Opinion
No. CV 084018880S
August 27, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Sharon Lee Albuquerque, appeals from the August 28, 2008 final decision of the state employees retirement commission (the commission) denying her claim for payment of survivor retirement benefits.
The plaintiff is the widow of Anthony Albuquerque, a retired Windsor police officer. (Return of Record (ROR), 045.) Mr. Albuquerque retired on September 20, 1986 and received his pension until his death on July 8, 2004. (ROR, 033-034, 045.)
Mr. and Mrs. Albuquerque were married in 1979. (ROR, 138.)
As a member of the Connecticut Municipal Employees Retirement System (CMERS) and pursuant to General Statutes § 7-439g, Mr. Albuquerque had a choice of five retirement system elections. He selected Option D, the straight life annuity plan, which provided him with the highest monthly payment during his lifetime but terminated upon his death. (ROR, 028.) Mr. Albuquerque did not select Option A, the default retirement plan, which provided a reduced monthly benefit to the member for life and then 50% to the surviving spouse after the member's death, for the lifetime of the surviving spouse.
General Statutes § 4-183(j) controls the court's review of the merits of an agency's decision. It provides that "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, may render a judgment under subsection (k) of this section or remand the case for further proceedings. For purposes of this section, a remand is a final judgment."
"Judicial review of [an administrative agency's] action is governed by the [Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. (UAPA] . . . and the scope of that review is very restricted . . . With regard to questions of fact, it is [not] the function of the trial court . . . to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. Judicial review of the conclusions of law reached administratively is also limited. The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion . . . Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 800, 955 A.2d 15 (2008). See also Hart v. Connecticut State Employees Retirement Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 07 4016065 (November 10, 2008, Schuman, J.).
While the plaintiff contends that § 7-448-2 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, providing that a "spouse shall be entitled to a retirement salary commencing at the employee's death[,]" controls here, the court is not persuaded. Section 7-448-2 was rendered moot when its corresponding statutes, §§ 7-439 and 7-439a, were repealed and replaced by General Statutes § 7-439g. The court notes that "[s]ubsequent enactments of statutes are presumed to repeal earlier inconsistent statutes or regulations only to the extent necessary to remove the conflict." Reddy v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 28 Conn.App. 145, 160 n. 14, 612 A.2d 64 (1992).
While § 7-448-2 of the regulations and the corresponding statutes §§ 7-439 and 7-439a may have guaranteed payment of retirement income to a surviving spouse, the subsequently enacted statute § 7-439g allowed for the unilateral exclusion of a surviving spouse from retirement benefits. Since § 7-439g is in conflict with § 7-448-2 of the regulations in this respect, the court presumes the latter repealed. Therefore, the plaintiff's reliance on § 7-448-2 of the regulations is misguided.
Moreover, standing is a justiciability doctrine "that implicate[s] a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter. A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 86, 952 A.2d 1 (2008).
In McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56, 65, 946 A.2d 862 (2008), the Supreme Court set forth a three-prong test with regard to claims of standing under a specific statute: 1) can the statute on which the claim rests be understood to provide to a person "in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief"; 2) assuming that the answer to the first prong is yes, does the statute contain a duty owed to the plaintiff; and 3) if the answer to the second prong is yes, did the defendant violate a duty owed to the plaintiff? For purposes of this appeal, the answer to all three questions is no. In light of McWeeny v. Hartford, the court concludes that Mrs. Albuquerque does not have standing to bring this claim. Therefore, this matter falls outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.
Pursuant to the court's request at oral argument on June 25, 2009, each party submitted supplemental briefs regarding the applicability of CT Page 14562 McWeeny v. Hartford to the issue of standing.
Section 7-439g can only be understood as providing a CMERS member with the right to judicial relief. The plaintiff is clearly not a member within the meaning of the statute. The statute is clear that the commission's duty was to the CMERS member. Furthermore, the statute in effect when Mr. Albuquerque selected his retirement option in 1986, § 7-439g, is clear and unambiguous. It states that a member married longer than one year will be presumed to have elected the 50% spousal option " unless a contrary election is made by the member." (Emphasis added.) Simply stated, Mr. Albuquerque made a contrary election when he selected the straight life annuity and this occurred before the legislature amended § 7-439g in 1991 to require a spouse's consent to an election that would exclude the surviving spouse from retirement benefits. The court declines to apply that amendment retroactively.
The plaintiff also argues that the commission "acted illegally" when it allowed her husband to choose a retirement option which excluded her from receiving benefits as a surviving spouse. (Plaintiff's brief, p. 7.) According to the plaintiff, the retirement election system in place vested her husband with "absolute discretion over her marital rights" and violated the Married Women's Act, General Statutes § 46b-36, by ignoring the elimination of a husband's common-law right to control the property rights of his wife; not notifying her of her husband's election; and failing to obtain her approval. See plaintiff's brief, pp. 8-10.
General Statutes § 46b-36 provides that "[n]either husband nor wife shall acquire by the marriage any right to or interest in any property held by the other before or acquired after such marriage . . ."
The plaintiff further contends that the commission denied her the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the U.S. constitution and the equal rights amendment of the Connecticut constitution. The plaintiff relies on City Recycling, Inc. v. State, 257 Conn. 429, 778 A.2d 77 (2001), for the proposition that the equal protection clauses are implicated when "the state statute [or statutory scheme] in question, either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) (Plaintiff's brief, p. 13.) The plaintiff argues that she and her husband were "similarly situated" because they had vested rights in Mr. Albuquerque's retirements benefits which she characterizes as "significant marital assets." (Plaintiff's brief, p. 14.) She contends that the commission failed to provide her with equal protection of the law "by allowing her husband sole and exclusive control of this marital asset." Id.
The court finds the plaintiff's arguments in regard to equal protection and marital property rights both off-point and unconvincing. The state and federal equal protection clauses are not implicated in this matter. "To implicate the equal protection clauses under the state and federal constitutions . . . it is necessary that the state statute in question, either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morales, 240 Conn. 727, 738-39, 694 A.2d 758 (1997).
The plaintiff and her husband were not similarly situated for equal protection purposes because unlike her husband, the plaintiff was not an employee-member of a municipality participating in the retirement system. See, e.g., Shuchman v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 1 Conn.App. 454, 463, 472 A.2d 1290 (1984) ("[a] state has a legitimate interest in conferring greater benefits to those who have previously served it as opposed to those who have not").
The court also does not accept the plaintiff's argument that she was denied a valuable property interest. The plaintiff is not entitled to a retirement benefit under § 7-439g, nor does she point to any other statute which would bestow this benefit on her in the absence of her husband selecting an approximate plan. While the plaintiff may have expected retirement benefits after her husband's death, "[a] unilateral expectation of benefits is simply not enough to create a constitutionally protected property interest within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment." Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 65, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988).
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is hereby dismissed.