Opinion
1130 Index No. 152345/20 Case No. 2023–00893
11-30-2023
Aqeel AHMAD, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Brinda BEHAL, Defendant–Respondent.
Alexander J. Wulwick, New York, for appellant. The Zweig Law Firm, P.C., Woodmere (Daniel P. Rifkin of counsel), for respondent.
Alexander J. Wulwick, New York, for appellant.
The Zweig Law Firm, P.C., Woodmere (Daniel P. Rifkin of counsel), for respondent.
Kapnick, J.P., Webber, Singh, Moulton, Scarpulla, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (James G. Clynes, J.), entered January 18, 2023, which denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted.
Plaintiff met his prima facie burden of establishing his entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability by submitting an affidavit stating that when he braked because of the 15 miles per hour speed limit imposed by a construction area in the Holland Tunnel, defendant's car collided with the rear of his vehicle three times (see Reyes v. Gropper, 212 A.D.3d 565, 565, 183 N.Y.S.3d 369 [1st Dept. 2023] ). It is well established that a rear-end collision with a slowing or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle (see e.g. Kalair v. Fajerman, 202 A.D.3d 625, 626, 164 N.Y.S.3d 106 [1st Dept. 2022] ).
In opposition, defendant failed to provide a nonnegligent explanation for the accident ( Baez–Pena v. MM Truck and Body Repair, Inc., 151 A.D.3d 473, 476, 56 N.Y.S.3d 307 [1st Dept. 2017] ). Defendant failed to establish that she maintained a safe following distance (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] ; Chame v. Kronen, 150 A.D.3d 622, 622, 55 N.Y.S.3d 228 [1st Dept. 2017] ) and that any repeated braking by plaintiff was not foreseeable due to the existence of the construction zone and 15 mile per hour speed limit. Defendant failed to establish that given the circumstances she could have "reasonably expected that traffic would continue unimpeded" ( Baez–Pena, at 477, 56 N.Y.S.3d 307 ; see also Diako v. Yunga, 126 A.D.3d 567, 3 N.Y.S.3d 577 [1st Dept. 2015] ). While defendant claims that plaintiff made a sudden stop, a "claim by the rear driver that the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence" ( Bajrami v. Twinkle Cab Corp., 147 A.D.3d 649, 649, 46 N.Y.S.3d 879 [1st Dept. 2017] [internal quotation marks and omitted]; see also Cabrera v. Rodriguez, 72 A.D.3d 553, 553, 900 N.Y.S.2d 29 [1st Dept. 2010] ).
Furthermore, the motion for summary judgment was not premature. Plaintiff's affidavit established that a rear-end collision occurred, and defendant was in a position to proffer sufficient relevant information concerning the circumstances of the accident ( CPLR 3212[f] ; see Salodkaya v. City of New York, 193 A.D.3d 604, 604–605, 147 N.Y.S.3d 24 [1st Dept. 2021] ; Mirza v. Tribeca Auto. Inc., 189 A.D.3d 448, 448, 137 N.Y.S.3d 13 [1st Dept. 2020] ).