Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1684 (CKK).
April 28, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Having considered defendant's motion, plaintiff's opposition, and the entire record of the case, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss in part, and deny the motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he applied for the position of "Info. Tech. Specialist (Application Software)" with the District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS"). Compl. He further alleges that DCPS did not hire him because of his disability, deafness, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Id. In this action, plaintiff demands "restoration of [his] rightful employment" and back pay. Id.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff properly has stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true and are construed liberally in plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2001). The Court is not obligated, however, to draw factual inferences that are not supported by the facts alleged. Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).A. Plaintiff's claim is not time barred.
A plaintiff must commence a civil action under the ADA in a federal court within 90 days after receipt of right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 12117(a). Defendant contends that the EEOC issued plaintiff's right-to-sue letter on June 10, 2004, and that plaintiff did not file his complaint until October 1, 2004, approximately 112 days later. See Def.'s Mot. at 6 Ex. (Dismissal and Notice of Rights). Because plaintiff failed to file his complaint within the 90-day limitations period, defendant argues that the complaint must be dismissed.
It is presumed that the right-to-sue letter was mailed on the same date of its issuance. See Anderson v. Local 201 Reinforcing Rodmen, 886 F.Supp. 94, 97 (D.D.C. 1995). The date on which plaintiff received the right-to-sue letter is not stated in the record. It is presumed, then, that plaintiff received the letter three days later, on June 13, 2004. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n. 1 (1984) (per curiam) (applying "3-day rule" of Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e)); Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same).
The official court record shows that the Clerk of the Court received plaintiff's complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis on September 9, 2004, within the 90-day limitations period. The Clerk officially filed plaintiff's pleadings on October 1, 2004. See Dkt. #1-2. In the interim, the Court reviewed and approved plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis. See Dkt. # 2. Plaintiff is not responsible for the lapse of time between submission of his complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis to the Clerk and the official filing of these papers on the docket. The Court does not penalize plaintiff for any delay caused by its own internal administrative processes. See Hogue v. Roach, 967 F.Supp. 7, 8 (D.D.C. 1997) (administrative delay for correction of deficiencies in application to proceed in forma pauperis irrelevant to issue of timeliness of filing Title VII complaint); Guillen v. National Grange, 955 F.Supp. 144, 145 (D.D.C. 1997) (tolling 90-day limitations period upon presentation of complaint accompanied by petition to proceed in forma pauperis).
The reverse side of plaintiff's original complaint, maintained in the Court's jacket, reflects that the documents were stamped "received" by the Clerk of the Court on September 9, 2004.
B. The District of Columbia is the proper defendant.
Plaintiff brings this action under the ADA, naming Valarie Jones, EEOC Counsel for DCPS, as the defendant to this action. See Compl. Ms. Jones is not the proper defendant, as she is not plaintiff's prospective employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a)(5) (defining term "employer" for purposes of ADA); see Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia, 973 F.Supp. 184, 187 (D.D.C. 1997) (dismissing plaintiff's ADA claim against police officers in their individual capacities).
Neither the District of Columbia Board of Education nor the District of Columbia Public Schools is a proper party. Neither entity is a suable entity. See Tschanneral v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 594 F.Supp. 407, 408 (D.D.C. 1984) (dismissing Board of Education, which operates the District of Columbia Public Schools, as a party defendant).
This pro se plaintiff's failure to name the proper defendant is not fatal, however. Pleadings filed by pro se litigants are construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Plaintiff explains that he named Ms. Jones for two reasons: she is the person with whom EEOC interacted during the administrative proceedings, and she is a person would could "carry the message to a proper person or on the behalf of DC Public Schools for hand[l]ing such a suit." Pl.'s Opp. at 2. The Court will dismiss Ms. Jones as a party defendant, and, sua sponte, will substitute the District of Columbia.
C. Failure to allege all elements of a prima facie case of discrimination does not warrant dismissal.
Defendant argues that plaintiff's failure to allege the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA requires dismissal of the complaint. Its argument is meritless.
. A plaintiff's employment discrimination complaint need not allege specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A complaint need only provide a short and plain statement of claim, sufficient to put the defendant on notice of claims raised against it. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), (e). Plaintiff's complaint satisfies this requirement. It clearly alleges that plaintiff wrongfully was denied employment because of his disability in violation of the ADA. This is a claim upon which relief can be granted, assuming that plaintiff can prove the facts of his case
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss [Dkt. # 5] is GRANTED IN PART, dismissing defendant Valarie Jones as a party defendant, and DENIED in all other respects. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the District of Columbia shall be substituted as the party defendant to this action. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #7] is DENIED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Order to plaintiff at his address of record.
SO ORDERED.