Opinion
5:21-CV-00369-M
12-07-2021
Wanda Marie Allen, Plaintiff, v. City of Raleigh Police Department, Defendant.
ORDER & MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
ROBERT T. NUMBERS, II UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Wanda Marie Allen has sued the City of Raleigh Police Department. She claims that RPD damaged her HVAC unit which caused “highly biotoxic chemicals” to spill into her house. She also claims that RPD has failed to investigate or stop criminal activity near her home.
Allen asks the court to allow her to proceed with this action without paying the required filing fee and other costs associated with litigation (colloquially known as proceeding in forma pauperis or IFP). The court may grant his request if she submits an affidavit describing her assets and the court finds that she cannot pay the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In assessing a request to proceed IFP, the court should consider whether the plaintiff can pay the costs associated with litigation “and still be able to provide [her]self and [her] dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotations omitted).
The court has reviewed Allen's application and finds that she lacks the resources to pay the costs associated with this litigation. The court thus grants Allen's motion (D.E. 1) and allows her to proceed IFP.
Along with determining whether Allen is entitled to IFP status, the court must also analyze the viability of the claims in the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court reviews a complaint to eliminate claims that unnecessarily impede judicial efficiency and the administration of justice. Specifically, the court must dismiss any portion of the complaint it determines is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Allen's pro se status relaxes, but does not eliminate, the requirement that her complaint contain facially plausible claims. The court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's allegations, but it “cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts” that set forth a cognizable claim. Johnson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 867 F.Supp.2d 766, 776 (E.D. N.C. 2011).
Allen claims RPD did not investigate or prevent crimes in her neighborhood. She says this violates her rights under North Carolina law and the United States Constitution. But the federal Constitution does not provide individual citizens with a right to have law enforcement protect them or investigate a specific crime. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1174 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). So the district court should dismiss Allen's § 1983 claim related to RPD's failure to investigate crime or protect her from criminal activity.
That leaves Allen's state-law-based failure-to-protect claim and her property damage claim. The property damage claim also arises under state, not federal, law. See Andrews v. Elkins, 227 F.Supp.2d 488 (M.D. N.C. 2002) (explaining that a property damage claim against a government official “must be brought under state tort law in state court.”).
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction to hear state law claims. But so long as a district court has original jurisdiction over a dispute, it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law tort claims that are “part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a case once it has dispensed with all the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Id. § 1367(c)(3); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).
If the district court accepts the recommendation to dismiss Allen's § 1983 claim, it will have dismissed all claims that created this court's original jurisdiction. In light of that fact-and after considering interests of judicial economy, fairness, federalism, and comity-the undersigned recommends that the district court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the rest of her claims and dismiss them without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”) on each party who has appeared in this action. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals.