Opinion
9:12-CV-0575 (DNH/TWD)
07-30-2014
KARL AHLERS, Plaintiff, v. MIA TOWNSEND, Defendant.
APPEARANCES: KARL AHLERS, 61656-305 Plaintiff pro se CNY PC PO Box 300 Marcy, NY 13403 HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General for the State of New York Counsel for Defendants The Capitol Albany, NY 12224 OF COUNSEL: C. HARRIS DAGUE, ESQ.
APPEARANCES: KARL AHLERS, 61656-305
Plaintiff pro se
CNY PC
PO Box 300
Marcy, NY 13403
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General for the State of New York
Counsel for Defendants
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224
OF COUNSEL: C. HARRIS DAGUE, ESQ. THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
This pro se civil rights action, commenced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has been referred to me for Report and Recommendation by the Honorable David N. Hurd, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(c). Plaintiff Karl Ahlers claims that he was deprived of his rights regarding telephone communication by Defendant Mia Townsend. (Dkt. No. 5.) Currently pending before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Dkt. No. 19.) For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that Defendant's motion be granted.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Plaintiff, a former prisoner of the State of New York, was civilly committed following his sentence and has been in the custody of the Central New York Psychiatric Center ("CNYPC") since 2009. (Dkt. No. 5 at 2, 6.)
As a patient at CNYPC, Plaintiff was issued a phone card which could be used to make phone calls from the facility, provided that there were sufficient funds on the account. (Dkt. No. 5 at 6.) From February 2012 to late July or August 2012, Plaintiff's phone card account was suspended by CNYPC staff because they believed Plaintiff owed money related to his account. Id. at 8-9. During this time, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, the primary therapist on Plaintiff's ward, "repeatedly without explanation nor due process, refused to permit Plaintiff to make and/or delayed permission to telephone Plaintiff's attorneys as well as refusing to permit Plaintiff (without explanation or due process[)], to make collect calls . . . to friends, family, and/or his support group members." Id. at 11-12.
Plaintiff elaborates in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment that between February 2 and July 26, 2012, he requested a slip to speak with an attorney forty-five times. (Dkt. No. 21 ¶¶ 32-33.) He was granted twenty-two attorney phone calls, and denied twenty-three. Id. Of the twenty-four dates on which he requested attorney call slips, on sixteen days he made multiple call requests. Id. On all but nine days, Plaintiff was granted permission to speak with an attorney at least once. Id. In addition, Plaintiff claims that all eighteen of the collect calls to family or friends which he requested were denied. Id.
Defendant's role is unclear. Plaintiff claims that it was Defendant who granted or denied permission to call attorneys or to make collect calls. (Dkt. No. 5 at 11-12.) Jeffrey Nowicki, the Chief of Mental Health Treatment at CNYPC, declares to the contrary that Defendant Townsend did not have the authority to deny telephone request slips. (Dkt. No. 19-3 ¶ 35.)
Telephone usage is governed at CNYPC by the internal policy numbered 5.1. (Dkt. No. 19-4 at 17-30.) That policy declares that calling card use is a privilege that can be suspended on the basis of treatment, safety, or security issues. Id. at 17, 21, 26. The policy states, however, that "[r]esidents will retain their collect call privileges should they lose the ability to participate in the Calling Card Program." Id. The policy states that "residents shall be permitted to make calls during non-program, non-meal times from 8:00 a.m. until 10:30 p.m." Id. at 18, 22, 27 (emphasis added). Residents' phone privileges may be restricted "[o]n rare occasions" if such a restriction is supported by a physician's order and documented in a medical record progress note. Id.
Plaintiff first filed this action on April 4, 2012. (Dkt. No. 1.) Although Plaintiff's initial complaint and amended complaint included claims regarding improper behavior on the part of the CNYPC staff with regard to the funds in Plaintiff's phone card account and a Fourth Amendment claim regarding the seizure of his legal paperwork, all claims except those pertaining to Defendant Townsend's alleged restrictions on Plaintiff's telephone use were dismissed with prejudice upon this Court's initial reviews. (Dkt. Nos. 4, 7.) As such, only those facts which pertain to the remaining claims are outlined above. Defendant now moves for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 19.) Plaintiff has opposed the motion. (Dkt. No. 21.)
