Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:02-CV-611-Y.
June 22, 2005
ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, REMANDING STATE-LAW CLAIM TO STATE COURT, AND MOOTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
Pending before the Court are two motions: (1) defendants Bruce Espin, Kenneth Matthews, Chris Cogdill, and the City of Granbury's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 1, 2004, and (2) the defendants' Motion To Strike The Evidence Offered By the Plaintiffs In Support Of Their Response To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed May 26. Having carefully considered the motions, responses, and replies, the Court concludes that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be PARTIALLY GRANTED, and that the defendants' motion to strike should be rendered MOOT.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The Court, in analyzing a motion for summary judgment, must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Newell v. Oxford Management Inc., 912 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1990).
On June 26, 2000, Ben Fuller met with plaintiff Lanny Aiken at the offices of plaintiff Lanny Aiken Insurance Company, Inc. ("the Insurance Company") to discuss Fuller's personal automobile insurance policy. Fuller had previously spoken to employees of the Insurance Company over the telephone and used harsh, hostile, and profane language during each conversation. Aiken had invited Fuller to come to the Insurance Company to discuss the matter in person.
The Insurance Company was located in Granbury, Texas.
Aiken, who was approximately 65 years old at this time, was co-owner and president of the Insurance Company.
Fuller denies using "foul language" when speaking with any of the employees of the Insurance Company. (Fuller Dep. at 13; Defs.' App. at 116.)
When Fuller arrived at the Insurance Company's premises, Aiken met with him in Aiken's office. Although the parties differ on exactly what happened during this meeting, Aiken claims that, at some point, Fuller stated that the employees of the Insurance Company were a bunch of "dumb, fucking whores." (Aiken Dep. at 13; Defs.' App. at 103; see also Pls.' Resp. at 2.) At this point, Aiken states that he asked Fuller to take his business somewhere else and asked him to leave the office.
The Insurance Company's premises were "comprised of doorless open cubicles divided by thin board approximately five feet high. Employees and customers could regularly hear others in the office talking and loud noises could easily be heard throughout the office." (Pls.' Resp. at 2.)
Aiken concedes that he ordered Fuller out of his office with the command "get the fuck out of my office" and that he also told Fuller that he could "shove it up [his] ass." (Aiken Dep. at 13; Defs. App. at 103; see also Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.)
Aiken claims that Fuller left his office and proceeded to the front reception area of the Insurance Company's premises. Once Fuller got to the front reception area, he began yelling and screaming that Aiken had hit him in the head with a baseball bat. Aiken, hearing the commotion, went to the front and again asked Fuller to leave. Aiken claims that as Fuller was leaving, Fuller turned to Aiken and threatened Aiken's life. Aiken further claims that several employees and customers witnessed this whole event. After Fuller left, the receptionist of the Insurance Company informed Aiken that Fuller had accused him of hitting Fuller in the head with a baseball bat. Subsequently, Aiken called 911 to report the incident and notify the police about Fuller's threats. The dispatcher informed Aiken that a patrol car would be sent to his location.
Fuller claims that Aiken followed Fuller out of the office with a baseball bat. ( See, e.g., Fuller Dep. at 59-60; Defs.' App. at 125-26.)
Fuller denies that he made any threatening statements to Aiken. (Fuller Dep. at 60; Defs.' App. at 126.)
Fuller, after leaving the Insurance Company, got into his vehicle and drove to the "Suds Your Duds Laundry Mat" ("the laundry mat"), which was about one block away. At the laundry mat, Fuller dialed 911 and reported that he had been hit in the head with a baseball bat. At 10:09 a.m., City of Granbury Police Officer Christine Willsey received a dispatch to respond to Aiken's call. In route, Officer Willsey was redirected to the location of the laundry mat to meet with Fuller. Officer Willsey met with Fuller in the parking lot of the laundry mat, where Fuller claimed that Aiken had hit him in the head with a baseball bat. Fuller asserted that Aiken had "retrieved a baseball bat from behind his desk, walked towards [Fuller] and started twirling the bat." (Pls.' Resp. at 4.) Fuller further alleged that Aiken "then suddenly and unexpectedly quit twirling the bat and hit Fuller in the head with the small blunt end." (Pls.' Resp. at 4.) Fuller also told Officer Willsey that Aiken, still holding the baseball bat, had chased Fuller out of the Insurance Company and into the parking lot. Officer Willsey observed that Fuller had a small red "straight pen like swollen area above his eyebrow." (Pls.' Resp. at 4.)
According to Fuller, he was struck "between the eyes on the forehead." (Fuller Dep. at 34; Defs.' App. at 122.)
At some point, an ambulance arrived at the laundry mat. Fuller told the medical personnel that his head hurt and that he had blurred vision. Fuller did not go to the hospital on the ambulance; instead, he chose to go see his own doctor. (Fuller Dep. at 30; Defs.' App. at 120.)
