Opinion
CV 23-10167 RAO
07-26-2024
ALEXANDER R., Plaintiff, v. MARTIN J. O'MALLEY,[1] Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ROZELLA A. OLIVER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Alexander R. (“Plaintiff”) challenges the Commissioner's denial of supplemental security income (“SSI”). For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED.
Partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
II. BACKGROUND
On October 1, 2020, Plaintiff applied for SSI, originally alleging disability beginning June 1, 2018, and later amending the beginning date to October 25, 2022. (AR 377-92, 468-75.) Plaintiff's application was denied on February 9, 2021, (AR 421-25), and upon reconsideration on September 21, 2021 (AR 428-33). On October 20, 2021, Plaintiff appealed the Commissioner's decision and requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 434.) The hearing took place on October 11, 2022. (See AR 353-76.)
On October 20, 2022, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision using the familiar five-step sequential process. (AR 8-24.) At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 29, 2020. (AR 13.) At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had two severe impairments: bipolar disorder and depression. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that medically equals the severity of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926. (AR 14.) The ALJ assessed that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to work at all exertional levels but with non-exertional limitations: He can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; make commensurate work related decisions; respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work situations; deal with routine changes in the work setting and maintain concentration, persistence, and pace for up to and including two hours at a time with normal breaks throughout a normal workday; is suitable for jobs requiring no interaction with the general public and only occasional changes in the work setting; and can be around coworkers throughout the workday but can have only occasional interaction with them. (AR 15.) At step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had no relevant past work. (AR 19.) At step five, the ALJ found that there were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff, considering his age, education, work experience, and RFC, could perform. (Id.)
On October 12, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (AR 1-7.) Plaintiff then initiated this action challenging the Commissioner's decision on December 4, 2023. (Dkt. No. 1.) The parties filed their respective briefs for the Court's consideration. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 13 (“Pl. Brief”), 15 (“Comm'r Brief”), 17 (“Pl. Reply”).)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. A court must affirm an ALJ's findings of fact if, when applied against proper legal standards, they are supported by substantial evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla[,]' . . . [which] means-and means only-‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019) (citations omitted); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). Substantial evidence is shown “by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998). “[T]he Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence....Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Secretary's conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “However, the ALJ ‘need not discuss all evidence presented'” to her, but “must only explain why ‘significant probative evidence has been rejected.'” Hurn v. Berryhill, No. 1700884, 2018 WL 4026357, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2018) (citing Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984)).
“‘Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,' the ALJ's decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)); see Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ's conclusion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”). The Court may review only “the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which [s]he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises two issues: (1) his RFC is unsupported by substantial evidence and (2) the ALJ improperly rejected the new and material evidence Plaintiff submitted post-hearing. (See generally Pl. Brief; Pl. Reply.)
a. Claim One-RFC
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to account for Plaintiff's moderate limitations in his abilities to interact with supervisors, comply with job rules, and respond to changes in a routine work setting or work pressure in a usual work setting; that the ALJ's limitation to simple, repetitive tasks with limited contact is insufficient to account for Plaintiff's moderate limitation in his ability to deal with the stress encountered in a competitive work environment; and that the ALJ's limitation as to maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace in two-hour increments is actually not a limitation at all. (Pl. Brief at 23-28.)
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ reasonably translated and accounted for Plaintiff's mental limitations in his RFC and that, even if the ALJ did err, such error was harmless. (Comm'r Brief at 3-6.)
The Court agrees with the Commissioner.
i. Applicable Law
An ALJ must consider the limiting effect of all of a claimant's impairments. George A. v. Berryhill, No. 18-00405, 2019 WL 1875523, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2019). However, those limiting effects that do not significantly interfere with a claimant's ability to work are not required to be included in a claimant's RFC. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2022); Bray v. Astrue, 554 F.3d 1219, 122829 (9th Cir. 2009). As long as the ALJ “specifies reasons supported by substantial evidence for not including the non-severe impairment in the RFC determination, the ALJ has not committed legal error.” George A., 2019 WL 1875523, at *3 (internal brackets omitted).
ii. Analysis
The Court addresses the at-issue limitations and whether the RFC accounts for each.
