Opinion
NO. 2019-CA-0210 NO. 2019-C-0198 NO. 2019-C-0199 NO. 2019-C-0708 NO. 2020-CA-0069 NO. 2020-CA-0070
02-24-2021
Earl A. ADAMS, Jr., et al. v. CHEVRON USA, INC., et al. Earl Adams, et al v. Chevron USA, Inc., et al Earl Adams, et al v. Chevron USA, Inc., et al Earl A. Adams, Jr., et al v. Chevron, U.S.A., et al Earl A. Adams, Jr., et al. v. Chevron USA, Inc. Elda Long, Althea Smart, Earl Hynes, Edward Williams, Kenneth Mouille, Malcolm Harris, Jr., and Merle McIntyre v. Joseph Grefer and The Estate of Camille Grefer
ROBERT G. HARVEY, LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT G. HARVEY, SR., APLC, 600 North Carrollton Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 70119 -and- DARLEEN MARIE JACOBS, THE LAW OFFICES OF DARLENE M JACOBS, 823 St. Louis Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 -and- ALAN DEAN WEINBERGER, HANGARTNER, RYDBERG & TERRELL, Hancock Whitney Center, Suite 310, New Orleans, Louisiana 70112, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT DONALD C. DOUGLAS, JR., THE DOUGLAS LAW FIRM, LLC, 1070 West Causeway Approach, Suite B, Mandeville, Louisiana 70471, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS EBERHARD D. GARRISON, PETER N. FREIBERG, KEVIN HUDDELL, LINDSAY E. REEVES, CHRISTOPHER W. SWANSON, JONES SWANSON HUDDELL & GARRISON, LLC, 601 Poydras Street, Suite 2655, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
ROBERT G. HARVEY, LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT G. HARVEY, SR., APLC, 600 North Carrollton Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 70119 -and- DARLEEN MARIE JACOBS, THE LAW OFFICES OF DARLENE M JACOBS, 823 St. Louis Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 -and- ALAN DEAN WEINBERGER, HANGARTNER, RYDBERG & TERRELL, Hancock Whitney Center, Suite 310, New Orleans, Louisiana 70112, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
DONALD C. DOUGLAS, JR., THE DOUGLAS LAW FIRM, LLC, 1070 West Causeway Approach, Suite B, Mandeville, Louisiana 70471, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
EBERHARD D. GARRISON, PETER N. FREIBERG, KEVIN HUDDELL, LINDSAY E. REEVES, CHRISTOPHER W. SWANSON, JONES SWANSON HUDDELL & GARRISON, LLC, 601 Poydras Street, Suite 2655, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
(Court composed of Chief Judge James F. McKay III, Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Roland L. Belsome )
JAMES F. MCKAY. CHIEF JUDGE
This case arises out of the contamination of a parcel of land with naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM), resulting from of oil-field supply cleaning activities. The neighboring landowners filed suit against several defendants involved in the oil-field supply cleaning activities, as well as the landowners of the contaminated property. Eventually, the plaintiffs entered into settlement agreements with most of the defendants with the exception of the landowners. The landowners did not participate in the settlements, did not contribute to the settlements, and were not parties to the settlements.
For a more detailed history regarding the background of this case, one may wish to consult Grefer v. Alpha Technical , 02-1237 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/8/07), 965 So.2d 511, cert. denied , 553 U.S. 1014, 128 S.Ct. 2054, 170 L.Ed.2d 810 (2008).
The named plaintiffs in this case are Elda Long, Althea Smart, Earl Hynes, Edward Williams, Kenneth Mouille, Malcom Harrison, and Merle McIntyre.
The named defendants in this case are Joseph Grefer and Camille Grefer.
Several years after the plaintiffs had entered into the settlement agreements with other defendants, the landowner defendants, on June 20, 2018, filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement against the plaintiffs. A hearing on the motion took place on August 30, 2018. After considering the motions, supporting memoranda, and the exhibits thereto and opposition, as well as the oral arguments presented by counsel, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice on September 11, 2018. It is from this judgment that the plaintiffs now appeal.
