Opinion
510 EDA 2022 615 EDA 2022 J-E01005-24
09-26-2024
MARCELO AITA v. NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. Appellant MARCELO AITA Appellant v. NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.
Appeal from the Order Entered January 21, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 2019-00981
Before: Lazarus, P.J., Bowes, J., Stabile, J., Dubow, J., Kunselman, J., Nichols, J., King, J., Sullivan, J., and Lane, J.
OPINION
KING, J.
Appellant, NCB Management Services, Inc. ("NCB"), and Cross-Appellant, Marcelo Aita ("Aita"), appeal from the order entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which denied NCB's motion for summary judgment, granted Aita's cross-motion for summary judgment, and awarded Aita $60,000.00 in liquidated damages under the Wage Payment and Collection Law ("WPCL"). We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. From June 9, 2008, until July 18, 2017, Aita was employed by NCB as its Chief Executive Officer. On December 29, 2014, the parties entered into a Private Sale Bonus Agreement ("Agreement"). Per the Agreement, NCB would provide Aita bonuses, including a retention bonus of $60,000.00 per month beginning on the first regular payroll date of January 2015 and continuing for seventeen (17) months thereafter, totaling $1,080,000.00 ("Retention Bonus"), so long as Aita remained with and provided services to NCB during each month preceding each installment payment. NCB timely paid Aita the monthly Retention Bonus installments under the terms of the Agreement from January 2015 to July 2015. Nevertheless, NCB failed to pay the remaining Retention Bonus installments in a timely manner due to cash flow problems. In July 2017, NCB paid Aita all but one of the unpaid Retention Bonus installments per the Agreement in one lump sum, totaling $660,000.00, plus 6% interest. In October 2017, NCB paid Aita the final Retention Bonus installment of $60,000.00, plus 6% interest.
The Agreement did not provide for a specific rate of interest. Thus, NCB applied the general legal rate of interest defined in 41 P.S. § 202 (providing that reference in legal document "to an obligation to pay a sum of money 'with interest' without specification of the applicable rate shall be construed to refer to the rate of interest of six per cent per annum").
On February 13, 2019, Aita filed a complaint against NCB for breach of employment contract and a violation of the WPCL, seeking compensatory damages, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. NCB filed preliminary objections on March 5, 2019, which the trial court sustained as to Aita's breach of contract claim. The trial court overruled NCB's preliminary objections with respect to Aita's WPCL claim.
On March 8, 2021, NCB filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that because it ultimately made all bonus payments before Aita had filed the complaint, Aita could not recover under the WPCL. According to NCB, Aita could not maintain a cause of action under the WPCL because Aita no longer had wages that were "payable" at the time he filed suit. Aita responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on April 7, 2021, seeking $180,000.00 in liquidated damages under the WPCL.
The parties do not dispute that bonuses constitute wages for purposes of the WPCL. See 43 P.S. § 260.2a.
This amount represented 25% of the total of the bonus payments made to Aita in July and October 2017 ($720,000.00), in accordance with the WPCL, which provides for liquidated damages in the amount of 25% of wages that are not paid over 30 days past the regular pay date. See 43 P.S. § 260.10.
The court heard argument on August 4, 2021 and took the matter under advisement. By order filed on January 21, 2022, the court denied NCB's motion for summary judgment. The court granted Aita's cross-motion for summary judgment for liquidated damages, but in the amount of $60,000.00 rather than the $180,000.00 that Aita sought. The court reasoned that some of the late payments fell outside of the WPCL's three-year statute of limitations.
NCB timely filed a notice of appeal on February 18, 2022, and Aita timely filed a cross-appeal. On March 2, 2022, the court ordered the parties to file concise statements of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Both NCB and Aita filed their respective Rule 1925(b) statements on March 18, 2022.
On May 15, 2023, a three-judge panel of this Court affirmed the trial court's order, with one dissent. The parties subsequently filed applications for reargument. On July 21, 2023, this Court granted en banc reargument and withdrew the three-judge panel decision. Thereafter, the parties filed substituted briefs for this Court's en banc review.
NCB raises the following issues on appeal:
Whether the trial court correctly found that an employee can maintain a cause of action under the Pennsylvania [WPCL] for liquidated damages when no wages were owed to him by his employer at the time that he filed his Complaint.
Whether the trial court correctly found than an employee can maintain an action under the WPCL when he has no contractual right to wages.
Whether the trial court correctly found than an employee who is owed no wages by his employer is in the class of persons protected by the civil remedies and penalties section of the WPCL?(NCB's Substituted Brief at 3).
Aita raises the following issue in his cross-appeal:
Whether the acknowledgement doctrine resets the statute of limitations under the WPCL where NCB made a partial payment of bonuses due under the WPCL and where NCB admits that the payment represented unpaid bonuses.(Aita's Substituted Brief at 14).
Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is well-settled:
We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of a trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court's order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.Shellenberger v. Kreider Farms, 288 A.3d 898, 905 (Pa.Super. 2023) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further:
Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment. Further, failure of a nonmoving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.
Thus, our responsibility as an appellate court is to determine whether the record either establishes that the material facts are undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action, such that there is no issue to be decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence that would allow a fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then summary judgment
should be denied.Id. at 905-06 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
For purposes of disposition, we combine NCB's issues. NCB argues that the WPCL only provides a cause of action to an aggrieved party who is owed wages. NCB asserts that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous that an aggrieved employee must be owed wages to avail himself of the remedies provided by the WPCL. NCB maintains that the purpose of the WPCL is to provide aggrieved employees a vehicle to collect unpaid wages from their employer and to make such employees whole. Because NCB ultimately paid all outstanding wages before Aita filed suit, NCB contends that he was already made whole. NCB insists that the court's liquidated damages award of $60,000.00 provided a windfall to Aita. In other words, NCB posits that Aita was allowed to recover liquidated damages when he could not and did not allege that he suffered any wage loss at the time he filed his complaint. NCB concludes that the court erred by granting Aita summary judgment, and this Court must reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment in NCB's favor. We disagree.
