Opinion
C.A. No. 06A-08-004(RBY).
Submitted: January 24, 2007.
Decided: March 26, 2007.
Upon Consideration of Appellants' Appeal of the Decision of the Court of Common Pleas.
AFFIRMED.
Charles S. Knothe, Esq., Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Jennifer Gimler Bra dy, Esq., Potter, Anderson Corroon, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellee.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs-Below/Appellants ("Appellants"), Acute Nursing, Inc. and Tropical Nursing, Inc., appeal the decision of the Court of Common Pleas ("the Trial Court") to grant the Motion made by the Defendant-Below/Appellee ("Appellee"), Westminster Village to enter the Arbitrator's Order and to deny the Appellants' Request for Trial De Novo. For the following reasons, however, the Trial Court's decision is AFFIRMED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 19, 2004, the Appellants filed a Complaint against the Appellee in the Trial Court. The Complaint alleges that the Appellants had an agreement with the Appellee to provide for staffing services, and that the Appellee violated that agreement when it hired a nurse under contract to the Appellant before the time allowed in the agreement.After service on the Appellee, the case became inactive. On October 4, 2005, the Trial Court, pursuant to Rule 41(e), sent notice to the Appellants that the matter would be dismissed if it remained inactive for another 30 days. The Appellant then moved to amend the Complaint to include a second plaintiff, Tropical Nursing, which the Trial Court allowed on December 7, 2005. Eventually, on April 12, 2006, the Appellee filed its Answer to the Complaint.
On April 19, 2006, the matter was referred to arbitration pursuant to the Trial Court's Rule 16.1(a). On May 10, 2006, Ronald D. Smith, Esq. was appointed as an Arbitrator in the matter. On May 31, 2006, Mr. Smith's legal assistant sent an e-mail to counsel for the Appellants suggesting four dates when both Mr. Smith and counsel for the Appellee would be available for the arbitration hearing. Counsel for the Appellants responded by e-mail that neither he nor his client would attend. On June 9, 2006, Mr. Smith informed both parties that the arbitration would be held on July 14, 2006. The Appellee appeared for the hearing, however, the Appellants did not. Accordingly, Mr. Smith issued an Order in favor of the Appellee on the same day as the hearing. He also had the Order docketed with the Clerk of the Court ("the Clerk") that day. However, the Appellants have stated that a copy of the Order was not mailed to them until July 31, 2006, and that it was not received until August 1 or 2, 2006.
On August 3, 2006, the 20 day period for seeking a trial de novo expired without a demand by the Appellants. On August 4, 2006, the Appellee drafted a motion to enter the Arbitrator's Order as an Order of Judgment, which was filed with the Clerk on August 7, 2006. On August 7, 2006, the Appellants drafted a demand for trial de novo, which was filed with the Clerk on August 8, 2006.
See CCP Civ. R. 16.1(k)(11)(D).
See CCP Civ. R. 16.1(k)(11)(C).
On August 9, 2006, the Trial Court entered a judgment on the Arbitrator's Order. On August 14, 2006, the Appellants filed a motion for reargument on the entry of judgment. On the same day, the Trial Court denied the Appellants' demand for a trial de novo. The next day, the Appellants filed a motion for reargument on the denial of the demand for a trial de novo. The Trial Court heard the motion for reargument on August 22, 2006, and issued a decision later that day denying the motion.
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
In its August 14, 2006, denial of the Appellants' demand for a trial de novo the Trial Court stated that the Appellants' demand came after the 20 day period established by Rule 16.1(k)(11)(D). As such, the demand was untimely. Therefore, the Trial Court found its entry of the Arbitrator's Order on August 9 to be appropriate.
In its August 22, 2006, decision following the hearing on the Appellants' motion for reargument, the Trial Court further elucidated the reasoning behind its denial of the Appellants' demand. The Trial Court described the standard for enlarging the time in which to file a trial de novo: the excusable neglect standard. The Trial Court then determined that based on the evidence submitted, the Appellants had failed to demonstrate excusable neglect.
Specifically, the Trial Court found that: (1) the late arrival of the Arbitrator's Order does not excuse the Appellants' failure to timely demand a trial de novo, because the Appellant failed to attend the arbitration hearing; (2) counsel for the Appellants' knew that the arbitration hearing would proceed without him and his client, knew that the Arbitrator had the power to issue an Order on the same day as the hearing was scheduled pursuant to CCP Civ. R. 16.1(k)(3), and knew that he could discover if an Arbitration Order had been filed by telephoning the Clerk; and (3) counsel for the Appellant offered no explanation as to why he waited until August 7, 2006 to draft a demand for a trial de novo, even though he had knowledge of the Order on August 1, 2006, three days before the 20 day period expired. Based on these findings, the Trial Court denied the motion for reargument.
Additionally, the Trial Court awarded sanctions to the Appellee. The Appellant has not asked the Court to review that decision.
