Opinion
Review Granted April 16, 1987.
Previously published at 188 Cal.App.3d 1398
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Elisabeth C. Brandt and Barbara Haukedalen, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendants and appellants.
Michael B. Arkin, Sacramento, for plaintiffs and respondents.
PUGLIA, Presiding Justice.
In this appeal we decide that the word "spouse" in section 1032 of the Unemployment Insurance Code is not wholly synonymous with the identical word as used in section 1256 of the same code. Accordingly, we hold that an employer's reserve account may be charged for unemployment insurance benefits payable to a former employee who, not yet married, voluntarily quit her job in anticipation of her imminent marriage and relocation to a marital home an impractical commuting distance from the work site. (All further references to sections of an unidentified code are to the Unemployment Insurance Code.)
The facts are undisputed. On December 29, 1983, Belinda Dillard (claimant) resigned voluntarily from employment with plaintiff Altaville Drug Store, Inc., for the purpose of marrying and moving to Sacramento with her new husband. Claimant was married the next day, December 30, 1983, and moved as planned to Sacramento, a distance of about 70 miles from Altaville.
Claimant applied to defendant Employment Development Department (EDD) for unemployment insurance benefits. EDD granted benefits pursuant to section 1256 and charged Altaville Drug's reserve account for the benefits paid and payable to claimant.
Altaville Drug appealed EDD's decision. In a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), Altaville Drug conceded that claimant had good cause to quit and was therefore eligible under section 1256 for unemployment benefits, but argued that under section 1032, the cost of her benefits should not be charged to the employer's reserve account. The ALJ found that claimant's resignation imminently to marry and join her spouse at a new residence constituted "good cause" to quit under section 1256. Nonetheless, the judge ruled that Altaville Drug's reserve account would not be relieved of charges because such relief is available under section 1032 only to employers whose employees are married at the time they leave employment.
Altaville Drug again appealed. Defendant Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board) affirmed, adopting as its own the ALJ's written opinion and decision.
Altaville Drug then sought relief in superior court by writ of administrative mandate. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5.) Reasoning that section 1032 is a correlative provision to section 1256, the superior court held that the word "spouse," which for purposes of section 1256 includes "imminent spouse," has the same meaning for purposes of section 1032. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing EDD to relieve Altaville Drug's reserve account
Unemployment benefits are paid from a pooled fund contributed to by all employers. (§§ 976, 1025, 1521.) EDD maintains a separate account (reserve account) for each employer (§ 1026, subd. (a)). Generally, benefits paid to an unemployed individual from the pooled fund are charged to the reserve account of the individual's former employer. (§ 1026, subd. (b).) The rate of an employer's contributions to the fund is based upon the ratio between its average base payroll and the net balance in its reserve account. (See § 977.) A decision awarding benefits to a claimant which are chargeable to the reserve account of the claimant's employer (§§ 1026, 1032) has the effect of increasing the employer's rate of contributions to the fund. (See Interstate Brands v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 26 Cal.3d, at p. 776, 163 Cal.Rptr. 619, 608 P.2d 707.) In other words, it " 'is of direct financial advantage to an employer to prevent inroads on his reserve account chargeable to benefit payments in order to protect his merit rating or to become eligible for a reduced rate of contribution.' " (P. 776, 163 Cal.Rptr. 619, 608 P.2d 707, quoting Chrysler Corp. v. California Emp. etc. Com. (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 8, 14, 253 P.2d 68.) Section 1032 sets forth certain circumstances in which benefits awarded to a claimant are not charged to the reserve account of the employer. (See also §§ 1335, 1338, 1380.) When these circumstances exist, benefits are paid out of the pooled fund and the charge is allocated to the accounts of every employer in an amount directly proportional to the ratio an employer's taxable wages bear to the total of all employers' taxable wages. (§ 1026, subd. (e)(3).)
Section 1032 provides in pertinent part: "If it is ruled under Section 1030 or 1328 that the claimant left the employer's employ voluntarily and without good cause or was discharged by reason of misconduct connected with his or her work ... or that he or she left the employer's employ to accompany his or her spouse to or join her or him at a place from which it is impractical to commute to such employment, to which a transfer of the claimant by the employer is not available, and at which the spouse has secured employment, benefits paid to the claimant subsequent to the termination of employment due to such voluntary leaving or discharge ... or due to the termination of employment caused by such leaving to accompany or join a spouse, which are based upon wages earned from such employer prior to the date of such termination of employment, shall not be charged to the account of such employer, except as provided by Section 1026, unless he or she failed to furnish the information specified in Section 1030 within the time limit prescribed in that section or unless such ruling is reversed by a reconsidered ruling."