To begin, the Pennsylvania legislature's purpose in passing the WPCL was, inter alia, "to provide an employee with a statutory remedy for an employer's breach of its contractual obligation to remit wages." Laborers Combined Funds of Western Pa. v. Mattei, 518 A.2d 1296, 1298 (Pa.Super. 1986) (emphasis in original). "The policy of the statute is to aid an employe[e] in the prompt collection of compensation due him and to discourage an employer from using a position of economic superiority as a lever to dissuade an employe[e] from promptly collecting his agreed compensation…[.]" Ressler v. Jones Motor Co., 487 A.2d 424, 429 (Pa.Super. 1985) (internal citation omitted). Consistent with this purpose, the WPCL provides a statutory remedy to ensure that employees are paid on their regular payday and, if not timely paid, to make them whole by penalizing employers who fail to pay regular wages without good cause. "The question of liability under the [WPCL] is to be gleaned from a perusal of the [statute] as whole, and, in this effort, we seek to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Legislature by its passage…." Mattei, supra. As such, the civil provisions of the WPCL must be liberally construed to effectuate their remedial purpose and to "promote justice." See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(c). See also Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875, 960 (Pa.Super. 2011), cert. denied, 578 U.S. 905, 136 S.Ct. 1512, 194 L.Ed.2d 602 (2016) (acknowledging our mandate to construe WPCL liberally).
"[T]he right to recover wages 'earned' by employees upon separation from employment under the WPCL is a statutory remedy which supplements rather than supplants a common law action for breach of contract." Andrews v. Cross Atl. Cap. Partners, Inc., 158 A.3d 123, 133-34 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc), appeal denied, 643 Pa. 99, 172 A.3d 584 (2017) (emphasis in original).
Against this backdrop, the statutory language reinforces the WPCL's purpose. First, the WPCL requires that all wages be paid on an employee's "[r]egular payday," stating:
§ 260.3. Regular payday
(a) … Every employer shall pay all wages, other than fringe benefits and wage supplements, due to his employe[e]s on regular paydays designated in advance by the employer. … All wages, other than fringe benefits and wage supplements, earned in any pay period shall be due and payable within the number of days after the expiration of said pay period as provided in a written contract of employment or, if not so specified, within the standard time lapse customary in the trade or within 15 days from the end of such pay period. …43 P.S. § 260.3(a) (emphasis added). Although the WPCL does not define the term "payable" (see 43 P.S. § 260.2a), "payable" as used in this section plainly refers to when wages are "due." See Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining "due and payable" (of a debt) as "owed and subject to immediate collection because a specified date has arrived or time has elapsed, or some other condition for collectability has been met").
Second, the WPCL entitles an employee to collect liquidated damages when the employer fails to make payment on an employee's regular payday, i.e., when wages are payable and not paid within the grace paid. See 43 P.S. § 260.10 (stating: "Where wages remain unpaid for thirty days beyond the regularly scheduled payday, or, in the case where no regularly scheduled payday is applicable, for sixty days beyond the filing by the employe[e] of a proper claim … and no good faith contest or dispute of any wage claim … exists accounting for such non-payment, the employe[e] shall be entitled to claim, in addition, as liquidated damages an amount equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount of wages due, or five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater"). Thus, if an employer fails to pay wages within the applicable period, an amount equal to 25% of total wages due or $500.00, whichever is greater, is automatically added to the wages that were payable at the regularly scheduled payday, unless an employer has a good-faith defense. "Section 260.10 is intended to be a disincentive or penalty for employers to withhold wages in bad faith." Andrews, supra at 136. This section applies regardless of whether the employer ultimately pays the wages owed to the employee, because the liquidated damages are statutorily imposed once wages remain unpaid for thirty days beyond the scheduled payday, and no good faith dispute exists over the claim.
Third, the General Assembly considered the failure to pay an employee on the regular payday so egregious, that it also provided for a criminal penalty:
§ 260.11a. Criminal penalties
(a) The secretary or any employe[e], group of employe[e]s, labor organization or party to whom any type of wages is payable may institute prosecutions under this act.
(b) In addition to any other penalty or punishment otherwise prescribed by law, any employer who violates any provisions of this act shall be guilty of a summary offense and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollar ($300), or by imprisonment up to 90 days, or by both, for each offense. The good faith contest or dispute by any employer of any wage claim or the good faith assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim shall not be considered a violation of this act: Provided, That the employer has paid all wages due in excess of the amount in
dispute or asserted to be subject to a right of set-off or counter-claim. Nonpayment of wages to, on account of, or for the benefit of each individual employe[e] shall constitute a separate offense.
(c) Where such employer is a corporation, the president, secretary, treasurer or officers exercising corresponding functions shall each by guilty of such summary offense.
(d)All fines or penalties collected under this act shall be paid into the State Treasury through the Department of Revenue to the credit of the General Fund.43 P.S. § 260.11a.
Fourth, the WPCL allows for the imposition of counsel fees to an employee who prevails on a claim. See 43 P.S. § 260.9a(f) (stating: "The court in any action brought under this section shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow costs for reasonable attorneys' fees of any nature to be paid by the defendant"). The "award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing employee in an action brought under the [WPCL] is mandatory," because it "promotes the statute's purpose to protect employees when employers breach a contractual obligation to pay wages." Oberneder v. Link Computer Corp., 548 Pa. 201, 206, 696 A.2d 148, 151 (1997).
We further note that the WPCL provides that "[a]n employe[e] or group of employe[e]s, labor organization or party to whom any type of wages is payable may institute actions provided under the act." 43 P.S. § 260.9a(a).
To summarize, the WPCL requires that an employer pay wages on an employee's regular payday, subjects an employer who fails to pay on that date to criminal penalties, and if not paid within the grace period provided by statute absent a good-faith defense, imposes liquidated damages against the employer as well as reasonable attorneys' fees expended in pursuing the claim. See 43 P.S. §§ 260.3(a); 260.11a; 260.10; and 260.9a(f).
Instantly, in ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court explained:
The untimely payments well exceeded both the expiration of the pay period as provided in the Agreement for payment of wages and the ten (10) day requirement of the employer to pay wage supplements under the WPCL. Therefore, the withholding and nonpayment of said payments beyond the WPCL's allowable time frames is a proper basis for Aita to assert a cause of action under the WPCL.
Once a contractual basis to compensation is established, a Plaintiff has a right to assert a cause of action for liquidated damages if said wages or wage supplements remain unpaid for a period of time.
This [c]ourt did not err in allowing Aita's liquidated damages claim without a claim for unpaid wages. As discussed above, Aita did have a claim for unpaid wages immediately following the WPCL's allowable period of time of delayed Bonus Retention installment payments. Still, said payments were at least thirteen months late, and well exceeded any thirty- or sixty-day allowable delay.(Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/19/22, at 8-9, 12-13).
We agree with the court's ruling. We reiterate that an employee "to whom any type of wages is payable may institute" an action under the WPCL. See 43 P.S. § 260.9a(a). Thus, "payable" as used in this section and consistent with the statute's purpose, means when a monetary obligation becomes due or is required to be paid. Such an interpretation is consistent with other definitions of "payable" in Black's Law Dictionary. See Payable, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (including, inter alia, definitions of payable such as "[o]f a sum of money or a negotiable instrument that is to be paid"). Consequently, within the meaning of Section 260.9a(a), an employee "to whom any type of wages is payable" means that an employee is payable on his or her regular payday, i.e., once the grace period has expired, and an action can be maintained for liquidated damages thereafter. This interpretation is in accord with the General Assembly's intent to fix a date when payment must be made and penalize employers for failure to do so. Thus, the WPCL provides for liquidated damages even if the wages are paid outside the grace period to further the statutory objective of ensuring that employees are paid on their regular payday. See Andrews, supra.
NCB argues (and our colleagues in the dissent agree) that if the employer ultimately pays the wages owed to an employee prior to the employee filing a WPCL action, the employee loses the remedy of liquidated damages regardless of the employer's violation of the WPCL. Essentially, this interpretation renders the grace period under the statute a mere suggestion rather than a fixed date by which liquidated damages can be imposed. Further, this interpretation effectively amends the statutory grace period by extending it to the day before an employee files suit. In this scenario, an employer could drag its feet for months and escape liability for liquidated damages by finally paying the employee's due and payable wages just before the employee files suit. Such an outcome would be in direct contravention of the purpose of the WPCL, which is to protect employees when employers breach a contractual obligation to pay wages. See Oberneder, supra; Mattei, supra; Ressler, supra.
The parties each cite to Yablonski v. Keevican Weiss Bauerle & Hirsch LLC, 197 A.3d 1234 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 654 Pa. 424, 215 A.3d 562 (2019), to support their respective positions on appeal. Nevertheless, Yablonksi was concerned with only the calculation of liquidated damages, where the employer had claimed on appeal that the amount of liquidated damages entered in favor of the employee should be reduced based on the employer's partial payment of wages owed during the pendency of litigation. The Yablonski Court was not tasked with analyzing, and did not analyze, whether the employee could have brought a claim for liquidated damages if the employer had made all belated wage payments owed prior to commencement of the litigation. Thus, Yablonski does little to resolve the issue in this appeal.
Furthermore, the WPCL permits a separate claim for liquidated damages independent of a claim for unpaid wages. The statute provides:
No administrative proceedings or legal action shall be instituted under the provisions of this act for the collection of unpaid wages or liquidated damages more than three years after the day on which such wages were due and payable as provided in [43 P.S. §§ 260.3 and 260.5].43 P.S. § 260.9a(g) (emphasis added). The use of "or" in this provision carries its ordinary disjunctive meaning, indicating that an employee may bring a claim for liquidated damages without seeking unpaid wages, or vice versa. See also Braun, supra at 960 (explaining that word "or" is disjunctive and word "and" is conjunctive when interpreting Section 260.10 of WPCL concerning liquidated damages).
Indeed, at least one federal district court in Pennsylvania has permitted a standalone claim for liquidated damages to proceed to trial, where the employer had paid all wages owed prior to the commencement of the action. See Bair v. Purcell, No. 1:04-CV-1357, 2010 WL 3282653 (M.D.Pa. Aug. 17, 2010). More recently, another federal district court in Pennsylvania permitted a standalone claim for liquidated damages under the WPCL to survive a motion to dismiss. See Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Fryer, No. 17-2245, 2020 WL 4748296 at *4 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 17, 2020) (denying employer's motion to dismiss employee's counterclaim under WPCL for paid time off ("PTO") wages; stating "[a]lthough [employer] did pay [employee's] PTO 'with interest,' [employee] claims it did not do so until over nineteen months later-far after the 60-day period had passed. Therefore, [employee] may still be entitled to liquidated damages and [employer's] Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with regards to the PTO payments in counterclaim count five") (emphasis in original).
Although the employee in Endo had also asserted a counterclaim under the WPCL for severance pay (wages), the court granted the employer's motion to dismiss that counterclaim. See id. Thus, this case did not involve a scenario where the employee was seeking another type of unpaid wages in addition to liquidated damages. In other words, the court's disposition in Endo supports the notion that a standalone claim for liquidated damages is cognizable under the WPCL. To be sure, the procedural history in Endo confirms that the employee was terminated in January 2017, and she brought her counterclaims under the WPCL against her employer on March 18, 2019, in which the employee admitted that her employer had already paid the PTO with interest, albeit 19 months late. See id. at *2, *4.
Reading the relevant provisions of the WPCL together as a whole and with the purpose and liberal construction of the statute in mind (see Braun, supra; Mattei, supra), we hold that an employee can bring an action for liquidated damages under the WPCL regardless of whether the employer has paid all outstanding wages by the time legal action is commenced. Therefore, the trial court properly denied NCB's motion for summary judgment and granted Aita's cross-motion for summary judgment.
Turning to Aita's cross-appeal, Aita argues that the trial court erred in applying the three-year statute of limitations to reduce his liquidated damages from $180,000.00 to $60,000.00. Aita claims that because NCB's July 2017 payment "acknowledged" the debt was owed, it reset the statute of limitations clock. We disagree.
The $180,000.00 Aita sought represented 25% of the $720,000.00 that NCB had belatedly paid after the grace period expired. Nevertheless, because Aita filed his complaint on February 13, 2019, the trial court found that any claim for liquidated damages related to bonus payments that became due and payable before February 13, 2016 fell outside the three-year statute of limitations. Thus, the court reduced the award of liquated damages to $60,000.00, representing 25% of the $240,000.00 that became due and payable after February 13, 2016 (reflecting the payments that became due and payable on March 1, 2016, April 1, 2016, May 1, 2016, and June 1, 2016, all of which were paid late).
In its opinion, the trial court notes that Aita failed to serve his Rule 1925(b) statement on the trial judge in accordance with the court's order. Although the court's Rule 1925(b) order directed Aita to "serve upon the undersigned" his Rule 1925(b) statement no later than 21 days from date of order, the trial court's order also failed to comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure by specifying the place Aita could serve the statement in person and the address to which Aita could mail the statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii). Thus, we decline to find waiver of Aita's issue on this ground and address the merits of Aita's cross-appeal. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 193 A.3d 957 (Pa.Super. 2018) (declining to waive issue for failure to serve trial judge with Rule 1925(b) statement where trial court's Rule 1925(b) order was deficient).
