Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1511.
May 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
On March 3, 2004, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order addressing Jeffrey and Gail Alexander's ("Plaintiffs") and National Fire Insurance of Hartford's ("Defendant") cross motions for summary judgment. The Court held that Defendant was obligated to insure Plaintiffs as "additional insureds" under the terms of the insurance policy Defendant issued to Plaintiffs' condominium association. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that Plaintiffs faced liability in an underlying state court cause of action due to a defect in the premises of the condominium association not reserved for their exclusive use or occupancy. In deciding the motions, the Court also expressly declined to rule on the issue of "excess insurance," even though it offered its preliminary opinion on the matter. The Court noted that resolution of the "excess insurance" issue could not be resolved absent the presence of a necessary party — the Shelby Insurance Company ("Shelby"), which insured the Plaintiffs directly pursuant to a separate policy of insurance.
Presently before the Court are two motions for reconsideration and a motion to file a third party complaint. They are as follows:
(1) Defendant has moved for reconsideration on the basis that the Court erred in its determination that Plaintiffs potential liability in the underlying state court litigation arises out of an alleged defect in an area of the premises not reserved for the Plaintiffs' exclusive use or occupancy.
(2) Plaintiffs have moved for reconsideration arguing that the Court erred by not ruling on the issue of "excess insurance."
(3) Defendant has moved to file a third party complaint against Shelby and another insurance company United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company ("USFG"), alleging that they and not Defendant constitute Plaintiffs' primary insurers.
The two motions for reconsideration will be denied. Defendant's motion to file a third party complaint will be granted.
II. Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2895, 90 L.Ed.2d 982 (1986)). A court should grant a motion for reconsideration only "if the moving party establishes one of three grounds: (1) there is newly available evidence; (2) an intervening change in the controlling law; or (3) there is a need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice."Drake v. Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, No. 97-585, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13791, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1998) (citingSmith v. City of Chester, 155 F.R.D. 95, 96-97 (E.D. Pa. 1994)). "Because federal courts have a strong interest in finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly." Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Industries, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
III. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration
Defendant moves the Court to reconsider its holding that Defendant must insure Plaintiffs in the underlying state court litigation. Specifically, Defendant contends the Court erred in holding that Defendant did not contest that "the defective [deck] joists were a shared element." March 3rd Opinion at 11. Defendant contends it argued that the "deck joists" constituted a limited common element, reserved for Plaintiffs' exclusive use or occupancy, and were, therefore, outside the scope of Plaintiffs' insurance coverage as "additional insureds."
After reviewing the transcript from oral argument, which this Court held on January 26, 2004, the Court concludes that Defendant argued not that the "deck joists" constituted a limited common element, but rather that Plaintiffs' "deck" itself constituted a limited common element. (Tr. 1/26/2004 at 29.) Defendant never contested, at oral argument or in its briefs, Plaintiffs' assertion that their deck's "structural support elements, i.e., posts, joists, etc. are common to the first floor deck and second floor deck," (Pls' M.S.J. ¶ 67) and that the "upper and lower portions of the deck were supported by the same structure, i.e., the same main posts." (Pls' Mem. in Supp. of its M.S.J.) At oral argument, Defense counsel was unable to directly answer the Court's questions about the allegations faced by the Plaintiffs in the underlying litigation, which related to the "structure" rather than to the deck itself. (See Tr. 1/26/2004 at 38-42.)
Defendant's opposition to Plaintiff's Motion focused solely on the issue of Plaintiffs' exclusive access to the deck. (Def's Resp. to Pls' M.S.J. at 5-8.) Thus, the Court held that Defendant did not contest Plaintiffs' assertion that the structural support system of the deck, which included the deck joists, constituted a shared common element in that it supported both the Plaintiffs' deck and the deck directly beneath it. This issue directly relates to the Court's holding that there exists a distinction between conditions that occur on the surface of the deck and conditions that relate to the structural support system of the deck. March 3rd Opinion at 11. Here, the structural support system, supporting Plaintiffs' deck also supported the deck directly beneath it. Thus, the Court held it to be an area of the premises not reserved for Plaintiffs' exclusive use or occupancy. Defendant's Motion does not deny that the Court correctly observed that the case of Davis v. Metuchen Gardens Condominium Assoc., 790 A.2d 184 (N.J.Super.Ct. A.D. 2002) supports this holding.
This analysis is not altered, as Defendant contends, by the fact that Plaintiffs' expert did not opine that Plaintiffs' deck collapsed due to a failure in the deck joists, but that it collapsed due to "the deterioration of the nails used to support the outbound end of the deck joists." (Pls' Mot. for S.J. Ex. A.6; see also Tr. 1/26/2004 at 3.) Like the deck joists, the nails do not relate to the surface of the deck. Rather, they constitute a component of the deck's shared structural support system. As such, like the deck joists they must constitute an area of the premises not reserved for Plaintiff's exclusive use or occupancy.
This argument assumes that a failure of the nails used to support the deck joists and a failure of deck joists themselves constitutes two separate occurrences. The validity of this assumption is not readily ascertainable. However, because the validity of such an assumption is not material to the Court's holding, it will be accepted as true.
In further support of the Court's March 3rd Memorandum and Order, the Court noted that under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:8B-3(d) common elements include "structural and bearing parts . . . [and] supports" so long as they are not "specifically reserved or limited to a particular unit or group of units." Hence, because the deck joists and nails constituted structural and bearing parts or supports, under the Act they also constituted common elements, as they both constituted components of a shared structural support system. And, because Plaintiffs' condominium association consisted of only one other unit, the Court concluded that the structural support system, which included the deck joists and nails, did not benefit only a particular group of units, but all of the units. March 3rd Opinion at 12. This, reinforces the Court's holding that the failed deck joists and nails constituted a common element not reserved for Plaintiffs' exclusive use or occupancy.
IV. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiffs move the Court to reconsider an issue it expressly declined to decide in the absence of a necessary party. Hence, there is no basis for Plaintiffs' motion. It does not: (1) demonstrate to the Court that there exists newly available evidence, (2) show an intervening change in the controlling law or (3) that there is a need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent a manifest injustice. On this matter the Court could not have made an error of law or created a manifest injustice as it did not issue a final Order. The Court merely expressed a preliminary opinion. Thus, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration will be denied.
V. Defendant's Motion to File a Third Party Complaint
As stated above, the Court expressly declined to rule on the issue of excess insurance absent the presence of Shelby, which the Court deemed to be a necessary party under Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because, the record was insufficient to establish whether or not such joinder would divest the Court of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court provided Defendant fourteen (14) days to move for the joinder of Shelby, which Defendant has done.
Defendant also moves to join USFG, an insurer that Defendant alleges also insured Plaintiffs' condominium unit during the relevant time period. Plaintiffs have not opposed this motion. Hence, because, on its face, Defendant's Third Party Complaint shows that joinder of these parties will not destroy diversity jurisdiction and because this matter affects the interests of both Shelby and allegedly USFG, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion to File a Third Party Complaint.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court affirms its holding in its Memorandum and Order dated March 3, 2004. As such Defendant's and Plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration will be denied. Additionally, based on the Court's holding in its March 3, 2004 Memorandum and Order, Defendant's Motion to file a third party complaint against Shelby and USFG will be granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of May, 2004 upon consideration of Plaintiffs' and Defendant's Motions for Reconsideration and Defendant's Motion for Leave to File a Third Party Complaint, it is hereby ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No. 18) is Denied.
(2) Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No. 19) is Denied.
(3) Defendant's Motion to File a Third Party Complaint (Docket No. 20) is Granted.