Opinion
No. CV03-0518832S
November 19, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In this case the plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company, seeks a declaratory judgment that it does not have to defend against a suit now pending in federal court against the defendants Chaker and Stephanie Ann Dridi. The plaintiff has now moved for summary judgment.
The other defendants, Steven Szekeres and Denise Miller, are the plaintiffs in the District Court action and are presumably named to comply with Practice Book § 17-56(6)(b).
Szekeres v. Howard, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Civil Action Number 3:01 CV2108 (RNC) (January 19, 2002).
Another suit in federal court involving plaintiff and the defendant Stephanie Dridi was similarly subject to a declaratory judgment action in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Dridi, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV03-0518841S. In that case on September 3, 2003, this court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate that it did not have a duty to defend under its homeowner's policy and ruled as follows: 1.) The insurer may seek a declaratory judgment to determine coverage; 2.) In resolving the matter, this court may look only to the complaint in federal court and the insurance policy in question; 3.) The allegations of the federal complaint were exclusively those of a federal civil rights action and a state claim for emotional distress; 4.) There were no allegations of an "occurrence" or "bodily injury" as those terms were defined in the policy in the federal complaint; and 5.) The court need not consider the policy exclusion for "intentional acts."
In that case the federal plaintiff alleged that Dridi falsely accused Szekeres of threatening her with a handgun and that this led to an unauthorized search of the federal plaintiffs' premises. This was claimed to be a violation of the federal plaintiffs' fourth amendment rights, as well as common-law slander and the infliction of emotional distress upon the plaintiffs. Here the federal plaintiffs complain about subsequent events to the handgun incident where the police arrested the plaintiffs for trespass, as they entered their premises. They allege malicious prosecution, false arrest, violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, trespass and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendants, Mr. and Ms. Dridi.
It should logically follow that the court should reach the same result with regard to the present action — involving the federal "post-trespass action" against Mr. and Ms. Dridi — as it did regarding the federal "handgun" litigation; in other words, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Dridi should apply here as well. The court has been asked to come to a different conclusion from Allstate basically on the ground that the federal action continues. The defendant Dridis claims that there is an outstanding deposition that shows the federal suit concerns more than a civil rights action and that the facts as developed fall within the coverage of the policy. The court rejects the defendant's contentions.
The court continues to adhere to the rule stated in Allstate that, on summary judgment or at trial, coverage is resolved only by looking to the "four corners" of the complaint and measuring the allegations against the language of the policy. See QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343, 352 (2001); Security Insurance Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty, 264 Conn. 688, 712 (2003). As a case decided by the Texas Court of Appeal recently stated: "To determine an insurer's duty to defend, we apply the `eight-corners' rule, comparing the factual allegations in the pleadings with the language of the insurance policy. In applying that rule, the court must focus on the factual allegations that show the origin of the damages rather than on the legal theories alleged, give a liberal interpretation to the allegations in the petition and resolve doubts in favor of coverage. However, the court may not read facts into the pleadings, may not look outside the pleadings, and may not `imagine factual scenarios which might trigger coverage. An insurer's duty to defend arises if the factual allegations against the insured, when fairly and reasonably construed, state a cause of action potentially covered by the policy.'" (Citations omitted.) Allstate Insurance Company v. Hicks, S.W.3d No. 07-02-0399-CV (Tex.App. September 10, 2003). See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, 939 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1997) (no duty to defend defendant accused of discharging weapon; not an "occurrence"); Tri-Coastal v. Hartford U/W, 981 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. 1998) (stating this rule in summary judgment sought by insurer on duty to defend); Doe v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 667 N.E.2d 1149 (Mass. 1996) (summary judgment based solely on comparison of allegation of civil rights violation and policy). The cases do not support the defendants' contention that this court must critique the federal complaint, or modify it by considering information from the discovery process in federal court, before ruling on summary judgment.
The court therefore follows the procedure it established in the Allstate decision and grants summary judgment for the reasons stated therein. The allegations of the January 19, 2002 amended complaint do not set forth an "occurrence" and do not concern "bodily injury" as defined in the plaintiff's insurance policy. See the discussion of these issues at pages 4-6 of the Allstate decision.
As in Allstate, the court does not rule on Allstate's contentions regarding the policy exclusion for intentional acts.
The court notes, however, that any declaratory judgment issued in this case, and in Allstate v. Dridi as well, constitutes res judicata only as to the case as it is now pled. Should there be another amended complaint in the federal case, the insured may well be entitled to representation on the subsequent complaint. See Couch, Insurance § 202:3; Bernard v. Gulf Ins. Co., 542 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.App. 1976): "Based upon the pleadings as they exist at any given time, a declaratory judgment may be entered with regard to a duty to defend under the allegations of such pleadings . . . Obviously, such a judgment would be res judicata only as to the pleadings as they existed at the time of the judgment, but such judgment would not be res judicata as to any amended pleadings which might substantially change the nature of the cause of action alleged or assert a new or different cause of action and thereby change the basic nature of the suit."
Since the plaintiff has demonstrated again that the allegations of the federal complaint are not covered by its policy provisions, the court grants its motion for summary judgment. The declaratory judgment as sought finding that Allstate does not have a duty to defend the defendants in the pending federal lawsuit is issued by the court.
HENRY S. COHN, JUDGE.