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Legal Standard Governing Motions for Summary Judgment
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is warranted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing, through the production of admissible evidence, that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2006). Only after the moving party has met this burden is the nonmoving party required to produce evidence demonstrating that genuine issues of material fact exist. Id. at 273. The nonmoving party must do more than "rest upon the mere allegations . . . of the [plaintiff's] pleading" or "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 & n.11 (1986). Rather, a dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008).
A fact is "material" only if it would have some effect on the outcome of the suit. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
B. Legal Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
To the extent that a defendant's motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is based entirely on the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, such a motion is functionally the same as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As a result, "[w]here appropriate, a trial judge may dismiss for failure to state a cause of action upon motion for summary judgment." Schwartz v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 1968); accord Katz v. Molic, 128 F.R.D. 35, 37-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("This Court finds that . . . a conversion [of a Rule 56 summary judgment motion to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint] is proper with or without notice to the parties."). Accordingly, it is appropriate to summarize the legal standard governing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, inter alia, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff "show" that he or she is entitled to relief means that a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (emphasis added). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense . . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).
"In reviewing a complaint for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Courts are "obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally." Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III. ANALYSIS
Construing Plaintiff's complaint liberally, Plaintiff has alleged a First Amendment violation regarding telephone contact with family, a First Amendment violation regarding access to courts, and a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation concerning these telephone rights. (Dkt. No. 5.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not stated cognizable First Amendment claims and has shown no protected liberty interest for the Fourteenth Amendment claim, and moves for summary judgment on those grounds. (Dkt. No 19-5.) For the reasons below, I recommend that Defendant's motion be granted.
A. First Amendment Contact with Family
Construing the complaint liberally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Townsend restricted his access to the telephone in violation of his First Amendment rights to contact his family. (Dkt. No. 5 at 11-12.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for a First Amendment violation or raised a triable issue of fact. (Dkt. No. 19-5 at 4-5.) For the reasons stated below, Defendant is correct.
Page numbers in citations to Defendant's memorandum of law refer to the page numbers in the original document rather than to the page numbers assigned by the Court's electronic filing system.
First, it is necessary to comment on Plaintiff's status as a civilly committed individual. While the majority of § 1983 case law involving telephone access concerns prisoners, Plaintiff has completed his criminal sentence and is no longer a prisoner. Nevertheless, the same analyses for alleged civil rights violations apply here. In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319-24 (1982), the Supreme Court made clear that civilly committed persons retain various constitutional rights, but that these rights must be tempered by the relevant state interest and the (presumably correct) opinions of trained professionals. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) ("[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.").
More specifically, for First Amendment claims by civilly committed individuals involving access to telephones, the Second Circuit has affirmed district court rulings which apply the Turner standard (originally for prisoners) to the rights of the civilly committed. See, e.g., Yeldon v. Hogan, No. 9:08-CV-769 (NAM/RFT), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23821, at *19-22, 2010 WL 983819, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010), aff'd, 400 F. App'x 580 (2d Cir. 2010). The aforementioned standard, from Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987), is a balancing test pursuant to which courts analyze prohibitions on prisoners' exercise of their constitutional rights by considering the following four factors: (1) whether prohibiting an inmate from exercising a constitutional right is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising that right; (3) what effect accommodation of the interest would have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether there are ready alternatives available that continue to serve the prison's interest without impinging constitutional rights. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet addressed the issue of telephone access for the civilly committed in a reported decision.
Lexis and Westlaw list different dates for this decision. This Court has used the date from the Lexis version, which refers to the date of the magistrate judge's Report-Recommendation.
