Opinion
19155
January 14, 1971.
Messrs. Max B. Cauthen, Jr., of Cauthen Eubanks, and T.E. Walsh, of Spartanburg, for Appellants, cite: As to no action being commenced in these proceedings: Section 10-101, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1962); 208 S.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 1; 229 S.C. 8, 91 S.E.2d 538. As to the Court's erring in failing to require petitioner to post a bond: Section 10-2055.2, Code of Laws of S.C. (962); Circuit Court Rule 56; 218 S.C. 359, 62 S.E.2d 832. As to the proper method for Judicial Review of decisions of Administrative Bodies: 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22; 22 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 893; 171 N.C. 84, 87 S.E. 981; Section 32, 14 Am. Jur.2d, page 810. Section 33. As to the Spartanburg County Court's not having appellate jurisdiction from the decisions of the Planning Commission of the City of Spartanburg: 131 S.E.2d 705, 242 S.C. 528. As to the Court's failing to find that Appellants Rowland Lynch, Inc. had a vested right in the building permit dated May 21, 1970: 254 S.C. 28, 173 S.E.2d 140; 232 S.C. 405, 102 S.E.2d 364; 209 S.C. 394, 40 S.E.2d 499; 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E.2d 699. As to the Court's erring in remanding the proceedings to the Planning Commission for modification: 86 S.C. 451; 68 S.E. 676; 165 S.C. 37, 162 S.E. 751; 218 S.C. 322, 62 S.E.2d 780; 182 S.C. 378, 189 S.E. 361; 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22.
E.C. Burnett, III, Esq. of Spartanburg, for Respondents, cites: As to an action having been commenced: 208 S.C. 349, 38 S.E.2d 145; 229 S.C. 8, 91 S.E.2d 538. As to Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme Court: Code of Laws of S.C. 1962, Section 15-123; 69 S.C. 231, 233, 48 S.E. 72. As to no error by Court in failing to require Respondents to post bond: 72 S.C. 31, 51 S.E. 614; 160 S.C. 63, 158 S.E. 134. As to Writ of Certiorari being proper method in this case to perfect appeal: 242 S.C. 528, 131 S.E.2d 705; 249 S.C. 162, 166, 153 S.E.2d 396. As to issue rendered moot not being proper subject of review: 254 S.C. 180, 183, 174 S.E.2d 342; 107 S.C. 290, 92 S.E. 619; 109 S.C. 210, 96 S.E. 116; 220 S.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 459.
Jan. 14, 1971.
The respondent sought to appeal to the Spartanburg County Court from certain decisions of the Planning Commission for the City of Spartanburg in regard to the approval of a site plan for a housing project in the City of Spartanburg. The appeal here is from an order of the County Court reversing, in part, the decisions of the Planning Commission, remanding the matter to the Commission for further proceedings, and granting respondent certain injunctive relief against appellants Rowland and Lynch.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Spartanburg County Court is specified in Sec. 15-806 of the 1962 Code of Laws as amended by an Act of the General Assembly, 1970 (56) 2487. Under the principles enunciated in the opinion in the City of Columbia v. S.C. Public Service Commission et al., 242 S.C. 528, 131 S.E.2d 705, we unhesitatingly conclude that the Spartanburg County Court had no jurisdiction of the attempted appeal in this case. The pertinent language of the statute here with respect to the appellate jurisdiction cannot be distinguished from the pertinent language of Code Sec. 15-764(1) which governed the appellate jurisdiction of the Richland County Court in the cited case.
We do not understand the respondent to seriously contend that the County Court did have jurisdiction. Rather, it is argued that the appellants waived all questions of jurisdiction by appearing generally and contesting the appeal on the merits. It is elementary that lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action cannot be waived. See cases collected in West's South Carolina Digest, Courts, Key No. 37.
Since the court below was without jurisdiction of the subject matter, it follows that its orders are void and must be vacated. There being no jurisdiction, all other questions raised on appeal are academic.
Reversed.