Opinion
Civil No. 98-1075 (JRT/FLN)
August 24, 2003
Francis J. Manion, AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW JUSTICE — MIDWEST, New Hope, KY for Plaintiffs
Wayne B. Holstad, HOLSTAD LAW OFFICE, St. Paul, MN for plaintiffs
Gary R. Cunningham, OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL, St. Paul, MN for defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT ROERHRICH'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL BASED ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Plaintiffs sued individual defendant Connie Roerhrich ("defendant") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their rights to free speech and equal protection of the laws under the United States Constitution. On August 1, 2002, a jury found in favor of plaintiffs on both counts. This matter is now before the Court on defendant's motion for dismissal based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies defendant's motion.
Plaintiffs also successfully sued the Department of Corrections for religious discrimination under Minnesota law, but that count is not at issue in this motion.
BACKGROUND
Defendant is the warden at the Minnesota Correctional Facility-Shakopee ("MCFS"), where plaintiffs are employed. Plaintiffs sued under § 1983 after being disciplined for their behavior during a 1997 mandatory training session entitled "Gays and Lesbians in the Workplace." Plaintiffs, who were opposed to attending the session because it conflicted with their religious beliefs, decided to protest the requirement by reading from their bibles during the sessions. Plaintiffs were disciplined for this activity. They received written reprimands, and were denied promotions for which they were otherwise eligible. Plaintiffs' free speech and equal protection claims were tried before a jury, which found in favor of plaintiffs on both claims.
ANALYSIS
Defendant claims that she has qualified immunity, and that the verdicts against her should therefore be dismissed. Government officials are immune from personal liability for civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Campbell v. Arkansas Dept. of Correction, 155 F.3d 950, 960 (8th Cir. 1998). Determining whether a state actor like defendant is protected by qualified immunity is a two-step process. Washington v. Normandy Fire Protection Dist., 272 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2001). The first step involves multiple questions. The Court must first determine whether the facts alleged show that defendant violated a constitutional right. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). The facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Campbell, 155 F.3d at 959. In this case, the jury clearly found that defendant violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights to free speech and equal protection of the law.
The Court must next determine whether the constitutional rights were clearly established at the time the violation occurred. Washington, 272 F.3d at 526; Sexton v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Circuit has "taken a broad view of what constitutes `clearly established law' for the purposes of a qualified immunity inquiry." Sexton, 210 F.3d at 909 (quoting Boswell v. Sherburne County, 840 F.2d 1117, 1121 (8th Cir. 1988)). For a right to be clearly established, the "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Washington, 272 F.3d at 526.
In this case, whether plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated depends upon whether their conduct can be "fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Sexton, 210 F.3d at 910. Most of defendant's argument is devoted to demonstrating that plaintiffs' conduct in this case was simply a question of internal prison policy, and was not a matter of public concern. These arguments are misplaced, because the Eighth Circuit has already settled this question. In reversing another District of Minnesota judge's dismissal of plaintiffs' free speech and equal protection claims, the Court of Appeals held that:
the way in which the Department [of Corrections] and MCFS deal with issues of gays and lesbians in the workplace affects the performance of their public duties and is a matter of political and social concern to the general public. By making attendance at the training session mandatory, MCFS created a context in which employees speaking out in opposition to their public employer's handling of this social issue should be considered speech on a matter of public interest and concern.Altman v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 251 F.3d 1199, 1202 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The question of whether plaintiffs' conduct in this case was "speech on a matter of public concern" is thus settled. The Eighth Circuit has determined that it is, and this Court may not revisit that determination.
The Court thus turns to the second step of the qualified immunity inquiry. For this step, the Court must balance the employee's right to comment on matters of public concern against the state's interest, as an employer, "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 880 (8th Cir. 2000). However, the Pickering balancing test does not apply in all cases. The Court need only perform this test if the defendant has produced sufficient evidence that the speech "created a disruption in the workplace." Washington, 272 F.3d at 526 (citing cases); Sexton, 210 F.3d at 911; Gordon v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 241 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2001). If the defendant cannot show such evidence, "resort to the Pickering factors is unnecessary because there are no government interests in efficiency to weigh" against plaintiffs' constitutional rights; the balance would obviously favor the plaintiff. Belk, 228 F.3d at 881.
In this case, defendant points to scant evidence of any disruption as a result of plaintiffs' protest. She notes the testimony of another participant who was distracted by plaintiff Altman's reading of the bible, as well as testimony from the session leader that some participants watched plaintiffs instead of paying attention to the training. The trainers also claimed that plaintiffs' behavior distracted them, and that they felt harassed and intimidated by the plaintiffs. Defendant also claims that plaintiffs were disciplined because their behavior had the potential to disrupt future training sessions, and because their behavior could undermine discipline among employees at MCFS.
This evidence is insufficient to trigger the Pickering balancing test. Causing distraction during a training session does not amount to a showing that plaintiffs' conduct created "disharmony in the workplace, impeded plaintiffs' ability to perform their duties, or impaired working relationships with other employees." Sexton, 210 F.3d at 913. The Court also finds that the allegations of harassment and intimidation are "vague and conclusory," and do not demonstrate with any specificity what, if any, disruption plaintiffs' conduct caused or how their actions constituted harassment and intimidation. See id. Defendant's claim that plaintiffs' conduct would undermine future training efforts and workplace discipline are similarly unsupported.
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that the government employer must make a "substantial showing" that the speech at issue was disruptive before it may be punished. Id. at 913. See, e.g., Belk, 228 F.3d at 881-2; Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 679 (8th Cir. 1997). "Mere allegations of disruption are insufficient to put the Pickering balance at issue." Id. at 912. Defendant must provide "specific and unrefuted evidence" that the speech substantially disrupted the work environment. Domina v. Van Pelt, 235 F.3d 1091, 1098 (8th Cir. 2000); Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 295 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1994). Cf. Gordon, 241 F.3d at 1003 (finding that workplace would be disrupted where defendant, who exercised control over her department with "nearly complete autonomy," abused her power by soliciting signatures from subordinates on petition to remove city manager from office). Here, the Court can identify no such evidence in the trial record or elsewhere. In the absence of such a showing, plaintiffs' speech could not be punished. See Washington, 272 F.3d at 522. A Pickering analysis is not necessary, and the Court finds that defendant's claim of qualified immunity fails.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Dismissal For Qualified Immunity [Docket No 70] is DENIED.