1. Interacting with supervisors
Plaintiff argues that the RFC does not account for Dr. Williamson's opined limitation that Plaintiff is moderately limited in interacting with supervisors because the RFC limits Plaintiff to occasional interaction with coworkers but says nothing about supervisors. (Pl. Brief at 4-5.) The Commissioner cites two cases in support of the position that the limitation to occasional interaction with coworkers implicitly includes supervisors. (Comm'r Brief at 4 (citing Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2017); Jones v. Kijakazi, No. 21-00608, 2022 WL 1421956, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 2022)).) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred, but nevertheless finds the error harmless.
Decisions from district courts within the Ninth Circuit are inconsistent about whether an RFC that includes a limitation to occasional interaction with coworkers accounts for a medical doctor's opinion that a claimant is limited to occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors, and, if not, whether that constitutes reversible error. See Dennis v. Colvin, No. 14-00822, 2015 WL 3867506, at *8 (D. Or. June 20, 2015) (citing cases). Here, the Court finds that the ALJ's RFC limiting Plaintiff to occasional interaction with coworkers does not account for Dr. Williamson's opined limitation as to supervisors because “limitations on interactions with . . . coworkers do not address the separate dynamic created by the supervisory relationship.” Id. at *8-9.
However, the ALJ's error here is harmless because the occupations identified by the VE-merchandise marker (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 209.587-034); routing clerk (DOT 222.687-022), and collator (DOT 208.685-010)-do not mention interaction with supervisors, coworkers, or the public at a level inconsistent with Dr. Williamson's opined limitation. See Andrea A. Saul, No. 19-09908, 2020 WL 5961088, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2020). The “people” classification for merchandise markers is “taking instructions-helping” and is classified as “not significant.” DICOT 209.587-034, available at 1991 WL 671802; see also Rickman v. Colvin, No. 6:12-CV-01201, 2013 WL 4773627, at *10 (D. Oregon, Sept. 4, 2013). The same is true for the routing clerk and the collator jobs. See DICOT 222.687-022, available at 1991 WL 672133 (routing clerk); DICOT 208.685-010, available at 1991 WL 671753 (collator). The omission of the limitation as to supervisors is therefore inconsequential. Stout v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006).
With respect to the Commissioner's arguments, the Court is not bound by Jones, 2022 WL 1421956, (Comm'r Brief at 4), which comes from the Eighth Circuit. As to Shaibi, 883 F.3d at 1107, the Court is unpersuaded. The specific issue at the district court level there was whether two doctors' opinions-Dr. Izzi assigning to claimant a “moderate limitation in interacting with supervisors and coworkers,” and Dr. Lochner opining that claimant “can relate to others on a superficial work basis”-were accounted for in an RFC that limited the claimant to “simple routine tasks in a non-public setting, with occasional interaction with coworkers.” Shaibi v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-00948, 2015 WL 4879593, at *1-5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015). The Ninth Circuit affirmed: The RFC accounted for Dr. Izzi's moderate limitation (as opposed to mild or marked) because the ALJ contemplated that the claimant's social limitations “were significant enough that he was incapable of frequent or sustained interactions with coworkers, but not sufficiently debilitating that [claimant] could never interact with colleagues or supervisors.” Shaibi, 883 F.3d at 1107. Dr. Lochner's limitation that the claimant could “relate to others on a superficial work basis,”-which the claimant erroneously mischaracterized as a limitation to “‘superficial contact' with coworkers”-was accounted for in the RFC because “[t]he ALJ could reasonably have concluded that, given Shaibi's ability to ‘relate to others on a superficial work basis,' he could perform essential workplace functions, even if he could not easily develop deeper emotional bonds with his coworkers.'” Id. The Ninth Circuit made no reference to whether the term “coworkers” encompasses both coworkers and supervisors. Thus, Shaibi does not stand for the proposition that an RFC limiting interactions with coworkers implicitly includes supervisors. (See Pl. Reply at 3.)
A review of the Ninth Circuit Oral Argument in Shaibi confirms that this specific issue in Plaintiff's case was not contemplated, or even raised. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-16849), 2017 WL 3735135.
