Opinion
21-465
09-26-2022
UDY RURIIK AKINO, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted September 22, 2022 San Francisco, California
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A215-544-231
Before: GRABER, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Udy Ruriik Akino, a native and citizen of Palau, timely seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") dismissal of his appeal from an immigration judge's ("IJ") final order of removal. Reviewing questions of law de novo, Flores-Rodriguez v. Garland, 8 F.4th 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2021), we deny the petition.
1. The BIA correctly rejected Petitioner's argument that the United States-Palau Compact of Free Association, Pub. L. No. 99-658, 100 Stat. 3672 (1986), exempts him from removal. In United States v. Terrence, 132 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1997), we interpreted Section 141(a) of the Compact. We held that, even though Section 141(a) exempts Palauan citizens from certain subsections of § 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, "the requirements of all other provisions of immigration law remain applicable." Terrence, 132 F.3d at 1294 (emphasis added). Accordingly, a citizen of Palau could be convicted of illegal reentry as a deported alien. Id. at 1294-95.
Petitioner resides in Arizona. He argues that, because he has established "habitual residence" in Arizona, it is Section 141(b), not Section 141(a), that controls this case. Under his reading, Section 141(a) confers certain rights on Palauan citizens related to entry, while Section 141(b) confers distinct rights on Palauan citizens that relate to long-term ("habitual") residence.
We reject this argument because, under the most natural reading of the Compact, Section 141(a) applies to Petitioner. Section 141(a) allows Palauans to "enter into, lawfully engage in occupations, and establish residence" in the United States, without regard to the requirements contained in three narrow provisions of immigration law. § 141(a), 100 Stat. at 3682 (emphasis added). And Section 141(c) of the Compact specifies that Section 141(a) does not grant Palauan citizens the right to establish the residency necessary for naturalization, which demonstrates that Palauan citizens are not United States citizens and comports with the holding in Terrence that such persons are removable. Put another way, Section 141(a) confers certain privileges on Palauans who, like Petitioner, reside in the United States, and Section 141(c) makes explicit that those privileges are limited. The interaction between Sections 141(a) and 141(c) therefore controls here. Section 141(b)-which allows certain limits to be placed on the "habitual residence" rights of Palauan citizens living "in a territory or possession of the United States"-does not apply to Petitioner given his residence in Arizona. Petitioner's argument that Section 141(b) implies that there are no limits on the "habitual residence" rights of Palauan citizens residing in the "interior" of the United States is foreclosed by 141(c), which makes clear that Palauan citizens do not gain the rights of United States citizens merely by residing in the United States.
2. Petitioner's remaining arguments all stem from his flawed interpretation of the Compact. Because we hold that Petitioner's interpretation fails, we also reject those remaining arguments.
PETITION DENIED.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).