Opinion
A23-1172
07-22-2024
Kallys Albert, Sr., Appellant, v. The Hartford, et al., Respondents, John Does, Defendant.
Anoka County District Court File No. 02-CV-21-897
Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and John Smith, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
Elise L. Larson Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Kallys Albert, Sr., appeals the district court's decisions to: (1) grant respondents' motions for summary judgment and (2) deny his motion to vacate judgment.
2. In February 2021, Albert sued respondent Marilyn Mae Miller and her insurer, respondent The Hartford (the insurer), for $2,725 in property damage stemming from a vehicle collision between Albert and Miller. In September 2021, Miller died at the age of 90 from causes unrelated to the collision. In December 2021, respondents moved for summary judgment, first arguing that the claim against Miller could not proceed because she had passed away, and second, arguing that the claim against the insurer could not proceed because it was an impermissible direct action. In July 2022, the district court granted respondents' motions for summary judgment.
Early in the case, Miller filed a counterclaim alleging that Albert negligently caused $3,300 in property damage. Later, Miller requested that the district court dismiss the counterclaim, see Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, stating that she mistakenly filed the counterclaim without knowing about an arbitration agreement with Albert's insurer. Albert argues the district court improperly dismissed respondents' counterclaim. Nevertheless, district courts have "wide discretion" in deciding whether to grant a motion for dismissal, and we review dismissals for an abuse of discretion. Kelbro Co. v. Vinny's on the River, LLC, 893 N.W.2d 390, 398 (Minn.App. 2017) (quotation omitted). Even "the mere prospect of a second lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial to justify denial of a rule 41.01(b) motion to dismiss." Id. (quotation omitted). Here, given the lenient standard of review that applies to a district court's decision to dismiss a counterclaim under rule 41.01(b), the district court did not abuse its discretion.
3. In August 2022, Albert moved for relief from final judgment pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The district court issued an order in July 2023 denying Albert relief, reasoning he did not satisfy the four factors set forth in Finden v. Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1964).
4. On appeal, Albert first argues that the district court erred when it granted respondents' motions for summary judgment. We review a district court's summary judgment decision de novo. Hanson v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 972 N.W.2d 362, 371 (Minn. 2022). We "will affirm a grant of summary judgment if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the court accurately applied the law." Id. at 371-72.
5. Albert first argues the district court erred when it granted summary judgment on his claims against Miller, contending that summary judgment was not warranted simply because Miller passed away.
6. A deceased person being "a party to an action at law or equity is contrary to common and statutory law, which provides that an action abates against a person individually after [her] death, and survives, if at all, only against [her] personal representative or estate." Zahler v. Manning, 295 N.W.2d 511, 513 n.2 (Minn. 1980). Nevertheless, aside from certain exceptions for wrongful-death and personal-injury claims, "[a]ll other causes of action by one against another, whether arising on contract or not, survive to the personal representatives of the former and against those of the latter." Minn. Stat. § 573.01 (Supp. 2023) (emphasis added). Moreover, "[i]f a party dies and the claim is not extinguished or barred, the [district] court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by . . . any party." Minn. R. Civ. P. 25.01(a) (emphasis added).
We note that the legislature amended section 573.01 in 2023. See 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, § 32, at 1143. However, the amendment is not relevant to Albert's claim and does not impact the outcome of this case.
7. In a recent opinion, we concluded that "[t]he absence of a motion to substitute under rule 25.01 does not justify dismissal of [an] action because . . . rule [25.01] 'does not limit the time within which the motion to substitute must be made.'" Geyen v. Comm'r of Minn. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 964 N.W.2d 639, 649 (Minn.App. 2021) (quoting Witthuhn v. Durbahn, 157 N.W.2d 360, 361 (Minn. 1968)). There, we rejected an argument that a district court lost jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an administrative action because no substitution occurred after the party who filed the appeal died. See id. ("[W]hile [the party's] attorney should have moved to substitute a new party in [the party's] place following her death, [the attorney's] failure to do so did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over the action.").
8. Here, we conclude that Albert's claim against Miller is not subject to summary judgment simply because Miller passed away after Albert filed suit. First, the statute plainly provides that property-damage claims "survive to the personal representative[]." Minn. Stat. § 573.01 (emphasis added). Moreover, rule 25.01 does not include a time limit to bring a motion to substitute a party. See Geyen, 964 N.W.2d at 649. Thus, Albert's failure to immediately move for substitution does not justify the district court's dismissal of his claim against Miller.
9. Because the district court erred as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment on the sole basis that Miller passed away, we reverse the district court's decision regarding Albert's claims against Miller.
10. Next, Albert argues the district court erred when it granted summary judgment on Albert's claims against the insurer, contending primarily that his claim should proceed because it involves property damage rather than personal injury.
11. In Minnesota, "an injured person possesses no direct cause of action against the insurer of the tortfeasor prior to recovery of judgment against the latter." Miller v. Mkt. Men's Mut. Ins. Co., 115 N.W.2d 266, 268 (Minn. 1962) (citing Gjovik v. Bemidji Loc. Bus Line, 27 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1947)). We have previously affirmed a district court's decision to grant summary judgment where the plaintiff sued an insurer without first obtaining judgment against the insured. See Mavco, Inc. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., No. A14-1085, 2015 WL 1013856, at *3 (Minn.App. Mar. 9, 2015); see also Anderson v. St. Paul Fire &Marine Ins. Co., 414 N.W.2d 575, 576-77 (Minn.App. 1987) (affirming a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss); George v. Evenson, No. A06-2133, 2007 WL 4303518, at *3-4 (Minn.App. Dec. 11, 2007) (same), aff'd 754 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 2008).
Mavco and George are nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite them as persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
12. We do not discern from our caselaw that the rule prohibiting a direct action against an insurer excludes property-damage claims. See Gjovik, 27 N.W.2d at 273-74 (rejecting direct action against insured in case involving property damage). Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision to grant the insurer's motion for summary judgment.
13. Albert argues that, even if the district court did not err when it granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, it abused its discretion when it denied him relief from the judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a), (f).
14. Whether a party is entitled to relief from a judgment under rule 60.02 "is based on the surrounding facts of each specific case, and is committed to the sound discretion of the district court." Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016). We review the district court's decision for a clear abuse of discretion. Cole v. Wutzke, 884 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. 2016).
15. Under rule 60.02(a), the district court "may relieve a party . . . from final judgment [for] . . . [m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." When reviewing a rule 60.02(a) motion, the district court must consider the four Finden factors, including whether "the claim [is] debatably meritorious." Cornell v. Ripka, 897 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Minn.App. 2017) (quotation omitted); see also Finden, 128 N.W.2d at 750 (articulating the four-factors, including "a reasonable defense on the merits"). For the district court to grant a rule 60.02(a) motion, the movant must satisfy all four Finden factors. See Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 620.
16. In addition, under rule 60.02(f), a district court may vacate judgment for "[a]ny other reason justifying relief." Relief under rule 60.02(f) is only available "in exceptional circumstances." Kern v. Janson, 800 N.W.2d 126, 133 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). However, as a threshold matter, a party must "establish a meritorious claim." See Buck Blacktop, Inc. v. Gary Contracting &Trucking Co., 929 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Minn.App. 2019) (quotation omitted).
17. Here, the district court denied Albert relief because-for the reasons discussed above-he did not demonstrate that his claims against the insurer had merit. See Miller, 115 N.W.2d at 268 ("[A]n injured person possesses no direct cause of action against the insurer of the tortfeasor prior to recovery of judgment against the latter."). In doing so, the district court correctly applied the law. See Cornell, 897 N.W.2d at 807 (requiring a "debatably meritorious" claim for relief under rule 60.02(a) (quotation omitted)); Buck Blacktop, 929 N.W.2d at 20 (requiring "a meritorious claim" for relief under rule 60.02(f) (quotation omitted)); Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 638 ("[A] debatably meritorious claim is one that, if established at trial, presents a cognizable claim for relief.”). Therefore, we do not discern that the district court clearly abused its discretion when it denied Albert relief from the judgment for his claims against the insurer.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Regarding the claims against Miller, the district court's decision to grant the motion for summary judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded.
2. Regarding the claims against the insurer, the district court's decisions to grant the motion for summary judgment and deny the motion for relief from the judgment are affirmed.
3. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
BY THE COURT
[*]Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.