Officer Chris Cogdill was the first Granbury police officer to arrive at the Insurance Company. Aiken invited Cogdill into his office and told Officer Cogdill his version of the events. He denied that he had hit Fuller and remarked that a room full of witnesses could confirm that he did not chase Fuller out of the building with a baseball bat. Officer Cogdill stated that Aiken "was extremely courteous." (Cogdill's Dep. at 23; Defs.' App. at 60.)
Aiken claims that Officer Cogdill did not interview any other employees or customers at the Insurance Company that witnessed the events. (Aiken Dep. at 22; Defs.' App. at 107.) However, Sgt. Matthews claims that he and Officer Cogdill had been unable to locate any witnesses to "what had occurred inside Mr. Aiken's office." (Matthews Aff. at 3; Defs.' App. at 206; see also Cogdill Aff. at 3; Defs.' App. at 210.)
Shortly thereafter, Sgt. Kenneth Matthews, Officer Cogdill's supervisor, arrived at the Insurance Company. He and Officer Cogdill observed a wooden baseball bat sitting in Aiken's office, along with other sports memorabilia. He conferred with Officer Cogdill and they made contact with Officer Willsey. Officer Willsey relayed to Sgt. Matthews and Officer Cogdill the allegations that Fuller had made to her. She also indicated that Cogdill had injuries consistent with being struck by a baseball bat. (Cogdill Aff. at 3; Defs.' App. at 210.) Subsequently, Sgt. Matthews placed a call to Deputy Chief Bruce Espin, who was the highest-ranking police officer on duty that day, to determine whether he should arrest Aiken. Deputy Chief Espin and Sgt. Matthews discussed whether there was probable cause to arrest Aiken for aggravated assault. Thereafter, Sgt. Matthews instructed Officer Cogdill to arrest Aiken. Officer Cogdill then informed Aiken that he was under arrest and led Aiken to the back door of the Insurance Company. Once they were outside, Officer Cogdill handcuffed Aiken and placed him under arrest for the aggravated assault of Fuller.
The chief of police of the Granbury police department was either out of town or unavailable at the time.
Specifically, Sgt. Matthews stated that Deputy Chief Espin advised him that there was enough probable cause to make an arrest but that it was Matthews's decision to arrest Aiken. (Matthews Dep. at 11-12; Defs.' App. at 77-78.) Deputy Chief Espin, in his deposition, states that he does not remember "anything of what was discussed." (Espin Dep. at 21; Defs.' App. at 11.) In addition, Deputy Chief Espin claims that he "did not order nor command the arrest of Mr. Lanny Aiken although [he] did talk with Sgt. Matthews about the facts surrounding the incident." (Espin Aff. at 3; Defs.' App. at 202.) Deputy Chief Espin further stated, "It is the officers on the scene who have the discretionary authority to determine whether probable cause exists to effectuate an arrest in compliance with the applicable law." ( Id.)
Thereafter, Aiken was indicted on the aggravated assault charge. Thereafter, on July 11, 2000, Aiken filed a civil lawsuit against Fuller. The civil case was eventually settled and Fuller requested that the criminal charges against Aiken be dropped. Once they were dropped, Aiken had his criminal record expunged.
Subsequently, Aiken and the Insurance Company filed suit in state court against the defendants. The defendants removed the case to this Court on July 15, 2002. In their Second Amended Original Complaint, the plaintiffs assert claims against the individual police officer defendants for: (1) false imprisonment under state common law and (2) unlawful arrest, made actionable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Furthermore, the plaintiffs assert a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Granbury, alleging that its official policy or custom caused Aiken to be deprived of his federally protected rights.
The defendants, in their motion for summary judgment, claim they are entitled to summary judgment based on several grounds, including that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity as to the federal-law claim for unlawful arrest and to official immunity as to the state-law claim for false imprisonment. In addition, the defendants argue that the City of Granbury is entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiffs' claims against it fail as a matter of law.
II. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when the record establishes that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56©; Hill v. London, Stetelman, Kirkwood, Inc., 906 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1990). An issue is considered "genuine" if "it is real and substantial as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham." Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilkinson v. Powell, 149 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1945)). Facts are considered "material" if they "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine whether an issue of material fact exists, the Court must first consult the applicable substantive law to ascertain what fact issues are material to the disposition of the case. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990).
The Court must review the evidence presented, viewing the facts and inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Newell v. Oxford Management Inc., 912 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1990); Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1989). The Court's function is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249 (1986). Where the movant bears the burden of proof on a claim or defense, he must establish all elements of the claim or defense to prevail on summary judgment. Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Copeland, 651 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (S.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 824 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1987).
When the moving party has carried its summary-judgment burden, the respondent "must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). The respondent must produce evidence, not merely argument, in response to a movant's properly supported motion for summary judgment. See Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir. 1988); Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987).
III. FEDERAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS
A. Individual Officers
In this case, the individual police officers seek summary judgment on the basis that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to the federal-law claim for false arrest. To the extent the plaintiffs seek money damages directly from the individual officers for their actions taken under color of state law, the officers may invoke their right to qualified immunity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991). Public officials performing discretionary functions enjoy immunity from suits for damages, provided their "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Because an official is entitled to immunity from suit, not merely from liability, immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in the litigation. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code imposes liability upon "every person who, under color of state law or custom, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." By its terms, section 1983 "creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities." Impler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). "Rather than creating substantive rights, § 1983 simply provides a remedy for the rights that it designates." Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989). To state a valid claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must "(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or law of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person [or entity] acting under color of state law." Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing West v. Akins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
"Because of the underlying purposes of qualified immunity, . . . summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity questions [are reviewed] differently from other summary judgment decisions." Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1995)). Once the defendant official asserts the qualified-immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy the first two elements of the three-part qualified-immunity inquiry. See Holland, 268 F.3d at 1185-86; Bazan ex. rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo City, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001); Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1997). If the plaintiff successfully satisfies these two elements, the "burden shifts to the defendant, who must prove `that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he . . . is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Holland, 268 F.3d at 1186 (citing Medina, 252 F.3d at 1128).
When this Court is called upon to confer qualified immunity upon a government official accused of violating a federal constitutional or statutory right, the Fifth Circuit requires the Court first to employ a three-party inquiry. See Conroe Creosoting Co. v. Montgomery Cty., Tex., 249 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2001). Initially, the Court must determine whether the complainant has actually alleged the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right. See id.; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). If the Court determines that he has, the Court must then decide whether, at the time of the alleged violation, that right was so clearly established that a reasonable government official in the defendant's situation would have understood that his conduct violated that right. See Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993). No prior case directly on point need be extant but, again, the official must have been able to understand that what he did violated a federal right. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640; Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1995). Finally, the Court must "determine whether the record indicates that the violation occurred, or gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant actually engaged in the conduct that violated the clearly established right." See Conroe Creosoting Co., 249 F.3d at 340; Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir. 1999).
This second part of the three-part inquiry is often condensed into "objective reasonableness." Many cases, then, ask whether the accused government official's conduct was objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Conroe Creosoting Co., 249 F.3d at 340. Anderson seems to supply some intermediate language between the full and the condensed expression of the second part of the three-part inquiry: "Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action turns on the `objective legal reasonableness' of the action . . . assessed in light of the legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
1. Officer Cogdill and Sgt. Matthews
In fidelity to the law regarding qualified immunity discussed above, the first issue is whether the plaintiffs have alleged a constitutional violation. In this case, the plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Officer Cogdill and Sgt. Matthews unlawfully arrested Aiken without probable cause and without a warrant. (Pls.' Am. Compl. at 14-15.)
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that "an arrest be supported by a properly issued arrest warrant or probable cause." Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001); see Farris v. Slaton, No. Civ. A. 3:97-CV-1223-D, 1999 WL 47262, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 1999) ("A warrantless arrest made without probable cause violates the arrestee's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights."). In cases such as this one, where the officers arrested the plaintiff without a warrant, "probable cause exists when the totality of facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense." United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1996).
In this case, it is clear that the Officer Cogdill and Sgt. Matthews had probable cause, as defined under federal law, to conclude that Aiken had committed, at the very least, the offense of assault. The officers had the testimony of an alleged victim, Fuller, who claimed that Aiken had hit him in the head with a bat, there was a visible injury on Fuller's head that appeared to be consistent with his claims, and there was a bat located in Aiken's office.
The plaintiffs argue that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity because they did not have probable cause under Texas law to arrest Aiken. Under Texas law, a person commits the offense of assault if he intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(2) (West Supp. 2004). Furthermore, a person commits the offense of aggravated assault if he commits an assault and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon while doing so. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West Supp. 2004). In Texas, a police officer may arrest, without a warrant, "persons who the peace officer has probable cause to believe have committed an assault resulting in bodily injury to another person and the peace officer has probable cause to believe that there is danger of further bodily injury to that person." TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis supplied).