With respect to Plaintiff's arguments, his analogy to Tahni K. v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, No. 23-5761, 2024 WL 49694, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 2024), (Pl. Reply at 3), is unpersuasive because Tahni analyzes the distinction between “occasional” and “moderate” interactions, which is irrelevant here. Tahni K., 2024 WL 49694, at *1-2. Additionally, the numerous cases Plaintiff cites, (Pl. Reply at 3-4), to support the distinction between supervisors and coworkers are inapposite because those cases relate to claims for harassment, which involve an entirely different body of law.
2. Complying with job rules
Plaintiff argues his moderate limitation in his ability to comply with job rules, such as safety and attendance, is unaccounted for in the RFC because of his “well-documented history with the criminal justice system,” and various mental health issues. (Pl. Brief at 24-25.) The Commissioner argues that any perceived error was harmless because the ALJ was not required to expressly address attendance limitations since Dr. Williamson's opinion did not provide specific attendance restrictions. (Comm'r Brief at 4-5) (citing Tamra W. v. O'Malley, No. 22-9098, 2024 WL 283684 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2024)).) The Court agrees with the Commissioner.
Here, the RFC accounts for the mild to moderate limitation in Plaintiff's ability to comply with job rules such as safety and attendance despite its lack of specific attendance restrictions because Dr. Williamson did not render any specific attendance requirements. (Comm'r Brief at 5); see Tamra W., 2024 WL 283684, at *5; James D.C. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-02083, 2023 WL 115560, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2023). Plaintiff cites no authority in support of his argument that his history with the criminal justice system, placement in a 5150 hold, discharge from military service due to mental issues, difficulties with anger, distractibility, mood instability, and other symptoms would somehow change his RFC. (See Pl. Brief at 6.) See Tamra W., 2024 WL 283684, at *5; Xiong v. Kijakazi, No. 21-00134, 2022 WL 2119029, at *15 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2022). Nor does the Court find persuasive Plaintiff's cited authority for contending the ALJ needed to have addressed both attendance and safety, as Tamra does not turn on that issue. (See Pl Reply at 5-6); Tamra W., 2024 WL 283684, at *5-6.
3. Respond to work pressure and changes in a routine work setting
Plaintiff argues his moderate limitation in responding to work pressure and changes in a routine work setting is unaccounted for because the RFC is internally inconsistent: Plaintiff has no limitation in his ability to deal with routine work changes but can only handle occasional changes in the work setting. (Pl. Brief at 25-26; Pl. Reply at 7-8.) The Commissioner argues there is no conflict and, in any event, the RFC's inclusion of simple, routine work suffices. (Comm'r Brief at 5-6.) The Court agrees with the Commissioner.
Here, Plaintiff's moderate limitation in responding to work pressure and changes in a routine work setting is accounted for in the RFC because the RFC limits Plaintiff to simple instructions. (See Comm'r Brief at 14-15 (citing Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 490 Fed.Appx. 15, 17-18 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding an RFC limiting claimant to simple routine tasks performed in unskilled work was consistent with a moderate limitation to respond appropriately to changes in a work setting))); see also Myers v. Colvin, No. 12-00378, 2013 WL 3481689, at *16 & n.5 (finding that “tasks” and “instructions” are interchangeable).
And, even if it is not, the VE's opined occupations all have a reasoning level of two, which is compatible with the RFC's limitation to simple instructions. Barbee v. Berryhill, No. 16-1779, 2017 WL 3034531, at *16 (S.D. Cal. July 18, 2017) (collecting cases, e.g., Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2015); Lara v. Astrue, 305 Fed.Appx. 324, 326 (9th Cir. 2008); Abrew v. Astrue, 303 Fed.Appx. 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2008)); Coleman v. Astrue, No. 10-5641, 2011 WL 781930, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011) (collecting more cases). Thus, any theoretical error is harmless.
Plaintiff's argument rests on the erroneous assumption that the mental RFC assessment at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process can be directly translated from the various functions contained in the broad categories listed in paragraphs B and C. See Garza v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-00403, 2022 WL 2974691, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2022) (“[T]he mental RFC assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment [than at steps 2 and 3] by itemizing various functions contained in the broad categories found in paragraphs B and C of the adult mental disorders listings. . . . For that reason, a direct translation of the findings for the broad functional areas at step three into the concrete, functional limitations that must be identified in the RFC is untenable.” (quoting Carver v. Colvin, 600 Fed.Appx. 616, 620 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *4))). Plaintiff's nonlimitation in his ability to deal with routine work changes is a paragraph B function analyzed at steps two and three; his limitation to handling only occasional changes in the work setting is the RFC assessment used at steps four and five. Thus, a “direct translation . . . is untenable.” Id.; see id. (collecting cases). Plaintiff's reliance on Perez v. Astrue, 250 Fed.Appx. 774 (9th Cir. 2007)-which involves materially different limitations than the ones Plaintiff alleges are inconsistent- therefore fails. (See Pl. Reply at 8 n.3.)
