Opinion
No. C 01-3579 PJH (PR)
August 9, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in farina pauperis. Venue is proper in this district because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action occurred in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b).
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. Legal Claims
Plaintiff contends that defendants have harassed and pressured him in several ways, especially in their responses to his administrative appeals (grievances). For instance, he contends that his due process rights were violated when a grievance addressed to Squyres, with whom plaintiff was in conflict, was answered by Griffin, and that some of the defendants' other responses were false.
Although there certainly is a right to petition government for redress of grievances (a First Amendment Right), there is no right to a response or any particular action. See Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991) ("prisoner's right to petition the government for redress . . . is not compromised by the prison's refusal to entertain his grievance."). In addition, allegations of verbal harassment and abuse — the entire basis for plaintiff's claims — fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983); see, e.g., Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (disrespectful and assaultive comments by prison guard not enough to implicate 8th Amendment); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (directing vulgar language at prisoner does not state constitutional claim); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99 (8th Cir. 1986) ("mere words, without more, do not invade a federally protected right"); Ellingburg v. Lucas, 518 F.2d 1196, 1197 (8th Cir. 1975) (prisoner does not have cause of action under § 1983 for being called obscene name by prison employee). Finally, to the extent plaintiff alleges psychological injury, such claims by prisoners are not compensable in the absence of an allegation of prior physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to the hospital for high blood pressure and had to take medication to control it as a result of the "gruesome psycholog[ical] harassment," but this was not a "prior" physical injury.
Plaintiff's allegations involve the handling of his grievances and the allegedly false responses, which he contends were harassment. It is clear that no amendment could make such claims actionable. The complaint therefore will be dismissed without leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.