Opinion
No. 03 CV 1048 (SJ).
May 26, 2004
AXELROD GOTTLIEB, New York, NY, William Gottlieb, Esq., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, ESQ., United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, Som Ramrup, Esq., Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, (Of Counsel) Attorneys for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ana Almonte ("Plaintiff") brings the instant case on behalf of her son, Rudy Almonte ("Rudy"), challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or "the Commissioner") that Plaintiff is not entitled to Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits as provided for in Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("the Act") because his limitations did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal the criteria of any listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, App. 1, Subpart P ("Listing of Impairments"). Currently before the Court are Plaintiff's motion for remand to the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Having reviewed the record and listened to oral argument, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for remand.
BACKGROUND
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI benefits on December 29, 2000 on behalf her minor son Rudy, in which she stated that Rudy had a learning disability, could not read, had difficulty with math, did not speak clearly, and was "very hard to understand." (Tr. 50, 59.) The application was denied and Plaintiff requested a hearing.
On August 6, 2002, Plaintiff and Rudy testified through a Spanish interpreter at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Michael S. London. (Tr. 27, 28, 31.) The ALJ began to explain the complications involved in children's SSI cases, but almost immediately and without reason took the hearing off the record. (Tr. 30.) In response to the ALJ's questions, Plaintiff stated that Rudy was not getting needed psychiatric services and medication because the family did not have medical coverage. (Tr. 30, 32.) Plaintiff testified that Rudy demonstrated behavior problems at home and at school and that he had been left back in second grade. (Tr. 32-34.) Rudy stated that he spoke English "a little bit," that he didn't know his brother's age, and that he sometimes got into fights at school. (Tr. 31, 33.) The hearing ended abruptly and without a discussion of Rudy's learning disability, his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") diagnosis, or his speech and educational problems. The ALJ never inquired as to who treated Rudy at the school and medical clinics.
On October 28, 2002, the ALJ found that Rudy was not disabled. (Tr. 14-21.) In his decision, the ALJ only briefly discussed the evidence as it related to the specific impairments. (Tr. 19-20.) The ALJ acknowledged that although Rudy "had a learning disorder and ADHD, which are severe impairments," Rudy's condition did not meet or equal, medically or functionally, any criteria contained in the Listing of Impairments. (Tr. 20.) The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on February 1, 2003, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request fro review. (Tr. 3-5.) This action followed.
II. Medical and School Evidence
The record contains medical records from Hooper Medical Office, where Rudy received primary medical care. (Tr. 156-61.) It also contains numerous school records, including psychological and academic skills evaluations (Tr. 122-28) in which Rudy was classified as learning disabled (Tr. 122A); an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") from the New York City Board of Education dated December 1, 2000 (Tr. 129-43); a social history (Tr. 112-13) and classroom observation (Tr. 121); a statement about Rudy's abilities by his fifth grade teacher (Tr. 144-45); a report of the Commissioner's consulting psychiatrist, Margaret Chu, M.D. (Tr. 146-47); and a short evaluation by the Commissioner's non-examining physician, Dr. Y. Bernstein, which contained no explanation of findings (Tr. 149-53).
A second copy of the IEP appears in the record with the date April 19, 2001. (Tr. 99-110.) Other than the date, the two copies are identical.
DISCUSSION
The Social Security Act states that "[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court may only set aside a final ruling by the Commissioner if the ruling is a result of legal error and is unsupported by substantial evidence. Id.; see Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).
The Court may review the Commissioner's decision only to determine whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence to support the findings of the ALJ that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Court has the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the Commissioner upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, "with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98 (1991). Remand is appropriate under § 405(g) where the ALJ has failed to provide a full and fair hearing, the administrative record has not been fully developed, or where the ALJ has misapplied legal standards.Id. at 99.
The Court finds that the Commissioner's final ruling is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff persuasively argues that: (1) Plaintiff and Rudy were not afforded a full and fair hearing, and (2) the ALJ failed to fully consider and develop the medical and school evidence.
With respect to the first issue, Plaintiff's hearing was notably brief — the transcript only consists of seven pages. (Tr. 29-35.) Moreover, at the commencement of the hearing, the ALJ took the hearing off the record, without giving a reason for doing so. (Tr. 30.) Because Plaintiff was pro se at the administrative hearing, the ALJ was under a heightened duty to inquire into relevant facts, and he did not do so.
With respect to the second issue, the ALJ failed to adequately develop the record and to analyze Plaintiff's claims under the listings for Communication Impairment and Mental Retardation. The ALJ should have inquired at the hearing as to the specifics of Rudy's special education program. Because he did not, the most recent evidence at the hearing — the April 19, 2001 IEP — was over one year old (and this IEP was, in both form and substance, a copy of the December 1, 2000 IEP). Additionally, the ALJ did not fully consider evidence relating to Rudy's communication difficulties and ADHD. As a result, the ALJ never analyzed Plaintiff's claims under the listings for Communication Impairment and Mental Retardation.
Upon remand, the ALJ is reminded that for a child to have a marked or extreme limitation in a particular domain, not all activities or functions encompassed by the domain need be impaired. For instance, a twelve-year old child could have a marked or extreme limitation in the domain of acquiring and using information if he had a serious learning disability which had prevented him from learning to read and write even though he was of normal intelligence and had good verbal communication skills.See, e.g., Quinones v. Chater, 117 F.3d 29, 31-32, 36 (2d Cir. 1997). Alternatively, when a child suffers from multiple impairments within a single domain, each of which, when considered separately, imposes a less-than-marked limitation, the combined result nonetheless may be marked or extreme. See, e.g., Encarnacion v. Barnhart, 191 F. Supp. 2d 463, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that two less-than-marked limitations in the area of social functioning may cumulatively contribute to the finding of a marked or extreme limitation in the area of social functioning).
CONCLUSION
Based on the record and oral argument, and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court remands this matter for further administrative proceedings, so that the ALJ can: (1) provide Plaintiff and Rudy a full and fair hearing, and (2) fully consider and develop the medical and school evidence.
SO ORDERED.