Section 1256 governs eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. Since its enactment, section 1256 has always contained a general provision disqualifying from benefits employees who leave their work "voluntarily without good cause." Former section 1264 also disqualified "... an employee who leaves his or her employment to be married or to accompany his or her spouse to or join her or him at a place from which it is impractical to commute to such employment...." The exclusion from benefits of these so-called "domestic quits" did not apply however "if the individual at the time of such voluntary leaving was and at the time of filing a claim for benefits is the In 1979, the Legislature amended section 1032 to provide that, if an employee "left the employer's employ to accompany his or her spouse to or join her or him at a place from which it is impractical to commute to such employment ... benefits paid to the claimant subsequent to the termination of employment ... due to [such] termination ... shall not be charged to the account of such employer...." (Stats.1979, ch. 521, § 3.) A contemporaneous committee report on the proposed amendments states that its purpose is to " 'socialize' " the cost of the specified type of domestic quit equally among employers rather than penalizing individual employers for reasons "totally beyond their control." (Assem. Finance, Insurance and Commerce Com. Analysis of Assemb. Bill No. 134 as amended Mar. 12, 1979) (Mar. 9, 1979).)
Section 1256 provides in pertinent part: "An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he or she left his or her most recent work voluntarily without good cause or that he or she has been discharged for misconduct connected with his or her most recent work.... [p ] An individual may be deemed to have left his or her most recent work with good cause if he or she leaves employment to accompany his or her spouse to a place from which it is impractical to commute to the employment...."
In 1980, EDD adopted section 1256-12 of title 22 of the California Administrative Code. This administrative regulation for the first time formally recognized "prospective" as well as "existing marital status" as a domestic obligation which might with good cause impel a claimant to leave work. Expressly included was the situation where the claimant's "prospective marriage is imminent and involves a relocation to another area because the claimant's future spouse has established or intends to establish his or her home there, and it is impossible or impractical for the claimant to commute to work from the other area." (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 22, § 1256-12, subd. (b)(1).)
In 1982 the Legislature amended section 1256 to add a fourth paragraph which provides: "An individual may be deemed to have left his or her most recent work with good cause if he or she leaves employment to accompany his or her spouse to a place from which it is impractical to commute to the employment." (Stats.1982, ch. 1073, § 1.) An uncodified provision of the 1982 amendment states that the "amendment to Section 1256 ... is intended to restore the law as it was construed prior to the decision by the First District of the California Court of Appeal in Norman v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 1 Civ. No. 52713, and to endorse the policy of the Employment Development Department, as expressed in its regulations, which distinguishes persons who are married or whose marriage is imminent from others in determining whether a person has left his or her most recent work without good cause when he or she leaves employment to accompany another person to a place from which it is impractical to commute to that employment." (Stats.1982, ch. 1073, § 13, pp. 3873-3874.)
In Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (Cal.App.) [182 Cal.Rptr. 708], the Court of Appeal (First District) held that an employee who quit her job to join her fiance who had secured employment in another state and with whom she had been living in a meretricious relationship had "good cause" to terminate her employment notwithstanding that marriage was not imminently contemplated. On July 22, 1982, the Supreme Court granted a hearing thus vacating the opinion and decision of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that Norman had not established good cause for her voluntary departure from employment since she had not demonstrated the imminency of her marriage or any other compelling need for termination of employment (Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 1, 10, 192 Cal.Rptr. 134, 663 P.2d 904).
In MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 205, 207 Cal.Rptr. 823, 689 P.2d 453, the Supreme Court construed the fourth paragraph of section 1256 together with the uncodified expression of legislative intent as recognizing "that the desire to preserve ... a relationship in which marriage is imminent, may constitute good cause within the meaning of the statute." (At p. 210, 207 Cal.Rptr. 823, 689 P.2d 453, fn. omitted; emphasis added.) Hence we take it as authoritatively established that "spouse" as used in section 1256 also includes "imminent spouse." Although EDD and the Board agree with this proposition, they argue that the meaning of "spouse" as it appears in section 1032 should not be construed in the same expansive way as implied by the uncodified language of the 1982 amendment to section 1256, because its meaning in section 1032 as enacted before the 1982 amendment to section 1256 is "clear and unambiguous."
The courts will give effect to a statute according to the natural and ordinary import of the words used. "When statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it." (West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court (1986) 41 Cal.3d 846, 850, 226 Cal.Rptr. 132, 718 P.2d 119, and cases cited there; Code Civ.Proc., § 1858.) Resort to extrinsic interpretive aids is appropriate only where there is ambiguity or irreconcilable conflict in the provisions of the statute, or where a literal reading would lead to absurd results. (Castaneda v. Holcomb (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 939, 942, 170 Cal.Rptr. 875; see also In re Andrews (1976) 18 Cal.3d 208, 212, 133 Cal.Rptr. 365, 555 P.2d 97; Warne v. Harkness (1963) 60 Cal.2d 579, 587-588, 35 Cal.Rptr. 601, 387 P.2d 377; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014.)
The 1979 amendment to section 1032 relieved the employer's reserve account from charges for benefits paid to a former employee who quit "to accompany his or her spouse to" a place from which continued employment would be impractical. From all that appears on the face of section 1032, a construction of the word "spouse" at or about the time of the 1979 amendment would necessarily have followed the plain, ordinary meaning of the word i.e., a husband or wife, not someone who has not yet attained that status. (Black's Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 1258; see also Evid.Code, § 970.) In the context of section 1032, the meaning of the word "spouse" is clear. If there is ambiguity, it arises not from section 1032 nor from any other source of uncertainty in existence at the time of the 1979 amendment to section 1032. It arises instead from the 1982 amendment to section 1256 which, at least as used in that section, expanded the definition of the word "spouse" beyond its commonly understood meaning.
A presumption lies that words or phrases used in the same or a related statute are used in the same sense throughout. (People v. Hernandez (1981) 30 Cal.3d 462, 468, 179 Cal.Rptr. 239, 637 P.2d 706; Estate of Downing (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 256, 265, 184 Cal.Rptr. 511.) The presumption is rebutted where a contrary intent is evidenced. (Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 468, 179 Cal.Rptr. 239, 637 P.2d 706.)
Doubtless the Legislature may, as part of its function, declare that words used in the same or a related statute are prospectively to carry a certain meaning. (See 1A Sutherland on Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1985 rev.) § 27.01, p. 457.) And where clearly expressed, that meaning is binding upon the courts even though it departs from the "rigid, precise or dictionary" meaning. (See B.P. Schulberg Prod. v. Cal. Emp. Com. (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 831, 835, 153 P.2d 404.) Furthermore, an expression of legislative intent bearing upon the intent of a prior enactment, though not binding upon the courts, may be considered together with other factors in arriving at the true legislative intent existing when the prior statute was passed. (Eu v. Chacon (1976) 16 Cal.3d 465, 470, 128 Cal.Rptr. 1, 546 P.2d 289; Friends of Lake Arrowhead v. Board of Supervisors (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 497, 506, 113 Cal.Rptr. 539.)
A directive on intended meaning is entitled to no less dignity where, as here, it appears in an uncodified provision of a statute regularly passed by the Legislature. (See County of Los Angeles v. Payne (1937) 8 Cal.2d 563, 574, 66 P.2d 658.)
However, in this case the Legislature, in an amendment to section 1256, chose to enlarge the meaning of the word "spouse" expressly as used in that section without
Even with statutes in pari materia, an implied amendment of one by the express amendment of another is disfavored and "may be only upheld where there is no reasonable basis for harmonizing the former with the latter as amended." (Lambert v. Conrad, supra, 185 Cal.App.2d at pp. 93-95, 8 Cal.Rptr. 56, citing People v. Leong Fook (1928) 206 Cal. 64, 69-70, 273 P. 779; see also Gov.Code, § 9605.) Unless the two dissimilar meanings cannot reasonably co-exist in the same statute (see Lambert, supra, 185 Cal.App.2d at p. 96, 8 Cal.Rptr. 56; Western Mobilehome Assn. v. County of San Diego (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 941, 948, 94 Cal.Rptr. 504), there is no warrant for a judicial construction interpolating into section 1032 the later legislative declaration of intent expressly directed only to section 1256.
Altaville Drug contends that in terms of individual employer responsibility for benefits, there is no rational basis for distinguishing between employees who are already married and those who are imminently to be married. Just as the employer in the former situation is relieved from exclusive responsibility for costs beyond its control, so also, it is argued, should the employer in the latter situation logically and fairly be relieved from the disproportionate burden of such costs. The argument has a certain superficial allure since employers rarely have any influence or control over such private, intimate matters as the marriage or mating of their employees. However, the logic of the argument applies equally as well to other kinds of essentially "domestic quits" for good cause. A resignation to care for a minor child, spouse, aging parent or other family member or to accompany a parent to a new residence is inherently beyond the control of the employer. Yet employers' reserve accounts are not relieved of charges in these situations. Carried to its logical conclusion, Altaville Drug's argument would place an added burden on the pooled fund to which such benefits would necessarily be charged, potentially requiring the levy of additional revenues, a function exclusively within the legislative province.
The responsibility for policing eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits falls largely on the individual employers who, on receiving notice of a claim, may submit to the EDD any facts which may affect the claimant's eligibility for benefits (§§ 1327-1331). Given the formula upon which an employer's contributions are based, there is "... a powerful incentive for employers to respond to claim notices and to seek favorable rulings ... An alert employer can prevent improper benefit payments from being charged against his or her reserve account. A higher reserve account balance improves the prospects of earning a lower tax rate in future years." (O'Brien, California Employer-Employee Benefits Handbook (6th ed. 1981) p. 419.) If the incentive is removed, the prospect exists that significant numbers of ineligible recipients will receive benefits, thus depleting the pooled fund and increasing the cost of the system, a cost that ultimately is borne by the public.
In "socializing" the cost of benefits paid to employees who leave employment to accompany their spouses, the Legislature may well have considered this circumstance more easily verifiable and thus less susceptible In conclusion, we hold that although "spouse" includes "imminent spouse" for purposes of section 1256, it is restricted to a husband or wife for purposes of section 1032. Since the record establishes that claimant left Altaville Drug's employ before her marriage, the superior court erred in issuing a peremptory writ of mandate directing that Altaville Drug's reserve account be relieved of the cost of claimant's unemployment benefits.
The judgment is reversed, and the matter remanded with directions to the superior court to deny the writ.
We concur:
Assigned by the Chief Justice.