Following the Trial Court's decision, the Appellants filed a timely appeal to this Court. What follows is the Court's decision on the appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, this Court sits as an intermediate appellate court. As such, the Court's function is similar to that of the Delaware Supreme Court. Therefore, the Court's role is to "correct errors of law and to review the factual findings of the court below to determine if they are sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process." Errors of law are reviewed de novo. However, this Court is bound by the findings of fact made by the Trial Court that are supported by substantial evidence on the record. If substantial evidence exists, this Court must accept the Trial Court's ruling and not make its own factual findings, weigh evidence, or make credibility determinations. Finally, when a decision is addressed to the sound discretion of the Trial Court, this Court reviews for an abuse of discretion. "An abuse of discretion occurs when `a court has . . . exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances,' [or] . . . so ignored recognized rules of law or practice . . . to produce injustice."DISCUSSION
Here, the Appellants argue: (1) the Trial Court applied the wrong standard when it applied the excusable neglect standard; (2) even if it applied the correct standard, its decision is contrary to existing case law; and (3) even if its decision is not contrary to law, it is an abuse of discretion. The Appellee contends that the Trial Court applied the correct legal standard and that it did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the Appellants had not demonstrated excusable neglect.Rule 16.1(k)(11)(D) provides that "[w]ithin twenty (20) days after the entry of the arbitration order by the Civil Clerk any party may serve and file a written demand for a trial de novo." The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that this Rule does not create a jurisdictional limit. Rather, the 20 day period is subject to enlargement under Rule 6(b). Such enlargement may be allowed both within and after the expiration of the time period. However, if the enlargement is sought after the expiration of the period, an extension is allowed only upon a showing of excusable neglect by the moving party. Our Courts hold that "[d]iligent efforts to comply with the Rule demonstrates excusable neglect." However, these efforts must be genuine, for "[n]egligence without a valid reason is not sufficient to constitute excusable neglect." The determination as to whether or not excusable neglect exists implicates "considerations of fairness with the liberal granting of extensions to the end that disputes be resolved on their merits." However, this determination is a matter within the sound discretion of the Trial Court.
PNC Bank, Delaware v. Hudson, 687 A.2d 915, 917 (Del. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Hall v. McGuigan, 1997 WL 527965, at *1 (Del.Super.) (citing PNC Bank, Delaware, 687 A.2d at 917).
Anticaglia v. Benge, 2000 WL 145822, at * 2 (Del.Super.)
Id. (citing Falcon Steel Co. Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 366 A.2d 512, 515 (Del.Super. 1976)).
PNC Bank, Delaware, 687 A.2d at 917.
Hall, 1997 WL 527965 at *1.
The Appellants submit that some other standard, besides the excusable neglect standard set out above, should apply when the Arbitrator does not supply copies of the Order within five days as required by Rule 16.1(k)(11)(A). However, the Appellants neither provide case law mandating that a different standard be applied, nor make an argument as to the standard that should be applied. While it is true the Arbitrator in this case did not comply with Rule 16.1(k)(11)(A), that does not mean that a different standard applies. Instead, our case law makes clear that the Arbitrator's noncompliance with the Rule simply becomes part of the excusable neglect calculus.
See Knutkowski v. Kent General Hosp., Inc, 1989 WL 167408, at *1 (Del.Super.) (The arbitrator's order was not issued to either party within the time required by the Rule. Rather, the order was received after the expiration of the period. Further, the party seeking demand did so after the expiration of the period. However, taking into account the late receipt of the order and the moving party's diligent acts, including a check of the court docket, the trial court found excusable neglect.).
The Trial Court, in reviewing the Appellants' demand for a trial de novo, applied the law as elucidated above. The Court finds that this is the appropriate legal standard to be applied in cases where a demand for a trial de novo is made after the expiration of the 20 day period. The case law the Appellants argue the Trial Court violated, Knutkowski v. Kent General Hosp., Inc., is inapposite. Therefore, following review of the Trial Court's legal analysis, this Court finds no error of law.
See Note 20, supra.
The only issue remaining in this appeal is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying the Appellants' request for a trial de novo. The Appellants clearly demanded a trial de novo after the 20 day period provided by the Rule expired. In assessing whether excusable neglect existed, the Trial Court determined that the Appellants failed to put forth an excuse as to why it took them almost a week to demand a trial de novo. Based on this finding, the Trial Court concluded that the Appellants failed to meet their burden to demonstrate excusable neglect. Therefore, the Trial Court denied the demand.
As stated previously, in reviewing an act of discretion this Court must determine if the Trial Court abused its discretion. This Court cannot say that the Trial Court exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances or so ignored recognized rules of law or practice as to produce injustice when it denied the Appellants' demand. It was the Appellants' burden to demonstrate excusable neglect. While the Appellants pointed to the 17 day delay in receipt of the Arbitrator's Order as hindering their ability to seek a timely demand, they did not present an excuse for their delay in acting after receiving the arbitration order. In fact, the Appellants maintain on appeal that they should not have to "explain why they were unable to comply with the rules when they were prejudiced by the Arbitrator's failure to comply with the Court rules." This reasoning is not supported by our case law, which holds, that "[n]egligence without a valid reason is not sufficient to constitute excusable neglect." Therefore, the Trial Court was acting within its discretion when it denied the demand.
Appellants' Opening Br. at 5.
Anticaglia v. Benge, 2000 WL 145822, at * 2 (Del.Super.) (citing Falcon Steel Co. Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 366 A.2d 512, 515 (Del.Super. 1976)).
Accordingly, the Trial Court's decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.