Opinion
20-3953
09-30-2021
Doran Allen, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Scott M. Stringer, New York City Comptroller, Warden AMKC-C-95, Defendants-Appellees.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Doran Allen, pro se, Ossining NY. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearance.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT''S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ''SUMMARY ORDER''). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 30th day of September, two thousand twenty-one.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Stanton, J.).
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Doran Allen, pro se, Ossining NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearance.
PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges, JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge. [*]
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Doran Allen, proceeding pro se, sued Scott M. Stringer, in his capacity as New York City Comptroller, and the unnamed warden of the Rikers Island Anna M. Kross Center ("AMKC") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allen alleges that, while he was detained at AMKC, a corrections officer refused to help him carry breakfast trays, causing him to slip and fall on broken stairs, injuring himself. The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review de novo a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Zaleski v. Burns, 606 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 2010). Under that statute, the district court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it determines that the action "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (recognizing that "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" to plead a viable claim). Pro se submissions are reviewed with "special solicitude," and "must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
Conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective prong and a subjective prong. See id. The objective prong requires "showing that the challenged conditions were sufficiently serious to constitute objective deprivations of the right to due process," while the subjective prong requires "showing that [an] officer acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If a conditions-of-confinement claim is predicated on an unsafe condition, a court will analyze "whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993).
Allen alleges that he slipped or tripped on broken stairs, causing him to fall. But while the existence of broken stairs could be deemed to constitute negligence on the part of the prison, broken stairs alone cannot satisfy the objective prong of a conditions-of-confinement claim. See McCray v. Lee, 963 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that the defendant's complaint alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement after a slip and fall in an icy prison yard did not show "exceptional circumstances" that would "elevate" the conditions "beyond the typical level of danger presented by a slippery sidewalk or a wet floor"). Because broken stairs cannot be considered a risk that is "so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency," Allen's conditions-of-confinement claim was properly dismissed. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.
But even if it could be argued that Allen alleged an objectively serious condition, the district court properly dismissed Allen's claims against Stringer and the AMKC warden due to the obvious deficiencies in Allen's complaint. As the district court concluded, the suit against the warden in his official capacity was more properly a suit against the City of New York because Allen did not allege that the warden personally had done or failed to do anything that violated his rights. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) ("Suits against state officials in their official capacity . . . should be treated as suits against the State."). Similarly, Stringer, as the New York City Comptroller, is sued in his official capacity. Allen was therefore obligated to allege sufficient facts showing that the Fourteenth Amendment violation occurred "pursuant to a municipal policy or custom," Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing, inter alia, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692-94 (1978)), or was caused by a "failure to train," Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Allen did not allege any facts showing that the corrections officer acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom, or that the City of New York failed to train its corrections officers, as required for such a claim.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims because the district court properly dismissed Allen's § 1983 claim, the only claim over which it had original jurisdiction. See Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[A] district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Finally, the district court did not err by denying Allen leave to amend his complaint. A district court should not dismiss a pro se plaintiff's complaint without granting leave to amend "when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, the incident involving the corrections officer and the broken steps did not amount to a due process violation, and that deficiency in the complaint cannot not be cured. Accordingly, amendment would have been futile.
We have considered all of Allen's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 5 [*]Judge John G. Koeltl of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.