4. Stress in competitive work environment
Plaintiff argues his moderate limitation in his ability to deal with the stress encountered in a competitive work environment is unaccounted for because the RFC's limitation to simple routine or repetitive tasks is inadequate. (Pl. Brief at 27.) The Commissioner argues the RFC's inclusion of simple, routine work suffices. (Comm'r Brief at 5-6.) The Court agrees with the Commissioner.
Here, the limitation to simple instructions, making commensurate work-related decisions, and having no interaction with the general public and only occasional interaction with coworkers in the RFC accounts for Plaintiff's moderate limitation in his ability to deal with stress in a competitive work environment. See, e.g., Pullen v. Kijakazi, No. 21-00404, 2023 WL 373380, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2023) (finding that an RFC limiting a claimant to simple, routine tasks and occasional interaction with coworkers and the public accounts for a moderate limitation to deal with stress); Lisardo S. v. Berryhill, No. 18-00480, 2019 WL 773686, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2019) (finding that an RFC limiting a claimant to simple work, limited contact with the public, a predictable work routine, and no more than simple decisions accounts for a moderate limitation to deal with stress).
5. Maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace
Lastly, Plaintiff posits that the RFC's limitation to maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace in two-hour increments is not a limitation at all because workers already have normal breaks every two hours. (Pl. Brief at 28 & n.2.) The Commissioner argues there is no error because the RFC includes a limitation to simple routine work, no interaction with the general public, occasional interaction with coworkers, and occasional changes in the work setting. (Comm'r Brief at 56.) The Court agrees with the Commissioner.
Here, the RFC's limitations to simple work, no interaction with the general public and only occasional interaction with coworkers, and only occasional changes in the work setting adequately accounts for Plaintiff's moderate limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding moderate limitations in pace were accounted for in an RFC limiting claimant to simple tasks); Christopher G. v. Saul, No. 19-06150, 2020 WL 2079972, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2020) (“[A]n RFC may account for a physician's opinion that the claimant suffers from moderate difficulties in concentration and persistence by assessing an RFC restricting the claimant to simple, routine, repetitive tasks.” (citing Hughes v. Colvin, 599 Fed.Appx. 765, 766 (9th Cir. 2015))).
Plaintiff's case is distinguishable from Harrell v. Kijakazi, No. 20-00614, 2021 WL 4429416, at *6-7, (Pl. Brief at 27; Pl. Reply at 9), because there, the claimant's RFC allowed for “limited public contact,” whereas here, Plaintiff's RFC limits him to no public contact. (AR 15.) Moreover, Plaintiff's other cases actually support the Court's holding here. (See Pl. Brief at 28 & n.2.) In James B. v. Berryhill, No. 17-06794, 2019 WL 1275344, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2019), the Court explicitly stated that “the ALJ did not need to specify that Plaintiff could concentrate for two-hour intervals because the RFC included ‘normal breaks,' which occur every two hours, and no additional two-hour restriction was necessary.” Likewise, here, the ALJ properly assessed the RFC limitation to “maintain[ing] concentration, persistence, and pace for up to and including two hours at a time with normal breaks.” (AR 15). As to Braithwaite v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-2922, 2011 WL 1253395, at *5 & n.4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011), the court there did not hold that two-hour increments of maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace, is not an actual “limitation” merely because the law already mandates breaks every two hours. That the court in Braithwaite considered whether accommodations in addition to the “normal breaks” were necessary implies that normal breaks alone can constitute an adequate limitation. See Childs v. Colvin, No. 15-00075, 2016 WL 1417380, at *5 n.2 (finding that normal breaks can be reasonable accommodations).
b. Claim Two-New and Material Evidence
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected new and material evidence submitted to the Appeals Council and that the consideration of new medical records would create a reasonable probability of a changed outcome because the ALJ specifically relied on the absence of emergency room visits or inpatient admissions based on “solely mental exacerbations.” ((Pl. Brief at 25-26; see also AR 17.)
