Opinion
00-CV-1816(JMR/SRN).
March 23, 2001.
ORDER
Defendants seek a dismissal of plaintiffs' allegations of civil rights violations, contending the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars their claims. Plaintiffs protest the characterization, and assert they should be allowed to proceed because their claims are separable from those raised in previous state court litigation and include distinct defendants. The Court, having reviewed the state court records, determines the claims now raised by plaintiffs are inextricably intertwined with those already adjudicated in state court. The action is therefore barred.
I. Background
This case arises out of a lengthy dispute between plaintiffs, Alejandro and Carol Alvarado, and defendant, City of Granite Falls ("the City"). In 1990, the City passed an ordinance prohibiting residence in mobile homes unless the homes were located in designated trailer parks. The ordinance contained a "grandfather" clause, excusing from compliance those mobile homes in habitable condition which did not change ownership after the ordinance enactment. In 1995, the City examined title documents on the mobile home owned by plaintiffs and determined ownership had changed in 1994. The City then brought criminal charges against Carol Alvarado for non-compliance with the ordinance. Plaintiffs produced a contradictory chain of title demonstrating they had continuously owned the mobile home since before 1990, and the charges were dropped.
Plaintiffs subsequently challenged the ordinance in state court, alleging it violated various provisions of the state and federal constitution, most notably due process and equal protection. See Ex. C (Complaint). That challenge was unsuccessful, and the court granted summary judgment to the City on all counts. See Ex. E F (state court decisions). Plaintiffs did not appeal the court's decision.
All exhibits referenced are attached to the affidavit of Gregory Holmstrom submitted in relation to this motion.
In 1999, following plaintiffs' unsuccessful challenge to the ordinance, the City brought proceedings against plaintiffs, citing the ordinance's requirement that mobile homes be maintained in a habitable condition. For several years, the City had received complaints from neighbors regarding the condition of plaintiffs' mobile home, as well as another home plaintiffs owned. Overgrown grass and weeds, structural deficiencies, and vermin infestation were among the issues cited by neighbors as areas of concern. Plaintiffs were notified of the complaints each year beginning in 1995, but failed to ameliorate the problems. See Ex. B (petition for and order granting entry and inspection).
The City, having failed to reach an agreement with plaintiffs regarding an inspection of their homes, obtained court orders authorizing entry onto and inspection of the two properties. Id. City and state building inspectors inspected the homes in the fall of 1999 and issued reports concluding the structures were irreparable and should be demolished. The City then ordered plaintiffs to remove the structures. Ex. G H (orders for removal of hazardous buildings).
Plaintiffs challenged the orders for removal in court, alleging the City was attempting to deprive them of their property without due process or just compensation. Upon plaintiffs' request, the court granted a continuance of the initial trial date, but warned plaintiffs that no further continuances would be granted "except upon the most exigent circumstances." Ex. K (state court order). The day before the scheduled hearing date, plaintiffs faxed a motion for a continuance to the court. The court denied the motion and proceeded with the hearing. Id.
Following the hearing, at which the City presented extensive evidence regarding the condition of the properties, the court affirmed the orders for removal and denied plaintiffs' posttrial motions. Although plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal with the Minnesota Court of Appeals, they failed to perfect it, and their appeal was dismissed. The properties were subsequently demolished by the City, and plaintiffs' personal possessions were placed in storage.
Plaintiffs then brought this action, seeking damages against the City and various city and state officials for the alleged violation of their civil rights stemming from the above course of events. Specifically, plaintiffs allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1982, and 1983.
Plaintiffs do not specify an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; however, they allege violations of their Fourth Amendment right to be free of illegal search and seizure; their Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for a taking of property; and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and equal protection. To the extent that plaintiffs are entitled to recompense for the alleged violations of those rights by state actors such as defendants, their remedy would be through § 1983, and the Court so construes their complaint.
II. Analysis
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires federal courts to give "the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment that the judgment would be given in courts of the rendering state." Fielder v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 188 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 1999). Not only claims actually adjudicated by state courts, but also claims "inextricably intertwined" with those claims, are barred by the doctrine. Id. A claim is inextricably intertwined under Rooker-Feldman if it "succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it [or] if the relief requested would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling." Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995). The claims need not be identically named or pled; "federal plaintiffs cannot by artful pleading obtain a hearing of disguised state court appeals that would otherwise be subject to a Rooker-Feldman bar." Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.2d 488, 494 (8th Cir. 2000).
Here, although couched in the language of the federal statute, plaintiffs' claims are simply a redux of their state claims, asserting violations of due process, equal protection, and taking without just compensation. See Ex. C and Complaint. The state court ruled on each of those issues, and this Court may not, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, reconsider that court's decisions.
Plaintiffs do assert two claims not raised in the state court action. First, they contend the property inspections conducted by defendants Jim Marka and Loris Gniffke constituted an illegal search and seizure of their property. Those inspections, however, took place pursuant to court order. See Ex. B. Second, plaintiffs assert that the state court's decision to conduct the hearing regarding demolition in their absence deprived them of due process of law. That claim was raised by plaintiffs in their post-trial motions and rejected by the court. See Ex. M.
Thus, all of the claims presented by plaintiffs in this case were presented to, and decided by, the state court. Those claims could succeed "only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." Accordingly, the claims are precluded under Rooker-Feldman. Charchenko, 47 F.3d at 983.
The inclusion of additional defendants in the federal action does not save plaintiffs' case. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the parties need not be identical for Rooker-Feldman's preclusive effect to apply, so long as the claims presented are "inextricably intertwined." Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 495.
III. Conclusion
The Court finds the claims asserted by plaintiffs in this action to be "inextricably intertwined" with those already raised and rejected in state court. The principles of federalism embodied in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbid this Court from examining the correctness of the state court's decision. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted.
2. This action is dismissed with prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.