As previously mentioned, the WPCL has a three-year statute of limitations. See 43 P.S. § 260.9a(g). Nevertheless, "the 'acknowledgement doctrine' provides that a statute of limitations may be tolled or its bar removed by a promise to pay the debt." S.T. Hudson Engineers, Inc. v. Camden Hotel Development Associates, 747 A.2d 931, 934 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding appellee's claim was not barred by statute of limitations where appellants had acknowledged that debt was owed, promised to pay its debt to appellee, and appellee relied on such; in reliance on appellants' promise to pay, appellee agreed to wait until appellants received certain settlement funds; nevertheless, appellants failed to remit payment of amount due despite receipt of funds from which it had promised to pay appellee; therefore, appellee was not on notice of any breach of appellants' promise until appellants denied payment after receiving funds from its settlement).
Significantly, we must interpret the "acknowledgment doctrine" strictly. Huntingdon Finance Corp. v. Newtown Artesian Water Co., 659 A.2d 1052, 1054 (Pa.Super. 1995). Thus:
A clear, distinct and unequivocal acknowledgment of a debt as an existing obligation, such as is consistent with a
promise to pay, is sufficient to toll the statute. There must, however, be no uncertainty either in the acknowledgment or in the identification of the debt; and the acknowledgment must be plainly referable to the very debt upon which the action is based; and also must be consistent with a promise to pay on demand and not accompanied by other expressions indicating a mere willingness to pay at a future time. A simple declaration of an intention to discharge an obligation is not the equivalent of a promise to pay, but is more in the nature of a desire to do so, from which there is no implication of a promise.
The acknowledgment doctrine serves a very useful purpose to both parties in that the creditor receives payment on a debt that would otherwise be unenforceable and the debtor satisfies a moral obligation to make payments pursuant to a contract where no legal obligation exists, thereby bolstering the credibility of its business. To accept appellant's position, debtors would be discouraged from acknowledging debts because of the corresponding interest payments, which in some instances could exceed the principal. The four-year statute of limitations [applicable in this case] serves to protect individuals from suffering the continuing anxiety over the possibility of the commencement of an action against them in the future. Because this acknowledgment doctrine removes the protection of the statute of limitations, the acknowledgment must be patently clear and distinct and free from ambiguity.Id. at 1054-55 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (holding appellee unquestionably acknowledged its obligation with respect to principal of debt; there can be no more clear and unequivocal acknowledgment of debt than actual payment, thus removing statute of limitations with respect to principal; however, this acknowledgment does not extend to corresponding interest on underlying debt; appellant does not cite to any place in record where appellee acknowledged duty to pay contested interest; appellee's payment was exact amount of principal owed; thus, appellee's payment of principal cannot be construed as promise to also pay interest when appellee never acknowledged such duty).
Instantly, the trial court explained its decision to award Aita $60,000.00 in liquidated damages instead of the amount Aita sought as follows:
[T]he three-year limit attached to each first regular payroll date from January 2015 and each regular payroll date for seventeen months thereafter. Aita filed the Complaint, commencing legal action, on February 13, 2019. Any Retention Bonus installment payment which became due and payable before February 13, 2016, was therefore, outside the statute of limitations.
NCB's final payments did not constitute a partial payment so as to infer a promise to pay liquidated damages. Aita does not cite to any place in the record where NCB acknowledged a duty to pay liquidated damages. Further, Aita's position is a contravention of public policy. The acknowledgment doctrine serves a very useful purpose to both parties in that the creditor receives payment on a debt that would otherwise be unenforceable and the debtor satisfies a moral obligation to make payments pursuant to a contract where no legal obligation exists, thereby bolstering the credibility of its business. To allow the tolling, employer debtors would be discouraged from acknowledging wages owed because of other corresponding interest or, in this case, liquidated damages.(Trial Court Opinion at 14-16) (internal citations omitted).
We agree with the trial court's rationale. While there is no dispute that NCB "acknowledged" the debt for the unpaid bonuses by virtue of the July 2017 payment, the trial court correctly found that Aita does not cite to any place in the record where NCB "acknowledged" a duty to pay liquidated damages under the WPCL. (See id.) To the contrary, NCB has consistently contested any obligation to pay liquidated damages (see, e.g., Aita's Supplemental R.R. at 371b-376b) (providing July 2017 e-mail thread where NCB acknowledged obligation to pay bonuses and interest but expressly stated that it did not intend to pay 25% in liquidated damages), and as evidenced by this appeal. Aita has simply failed to show that NCB acknowledged any obligation to pay liquidated damages in a way that was "patently clear and distinct and free from ambiguity." See Huntingdon Finance Corp., supra.Because the trial court properly found that NCB did not acknowledge a debt for liquidated damages under the WPCL, we see no error in the court's denial of liquidated damages in the amount sought. Accordingly, we affirm.
Aita argues that Huntingdon Finance Corp. is distinguishable because liquidated damages due under the WPCL are different from interest due in a breach of contract claim. (See Aita's Substituted Brief at 18). Aita claims that, unlike interest, liquidated damages are not a separate component of the underlying debt. Rather, liquidated damages are due as a result of the breach of the WPCL. (See id. at 18-19). Although we agree with Aita, in general, that interest and liquidated damages are not the same under the law and may have distinct purposes, we disagree with Aita that those differences are dispositive here. Just as the appellee in Huntingdon Finance Corp. acknowledged the obligation to pay the principal but not the interest, here, NCB acknowledged its obligation to pay Aita the unpaid bonuses and interest, but not any liquidated damages due thereon. See Huntingdon Finance Corp., supra. Additionally, as the trial court observed, and as expressed in Huntingdon Finance Corp., Aita's position contravenes public policy. If plaintiffs are permitted to recover liquidated damages on claims otherwise barred by the three-year statute of limitations, it would discourage employers from acknowledging wages owed because of other corresponding payments of liquidated damages. See id.
Order affirmed.
President Judge Lazarus, Judge Kunselman, Judge Nichols, and Judge Lane join the Opinion.
Judge Bowes files a Dissenting Opinion in which Judge Stabile, Judge Dubow and Judge Sullivan join.
Judge Sullivan files a Dissenting Opinion in which Judge Dubow joins.
Judgment Entered.
DISSENTING OPINION
BOWES, J.
In its cross-appeal, NCB argues that Aita could not institute an action for liquidated damages once he was paid because, at that time, he was no longer someone to whom any wages were payable. The Majority rejects this argument, "hold[ing] that an employee can bring an action for liquidated damages under the WPCL regardless of whether the employer has paid all outstanding wages by the time legal action is commenced." Majority at 15. Since I conclude that, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, a plaintiff must be due wages at the time of filing a suit pursuant to the WPCL in order to sustain an action seeking either unpaid wages or unpaid wages plus liquidated damages, I respectfully dissent.
The Majority accurately and thoroughly recounts the facts and procedural history. Suffice it to say for purposes of my dissent, there is no factual dispute that: (1) NCB failed to timely pay Aita several of his Retention Bonus installments pursuant to the Agreement; (2) NCB paid Aita the late installments in July and October 2017, plus interest at the rate of six percent per year pursuant to 41 P.S. § 202; and (3) Aita filed the underlying suit, pertaining to the late installment payments, in February 2019. As there is no issue of material fact, the focal point of the court's summary judgment order pertains to whether the WPCL entitled Aita, and not NCB, to judgment as a matter of law. See Khalil v. Williams, 278 A.3d 859, 871 (Pa. 2022) ("[A] trial court should grant summary judgment only in cases where the record contains no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (citation omitted)).
NCB utilized this general legal rate of interest because the Agreement did not set forth a specific rate. See 41 P.S. § 202 (providing that a reference in a legal document "to an obligation to pay a sum of money 'with interest' without specification of the applicable rate shall be construed to refer to the rate of interest of six per cent per annum").
This Court has explained that "[t]he WPCL does not create an employee's substantive right to compensation; rather, it only establishes a statutory vehicle to enforce payment of wages and compensation to which an employee is otherwise entitled by the terms of an agreement." Andrews v. Cross Atl. Cap. Partners, Inc., 158 A.3d 123, 136 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc) (cleaned up). "Whether specific wages are due is determined by the terms of the contract." Yablonski v. Keevican Weiss Bauerle & Hirsch LLC, 197 A.3d 1234 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up).
The crux of the parties' dispute and my disagreement with the Majority concerns the statutory interpretation of the WPCL. This Court's standard of review for such issues is well-settled:
When the question is one of statutory interpretation, our scope of review is plenary and the standard of review is de novo. Under the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, our paramount interpretative task is to give effect to the intent of our General Assembly in enacting the particular legislation under review. We are mindful that the object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly and the best indication of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute. When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we may not go beyond the plain meaning of the language of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. [O]nly when the words of the statute are ambiguous should a reviewing court seek to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly[.]In re D.M.W., 102 A.3d 492, 494 (Pa.Super. 2014) (cleaned up). A term is ambiguous if, "when read in context with the overall statutory framework in which it appears, [it] has at least two reasonable interpretations[.]" Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 198 A.3d 1056, 1073 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). Crucially, "[i]t is axiomatic that in determining legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be read together and in conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire statute." Penn Jersey Advance, Inc. v. Grim, 962 A.2d 632, 634 (Pa. 2009) (cleaned up).
As is the case in any appeal concerning statutory interpretation, I begin with the plain language of the statute. Section 260.9a(a) provides that actions may be filed pursuant to the WPCL by any employee "to whom any type of wages is payable[.]" 43 P.S. § 260.9a(a). The legislature did not define "payable" within the definitions section of the WPCL. See 43 P.S. § 260.2a. Likewise, our courts have not yet interpreted "payable" in the WPCL context. Nonetheless, I observe that Black's Law Dictionary defines "payable" as "(Of a sum of money or a negotiable instrument) that is to be paid. . . . An amount may be payable without being due. Debts are commonly payable long before they fall due." PAYABLE, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
The Majority begins its analysis with the WPCL's purpose, and then views the statutory language through that lens. See Majority at 6-7. However, the proper starting point is the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Koken v. Reliance Ins. Co., 893 A.2d 70, 81 (Pa. 2006) ("Generally, the best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. Thus, it is well settled that when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they are not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (cleaned up)). As explained in the body of my dissent, I find no ambiguity in the plain language of the text and therefore do not reach the unenviable task of attempting to read the tea leaves surrounding the WPCL's creation. See Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875, 954 n.25 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Barnhart v. Compugraphic Corp., 936 F.2d 131, 134 n.5 (3d Cir.1991)) ("This court has also attempted to review the legislative history of the [WPCL] to further determine the purposes underlying the law. Unfortunately, there are no substantive remarks included in the history of this law which would instruct this court.").
Importantly, the legislature wrote § 260.9a in the present tense, i.e., "is payable," as opposed to past tense to provide for an action to be available to a party to whom any type of wages were payable or "had been payable." Reading this term in conjunction with the remainder of the WPCL, it is clear to me that actions may be brought only when wages remain unpaid, as demonstrated by the following pertinent subsections:
The WPCL uses only one "e" at the end of the word "employee." I modify the text within this dissenting opinion to reflect the more common spelling.
(a) Any employee or group of employees, labor organization or party to whom any type of wages is payable may institute actions provided under this act.
(b)Actions by an employee, labor organization, or party to whom any type of wages is payable to recover unpaid wages and liquidated damages may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction, by such labor organization, party to whom any type of wages is payable or any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action or on behalf of all employees similarly situated. Any such employee, labor organization, party, or his representative shall have the power to settle or adjust his claim for unpaid wages.
(c) The employee or group of employees, labor organization or party to whom any type of wages is payable may, in the alternative, inform the secretary of the wage claim against an employer or former employer, and the secretary shall, unless the claim appears to be frivolous, immediately notify the employer or former employer of such claim by certified mail. If the employer or former employer fails to pay the claim or make satisfactory explanation to the secretary of his failure to do
so within ten days after receipt of such certified notification, thereafter, the employer or former employer shall be liable for a penalty of ten percent (10%) of that portion of the claim found to be justly due. A good faith dispute or contest as to the amount of wages due or the good faith assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim shall be deemed a satisfactory explanation for nonpayment of such amount in dispute or claimed as a set-off or counter-claim. The secretary shall have a cause of action against the employer or former employer for recovery of such penalty and the same may be included in any subsequent action by the secretary on said wage claim or may be exercised separately after adjustment of such wage claim without court action.
(d) In any civil action brought under the provisions of this act, the Secretary of Labor and Industry may require the employer to post bond or security to secure payment of the entire claim of the employee with credit in the amount of any good faith assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim. Such bond or security shall be posted in the court where the civil action is brought. The request for bond or security shall be signed by the secretary and shall provide that such bond or security in the amount stated shall be posted within 30 days of service thereof on the employer. If such bond or security is not posted within the 30-day period, the employer will be deemed to have admitted his liability and execution may immediately ensue.
(e) If the secretary determines that wages due have not been paid and that such unpaid wages constitute an enforceable claim, the secretary shall, upon the request of the employee, labor organization or party to whom any type of wages is payable, take an assignment in trust, from the requesting party of such claim for wages without being bound by any of the technical rules respecting the validity of any such assignments and may bring any legal action necessary to collect such claim, subject to the right by the employer to set-off or counter-claim against the assigning party. Upon any such assignment, the secretary shall have the power to settle and adjust any such claim to the same extent as might the assigning party.43 P.S. § 260.9a (emphases added).
Liquidated damages are more particularly covered in the next provision, § 260.10:
Where wages remain unpaid for thirty days beyond the regularly scheduled payday, or, in the case where no regularly scheduled payday is applicable, for sixty days beyond the filing by the employee of a proper claim or for sixty days beyond the date of the agreement, award or other act making wages payable, . . . and no good faith contest or dispute of any wage claim including the good faith assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim exists accounting for such non-payment, the employee shall be entitled to claim, in addition, as liquidated damages an amount equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount of wages due, or five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater.43 P.S. § 260.10.
Both Aita and NCB rely on this Court's decision in Yablonski to apply the salient provisions of the WPCL to the facts at hand. NCB argues that Yablonski "confirms that liquidated damages due to an employee are based on the amount of wages that are owed when the plaintiff is forced to resort to the courts to recover that which he previously earned." NCB's substituted brief at 26. Aita, on the other hand, professes that Yablonski "stands for the proposition that once the violation of the WPCL has occurred, later correction by the employer does not extinguish the claim for liquidated damages." Aita's substituted brief at 7. Given these divergent interpretations, I believe it worth a revisit to this Court's decision in Yablonski to ascertain its impact upon the question presently before this Court.
While I agree with my learned colleagues that Yablonski does not speak to the precise issue facing us in this case, I nonetheless find the reasoning therein instructive.
In Yablonski, we considered, inter alia, the appropriate amount of liquidated damages where the employer, KWBH, had made partial payments towards the wages that were payable to Yablonski after Yablonski initiated the WPCL suit for nonpayment of those wages. KWBH argued that "the trial court erred by awarding liquidated damages based upon the amount claimed in the amended complaint because after Yablonski filed the amended complaint, KWBH and Yablonski entered into a settlement agreement reducing the amount of claimed wages." Yablonski, 197 A.3d at 1241. In other words, KWBH contended that § 260.10 requires that liquidated damages be calculated based upon the amount still due at the time of an award. Since KWBH had paid a portion of the wages due following initiation of the suit, it insisted that the liquidated damages awarded to Yablonski should be reduced accordingly and computed based solely upon the wages still owed. Id.
We ultimately rejected KWBH's argument, explaining as follows:
[B]ecause the WPCL provides for liquidated damages when wages remain unpaid thirty days past payday, paying the May-August 2016 wages in December 2016 did not eliminate KWBH's liability pursuant to [§] 260.10. KWBH's argument ignores the trial court's explicit finding that at the time Yablonski filed his amended complaint, KWBH owed Yablonski all of the wages he claimed, plus interest. The only reason Yablonski was not awarded $63,949.91 at trial was because KWBH had already paid him $7,336.13 prior to trial, but that payment does not change the fact that $63,949.91 of wages plus interest were overdue pursuant to [§] 260.10. Therefore, the trial court did not err in awarding Yablonski 25% of $63,949.61 as liquidated damages.Id. at 1242 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Thus, we affirmed the trial court's award of liquidated damages calculated based upon the amount claimed in the amended complaint because Yablonski was still owed those wages, plus interest, at the time he filed the suit. Subsequent payment while the matter proceeded in court did not extinguish Yablonski's entitlement to that relief.
I cannot suggest simply applying this holding to the matter sub judice because Aita was no longer owed any wages at the time he filed his complaint. Indeed, since Aita had already been paid, with interest, at that time, he did not seek unpaid wages pursuant to the WPCL. Instead, his claim under the WPCL solely sought liquidated damages and attorney's fees. See Complaint, 2/13/19, at ¶ 18 (averring that "NCB has now paid the unpaid bonus, and interest due thereon, but remains liable for liquidated damages due under the WPCL and attorneys' fees incurred by [Aita]"). Therefore, it has become incumbent upon this Court to determine whether such an independent cause of action for liquidated damages exists. The Majority finds that it does while, for the reasons that follow, I do not.
As detailed earlier, the WPCL provides that: "No administrative proceedings or legal action shall be instituted under the provisions of this act for the collection of unpaid wages or liquidated damages more than three years after the day on which such wages were due and payable as provided in sections 3 and 5." 43 P.S. § 260.9a(g) (footnote omitted, emphasis added). Section 260.10, meanwhile, provides that where an employer did not act in good faith in withholding wages, "the employee shall be entitled to claim, in addition, as liquidated damages an amount equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount of wages due, or five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater." 43 P.S. § 260.10 (emphasis added).
I agree with the Majority that generally the word "or" is disjunctive. See Majority at 13 (citing Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875, 960 (Pa.Super. 2011)). However, reading § 260.9a(g) with the rest of the WPCL, I cannot conclude that the "or" in that section created a liquidated damages cause of action independent from one for unpaid wages where the text of § 260.10 clearly provides that a claim for liquidated damages is to be additive. To illustrate, our courts have explained that "the statute's liquidated damages provision is available to only a subset of those prevailing plaintiffs who can also prove that they are entitled to damages as a result of an employer having no good faith defense to wages remaining unpaid for a set amount of time under the statute." Andrews, 158 A.3d at 136 (emphases added). As we have explained,
[t]he WPCL is not only a vehicle for recovery of unpaid wages; it also provides for damages in the event an employer withholds compensation in the absence of good faith. Thus, for instance, if an employer withholds wages based on a dispute with the employee that would result in a set-off, the employer's reliance on the set-off must be held in good-faith. Otherwise, the employee is entitled to additional, liquidated damages pursuant to the statute[.]Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Wapner, 903 A.2d 565, 574 (Pa.Super. 2006) (emphasis added, citations omitted).