In opposition, the Commissioner argues the Appeals Council properly deemed the new and material evidence as unrelated to the at-issue period. Acknowledging that these records were included in the administrative record, the Commissioner recognizes the Court should consider it in determining whether substantive evidence supports the ALJ's decision. However, even with the new evidence considered, the Commissioner asserts the ALJ's decision would be the same because it rested on other reasons, including treatment noncompliance, objective findings, positive medication response, and activities, as well as a medical opinion and the state agency psychologists' prior administrative findings. (Comm'r Brief at 6-9; see also AR 15-19.) Additionally, the Commissioner notes that the new records are only one brief instance of suicidal ideation outside the relevant period and Plaintiff never expressed suicidal thoughts during the period at issue. (Comm'r Brief at 6-7.)
i. Applicable Law
New and material evidence submitted to the Appeals Council will be considered, and therefore part of the administrative record, when it relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision and there is a reasonable probability the evidence would change the disability decision. (Comm'r Brief at 6 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470(a)(5)).) Post-hearing evidence may be considered if it relates to a claimant's medical impairments during the relevant time period. (Pl. Brief at 30 (citing Taylor v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 2011)).) Although the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council's denial of review, “[w]hen the Appeals Council [does deny] review, the ALJ's decision becomes the final decision of the Commissioner, and the Court reviews that decision for substantial evidence based on the record as a whole, including any new evidence submitted to and considered by the Appeals Council.” See Richardson v. Berryhill, No. 16-04604, 2018 WL 1577919, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2018) (emphasis added) (citing Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2012).
ii. Analysis
Here, the new evidence consisted of medical records dated from March 23 to March 27, 2023, concerning Plaintiff's placement in a 5150 hold. (AR 69-352.) The records state that Plaintiff was having suicidal thoughts and exhibiting a depressed mood, which relates back to Plaintiff's depression and bipolar disorder. (AR 13-19 (discussing Plaintiff's depression and bipolar), 69-352 (documenting suicide ideation and other symptoms associated with Plaintiff's mental impairments)); see Paula W. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-04092, 2022 WL 2439178, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2022).
The Court concludes that remand is warranted on this claim. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's mental health treatment was routine and conservative, in part, by weighing Plaintiff's earlier placement in a 5150 hold in 2021 as an isolated event involving the use of drugs. (AR 17.) The ALJ's decision expressly stated, “There have been no such visits or admissions for solely mental exacerbations.” (Id.) The new medical records, at a minimum, would therefore require reevaluation of whether Plaintiff's mental health treatment can still be characterized as “routine and conservative” with two inpatient hospitalizations, one of which was not related to drug use. See, e.g., Warner v. Astrue, 859 F.Supp.2d 1107, 1112-17 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2012) (remanding where the ALJ failed to consider additional treatment records from a claimant's psychiatric hold post-ALJ decision); Paula W., 2022 WL 2439178, at *1-7 (remanding where an ALJ determined Plaintiff had severe impairments of anxiety and depressive order, and the new and material evidence submitted comprised of records pertaining to the claimant's mental health). Cf. Powers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-01131, 2023 WL 7130716, at *8-12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2023) (finding no reasonable possibility new evidence was material because the supplemental records were “little more than an attempt to reweigh the evidence,” and they did not demonstrate a worsening in the claimant's mental health). For that reason, the Court finds unpersuasive the Commissioner's argument that the ALJ's decision should be affirmed because it was based on routine conservative treatment and noncompliance with medication and treatment regimen. See Warner, 859 F.Supp.2d at 1117 n.13.
V. REMAND FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
The Court finds that remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate, as further administrative review could remedy the ALJ's errors. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) (remanding for an award of benefits is appropriate in rare circumstances). On remand, the ALJ is directed to consider the new medical records as part of the assessment of Plaintiff's RFC and then proceed to steps four and five to determine what work, if any, Plaintiff is capable of performing.
VI. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING for further administrative proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.
NOTICE
THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED IN WESTLAW, LEXIS/NEXIS, OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE.