our decision in Harbor Creek, "reiterated the well-established rule that an arbitrability determination is made by reviewing the [CBA] in order to ascertain whether the particular issue is involved." Cranberry, 713 A.2d 728 (citing Harbor Creek, 536 Pa. at 579, 640 A.2d at 902).
These principles apply with equal force to the [school district's] transfer of duties from the previous athletic director position to the presently existing assistant principal position. The athletic director position was a supplementary agreement as to which any dispute is non-arbitrable. Additionally, though a professional employee, when [the former athletic director] performed the extracurricular duties of the prior athletic director position, he was not acting within the capacity of a professional employee and would be precluded from resolving disputes through grievance proceedings.
Thus, we reject the District's assertion that the trial court erred by reaching a conclusion that conflicts with the decisions in Greater Johnstown and Harbor Creek. The District cannot simply ignore the now "well-established rule that an abitrability determination is made by reviewing" the provisions of the CBA at issue. Id. Moreover, as pointed out by the trial court, the language contained in the CBA between the District and the Association more closely resembles the CBA at issue in Apollo-Ridge and is very different from the CBA in Harbor Creek. (Trial Ct. 1925(a) Op. at 2.)
In Apollo-Ridge, the school district traditionally selected individuals to lead various extracurricular activities (referred to as extra-duty assignments in the parties' CBA) by adopting the high school principal's recommendations. Apollo-Ridge, 799 A.2d at 912. For the 1999-2000 school year, the principal recommended two bargaining unit members for senior class sponsor and assistant basketball coach. Id. The school district did not select the recommended bargaining unit members even though they had served in those particular extra-duty positions during prior school years. Id. Instead, the school district chose to fill the positions with two non-bargaining unit individuals; specifically, an assistant principal and a person not previously employed by the school district. Id. The union filed grievances alleging that the school district's failure to reappoint the two bargaining unit members violated the CBA. Id. The District argued that the assignment of extra-duty work was not covered by the CBA; therefore, the grievances were not arbitrable. Id. The arbitrator found that the matter was arbitrable and sustained the grievances. Id. The school district filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award, which the trial court denied. Id.
On appeal to this Court, the school district argued, inter alia, that the grievances were not arbitrable. Id. Upon review of this issue, we agreed with the arbitrator's conclusion "that the grievances were arbitrable because, even though the CBA [did] not describe precisely how extra-duty assignments [were] to be made, it [did] include an extensive list of extra-duty assignments and their salaries." Id. at 913. Specifically, we held that:
Article VIII, Section C, of the CBA states that "[c]ompensation for extra-duty assignments to be provided under this agreement are reflected in Appendix C attached to and incorporated in this agreement." (R.R. at 16a). Appendix C, entitled "Supplemental Pay Schedule," lists all of the extra-duty assignments and their salaries. (R.R. at 47a-50a). We believe the words "to be provided under this agreement" make it clear that the parties negotiating the CBA intended that bargaining unit members would hold the extra-duty assignments. Indeed, the very term "extra-duty assignment" evidences this intent when we consider the case of a non-bargaining unit member, not otherwise employed by the [school district], who is chosen for such an assignment. In such a case, it would hardly be appropriate to call the assignment "extra-duty" work; rather, it would be the only work that person performed for the [school district].Id. (emphasis in original). In distinguishing Apollo-Ridge from Harbor Creek, we further stated:
The CBA here, by contrast, does not limit the availability of grievance procedures to "professional employees." Indeed, Article XVII of the CBA, entitled "Grievance Procedure," does not even use the term "professional employee." Article XVII simply defines "grievance" as the
"alleged violation, misinterpretation or inequitable application of any of the provisions of this agreement." (R.R. at 32a) (Emphasis added). Given that Article VIII, Section C, of the CBA states that extra-duty assignments are "to be provided under this agreement," we can only conclude that a dispute over extra-duty assignments is a dispute over the provisions of the CBA and, therefore, is subject to arbitration. In short, the first prong of the "essence test" has been met.
Id.
Here, there is no dispute that, as per the Recognition Clause of the CBA, the bargaining unit consists of professional employees. However, as in Apollo-Ridge, the parties' CBA in this matter defines "grievance" as "a claim that there has been a violation, misrepresentation, or inequitable application of any of the stated provisions of the Agreement." (2010-2011 CBA, R.R. at 42a.) Employee is defined under the formal Grievance Procedure of the CBA as a bargaining unit employee. (2010-2011 CBA, R.R. at 43a.) As found by the arbitrator, the Band Director position, by its duties and functions, must be filled by a certified music teacher and, therefore, is and must be a member of the bargaining unit. (Award at 11-12, 17, 21.) As further found by the arbitrator, the District filled the Band Director position from which Dewar was removed with another bargaining unit member who was a certified music teacher. (Award at 6-7.) Moreover, there is nothing in the CBA that distinguishes professional employee duties from extracurricular duties, except for Appendix B and the pay scale associated therewith. Appendix B is a clear part of the CBA and it does not state that bargaining unit employees who hold extracurricular positions may not file a grievance pursuant to the formal Grievance Procedure. The only right reserved to the District in Appendix B is the District's right, "in its sole discretion to approve, add, disband or eliminate any or all District-sponsored clubs, groups and organizations." (2010-2011 CBA, R.R. at 83a.) Finally, the fact that Appendix B does not provide for the selection of an individual to fill the Band Director position is not dispositive. "Just because a position is listed under Appendix B does not automatically disqualify [the individual performing] that position as a [bargaining] unit member." (Trial Ct. 1925(a) Op. at 3.)
