Opinion
Civil Action CV-23-100
11-07-2023
TINA M. ALBERT, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, v. KEVIN C. ASHLINE, Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff.
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
JULIA M. LIPEZ JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COURT
In the pending motion, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Tina Albert asks the court to dismiss Counts II and III of the counterclaim pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, Ms. Albert's motion is denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After the parties' multi-year relationship ended, Ms. Albert filed a complaint against Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Kevin Ashline alleging, inter alia, breach of promissory note, conversion, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. Mr. Ashline counterclaimed.
In his counterclaim, Ashline alleges that he built and paid for various improvements to Ms. Albert's home, including an addition and a garage. Def.'s Counterci. ¶ 1. He further alleges that while Ms. Albert accepted and acknowledged the benefits conferred, she did not compensate Mr. Ashline for his services or reimburse him for the funds he contributed. Id. ¶¶ 3-5. Count I of the counterclaim seeks to recover under a theory of unjust enrichment and Count II seeks recovery in quantum meruit.
Count III, conversion, alleges that Ms. Albert is in possession of Mr. Ashline's mother's ashes and other personal items that belong to him. Id. ¶ 7. Count III further alleges that Ashline acquired an ownership interest in Ms. Albert's residential property by virtue of his investments into the home. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Mr. Ashline seeks damages and "demands judgment against [Ms. Albert] for [an] ownership interest in the personal residence."
Ms. Albert moves to dismiss the quantum meruit and conversion counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court examines the complaint '"in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory.'" Oakes v. Town of Richmond, 2023 ME 65, ¶ 15, -A.3d- (quoting Moody v. State Liquor &Lottery Comm'n, 2004 ME 20, ¶ 7, 843 A.2d 43). "A dismissal should only occur when it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that [she] might prove in support of [her] claim.'" Id. Because Maine is a notice-pleading jurisdiction, "the level of scrutiny used to assess the sufficiency of a complaint is 'forgiving.'" Id. ¶ 16.
DISCUSSION
I. Quantum Meruit (Count II)
Ms. Albert asks the court to dismiss Count II, arguing that there was no "implied contract" between the parties, i.e., the circumstances were such that it was unreasonable for Mr. Ashline to expect payment for the work he performed on Ms. Albert's home. Pl.'s Mot. Dismiss. 2-3.
"Quantum meruit claims permit recovery pursuant to an implied contract that is inferred from the conduct of the parties." Dinan v. Alpha Networks Inc., 2013 ME 22, ¶ 20, 60 A.3d 792. To establish a quantum meruit claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "'(1) services were rendered to the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) with the knowledge and consent of the defendant; and (3) under circumstances that make it reasonable for the plaintiff to expect payment.'" Sweet v. Breivogel, 2019 ME 18, ¶ 17, 201 A.3d 1215 (quoting Paffhausen v. Balano, 1998 ME 47, ¶ 8, 708 A.2d 269). The Law Court has described this test of reasonableness as requiring "proof that services were rendered under circumstances consistent with contract relations." Danforth v. Ruotolo, 650 A.2d 1334, 1335 (Me. 1994). That is, "[a]lthough contract formalities do not exist with respect to an implied contract, there must be a reasonable expectation of compensation for goods or services rendered." Sweet, 2019 ME 18, ¶ 17, 201 A.3d 1215. A party may prevail on a claim of quantum meruit "even where there was not a clear accession on both sides to one and the same terms if it is clear from the circumstances that the services were not intended to be gratuitous." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the counterclaim alleges that: Mr. Ashline invested time, money, and labor into Ms. Albert's personal residence, including financing and building an addition and a 24 x 30-foot garage; Ms. Albert accepted and acknowledged these services; and Ashline was not compensated or reimbursed. Def.'s Counterci. ¶¶ 1, 3-5, 8. The court concludes that these allegations are sufficient to state a claim of quantum meruit under Maine's "forgiving" notice pleading standard. Oakes, 2023 ME 65, ¶ 16, __A.3d__.
