Opinion
No. C97-0286L
July 2, 2001
ORDER CONFIRMING ARBITRATION AWARD AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Court on "Defendants' Motion and Memorandum for Confirmation of Arbitration Award, Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Claims." Plaintiffs, participants in the sport of judo, seek an end to defendants' requirement that they bow to inanimate objects such as portraits and tatami mats prior to judo matches. Plaintiffs claim that such practices violate their religious beliefs and discriminate against them in violation of the Amateur Sports Act ("ASA," 36 U.S.C. § 391(b)), the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000a), the Washington Law Against Discrimination ("WLAD," RCW 49.60.010 et seq.), and the Washington Consumer Protection Act ("CPA," RCW 19.86.010 et seq.).
I. AMATEUR SPORTS ACT CLAIM
Following this Court's September 23, 1999, Order authorizing and requiring an administrative appeal to the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") pursuant to 36 U.S.C. § 395(c), plaintiffs' ASA claim was heard and considered by a panel of three arbitrators. On April 17, 2000, the panel affirmed the United States Olympic Committee's determination that:
(1) the rules of respondent United States Judo, Inc. requiring contestants to bow at various times and places in a judo match do not offend 36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(8) and therefore (2) respondent United States Judo, Inc. is eligible to be recognized, and to continue to be recognized, as a national governing body under 36 U.S.C. § 220521.
Pursuant to 36 U.S.C. § 220529(d), the "[f]inal decision of the arbitrators is binding on the parties if the award is not inconsistent with the constitution and bylaws of the corporation? Although plaintiffs assert that the panel's decision must be inconsistent with the United States Olympic Committee's constitution because it violates the ASA, this argument is circular and plaintiffs have made no showing of any constitutional irregularities or violations.
The Court finds that the arbitrators' decision is final and binding on the parties. Because there is no judicial review of the arbitrators' decision, plaintiffs' ASA claims are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
II. CLAIM UNDER TITLE II OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Two days before defendants filed their reply brief, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in PGA v. Martin, __ U.S. __, 121 S.Ct. 1879 (2001). The parties have not yet had an opportunity to evaluate and brief the impact of that decision on plaintiffs' Title II claim. Absent a full evaluation of Martin and its effect on the Title II claim, defendants' motion to dismiss must be DENIED.
III. CLAIM UNDER WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, RCW 49.60.030(1)(b)
As noted by defendants, Washington courts look to federal decisions when construing state statutes which have the same purpose as their federal counterparts. Clarke v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 106 Wn.2d 102, 118 (1986). Whether PGA v. Martin will have any effect on the application of the public accommodation section of the WLAD has not been adequately briefed by the parties. Defendants' motion to dismiss the RCW 49.60.030(1)(b) claim is therefore DENIED.
IV. CLAIM UNDER WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, RCW 49.60.030(1)(f)
RCW 49.60.030(1)(f) provides in relevant part:
The right to be free from discrimination because of . . . creed . . . is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:
(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists. Discriminatory boycotts or blacklists for purposes of this section shall be defined as the formation or execution of any express or implied agreement, understanding, policy or contractual arrangement for economic benefit between any persons which is not specifically authorized by the laws of the United States and which is required or imposed, either directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, by a foreign government or foreign person in order to restrict, condition, prohibit, or interfere with or in order to exclude any person or persons from any business relationship on the basis of . . . creed. . . .
Defendants argue that, because bowing has been a part of judo competitions for many years, such a policy was not created "in order to" discriminate against defendants on the basis of creed. As noted by plaintiffs, however, it was only recently that defendants decided to make bowing a pre-requisite to competitive judo and it was only then that the Training Center's students were adversely affected.
Defendants also argue that the enforcement of a sport's rules cannot give rise to a boycott. After the Supreme Court's decision in PGA v. Martin, however, it is not enough to argue that sporting associations get the benefit of some sort of blanket exclusion from discrimination laws. Rules of competition which, though facially neutral, have a discriminatory effect may be subject to legal challenge. The rather extreme examples provided by defendants do not lead to the conclusion that the Court should abdicate all review simply because the challenged requirement is part of the "rules."
Defendants' motion for dismissal of the RCW 49.60.030(1)(f) claim is therefore DENIED. That having been said, the Court notes that there is some doubt whether plaintiffs, particularly the named individuals, will be able to show that they are engaged in "commerce" or that they were excluded from a "business relationship" on the basis of their creed.
V. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The balance of interests with which this Court was faced in May 1997 remains virtually the same. Although plaintiffs' claims under the ASA have now been rejected, the Supreme Court's recent interpretation and application of the Civil Rights Act left plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits no worse than it was before. The May 13, 1997 preliminary injunction shall therefore remain in force.
VI. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to confirm the arbitration award is GRANTED and plaintiffs' claims under the ASA are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Title II, WLAD, and CPA claims is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of additional dispositive motions. Defendants' request that the Court dissolve the 1997 preliminary injunction is also DENIED.
With the exception of a single sentence in their reply brief, defendants have not addressed the merits of plaintiffs' CPA claim.
The Court's judicial assistant, Teri Roberts, will contact the parties to schedule a status conference in this case. The parties should be prepared to establish a briefing schedule for subsequent motions to dismiss and a trial date for the above-captioned matter.