Opinion
CV166033614S
03-30-2017
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Farmington Auto Park, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #107.00
PETER EMMETT WIESE, JUDGE.
I
DISCUSSION
Allstate Ins. Co., the plaintiff/counterclaim defendant, moves to strike the first count (breach of contract) and second count (negligent claims handling) of the defendant/counterclaim plaintiff, Farmington Auto Park, LLC's complaint dated November 2, 2016 (no. 104). Farmington Auto asserts that Allstate breached its contract for failing to pay vehicle towing charges pursuant to the insurance policy between Allstate and Sharon Dunn, the insured.
As to the first count, " [t]he ultimate test to be applied [in determining whether a person has a right of action as a third party beneficiary] is whether the intent of the parties to the contract was that the promisor should assume a direct obligation to the third party [beneficiary] and . . . that intent is to be determined from the terms of the contract read in the light of the circumstances attending its making, including motives and purposes of the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wasniewski v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 292 Conn. 98, 109, 971 A.2d 8 (2009). " [O]ne who [is] neither a party to a contract nor a contemplated beneficiary thereof cannot sue to enforce the promises of the contract . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Board of Education of Bristol, 226 Conn. 704, 718, 629 A.2d 333 (1993). " [I]f the plaintiff is neither a 'party' to, nor a contemplated beneficiary of [a contract], she lacks standing to bring her claim for breach of the agreement." Id.
Farmington Auto alleges that it " was a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract" between Allstate and Dunn. Farmington Auto does not allege that that it was an intended or contemplated third-party beneficiary or that the promisor intended to assume a direct obligation to Farmington Auto with respect to vehicle towing and storage. See generally Reyes v. Nautilus Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-6013254-S (March 6, 2012, Wilson, J.) (53 Conn.L.Rptr. 656, 660, ) (" [i]n Connecticut it is well settled that both parties must intend that the promisor have a direct obligation to the third-party beneficiary") and cases cited.
As to the second count, negligent claims handling is not a recognized cause of action. Farmington Auto argues that it is a CUTPA/CUIPA claim, nonetheless it is insufficiently pleaded. See Practice Book § 10-43; Kaminski v. Fairfield, 216 Conn. 29, 33 n.1, 578 A.2d 1048 (1990). Accordingly, the motion to strike (107.00) is granted.
II
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the motion to strike first count, breach of contract, and second count, negligent claims handling, is granted.
SO ORDERED.