The Court will provide Plaintiff with a copy of all unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
It is well settled that a prisoner retains the right under the First Amendment to communicate with family and friends. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 1975). However, such right is not limitless. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
While a prisoner has a constitutional right to communicate with the outside world, this right does not include a guarantee of a specific means of communication. Thus, for example, there is no constitutionally guaranteed right of a prisoner to unrestricted use of a telephone. See Banks v. Argo, No. 11 Civ. 4222 (LAP), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141853, at *14-17, 2012 WL 4471585, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012); Bellamy v. McMickens. 692 F. Supp. 205, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). A prisoner's access to family and friends via telephone may be restricted so long as the prisoner has some other avenue to communicate, even if less than ideal. See Edwards v. Horn, No. 10 Civ. 6194 (RJS) (JLC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18424, at *17-18, 2012 WL 473481, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012) (denial of free telephone calls to prisoner is not actionable claim); Henry v. Davis, No. 10 Civ. 7575 (PAC) (JLC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84100, at *7, 2011 WL 3295986, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2011) ("Phone restrictions do not impinge on a prisoner's constitutional rights where an inmate has alternate means of communicating with the outside world."). Furthermore, phone restrictions have generally been upheld so long as the individual could still communicate with his family via mail. Pitsley v. Ricks, No. 96-CV-0372 (NAM) (DRH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5402, at *18, 2000 WL 362023, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000). This is treated as an element of the claim, and it is Plaintiff's burden to make a showing that he did not have access to other avenues, such as via mail. See Riddick v. Arnone, No. 3:11-cv-631 (SRU), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94718, at *16, 2012 WL 2716355, at *6 (D. Conn. July 9, 2012).
Here, neither Plaintiff's complaint nor his memorandum of law refer in any way to a restriction on access to mail. (Dkt. Nos. 5, 21.) There is no evidence from which to draw the inference that Plaintiff was also restricted in his access to mail. The phone restrictions at issue therefore do not constitute a First Amendment violation. As such, I recommend that the Court grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismiss Plaintiff's First Amendment claim regarding phone contact with his family and friends.
B. First Amendment Access to Courts
Construing the complaint liberally, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Townsend violated his First Amendment right to access the courts by denying attorney phone calls. (Dkt. No. 5 at 11-12.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for or raised a triable issue of fact as to a First Amendment violation for denial of access to courts. (Dkt. No. 19-5 at 5-6.) For the reasons stated below, Defendant is correct.
As with contact with family, a prisoner's access to counsel via telephone may be restricted so long as the prisoner has some other avenue to communicate, even if less than ideal. Pino v. Dalsheim, 558 F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (restrictions on telephone calls permitted where prisoner had other means to communicate with attorney). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied the opportunity to communicate with his attorney altogether, but rather that his ability to communicate was sometimes delayed and intermittently denied. Conceivably, Plaintiff could have met with his attorney via mail or in person as well. As discussed above, his complaint is silent with regard to these other forms of communication. Plaintiff has thus not stated a First Amendment claim.
Furthermore, to state a claim for deprivation of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly suggesting that (1) the defendant acted deliberately and maliciously, and (2) the plaintiff suffered an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996); Howard v. Leonardo, 845 F. Supp. 943, 946 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (Hurd, M.J.). Here, while Plaintiff has alleged a restriction on his ability to contact his attorney by telephone, he has not commented on any underlying action, nor has he shown that he has suffered any legal injury. Accordingly, on these grounds as well, Plaintiff's allegations fail to rise to the level of a First Amendment violation. Therefore, I recommend that the Court grant Defendant's motion and dismiss Plaintiff's First Amendment claim regarding telephone contact with his attorney.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Read liberally, Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that Defendant deprived him of his phone privileges without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 5 at 11-12.) Defendant argues that there is no protected liberty or property interest at issue which could support a § 1983 claim. (Dkt. No. 19-5 at 6-7.) For the reasons stated below, Defendant is correct.
To establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must show (1) that he had a property or liberty interest, and (2) that he was deprived of such interest without due process of law. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972); McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2010). In considering whether a civilly committed individual's Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated, courts must "show deference to the judgment exercised by . . . qualified professional[s]," whose decisions are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23. The rights of such individuals must be balanced with the legitimate State interests, bearing in mind the constraints under which State facilities operate. Id. at 321. While "[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish" (id. at 321-22), "the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised . . . [i]t is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made." Id. at 321. This district in particular presumes restrictions on liberty interests by medical professionals at CNYPC as correct for the purposes of deciding Fourteenth Amendment claims. See Yeldon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23825, at *10, 2010 WL 983819, at *5.
