Opinion
6:16-CV-06596 EAW
2021-03-01
Wamel ALLAH, Plaintiff, v. L. LATONA, J. Woodworth, Shu Director Prack, and L. Adams, Defendants.
Wamel Allah, Collins, NY, pro se. Hillel David Deutsch, Nys Attorney General's Office Department of Law, Rochester, NY, for Defendants.
Wamel Allah, Collins, NY, pro se.
Hillel David Deutsch, Nys Attorney General's Office Department of Law, Rochester, NY, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
INTRODUCTION
Pro se plaintiff Wamel Allah ("Plaintiff"), an inmate at Collins Correctional Facility, filed this action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. 1). The Court screened Plaintiff's complaint under the 28 U.S.C §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A criteria and concluded that the complaint was subject to dismissal, but granted Plaintiff leave to replead his claims. (Dkt. 13). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Dkt. 14), which the Court screened with respect to the §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A criteria and permitted Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim as asserted against defendants J. Woodworth, L. Latona, Special Housing Unit ("SHU") Director Prack, and L. Adams (collectively, "Defendants") to proceed to service (Dkt. 19).
Familiarity with underlying facts of this matter is assumed for purposes of this Decision and Order. Presently before the Court are the following motions: Plaintiff's Motion for an Expedited Order, filed on March 12, 2020 (Dkt. 76); Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Amended Complaint, filed on March 12, 2020 (Dkt. 77); and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, filed on August 17, 2020 (Dkt. 94). On September 3, 2020, following Plaintiff's completion of payment of the filing fee, the Court issued a scheduling order, directing Defendants to file a response by September 24, 2020. (Dkt. 98). Defendants filed a response on October 16, 2020, addressing some of those motions. (Dkt. 110). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for an Expedited Order (Dkt. 76), Motion to Amend (Dkt. 77), and Motion to Compel (Dkt. 94) are denied.
Also pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed on September 3, 2020 (Dkt. 97), and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on September 14, 2020 (Dkt. 101). The Court will address these motions in due course.
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DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's Motion for an Expedited Order
Plaintiff first moves for a pretrial conference and scheduling order pursuant to Rules 16(a) and 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to possibly resolve the case and to set deadlines for the exchange of discovery. (Dkt. 76 at 3, 5-6). He contends that pursuant to the Court's Decision and Order dated November 15, 2018, his First Amendment retaliation claim will "survive summary judgment." (Id. at 3-4).
As an initial matter, the Court's November 15, 2018 Decision and Order (the "November 15th Decision and Order") did not state that Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim would survive summary judgment. Rather, the November 15th Decision and Order merely found that Plaintiff's allegations were "sufficient to permit Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims to proceed to service...." (Dkt. 19 at 8). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff relies on any purported finding by the Court that his First Amendment retaliation claim would survive summary judgment as supporting his application for a pretrial conference and discovery, any such reliance is misplaced.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not automatically call for a stay of discovery when a motion to dismiss is filed, and "discovery should not be routinely stayed simply on the basis that a motion to dismiss has been filed." Hong Leong Ltd. (Singapore) v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd. , 297 F.R.D. 69, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted). However, the Court has "considerable discretion" to stay discovery and, under certain circumstances, "a pending motion to dismiss may constitute ‘good cause’ ... [to] stay[ ] discovery." Id. "A court determining whether to grant a stay of discovery pending a motion must look to the particular circumstances and posture of each case. Courts consider: (1) the breadth of discovery sought, (2) any prejudice that would result, and (3) the strength of the motion." Id. (original alterations, quotations, and citations omitted); see also Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd. , No. 20-CV-4849 (GBD)(JLC), 2020 WL 7483945, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2020).
Here, Plaintiff has not specifically identified the discovery he seeks to obtain. Rather, he makes an open-ended request for a pretrial order setting discovery deadlines. There are two dispositive motions currently pending, both of which were filed by Defendants: (1) a motion to dismiss, seeking dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), based on Plaintiff's purported failure to adequately plead his claims; and (2) a motion for summary judgment, based on Plaintiff's purported failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Dkt. 97; Dkt. 101). Plaintiff has responded to both motions, as well as filed a cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 105). Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to file a grievance; however, he contends that because he raised his retaliation claims in a Tier III Administrative Appeal, he was not required to grieve his claims. (Id. at 16 ("Plaintiff raised his retaliation claims in his Tier 3 Administrative Appeal, and before the Hearing Officer and was not required to file[ ] any grievance complaints...."); see also Dkt. 113 at 2).
Without finally addressing the merits of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment at this time, the Court notes that if it found Plaintiff was required to grieve his claims and he failed to do so, it would result in dismissal of the case. Both the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment recently became fully briefed, and the Court will therefore issue a Decision and Order addressing those motions in due course. Should the Court deny those motions, a Rule 16 conference and scheduling order will be set thereafter. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
II. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
Plaintiff also moves to file a second amended complaint (Dkt. 77), which he filed on April 13, 2020 (Dkt. 83). Plaintiff's new causes of action relate to the alleged violation of his due process rights for Defendants’ failure to afford him a hearing before classifying him as a sex offender, which he claims has caused him to be stigmatized and denied parole. (See Dkt. 77; see also Dkt. 83 at 2-4 (alleging that Defendants, in reaching their determination that Plaintiff was a sex offender, did not afford Plaintiff a hearing to challenge their determination)). Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims, which pertain to the fact that he was improperly required to complete the Sex Offender Counseling and Treatment Program after numerous misbehavior reports for sexual-related offenses, were "addressed by the Court and dismissed nearly two years ago." (Dkt. 110 at 2).
"A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant leave to amend[.]" Gurary v. Winehouse , 235 F.3d 792, 801 (2d Cir. 2000). Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), once the time for leave to amend as of right has expired, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Justice does not require that the Court grant Plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to due process protections in connection with his designation as a sex offender by Defendants was previously addressed and dismissed by the Court in its August 22, 2017 Decision and Order. (See Dkt. 13 at 5 ("Liberally construed, the thrust of Plaintiff's claim is that he was denied due process when Defendants referred him to SOCTP despite the fact that his criminal convictions did not involve crimes classified as sex offenses, and that he was denied parole release based, in part, on his refusal to participate in said programming. This claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and must be dismissed with prejudice.")); see also Blake v. Fischer , No. 09-CV-266 (DNH/DRH), 2010 WL 2522198, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. March 5, 2010) ("courts within the Second Circuit appear to be reaching a consensus that recommendations for sex offender classification and programming do not trigger due process rights." (citations omitted)), adopted , 2010 WL 2521978 (N.D.N.Y. June 15, 2010). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint to include claims relating to denial of his due process rights in connection with his classification as a sex offender by Defendants is denied.
III. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
Plaintiff further moves to compel the Attorney General to comply with the Court's March 29, 2019 Order to provide a proper address for defendant "L. Adams" by April 30, 2019. (Dkt. 94). Plaintiff refers to the Court's March 29, 2019 Order issued pursuant to Valentin v. Dinkins , 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997), requiring the Attorney's General's Office to produce to the Court's Pro Se Unit the proper address for defendant L. Adams by April 30, 2019. (Dkt. 40 (the "March 29th Order")). As explained in the March 29th Order, the Marshals Service previously attempted to serve defendant L. Adams by mail at the Gowanda Correctional Facility; however, they received no acknowledgement of service from him. (Id. ). The Court clarified that "[t]he Attorney General need not undertake to defend or indemnify this individual at this juncture. This Order merely provides a means by which Plaintiff may properly serve this Defendant as instructed by the Second Circuit in Valentin ." (Id. ).
Based on the Court's review of the docket, it does not appear that the Attorney General's Office initially produced this information to the Pro Se Unit, and Defendants’ response papers do not address this issue. However, the Pro Se Office has since received from the Attorney General's Office the address for the individual they believe to be defendant Adams. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is directed to cause the United States Marshal to serve copies of the Summons, Amended Complaint (Dkt. 14), and this Order upon Adams, SORC, at the Gowanda Correctional Facility, without Plaintiff's payment therefor, unpaid fees to be recoverable if this action terminates by monetary award in Plaintiff's favor. Because the Attorney General's Office has provided the information relating to defendant Adams, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for an Expedited Order (Dkt. 76), Motion to Amend (Dkt. 77), and Motion to Compel (Dkt. 94) are denied.
SO ORDERED.