Opinion
2017–09654 Index No. 8504/16
08-26-2020
In the Matter of ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner-respondent, v. Bryan DEWAR, appellant; Ameriprise Auto & Home Insurance Company, et al., additional respondents-respondents, et al., additional respondents.
Raiser & Keniff, P.C., Mineola, N.Y. (Ethan D. Irwin of counsel), for appellant. Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Nathan M. Shapiro of counsel), for additional respondents-respondents.
Raiser & Keniff, P.C., Mineola, N.Y. (Ethan D. Irwin of counsel), for appellant.
Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Nathan M. Shapiro of counsel), for additional respondents-respondents.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, HECTOR D. LASALLE, BETSY BARROS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, and upon the argument of the appeal, it is
ORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,
ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, with costs.
On March 13, 2016, Bryan Dewar allegedly was injured when he was struck by a vehicle operated by Ronald Ashley. The vehicle was owned by Deborah Johnson and Bernard Johnson (hereinafter together the Johnsons), and was insured under a policy issued by Ameriprise Auto & Home Insurance Company (hereinafter Ameriprise). Ameriprise disclaimed coverage, inter alia, on the ground that Ashley did not have the Johnsons' permission to operate the vehicle. Dewar served a demand upon his insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter the petitioner), to arbitrate his claim for uninsured motorist benefits. Thereafter, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, among other things, to permanently stay the arbitration. Ameriprise and the Johnsons cross-moved to dismiss the petition insofar as asserted against them. In an order dated July 13, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the petition, granted the cross motion, and determined that Dewar was "entitled to make a claim" to the petitioner and that "[t]his matter will now proceed to arbitration." Dewar appeals.
"[A] person is aggrieved [within the meaning of CPLR 5511 ] when he or she asks for relief but that relief is denied in whole or in part[, or] when someone asks for relief against him or her, which the person oppose[d], and the relief is granted in whole or in part" ( Mixon v. TBV, Inc., 76 A.D.3d 144, 156–157, 904 N.Y.S.2d 132 [emphasis omitted] ). Here, the order appealed from granted relief to Ameriprise and the Johnsons, against the petitioner, but not against Dewar. To the extent Dewar made an affirmative request for relief, the order appealed from did not address any such request. Further, Dewar is not aggrieved simply because he "disagrees with the particular findings, rationale or the opinion supporting the ... order" ( Parochial Bus Sys. v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 N.Y.2d 539, 545, 470 N.Y.S.2d 564, 458 N.E.2d 1241 ). Since Dewar is not aggrieved by the order appealed from, his appeal must be dismissed.
DILLON, J.P., AUSTIN, LASALLE and BARROS, JJ., concur.