As noted previously, "[a]n arbitrator's findings of fact are not reviewable on appeal, and as long as he has arguably construed or applied the collective bargaining agreement, an appellate court may not second-guess his findings of fact or interpretation." Coatesville, 978 A.2d at 415 n.2 (citing City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 5, 717 A.2d 609, (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)). --------
Thus, we conclude that the arbitrator correctly determined that the instant grievance was arbitrable. Accordingly, the first prong of the essence test has been met in this matter.
We now turn to the second prong of the essence test: whether the arbitrator's award is rationally derived from the CBA. Coatesville, 978 A.2d 413, 415 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (citing State System of Higher Education (Cheyney University v. State College University Professional Association, 560 Pa. 135, 743 A.2d 405 (1999)). With respect to this issue, the District argues that the arbitrator went beyond the essence of the contract by finding that the Band Director position was unique when the CBA does not classify and/or describe the position as such. The District contends that the only provision of the CBA that references the Band Director position is Appendix B and the selection of such position is not addressed by the CBA. The District relies upon this Court's holding with respect to the second prong of the essence test in Apollo-Ridge, wherein our Court held that the arbitrator's award was not rationally derived from the CBA because it contained no specific term or provision addressing how extra-duty assignments were to be made. Apollo-Ridge, 799 A.2d at 914. The District contends that the CBA lacks any provision of how to make assignments for coaches and student activities.
Finally, the District argues that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and, in so doing, has deprived the District of its management rights in determining Band Directors, coaches, and other positions set forth in Appendix B. The District argues that the arbitrator's merger of the position of music teacher and Band Director is based on the arbitrator's opinion of the two positions, not on any provision of the CBA; therefore, the Award is neither rationally derived from the CBA nor is the Award drawn from the essence of the CBA.
Initially, we acknowledge that this Court held in Apollo-Ridge that "the arbitrator's award was not rationally derived from the CBA because the CBA contains no specific term or provision addressing whether extra-duty work may be turned over to non-bargaining unit personnel or spelling out how extra-duty assignments are to be made." Apollo-Ridge, 799 A.2d at 914. However, we further determined that because the arbitrator's conclusion that the school district's "past practice had given rise to a local working condition protected by the CBA" and not envisioned therein, "let alone rationally derived from" the parties' CBA, we remanded to the trial court, "with specific instructions to remand to the [school board], to allow the [school board] to utilize its discretion in making extra-duty assignments from within the appropriate bargaining unit." Id. at 915. In the present matter, the arbitrator did not rely upon a past practice but, instead, construed and applied the provisions of the CBA. As such, this Court's decision in Apollo-Ridge does not control this matter.
Based on the evidence presented, the arbitrator found that the Band Director position: (1) encompasses formal classroom time, during the school day, taught from an approved syllabus; (2) the students are graded and receive credit for successful completion of those subjects taught by the Band Director; (3) the Band Director duties are evaluated yearly as part of the overall evaluation of the employee who is performing the Band Director duties, which are coupled with the music teacher's function; and (4) the Band Director must be a certified music teacher. (Award at 11-12, 17, 21.) The arbitrator determined further that "[t]his is in direct opposition to other extracurricular activities such as those that would involve" coaches, chaperones, or advisors for activities such as the yearbook. (Award at 11-12.) Accordingly, the arbitrator found that the Band Director position was required to be filled by a professional employee, that the Recognition Clause provided that professional employees were covered by the CBA, and that the formal Grievance Procedure governs a claim that there has been a violation, misrepresentation, or inequitable application of any of the stated provisions of the CBA; therefore, the Just Cause provision of the CBA was applicable.
The arbitrator construed and applied the CBA in conjunction with the evidence presented to arrive at the foregoing findings. Thus, the arbitrator's "findings of fact are not reviewable on appeal" and this Court "may not second-guess his findings of fact or interpretation." Coatesville, 978 A.2d at 415 n.2. It is well settled that, "[a]s soon as it is determined that the issue is encompassed within the terms of the [CBA], our scope of review ends." Cranberry, 713 A.2d at 729. Given this Court's narrow standard of review and the tenet that "[a] reviewing court may only vacate an award when it is indisputably without foundation or fails to logically flow from the agreement," Coatesville, 978 A.2d at 415 n.2, we are constrained to affirm the trial court's Order.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge Senior Judge Friedman concurs in the result only. ORDER
NOW, May 25, 2012, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County in the above-captioned matter is AFFIRMED.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
| Position | 2006-2007 | 2007-2008 | 2008-2009 | 2009-2010 | 2010-2011 |
| Band Director | 7597 | 7600 | 7700 | 7700 | 7750 |
See Moriarta v. State College Area School District, 601 A.2d 872, 874-75 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (Court held that teachers acting in extracurricular capacities are not professional employees as defined in the School Code).