Here, Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that "Defendant Townsend . . . repeatedly and without explanation or due process, refused to permit Plaintiff to make and/or delayed permission to telephone Plaintiff's attorneys as well as refusing to permit plaintiff . . . to make collect calls to friends, family, and/or his support group members." (Dkt. No. 5 at 11-12.) Defendant does not cite, and this Court cannot find, case law specifically addressing telephone restrictions as liberty interests in the context of civilly committed individuals. However, in the analogous context of prisoner liberty interests, "the loss of phones, packages, and commissary privileges does not give rise to a protected liberty interest under New York law." Smart v. Goord, 441 F. Supp. 2d 631, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Johnson v. Enu, No. 08-CV-158 (FJS/DRH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86831, at *34-35, 2011 WL 3439179, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. July 13, 2011) (suspension of recreation, commissary, and phone privileges did not give rise to a protected liberty interest); Edelkind v. Killian, No. 09 Civ. 5835 (SHS)(MHD), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157207, at *46, 2011 WL 10599973, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011) ("[L]oss of telephone privileges is plainly a common incident of prison life and hence does not itself reflect a circumstance that implicates the loss of a liberty interest."); Husbands v. McClellan, 990 F. Supp. 214, 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding temporary loss of various privileges—telephone, package, commissary, and recreation—did "not represent the type of deprivation which could reasonably be viewed as imposing an atypical and significant hardship on an inmate").
Even if there were a protected liberty interest in this case, Defendant Townsend, as a primary therapist, is a medical professional, and her decisions concerning restrictions on Plaintiff's rights are presumed to be correct insofar as she has rendered her professional judgment. Yeldon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23825, at *10, 2010 WL 983819, at *5. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to rebut this presumption, and therefore a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment must be dismissed.
C. Policy 5.1
Defendant argues that, in absence of the three constitutional rights violations discussed above, Plaintiff has only alleged conduct which violates CNYPC Policy 5.1. (Dkt. No. 19-5 at 6-7.) Because Plaintiff did not establish the source of his rights explicitly in his complaint, he did not specifically discuss Policy 5.1 prior to his opposition to the pending motion. Defendant moved for summary judgment in part because a violation of Policy 5.1 is not alone sufficient to establish a § 1983 claim. Id. Plaintiff admits in opposition to this motion that Defendant Townsend violated his rights under CNYPC Policy 5.1 by restricting his telephone access, but maintains his claim. (Dkt. No. 21 at 6.) For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that Defendant's motion be granted.
Mr. Nowicki declares that the only restrictions on Plaintiff arose from his suspended calling card, which does not affect residents' ability to make collect calls. (Dkt. No. 19-3 ¶¶ 7, 24.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Townsend denied his collect calls. (Dkt. No. 21 ¶¶ 32-33.)
Insofar as Defendant restricted his access to the telephone to contact his attorney or to make collect calls, this conduct is a violation of Policy 5.1, which states that residents who do not have a calling card may still call collect. (Dkt. No. 19-4 at 17, 21, 26.) However, a violation of state procedural requirements does not give rise to § 1983 liability, as such liability only comes from violations of rights secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. LaBoy v. Coughlin, 822 F.2d 3, 4 (2d. Cir 1987) (per curiam) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). Therefore, because I have already determined above that Plaintiff has not established any independent constitutional violation, a violation of Policy 5.1 does not alone give rise to the requisite constitutional harm to support Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Defendant's motion be granted, and Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
RECOMMENDED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 19) be GRANTED, and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with copies of Banks v. Argo, No. 11 Civ. 4222 (LAP), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141853, 2012 WL 4471585 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012); Edwards v. Horn, No. 10 Civ. 6194 (RJS) (JLC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18424, 2012 WL 473481 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012); Henry v. Davis, No. 10 Civ. 7575 (PAC) (JLC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84100, 2011 WL 3295986, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2011); Yeldon v. Hogan, No. 9:08-CV-769 (NAM/RFT), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23821, 2010 WL 983819 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010); Johnson v. Enu, No. 08-CV-158 (FJS/DRH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86831, 2011 WL 3439179 (N.D.N.Y. July 13, 2011); Riddick v. Arnone, No. 3:11-cv-631 (SRU), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94718, 2012 WL 2716355 (D. Conn. July 9, 2012); and Pitsley v. Ricks, No. 96-CV-0372 (NAM) (DRH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5402, 2000 WL 362023 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a). Dated: July 30, 2014
Syracuse, New York
/s/________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge