Opinion
Civil Action No. AW-00-3177.
March 26, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Joseph Adams, brings this employment discrimination action alleging that the failure of Defendants, the University of Maryland at College Park and James Frank Brewer, to promote him violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"). Currently pending before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts II (§ 1981) and III (§ 1983) of Plaintiff's Complaint [10-1] and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File his Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [11-1]. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. Defendants did not file an opposition to Plaintiff's motion. As the Court finds no compelling reason for denial, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File its Opposition is granted. The parties have filed supporting and opposing memoranda to Defendants' motion. Upon consideration of the arguments made in support of, and opposition to, the Defendants' motion, the Court makes the following determinations.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an African-American employed by the University of Maryland at College Park ("the University") as a Carpenter/Structural Trade I. James Frank Brewer is the Assistance Vice President for Facilities Management of the University. This division employs approximately 800 people, approximately 150 of whom are African-American. Plaintiff has been employed in the Facilities Management division of the University for eight years. In April or May of 1999, Plaintiff applied for a promotion to the position of Structural Trades Chief II. Plaintiff alleges that a white employee with less experience and a record of violent and abusive conduct was selected over him. After filing charges of discrimination with the appropriate federal and state agencies, Plaintiff instituted the instant litigation.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
It is well established that a court should not dismiss a complaint, under Rule 12(b)(6), "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The function of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and not the facts that support it. See Neitzeke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989). In determining whether to dismiss the complaint, this Court must view the well-pleaded material allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, with the alleged facts accepted as true. See Chisolm v. TranSouth Financial Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 1996).
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
1. The University
Plaintiff's prayer for relief seeks injunctive relief under §§ 1981 and 1983 prohibiting the University and Brewer "from discriminating on the basis of race in promotions and requiring them to immediately promote him to the position of Structural Trades Chief II." (Compl. at 4) The University argues that, under the Eleventh Amendment, it is immune to suit by individuals claiming violations of § 1981 and § 1983. "The Eleventh Amendment has long been interpreted . . . to prevent citizens from bringing suit against their own state in federal court." Palotai v. Univ. of Md., 959 F. Supp. 714, 716 (D.Md. 1997). This Court has held that Eleventh Amendment protections extend to university systems as well. See Bickley v. Univ. of. Md., 527 F. Supp. 174, 182 (D.Md. 1981) ("[T]he University of Maryland is an arm of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.").
The protections of the Eleventh Amendment insulate states from suit under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). Similarly, the Court has more recently addressed the more specific issue of Eleventh Amendment protection against 1981 suits in Roberson v. Bowie State Univ., 899 F. Supp. 235 (D.Md. 1995). In Roberson, the plaintiff, a former university system EEOC officer, sued the state university and several of its officers for employment discrimination under § 1981. Id. The court held that § 1981 claims against the state university or the individual defendants in their official capacity were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 237. More broadly, this Court had stated that "§§ 1981 and 1983 claims against the University, both for equitable and monetary relief, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Middlebrooks v. Univ. of Md., 980 F. Supp. 824, 828 (D.Md. 1997), aff'd, 166 F.3d 1209 (4th Cir. 1999). Therefore, Counts II and III of Plaintiff's against the University must be dismissed.
2. The Official of the University
Brewer maintains that he is also immune to suit for violations of §§ 1981 and 1983. "[S]tate officials who are sued in their personal capacity are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment, regardless of the recovery sought." Middlebrooks, 980 F. Supp. at 828; see Roberson, 899 F. Supp. at 237. As discussed above, university officials, if sued in their official capacity, have Eleventh Amendment immunity against § 1981 claims. See Roberson, 899 F. Supp. at 237. Unlike the Eleventh Amendment immunity conferred to states, under Ex Parte Young, this protection is limited and does not include claims seeking injunctive or prospective relief required to prevent a violation of federal law. See Middlebrooks, 980 F. Supp. at 828. In determining whether Eleventh Amendment immunity against a § 1981 claim applies to university officials within their official capacity, the Court has also considered what types of damages are being requested by the plaintiff. Middlebrooks, 980 F. Supp. at 828. In Middlebrooks, a former student who was terminated from her Masters program brought a discrimination suit against the university system and its officials under § 1981. 980 F. Supp. at 824. The plaintiff sought (1) a declaratory judgment that her constitutional rights had been violated and (2) reinstatement to the Masters program. Id. at 828. The Court concluded that the plaintiff's § 1981 claim against the university and university officials in their official capacity seeking monetary or retrospective damages was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. However, the court went on to hold that, even if sued within his official capacity, a state official does not have Eleventh Amendment immunity "if the plaintiff seeks injunctive, prospective relief to prevent a violation of federal law." Id. Thus, her claim for reinstatement was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
Here, Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages under § 1981 and § 1983 are confined to Mr. Brewer in his individual capacity. As Brewer has no Eleventh Amendment Immunity when sued in his personal capacity, the motion to dismiss must be denied on these grounds. Likewise, the injunctive relief sought against Brewer in his official capacity is not barred as he appears to have the power to promote Plaintiff to the contested position should Plaintiff prove that the alleged constitutional violation prevented him from receiving the promotion. See Coakley v. Welch, 877 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1989); Middlebrooks, 980 F. Supp. at 828. Likewise, in a failure to promote claim, "the proper injunctive remedy is to restore the chance by enjoining the discriminatory practice." Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims against Brewer are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
In the alternative, Brewer maintains that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Under §§ 1981 and 1983, state officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity where their conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982); see Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). "[Q]ualified immunity seeks to ensure that defendants `reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability' by attaching liability only if `[t]he contours of the right [violated are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right[.]'" United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1227 (1997) (citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that he was denied a promotion on the basis of his race and subject to a system of racial discrimination in employment decisions in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The question of Brewer's entitlement to qualified immunity hinges on whether, at the time Plaintiff was denied the promotion, an official at a state university would reasonably know that maintaining a practice of promoting white employees over qualified African-American employees and promoting a less senior white employee with a history of abusive and violent behavior over a qualified African-American employee would violate clearly established equal protection rights to be free from racial discrimination in employment decisions. It is clearly established, under §§ 1981 and 1983, that state officials cannot deny government employees promotions on the basis of their race and maintain a system of racially discriminatory promotional practices absent compelling circumstances, such as remedying past discrimination. See Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 918-21; United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 848 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding black employees' assertion of racial motivation in denials of promotions was sufficient to state a claim under §§ 1981 and 1983); Bulls v. Holmes, 403 F. Supp. 475, 477 (E.D. Va. 1975) (stating that defendants' racially motivated refusal to hire plaintiff clearly states a claim for which relief can be granted, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983). Therefore, assuming the truth of Plaintiff's allegations, the Court finds that Brewer's actions would not be protected by qualified immunity.
Lastly, Brewer maintains that the complaint does not sufficiently particularize his involvement in the decision not to promote Plaintiff. The Supreme Court has consistently declined to impose stricter procedural standards upon civil right plaintiffs beyond those outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 1595 (1998) (and cases cited therein). In Crawford-El, the Supreme Court instructed district courts on the proper means for addressing § 1983 claims and qualified immunity defenses brought by government officials. 523 U.S. at 598, 118 S.Ct. at 1597. As outlined by the Supreme Court,"if the defendant does plead the immunity defense, the district court should resolve that threshold question before permitting discovery. To do so, the court must determine whether, assuming the truth of the plaintiff's allegations, the official's conduct violated clearly established law." Id. Yet, even under the general notice pleading standard, in §§ 1981 and 1983 claims against government officials, the Fourth Circuit requires a showing of personal involvement by the defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Garraghty v. Dept. of Corrections, 52 F.3d 1274, 1280 (4th Cir. 1995). The requisite personal involvement may be established where the government official is "alleged specifically to have directed, supervised, participated in, authorized or even to have condoned by knowing acquiescence the specific incident upon which this claim for relief is based." Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 1980). Additionally, "[s]upervisory liability cannot be automatically ruled out in a § 1983 action . . . since a supervising individual or body may be held liable under § 1983 for failure to adequately supervise or control or where the supervising defendant is responsible for a policy or custom (either explicit or implied) which resulted in the deprivation of rights." McAdoo v. Toll, 591 F. Supp. 1399, 1404 (D.Md. 1984).
In the instant case, the complaint identifies Brewer as the Assistant Vice President for Facilities Management. The complaint alleges that Brewer maintained a practice of promoting white employees over qualified African-American employees. Under this practice, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied a promotion because of his race. These general allegations are insufficient to impose personal liability upon Brewer. There are no allegations identifying Brewer's actual participation in the decision to deny Plaintiff's application for promotion or indicating his actual or constructive notice of the alleged racial discriminatory promotional system and his failure to take corrective measures. Beyond Plaintiff's own charge, the complaint fails to identify multiple incidents of the denial of promotions to qualified African-Americans in the Facilities Management division that could support imposing supervisory liability pursuant to a policy or custom of racially discriminatory employment practices. Absent specific allegations connecting conduct by Brewer to Plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivation, the Court must dismiss Counts II (§ 1981) and III (§ 1983). Given that Plaintiff's complaint fails for lack of detail, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to correct the deficiencies. As Plaintiff acknowledges that Count I of his complaint is a Title VII claim against the University only, the Court need not address Brewer's arguments seeking dismissal of Count I (Title VII) as to him.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's complaints as to Counts II and III against the University and Mr. Brewer. An Order consistent with this Opinion will follow.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion dated March ___, 2001, IT IS this day of March, 2001 by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED:
1. That Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File his Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [11-1] BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED;
2. That Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II (§ 1981) and Count III (§ 1983) [10-1] BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED as to both defendants;
3. That Plaintiff may amend his complaint within ___ days of the date of this Order to adequately plead the requisite personal involvement of Defendant Brewer; and
4. That the Clerk of the Court mail copies of this order to all counsel of record.