Although the Court questions whether the officers did have probable cause under Texas law to arrest Aiken, the Court, when analyzing whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity, are required to apply federal law. In Fields v. City of South Houston, Texas, 922 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1991), the Court addressed the issue of whether to apply Texas state law or federal law in determining if a warrantless arrest violated section 1983. In this case, a police officer had arrested a person for public intoxication and public exposure, both of which constituted misdemeanors in Texas. In Texas, such an arrest without a warrant was only valid if the offender had committed the offenses within the officer's presence or view. The Court, acknowledging that the officer did not have probable cause under Texas law to arrest the offender because the offenses were not committed in the officer's presence, held that the arrest was valid under federal constitutional principles. Specifically, the Court stated:
The United States Constitution does not require a warrant for misdemeanors not occurring in the presence of the arresting officer. Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1974). For the reasons set forth by our brothers in the Fourth Circuit, we hold `there is no cause of action for `false arrest' under section 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause.' Id. at 372-73. Accordingly, a federal civil rights action will not lie for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest [made] in violation of state law [unless made without probable cause]. Section 1983 is a federally created cause of action to redress civil rights violations. `The states are free to impose greater restrictions on arrests, but their citizens do not thereby acquire a greater federal right.' Id. at 372.Fields, 922 F.2d at 1183. Because the officers did have probable cause under federal law to believe that Aiken had committed an assault on Fuller, the plaintiffs have failed to allege a constitutional violation. Consequently, Officer Cogdill and Sgt. Matthews are entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court notes, once again, that the first step in performing a qualified-immunity analysis is always to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right. In some circumstances, such as in this case where the plaintiffs are alleging that their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures has been violated, the first step of the qualified-immunity analysis involves a reasonableness issue: Was the seizure unreasonable? The Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 636-37 (1987), and Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001), has made clear that this analysis is not to be confused or combined with the second step of the qualified-immunity analysis, which also contains a reasonableness issue: Was the right to be free of illegal searches so clearly established that a reasonable officer in the defendant's situation would have understood that his conduct violated that right?
2. Deputy Chief Espin
The next issue is whether Deputy Chief Espin is entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiffs' federal-law claim for unlawful arrest. "The issue of whether a supervisor may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a separate analysis than that applied above." Evett, 330 F.3d at 689. Supervisory officials may not be found liable for the actions of their subordinates under § 1983 under a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452 (5th Cir. 1994); see Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58 (1974). Instead, to succeed on a claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show "either the supervisor personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that there is a `sufficient causal connection' between the supervisor's conduct and the constitutional violation." Evett, 330 F.3d at 689 (quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452-54 (5th Cir. 1994). "A supervisory official is held to a standard of `deliberate indifference, which requires proof that the supervisor `disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.'" Evett, 330 F.3d at 689.
Because, as discussed above, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs did not allege a constitutional violation against Officers Cogdill and Sgt. Matthews because they had probable cause to arrest Aiken, there is no constitutional violation for which Deputy Chief Espin can be held liable. Consequently, Deputy Chief Espin is also entitled to qualified immunity.
B. City of Granbury
The City of Granbury is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because no constitutional violation was committed by the individual defendants. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (holding that damages cannot be awarded against a municipal corporation based upon the actions of one of its officers if that officer inflicted no constitutional harm); Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 191 n. 18 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that "if the plaintiff does not show any violation os his constitutional rights — then there exists no liability to pass through to the county").
IV. STATE-LAW CLAIMS
The plaintiffs have also asserted a state-law claim against the defendants for false imprisonment. Although the removal of this case was originally "jurisdictionally proper" based on federal-question jurisdiction, this basis of jurisdiction no longer exists since all the federal claims have been ruled upon and only state-law claims remain. The United States Supreme Court, in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988), addressed the issue of whether a district court has discretion to remand a removed case to state court when all federal-law claims have dropped out of the action and only pendent state-law claims remain. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In this case, the Supreme Court stated:
The elements of a false imprisonment claim are that (1) the defendant willfully detained the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff did not consent to the detention, and (3) defendant lacked legal authority or justification for the detention. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002).
We conclude that a district court has discretion [under the doctrine of pendent or supplemental jurisdiction] to remand to state court a removed case involving pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate. The discretion to remand enables district courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.Id. at 357.
In light of the Carnegie-Mellon decision, the Court concludes that retaining jurisdiction over this case would be inappropriate, and that convenience and fairness dictates that the cause should be remanded. Consequently, the Court will remand the remaining state-law claim to state Court.
V. OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO STRIKE
The plaintiffs object to the use by the defendants of certain portions of the individual officer's affidavits. As to the plaintiffs' objections, the Court did not consider the objected-to portions of the affidavits when making its rulings. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs' objections should be rendered MOOT.
With respect to the defendants' motion to strike, the Court did not, when ruling on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, consider the evidence to which the defendants objected. Consequently, the Court concludes that the defendants' motion to strike should be rendered MOOT.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [doc.# 50-1] is PARTIALLY GRANTED in that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiff's federal claim for unlawful arrest and the City of Granbury is entitled to summary judgment as to the plaintiff's federal claim pursuant to section 1983.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff's remaining state-law claim for false imprisonment is REMANDED to the 355th Judicial District Court, Hood County, Texas (cause no. C2002226).
It is further ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Strike [doc. # 68-1] is rendered MOOT.