Consequently, in context, I find that §§ 260.9a(g) and 260.10 provide as follows. First, no proceedings pursuant to the WPCL shall be instituted beyond the statute of limitations period provided. Second, there are two potential causes of action. A plaintiff may file suit for (1) unpaid wages withheld in good faith, or for (2) unpaid wages withheld in the absence of good faith. If a plaintiff pursues the second cause of action, he may also seek ancillary liquidated damages, in an amount of at least five hundred dollars. As such, the WPCL does not support a separate cause of action solely for liquidated damages. Indeed, based upon the text of the statute and this Court's interpretation thereof, to be entitled to the additional remedy of liquidated damages, unpaid wages must first be recoverable.
While not binding, it bears mentioning that the Department of Labor and Industry has interpreted the WPCL in a manner consistent with my own, namely, as providing that "[a]ny employee or group of employees, labor organization or party to whom any type of wages is payable may take legal action to recover wages due plus liquidated damages." Summary of the WPCL, Department of Labor and Industry, https://www.dli.pa.gov/Individuals /Labor-Management-Relations/llc/Documents/llc-2.pdf (emphasis added).
If the WPCL, which has not been amended since 1977, meant to provide a mechanism for setting forth claims whenever an employee is paid late, it would stand to reason that such a case would have made its way to our appellate courts before now. The passage of nearly fifty years without the occurrence of any instance where an employee successfully instituted a WPCL action in our courts after being paid all outstanding late wages suggests the WPCL was not intended to operate in this fashion and need not do so in order to accomplish its goals.
That being said, I recognize that the federal courts have seen fit on occasion to permit such practice without explanation or citation to Pennsylvania authority. It is well-settled that "[w]e are not bound by federal district court opinions interpreting Pennsylvania law, but may use them for guidance where their analysis is sound." Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Am. Water Co., 850 A.2d 701, 705 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). More fundamentally, though, the three federal decisions revealed by my research do not shed meaningful light on the matter before us.
The first case apparently proceeded to trial in federal court based upon a WPCL claim solely for liquidated damages where the "[d]efendants had fully paid the claimed back wages by the time this case was filed, leaving only the propriety of liquidated damages at issue." Bair v. Purcell, No. 1:04-CV-1357, 2010 WL 3282653, at *7 (M.D.Pa. Aug. 17, 2010) (memorandum disposing of plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees). Outside this single reference, the court did not discuss the propriety of pursuing solely a liquidated damages claim under Pennsylvania's WPCL when no wages are due, and thus there is no pertinent analysis, sound or otherwise, to guide this Court on the issue presently before us.
Second, the Majority highlights Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Fryer, No. 17-2245, 2020 WL 4748296 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 17, 2020). The entire analysis regarding the timing of Fryer being paid for her paid time off with interest and Endo's motion to dismiss is a single paragraph, wherein the district court summarily denied the motion because Fryer "may still be entitled to liquidated damages[.]" Id. at *4. Thus, I do not glean any guidance from the Endo court's cursory conclusion.
The most recent federal case addresses whether a plaintiff was barred from adding a WPCL claim to a lawsuit after the parties had reached a settlement agreement regarding the underlying breach of contract claim, which included the defendant remunerating the unpaid back wages. Despite the back wages being satisfied before the complaint was amended to add the WPCL claims, the court noted that at that time, plaintiff "was still owed additional salary continuation payments by [the defendant] such that he was undoubtedly a party to whom any type of wages is payable. Hence, the statute authorizes him to bring an action to recover unpaid wages and liquidated damages." Viancourt v. Paragon Wholesale Foods Corp., No. CV 20-628, 2023 WL 2726705, at *22 (W.D.Pa. Mar. 31, 2023) (cleaned up). The court found that the plaintiff was not barred from asserting its WPCL claim for liquidated damages because the defendant did not cite any authority that a plaintiff can waive a WPCL claim by settling the underlying breach of contract claim. Likewise, there was no evidence that the parties intended for the settlement to preclude a WPCL claim, and, in any event, WPCL claims may not be waived by private agreement. Id.
In its discussion, the Viancourt court noted that the plaintiff cited Bair in support of his ability to amend the petition to raise a WPCL claim after having been paid the back wages. This mere mention of Bair did not impact the court's holding. Rather, the court held that the WPCL claim for liquidated damages was not barred because the plaintiff was authorized to bring a WPCL action as he was still owed other types of wages, and the settlement regarding the back wages did not bar pursuing a WPCL claim for liquidated damages pertaining to those back wages. In other words, the plaintiff was due wages at the time he filed the suit, and he could therefore also pursue liquidated damages. Insofar as Viancourt holds any persuasive value for this Court, it aligns with my interpretation that unpaid wages must be recoverable under the WPCL before a plaintiff may add on a claim to seek liquidated damages.
Ascribing to the statutory language of § 260.9a(a) its plain and ordinary meaning, I would find the legislature's intent is clear and unambiguous. An employee may file an action under the WPCL if, at the time the suit is initiated, there are any type of wages payable to him, that is, wages that are "to be paid" to him. See PAYABLE, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). However, as happened here, if an employer pays all outstanding wages plus interest before any suit is filed, at that point there are no longer any wages to be paid, such that the employee is no longer one "to whom any type of wages is payable[.]" 43 P.S. § 260.9a(a). Indeed, under such circumstances the employee has been made whole and, thus, no longer needs to turn to the courts to obtain full payment. See Andrews, 158 A.3d at 136 (noting that "the WPCL is intended to provide a vehicle for successful plaintiffs to be compensated for unpaid back wages based upon an existing contractual obligation").
Phrased simply, wages are not payable pursuant to the WPCL if they have already been paid. Though apparent from the plain language of the WPCL, I observe that this interpretation is also consistent with the WPCL's purpose, while not expanding the scope of the WPCL beyond the relief explicitly provided. We have explained:
The underlying purpose and intent of the WPCL is to remove some of the obstacles employees face in litigation by providing them with a statutory remedy of an employer's breach of its contractual obligation to pay wages. The WPCL does not create an employee's substantive right to compensation; rather, it only establishes a statutory vehicle to enforce payment of wages and compensation to which an employee is otherwise entitled by the terms of an agreement.Andrews, 158 A.3d at 133 (cleaned up, emphasis omitted); see also Ely v. Susquehanna Aquacultures, Inc., 130 A.3d 6, 13 (Pa.Super. 2015) ("[T]he primary goal of the WPCL is to make whole again employees whose wages were wrongfully withheld by their employers." (cleaned up)); Braun, 24 A.3d at 897 ("The WPCL is a statute permitting employees to recover unpaid wages." (citation omitted)); Belcufine v. Aloe, 112 F.3d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The WPCL arms Pennsylvania employees with a statutory vehicle for the collection of unpaid wages and benefits and provides for penalties to be imposed for non-compliance.").
In sum, the WPCL is intended to ensure that employers pay their employees, and that they do so on time. If an employer fails to do that, the WPCL provides the employee with a mechanism in which to file an action and, if the employer also withheld the wages without good reason, the employee may seek commensurate liquidated damages. Additionally, the WPCL provides for mandatory attorney's fees so that an employee's recoupment of wages due after a successful WPCL suit will not be immediately lost in paying for the attorney who had to bring the claim to obtain those unpaid wages. See Grimm v. Universal Med. Servs., Inc., 156 A.3d 1282, 1290 (Pa.Super. 2017) ("[T]he primary goal of the WPCL is to make whole again employees whose wages were wrongfully withheld by their employers. Consequently, to ensure that employees who are successful in their actions against an employer are made whole again, the statute mandates an award of attorneys' fees in addition to any judgment awarded to a plaintiff." (cleaned up)); id. at 1291 n.9 ("The award [of attorneys' fees] clearly supports the purpose of the WPCL; namely, permitting [the employee] to collect the severance payment which he was owed without causing him to incur the costs associated with the collection." (cleaned up)).
In this way, the WPCL serves as a bulwark against employers forcing employees to avail themselves of the court system to receive the wages due to them under a contractual agreement. Indeed, the mandatory nature of attorneys' fees in this context further supports our interpretation of the term "payable":
After considering § 260.9a(f) in the context of the entire statute, keeping in mind the statute's purpose of protecting employees and the remedial relief it seeks to provide, we conclude that the legislature intended a mandatory award of attorneys' fees for a plaintiff who prevails on a claim pursued under the [WPCL]. This interpretation is consistent with the general import of the statute, and goes to the very essence of its goal of making an employee whole again. Otherwise, employees who are unjustly deprived of their wages by their employers may be deterred from filing suit because of burdensome legal costs. Similarly, employees who do file suit and are successful would be subjected to payment of a substantial part of their award (which represents earned compensation) as attorneys' fees. This would clearly undermine the intent of the statute; because employees who are unable to retain their wages will not be made whole. Without an award of attorneys' fees the end result would be only a partial recovery under the statute. Therefore, under the WPCL, an employee who has prevailed on a claim for past wages due, is entitled to attorneys' fees as a matter of entitlement.Oberneder v. Link Computer Corp., 674 A.2d 720, 722 (Pa.Super. 1996) (cleaned up, emphasis added).
The Majority asserts that my interpretation renders the WPCL grace period "a mere suggestion" and would permit "an employer to drag its feet for months and escape liability for liquidated damages by finally paying the employee's due and payable wages just before the employee files suit." Majority at 12-13. Respectfully, that may only be the case where an employee chooses to sit on his rights. The WPCL was not written to protect dilatory enforcement, and this Court cannot read more into the statute than what is plainly provided for on its face. The legislature chose not to provide relief under the WPCL any time an employee is paid in an untimely manner, and it is beyond our purview to expand its scope to provide for such an action. Rather, the WPCL protects plaintiffs by allowing them to recover wages due at the time of filing a suit. Only after clearing that initial hurdle may a subset of plaintiffs pursue additional, liquidated damages.
Consequently, insofar as the court granted Aita's motion for summary judgment and denied NCB's motion for summary judgment based on an impermissible expansion of the scope of the WPCL, I would find that it erred. Since it is undisputed that no wages were payable to Aita at the time he filed the instant suit under the WPCL, as a matter of law he was not entitled to relief. The trial court should have granted NCB's motion for summary judgment and denied Aita's cross-motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the trial court and remand for the court to enter judgment in favor of NCB and against Aita on the WPCL claim.
In light of my proposed disposition, I would not reach NCB's remaining claims or the issue raised in Aita's cross-appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, I am compelled to dissent from the opinion of my esteemed colleagues.
Judge Stabile, Judge Dubow, and Judge Sullivan join this Dissenting Opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
SULLIVAN, J.
Based upon the particular facts of this case, I join the learned Dissent's opinion reversing the order of the trial court. I write separately, however, because the Dissent's correct statutory analysis of the Wage Payment and Collection Law ("WPCL") highlights a shortcoming that may frustrate the very purpose of the statute.
"The primary goal of the WPCL is to make whole again employees whose wages were wrongfully withheld by their employers." Ely v. Susquehanna, Inc., 130 A.3d 6, 13 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Under the WPCL an employee has a remedy when any type of wage "is payable", and the penalty of "liquidated damages" is collectable if the wages remain unpaid for more than 30 days, or more than 60 days in certain instances defined under the statute. See 43 P.S. §§ 260.9a(a) and 260.10. Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the words of the statute. When interpreting a statute, courts may not look beyond the plain meaning of a statute under the guise of pursuing its spirit. See City of Johnstown v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 255 A.3d 214, 220 (Pa. 2021).
While I agree with the dissent's interpretation of the plain meaning of the phrase "is payable," see Dis. Op. at 4-7, I am concerned that under that interpretation, an employer could, without good reason, make a practice of paying its employees one-to-two weeks late, with interest, which would make it practically impossible for the employees to have wages "payable" for a sufficient period to allow them to file suit under the WPCL and, if unpaid for more than 30 days, seek liquidated damages. For the innumerable employees who live paycheck to paycheck, such a practice could have dire financial consequences, including, for example, penalties for late payment of rent or the necessity to take a "pay day" loan at exorbitant interest rates, which could heavily burden an employee's personal budget with no statutory opportunity to be made whole. Yet under such a scenario, the employer would not be required to pay liquidated damages and would have no disincentive to discontinue the practice.
It is, however, not within the purview of this Court to "disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Goodwin v. Goodwin, 280 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). The Legislature, not this Court, is charged with the authority to make any changes in the WPCL it deems necessary to protect employees against the hypothetical employer practice described above. Thus, because I agree with the Dissent's interpretation of the plain language of the WPCL, I join the Dissent.
Judge Dubow joins this dissenting opinion.