Ms. Albert contends that there was no reasonable expectation of compensation, as the parties were romantic partners at the time the services were rendered. Pl.'s Mot. Dismiss. 3. Albert, however, fails to identify any authority holding that a romantic relationship, as a matter of law, renders a party's expectation of payment unreasonable under quantum meruit's third prong. Rather, Maine law suggests that the analysis under the third prong is context-specific and factually intensive and therefore, unsuitable for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage. See Forrest Associates v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 2000 ME 195, ¶ 11, 760 A.2d 1041 (quantum meruit's reasonableness inquiry is a question of fact); Sweet, 2019 ME 18, ¶ 17, 201 A. 3d 1215 (reasonableness of a party's expectation of payment is determined in light of the circumstances).
II. Conversion (Count III)
According to Ms. Albert, dismissal of the conversion claim is warranted because the counterclaim fails to allege a critical element: that Mr. Ashline demanded the return of the property and Ms. Albert refused to surrender it. She further challenges the viability of Count III to the extent Ashline pursues a claim of conversion with respect to the residential home.
"'The gist of conversion is the invasion of a party's possession or right to possession at the time of the alleged conversion.'" Barron v. Shapiro &Morley, LLC, 2017 ME 51, ¶ 14, 157 A.3d 769 (quoting Withers v. Hackett, 1998 ME 164, ¶ 7, 714 A.2d 798). Generally, "[t]he necessary elements to establish a claim for conversion are a showing that (1) the person claiming that his or her property was converted has a property interest in the property; (2) the person had the right to possession at the time of the alleged conversion; and (3) the party with the right to possession made a demand for its return that was denied by the holder." Id.
As an initial matter, the court agrees that Count III cannot be sustained on a theory that Ms. Albert is liable for conversion of the residential property. Mr. Ashline has not identified any Maine law suggesting that real property may be the subject of a conversion claim, and in any event, he fails to allege that he held a possessory right to the real estate at the time the alleged conversion occurred. See Doughty v. Sullivan, 661 A.2d 1112, 1118 (Me. 1995) (explaining that historically, the tort of conversion "lay to recover damages for the wrongful taking of a chattel"); Breen v. Lucas, No. RE-03-29, 2005 WL 2736540, at *5 (Me. Super. July 4, 2005) (noting that "the tort of conversion, by its very nature, deals with personal and not real property").
The court nevertheless concludes that the counterclaim states a claim of conversion with respect to Mr. Ashline's personal property, which includes his mother's ashes. Although the counterclaim does not allege that a demand for return was made, the Law Court has recognized at least two scenarios in which a demand is not necessary: (1) when "the taking by the holder was wrongful" and (2) when "the circumstances show that a demand would be useless." Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anacone, 197 A.2d 506, 524 (Me. 1964). As to the first scenario, the Law Court has suggested that where "the complaint contains no allegation that [the defendant] acquired possession of any of [the plaintiff]'s property rightfully, [] there is no requirement of demand and a refusal to surrender." Mitchell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2011 ME 133, ¶ 16, 36 A.3d 876 (analyzing a conversion claim in the context of a case deciding whether an insurer had a duty to defend the policyholder against a conversion action).
Thus, because recognized exceptions to the demand requirement exist and there is no suggestion in the counterclaim that Ms. Albert rightfully acquired possession of Mr. Ashline's mother's ashes, the court is unable to conclude "beyond doubt" that Mr. Ashline would not be entitled to relief on his claim of conversion. See Oakes, 2023 ME 65, ¶ 15, __A.3d__.
The entry is:
Ms. Albert's motion to dismiss is denied.
As the court concludes that Ms. Albert's motion to dismiss fails on the merits, it need not address Mr. Ashline's alternative argument regarding his belated receipt of the present motion.
The clerk is directed to incorporate this order on the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).