Opinion
23A-JV-2777
08-09-2024
A.M., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana, Frederick Vaiana Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin & Webb Indianapolis, Indiana. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore A. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Courtney L. Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Stephen R. Creason, Judge The Honorable Pauline A. Beeson, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D16-2307-JD-5991
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana, Frederick Vaiana Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin & Webb Indianapolis, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore A. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Courtney L. Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FOLEY, JUDGE.
[¶1] A.M. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent child for committing dangerous possession of a firearm, which would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. He raises the following restated issues for our review:
I. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting evidence discovered as a result of a pat-down search; and
II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support A.M.'s adjudication for dangerous possession of a firearm.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On July 14, 2023, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") Officer Isaias Soto ("Officer Soto") was dispatched to an apartment complex in Marion County in response to a potential drug overdose. He arrived on scene around the same time as the paramedics and was joined shortly after by IMPD Officer Alejandro Renteria ("Officer Renteria"). After Officer Soto arrived, he entered the apartment and observed fourteen-year-old A.M. on the floor "overdosing." Tr. Vol. 2 p. 8. A.M. was "completely unconscious," and the paramedics immediately began resuscitation efforts. Id. Eventually, A.M. began "coming to." Id. It did not appear to Officer Soto that A.M. ever became "fully conscious," but A.M. appeared to be "semi aware of his surroundings." Id. at 9. The paramedics decided to transport A.M. to Riley Hospital for further medical treatment. Prior to being transported, Officer Renteria conducted a limited pat-down search of A.M.'s outer clothing and found a black Glock on A.M.'s right ankle.
[¶4] On July 18, 2023, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that A.M. had committed dangerous possession of a firearm, which would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. A fact-finding hearing was held on September 20, 2023. During the hearing, A.M.'s counsel moved to suppress any testimony or evidence discovered as a result of the pat-down search, alleging that the pat-down search was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
[¶5] Officer Soto testified that the pat-down search was done as a part of IMPD's standard procedure and for the safety of the paramedics. He explained that the officers wanted to ensure that there were no weapons or other items that could pose a risk to safety officers, including the paramedics, on the body of the person being transported, as they did not want the paramedics to be placed in a position where they would be alone in the back of an ambulance with a semiconscious person who may be in possession of a weapon. Officer Soto also explained that the officers decided to conduct a pat-down search in this case based on the nature of the call because it was possible that there may be drug- related items, such as additional narcotics or needles that could pose a risk to the paramedics. After taking a brief recess, the juvenile court denied A.M.'s motion to suppress. The juvenile court found that the pat-down search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
[¶6] The State continued with its evidence, and Officer Renteria testified. He stated that, during the pat-down search, he found the black Glock inside A.M.'s right pants leg. At that point, the State showed Officer Renteria State's Exhibit 1, which the officer confirmed was "the firearm that was recovered" from A.M. Id. at 25. He also testified that Exhibit 1 contained "a black [G]lock with magazines, a laser, and several rounds of ammunition." Id. A.M.'s counsel objected to the admission of Exhibit 1, and the juvenile court overruled the objection.
[¶7] Following the presentation of evidence and argument of counsel, the juvenile court found that the State had met its burden of proof and took the adjudication under advisement. A.M. was ordered to remain on GPS monitoring, participate in day reporting, complete home-based casework, complete homebased therapy, submit to random drug testing, and draft an essay about "the dangers of a 14-year-old having a firearm." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 46.
[¶8] On September 29, 2023, the probation department filed a report with the juvenile court advising that A.M. had violated the terms and conditions of his release by overdosing on fentanyl. The report stated that A.M. had been transported back to Riley Hospital on September 25, 2023 "due to fentanyl overdose during which he stopped breathing" and required treatment in the intensive care unit. Id. at 48. On September 30, 2023, the juvenile court issued a warrant for A.M.'s arrest. A review hearing was held on October 11, 2023, at which the juvenile court ordered that A.M. continue to be detained. On October 25, 2023, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing, formally adjudicated A.M. to be a delinquent child and ordered him to be placed on formal probation and to complete substance abuse treatment. A.M. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Admission of Evidence
[¶9] On appeal, A.M. argues that the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to suppress. However, because A.M. is appealing following his juvenile adjudication, his appeal is better framed as whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting evidence discovered pursuant to the pat-down search. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017) (citing Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014)). We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion and will reverse only "when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances." Id. (citing Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997)). "However, when a challenge to such a ruling is predicated on the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo." Id. (citing Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013)).
A. Indiana Constitution
[¶10] A.M. asserts that the pat-down search conducted in this case violated both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides for "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure[.]" Although the language of Article 1, section 11 is similar to that of the Fourth Amendment, "Indiana courts interpret it 'independently from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.'" Budimir v. State, 218 N.E.3d 596, 599 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind. 2001)).
[¶11] "Our analysis under Article 1, section 11, focuses on the 'the totality of the circumstances' in determining whether 'the search or seizure was reasonable.'" Id. (quoting Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 134 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015), trans. denied). Our determination of whether a search or seizure was reasonable turns on a balance of three factors: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation of law has occurred, (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Id. The State bears the burden of showing that the search or seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. Rutledge v. State, 28 N.E.3d 281, 291 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015).
[¶12] As to the first factor, the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that A.M. had engaged in criminal activity in this case was moderate. The officers were dispatched to an apartment in response to a call of a possible drug overdose. When the police arrived, they observed A.M. "on the floor overdosing," which required resuscitation by the paramedics. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 8. As A.M. regained consciousness, he was disoriented and "started reaching" for something. Id. at 10. Thus, at the time Officer Soto and Officer Renteria decided to conduct a limited pat-down of A.M.'s clothing, they had a high degree of suspicion that A.M. had been engaged in illicit drug use, could possibly have items on his person that could pose a risk to the officers and paramedics such as drugs, weapons, or needles, and that A.M. required additional medical assistance.
[¶13] As to the second factor, the degree of intrusion was minimal. The pat-down involved nothing more than a cursory search of the outside of A.M.'s clothing to ensure that he was not armed or in possession of illicit substances or other items that would put the safety of the officers, paramedics, or A.M. at risk. An "ordinary" pat-down of the outside of a suspect's clothing is a fairly limited intrusion for the purposes of the Indiana Constitution. Carter v. State, 223 N.E.3d 246, 251 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), trans. denied; Berry v. State, 121 N.E.3d 633, 639 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied. Our Supreme Court has previously held that police are not required to wait until an individual appears to be reaching for a weapon in order to ensure the individual's safety and the safety of others at the scene because it is generally reasonable for a prudent officer to pat-down persons placed in his patrol car, even absent a belief of dangerousness particularized to the specific detainee. Wilson v State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. 2001). Although applying the Fourth Amendment, the concept applies equally here in looking to determine if the degree of intrusion was minimal under the Indiana Constitution.
[¶14] Finally, the extent of law enforcement needs was high. The officers had an obligation to assist A.M. due to his overdose, and once the paramedics determined that A.M. needed additional medical care and would therefore be transported to the hospital in the ambulance, the officers needed to ensure that both A.M. and the paramedics would be safe as he received further treatment. To ensure such safety, Officer Renteria conducted a simple pat-down of the outside of A.M.'s clothing and found a firearm under A.M.'s right pants leg.
[¶15] "In determining reasonableness under Section 11, we recognize that Indiana citizens are concerned not only with personal privacy but also with safety, security, and protection from crime." Saffold v. State, 938 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied. Accordingly, when government intrusion is challenged under Section 11, reasonableness under the totality of circumstances also includes considerations of protecting citizens from crime and the safety of first responders. Id.; see also Washburn v. State, 121 N.E.3d 657, 662 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied. Balancing the degree of suspicion, the degree of intrusion, and the law enforcement needs, we conclude that the officers' actions were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and therefore the search did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
B. Fourth Amendment
[¶16] A.M. also challenges the pat-down search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, if an officer has reasonable fear that a suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer may frisk the outer clothing of that suspect to try to find weapons. Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1205 (Ind. 2020) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 27 (1968)). "[C]ourts 'cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest.'" Berry, 121 N.E.3d at 637 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). The purpose of this type of search "is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (quotation omitted). "The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. To determine whether an officer acted reasonably, we consider the specific, reasonable inferences that the officer, in light of his experience, can draw from the facts. Id.
[¶17] Here, the facts supported the reasonableness of the pat-down search. The officers arrived at the scene in response to a drug overdose, and when they first arrived, A.M. was unconscious and required resuscitation. As A.M. began regaining consciousness, he was disoriented and "started reaching" for something. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 10. Once the paramedics determined that A.M. needed additional medical care and would therefore be transported to the hospital in the ambulance, the officers articulated that, due to the nature of the call involving drugs, it was standard procedure for them to perform a pat-down to ensure that the person being transported did not have anything on their person that could pose a risk to the paramedics, such as weapons, narcotics, or needles. "[I]t is generally reasonable for a prudent officer to pat-down persons placed in his patrol car, even absent a belief of dangerousness particularized to the specific detainee." Wilson, 745 N.E.2d at 792. It was reasonable for the officers to believe that the safety of the paramedics was potentially in danger and that they needed to ensure the paramedics' safety. To do so, Officer Renteria conducted a limited pat-down of the outside of A.M.'s clothing and found a firearm under A.M.'s right pants leg.
[¶18] The present case is almost identical to the circumstances in Fritz v. State, 223 N.E.3d 265 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), where a panel of this court found a pat-down done before placing the defendant into an ambulance to not be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. There, the police responded to a call regarding a medical emergency and found the defendant lying on his back in the middle of a parking lot. Id. at 273. When asked if he had ingested any drugs, the defendant's negative response was slow and drawn out, which the police testified could commonly be caused by a drug or alcohol related issue. Id. at 273-74. The police performed a pat-down search of the defendant for his safety and the safety of the paramedics so that the medics would not be harmed when they administered treatment, during which they found drug paraphernalia. Id. at 274. Because the protective pat-down search was performed before the defendant was transported to the hospital in the ambulance and was limited to a search for weapons or items that might harm the police or the paramedics as they administered treatment to Fritz, this court found that the officers' concerns for their safety and the safety of the attending paramedic was reasonable and held that the pat-down search did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
[¶19] As the circumstances in the instant case are almost identical to those in Fritz, we come to the same conclusion. Based on the facts of this case, a reasonably prudent officer in Officer Renteria's position would believe that the safety of the paramedics-and A.M.-was potentially in danger. We, therefore, conclude that the pat-down search did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence obtained as a result of the search.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶20] A.M. argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his adjudication for dangerous possession of a firearm. In juvenile delinquency adjudication proceedings, the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A.V. v. State, 193 N.E.3d 1031,1034 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022). When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. If we conclude that evidence of probative value exists so that a reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the underlying crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the adjudication. Id. The evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence but is sufficient if a reasonable inference may be drawn from it to support the adjudication. Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 12 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), trans. denied.
[¶21] To adjudicate A.M. to be a delinquent child for dangerous possession of a firearm, the State was required to prove that A.M. was "[a] child who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesse[d] a firearm." Ind. Code § 35-47-10-1(a). A "firearm" is defined as any weapon that is capable of expelling, designed to expel, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by means of an explosion. I.C. § 35-47-1-5. On appeal, A.M. argues that the State failed to prove that he possessed a firearm as defined in Indiana Code section 35-47-1-5.
Indiana Code section 35-47-10-1 contains numerous exemptions from the application of the statute. However, none of those exceptions are applicable to this case.
[¶22] Here, the evidence most favorable to the judgment showed that, when Officer Renteria performed the pat-down search, he discovered a "black [G]lock" from A.M.'s right pants leg. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 25. The State then introduced its Exhibit 1, which Officer Renteria described as "a box that my department tends to store firearms and ammunition [in]" and that he recognized it as the "box . . . where we stored the firearm that was recovered on scene." Id. He then stated that the box contained "a black [G]lock with magazines, a laser, and several rounds of ammunition." Id. When asked if he recognized the black Glock, Officer Renteria answered affirmatively and confirmed that it was "the firearm that was recovered on scene." Id. Exhibit 1 was then admitted into evidence. Officer Renteria's testimony, the State's physical evidence, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the foregoing evidence support the factfinder's determination that the Glock was a firearm.
[¶23] A.M. argues that the State's evidence was insufficient because the State failed to prove that the weapon discovered was capable of expelling, was designed to expel, or may be readily converted to expel, a projectile by means of an explosion under Indiana Code section 35-47-1-5. However, under the plain terms of the statue, "Indiana law does not require that the State prove a handgun is operable to obtain a conviction[;] . . . [t]hat the handgun was designed to expel a projectile [b]y means of an explosion is sufficient." Manley v. State, 656 N.E.2d 277, 279 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995). As the weapon was admitted into evidence in the present case, the fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the Glock, which was repeatedly described as a firearm, was capable of expelling a projectile by means of an explosion. See Staten v. State, 844 N.E.2d 186, 187 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (holding that a disassembled weapon was sufficient to meet the definition of firearm because it could readily be converted to expel a projectile by means of an explosion), trans. denied. We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support A.M.'s adjudication for dangerous possession of a firearm.
Conclusion
[¶24] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it admitted the evidence discovered as a result of the pat-down search and that the State presented sufficient evidence to support A.M.'s adjudication for dangerous possession of a firearm, which would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
[¶25] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.