This consolidated appeal involves the judgment enforcing the settlement agreement, a judgment compelling discovery, and several writs. However, based on the statements made by plaintiffs/appellants’ counsel, on the date of oral argument in this Court, it seems only the judgment enforcing the settlement agreement is now being appealed.
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in preventing the plaintiffs from offering evidence of the intent of the actual settling parties regarding the scope of the settlement and in dismissing the plaintiffs’ case.
The issue presented by this appeal is a question of law. Questions of law are reviewed de novo , with judgment rendered " ‘on the record, without deference to the legal conclusions of the tribunals below.’ " Holly J. Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc. , 06-0582, p. 9 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037, 1045 ; quoting Louisiana Municipal Association v. State , 04-0227, p. 35 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 836. "We are also mindful that when legal error committed by the trial court interdicts the fact-finding process, the appellate court must conduct a de novo review of the record." Kennedy-Fagan v. Estate of Graves , 07-1062, p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/21/08), 993 So.2d 255, 264 ; citing Levy v. Bayou Industrial Maintenance Services, Inc. , 03-0037, p. 7 ((La.App. 1 Cir. 9/26/03), 855 So.2d 968, 974.
When a dispute arises as to the scope of a compromise agreement, extrinsic evidence can be considered to determine exactly what differences the parties intended to settle. Maggio v. Parker , 17-1112, p. 4 (La. 6/27/18), 250 So.3d 874, 879 (internal citations omitted). In Maggio , the Louisiana Supreme Court explained and affirmed a long history of cases which established, recognized, and applied an exception to the "four corners" rule when interpreting settlement agreements. Id. at 879 ; See Brown v. Drillers, Inc. , 93-1019 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741. A compromise settles only those differences that the parties clearly intended to settle. Maggio at 879. See La. C.C. art. 3076. Accordingly, the plaintiffs in the instant case contend that a clearly established exception to the "four corners" rule allows them to offer evidence.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the landowner defendants are not parties to any settlement agreement with the plaintiffs. It is also undisputed that the landowner defendants did not contribute to any settlement agreement with the plaintiffs. As the landowner defendants are never mentioned in the four corners of any of the settlement agreements, the only way they could have been dismissed is by reference to something outside the agreements themselves.
Under these circumstances, the trial court should have considered the evidence of the intent of the actual parties to the settlement concerning whether the landowner defendants would or would not be released. To not do so interdicted the fact-finding process. Therefore, the district court erred as a matter of law in refusing to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to offer evidence of the intent of the settling parties, i.e., a contradictory hearing where the parties could have called witnesses and introduced other extrinsic evidence to establish the true intent of the parties to the settlement.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JAMES F. MCKAY III CHIEF JUDGE
ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
On February 24, 2021, this Court issued an opinion wherein the issue was "whether the trial court erred in preventing the plaintiffs from offering evidence of the intent of the actual settling parties regarding the scope of the settlement and in dismissing the plaintiffs’ case." Adams v. Chevron USA, Inc. 19-0210, (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/24/21), 365 So.3d 580, 582. In so determining, we found the following:
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the landowner defendants are not parties to any settlement agreement with the plaintiffs. It is also undisputed that the landowner defendants did not contribute to any settlement agreement with the plaintiffs. As the landowner defendants are never mentioned in the four corners of any of the settlement agreements, the only way they could have been dismissed is by reference to something outside the agreements themselves.
Under these circumstances, the trial court should have considered the evidence of the intent of the actual parties to the settlement concerning whether the landowner defendants would or would not be released. To not do so interdicted the fact-finding process. Therefore, the district court erred as a matter of law in refusing to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to offer evidence of the intent of the settling parties, i.e., a contradictory hearing where the parties could have called witnesses and introduced other extrinsic evidence to establish the true intent of the parties to the settlement.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Id. , 19-0210, 365 So.3d at 582–83.
Following the issuance of our opinion, both the appellants and the appellees filed applications for rehearing seeking clarification as to whether this Court's opinion applied to both of the trial court judgments regarding the granting of the Motions to Enforce Settlement Agreement rendered on September 11, 2018, and October 11, 2019.
Both applications for rehearing are granted for clarification purposes only. This court's February 24, 2021 opinion applied to both the September 11, 2018, and the October 11, 2019 trial court judgments. This Court's original judgment remains unchanged.