Opinion
A-13872 0354
12-27-2023
ALFRED BECK ALLEN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael L. Horowitz, Law Office of Michael Horowitz, Kingsley, Michigan, for the Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Jennifer S. Henderson, Judge Trial Court No. 3AN-19-08856 CI.
Michael L. Horowitz, Law Office of Michael Horowitz, Kingsley, Michigan, for the Appellant.
Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Alfred Beck Allen appeals the superior court's dismissal of his third successive application for post-conviction relief. Allen represented himself in the superior court proceedings, raising various claims, including that his trial attorney and his first (but not second) post-conviction relief attorney were ineffective. The court dismissed Allen's ineffective assistance of counsel claims as untimely, and Allen now appeals.
Allen also raised a newly discovered evidence claim. The superior court rejected that claim on the merits, and Allen does not dispute that ruling.
Allen, who is now represented by an attorney, argues that the superior court erred "by failing to address Allen's ineffectiveness claims and by failing to specifically determine whether those claims were time-barred." But Allen does not mean that the court failed to rule on his ineffective assistance claims - as we just explained, the superior court addressed those claims and dismissed them as untimely. Instead, Allen argues that the superior court erred when it failed to assist him in litigating those claims. Specifically, Allen contends (for the first time on appeal) that his second post-conviction relief attorney was ineffective, and further speculates (although there is nothing in the record to support this) that she may have failed to notify Allen when his second application was dismissed. He argues it was error for the court to dismiss his current ineffective assistance claims without investigating and analyzing these potential issues further. This is what Allen means when he claims the court "failed to address" his ineffective assistance claims and "fail[ed] to specifically determine" whether they were time-barred.
We find no merit to this argument. It is well established that "[t]he pleadings of pro se litigants 'should be held to less stringent standards than those of lawyers.'" "But judges must be careful to maintain their impartiality; they therefore may not act as advocates for pro se litigants on substantive legal issues." To provide the assistance Allen now claims he was denied, the superior court would have been required to identify, investigate, and analyze substantive legal issues. Such conduct "would have crossed the line between procedural assistance and substantive legal advice, and it would have cast the judge as [Allen's] advocate."
Rathke v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 153 P.3d 303, 308-09 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987)).
Rae v. State, Dep't of Corr., 407 P.3d 474, 479 (Alaska 2017) (emphasis added) (first citing McLaren v. McLaren, 268 P.3d 323, 334 (Alaska 2012); and then citing Tracy v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Children's Servs., 279 P.3d 613, 617 n.14 (Alaska 2012)).
See id. at 480. We note that Allen does not challenge the superior court's decision not to appoint counsel to represent him on his claims; he only argues that the superior court should have itself provided additional assistance. See Grinols v. State, 10 P.3d 600, 62123 (Alaska App. 2000) (holding that courts have authority to appoint counsel at state expense in a successive application for post-conviction relief "when litigation of the defendant's claim would be unfair unless the defendant is assisted by counsel"); see also Grinols v. State, 74 P.3d 889, 895 (Alaska 2003) (concluding that this Court's resolution of this issue was correct and declining to consider it further).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.