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holding that the "Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state courts, including the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Superior Court of DeKalb County"
Summary of this case from Stegeman v. StateOpinion
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:06-CV-0929-TWT.
July 28, 2006
ORDER
This is a pro se civil rights action. It is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 2] and the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike [Doc. 5]. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's motion is GRANTED and the Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 18, 2006, the Plaintiff, Mahmood Alyshah, filed this lawsuit against the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Superior Court of Dekalb County. This is one of many lawsuits filed by the Plaintiff arising out of the State Bar's efforts to prevent him from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. In this lawsuit, the Plaintiff alleges that "this is the Civil Rights Action challenging the constitutionality of the false imprisonment, false arrest and home invasion due to unconstitutional court order against the Plaintiff without any summons and charges against the Plaintiff and without any judicial court trial against the Plaintiff." (Compl., p. 1) The Plaintiff asserts eight separate causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1986, and 1988. The Plaintiff also brings state law claims pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-4-7(a) and 15-1-8(a)(2), as well as claims for "negligent infliction of emotional distress" and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On May 5, 2006, the Defendants moved to dismiss all claims. The Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Strike the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
1. Standard of Review
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears beyond doubt that no set of facts could support the plaintiff's claims for relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir. 1983). Generally, notice pleading is all that is required for a valid complaint. See Lombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Id.
2. Federal Claims
The Plaintiff asserts claims against the Defendants for alleged civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1986, and 1988. However, the Eleventh Amendment protects a state from being sued in federal court without the state's consent, including suits against the state by its own citizens. Abusaid v. Hillsborough County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to bar suits in federal court against state agents and state instrumentalities. Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). A state instrumentality is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when the nature of the entity is such that it should be treated as an "arm of the state" and recovery of money against that entity is, in essence, a recovery against the state.Id. at 429-30; see Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). The Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state courts such as these Defendants. Kaimowitz v. The Florida Bar, 996 F.2d 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 1993). As to the Plaintiff's claims, there has been no waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Plaintiff's federal claims must thus be dismissed.
2. State Law Claims
The Plaintiff originally alleged that the Defendants' actions violated O.C.G.A. §§ 9-4-7(a) and 15-1-8(a)(2), and also made claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, in his Motion to Strike, the Plaintiff appears to assert that he claims only "Civil Rights violations" under the U.S. Constitution. In any event, the Plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity as well as the Eleventh Amendment. In November 1990, the voters of the State of Georgia approved an amendment to Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX of the Georgia Constitution enabling the General Assembly to waive the state's sovereign immunity by enacting a Tort Claims Act, which the General Assembly then passed in 1992. See Datz v. Brinson, 208 Ga. App. 455, 455-56 (1993). However, in passing the Georgia Tort Claims Act ("GTCA"), the General Assembly declared as a matter of public policy "that the state shall only be liable in tort actions within the limitations of this article and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established in this article." O.C.G.A. § 50-21-21(a). The GTCA specifically preserves the State's sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for tort claims filed in federal court. See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b). Because the State of Georgia has not waived Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's state law claims. See Robinson v. Georgia Department of Transportation, 966 F.2d 637, 640 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that Georgia's waiver of sovereign immunity in state courts does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity).
B. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike
The Plaintiff has also filed a motion to strike the Defendant's motion to dismiss. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that "upon motion made by a party . . . the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." As explained in Lowery v. Hoffman, 188 F.R.D. 651, 653 (M.D. Ala. 1999):
The terms of [Rule 12(f)] make clear that "[o]nly material included in a `pleading' may be subject of a motion to strike. . . . Motions, briefs or memoranda, objections, or affidavits may not be attacked by the motion to strike." 2 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 12.37[2] (3d ed. 1999). Therefore, as an initial matter, the motion to strike must be denied as to all non-pleadings . . .See also Knight v. U.S., 845 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (D. Ariz. 1993),aff'd 77 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's motion for summary judgment was improper). Thus, because the Defendants' Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss is not a "pleading" within the meaning of Rule 12(f), the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike must be denied. The Court will, however, consider it as a response to the Motion to Dismiss.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 2] is GRANTED and the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike [Doc. 5] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.