Opinion
No. CV 08-4024733S
June 9, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
The defendant has filed this Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction and asking the court to impose sanctions for vexatious suit and bad faith against the plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel.
By way of background, the plaintiff filed an Application for Temporary Injunction seeking to have the court restrain the Administrator of the Estate of Kazimiera Dolik from taking any further action as the Administrator including further prosecution of an underlying personal injury case on behalf of the estate. The plaintiffs, Action Carting Environmental Services, Inc ("Action") and Charles Patterson are defendants in a suit brought by the Estate of Kazimiera Dolik ("Estate") pending in United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for the wrongful death of Ms. Dolik.
In this action Action is seeking to have this court find that the action by the Bridgeport Probate Court in opening an estate for Ms. Dolik and appointing an administrator was done without jurisdiction, in that there was fraud.
The plaintiff has filed an Objection to the Motion to Dismiss.
The defendant argued that the court in New York addressed this issue by way of an order dated February 28, 2007 (Pohorelsky, U.S. Magistrate Judge). The plaintiff did not appeal that ruling.
The time for an appeal in the Probate Court of Bridgeport has long expired.
Any defendant wishing to contest the court's jurisdiction may do so by filing a motion to dismiss, Practice Book § 10-31. "A motion to dismiss properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006).
"Jurisdiction is the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it. Jurisdiction must exist in three particulars: the subject matter of the case, the parties, and the process." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) LaBow v. LaBow, 171 Conn. 433, 440, 370 A.2d 990 (1976). "Standing goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction." (Citation omitted.) Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294, 533 A.2d 208 (1987); See St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 544, 825 A.2d 90 (2003) ("The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.").
"When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, supra, 278 Conn. 211. "A motion to dismiss raises the question of whether a jurisdictional flaw is apparent on the record or by way of supporting affidavits." (Citation omitted.) Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. Uni. Of Bridgeport, 41 Conn.App. 790, 793, 677 A.2d 1378 (1996). "[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Citation omitted; Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. George v. Gordon, supra, 264 Conn. 544-45.
With respect to the issue of standing, the court finds that the plaintiff's arguments fall short, very short.
"[S]tanding . . . implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at any point in judicial proceedings." Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn. 646, 656, 674 A.2d 821 (1996). "If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 274 Conn. 92, 104, 874 A.2d 742 (2005). "[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 544-45, 825 A.2d 90 (2003).
"[I]n Connecticut there has long existed a right for a party to appeal the decision or order of a court having jurisdiction over probate matters . . . This right of appeal, however, always has been contingent upon a threshold showing of aggrievement . . . Without such a demonstration of aggrievement, the appealing party may not maintain an appeal. That broad right of appeal for an aggrieved party currently is codified at General Statutes § 45a-186." (Citations omitted.) Fleet National Bank's Appeal from Probate, 267 Conn. 229, 242-43, 837 A.2d 785 (2004). "[T]he absence of aggrievement, as required by [§ 45a-186], is a defect that deprives the Superior Court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adolphson v. Weinstein, 66 Conn.App. 591, 595, 785 A.2d 275 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 921, 792 A.2d 853 (2002).
"When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eder Bros, Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 369, 880 A.2d 138 (2005). "Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring an action, in other words statutorily aggrieved, or is classically aggrieved." Id.
"In order to determine whether a party has standing to make a claim under a statute, a court must determine the interests and the parties that the statute was designed to protect . . . Essentially the standing question in such cases is whether the . . . statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief . . . The plaintiff must be within the zone of interests protected by the statute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) St. George v. Gordon, supra, 264 Conn. 545-46.
"The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eder Bros, Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., supra. "[T]he absence of aggrievement, as required by [§ 45a-186], is a defect that deprives the Superior Court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adolphson v. Weinstein, 66 Conn.App. 591, 595, 785 A.2d 275 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 921, 792 A.2d 853 (2002). "The trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from probate unless the person seeking to be heard has standing . . . In order for an appellant to have standing to appeal from an order or decree of the Probate Court, the appellant must be aggrieved by the court's decision." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kucej v. Kucej, 34 Conn.App. 579, 581, 642 A.2d 81 (1994).
"Appeals from probate are dictated by General Statutes § 45a-186, which provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a court of probate in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law, may appeal therefrom to the Superior Court." General Statutes § 45a-186. "Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected . . . Aggrievement exists in two forms: statutory and classical aggrievement. Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation . . . Classical aggrievement, in contrast, requires an analysis of the particular facts of the case in order to ascertain whether a party has been aggrieved and, therefore, has standing to appeal. [The Supreme Court] traditionally [has] applied the following two part test to determine whether [classical] aggrievement exists: (1) does the allegedly aggrieved party have a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of a decision; and (2) has this interest been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fleet National Bank's Appeal from Probate, supra, 267 Conn. 242 n. 10
The issue of a debtor of the estate having standing, is similar to the discussion in regards to whether creditors of estate have standing. "While there is no direct case law in Connecticut that addresses the issue whether a creditor of an heir can be considered "aggrieved" under § 45a-144(a), the Appellate Court has held that a creditor of an heir cannot be "aggrieved" within the meaning of General Statutes § 45a-186, which governs the appeal of probate orders, because he has only an "indirect" interest in the estate. See Urrata v. Izzillo, supra, 1 Conn.App. 20. In Urrata a creditor of an heir appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of her appeal from an order of the probate court admitting a will disinheriting that heir. The Urrata court holds that a creditor of an heir cannot be "aggrieved" under 45a-186, and therefore has no standing to appeal a probate order, on the basis of the following reasoning: "If the will were set aside, the plaintiff would not directly take any part of the estate. Any rights she claims are not rights in the estate itself; her interest derives strictly through a third person. Under these circumstances, she is not aggrieved." Id. The logic of the holding suggests that a party who has merely an "indirect" interest in the administration of an estate, such as an creditor of an heir of the estate, does not have standing to challenge the administration of a decedent's estate. In the case at bar, even if the premises were not sold to the heir, Celentano, and even if the plaintiff's judgment lien were valid, the plaintiff could not have a claim against the estate for the title of the premises or the sale premises of the premises because, as being not a beneficiary or creditor of the estate, he could not directly take any part of the estate. He would have to bring an independent suit against his debtor, Mansi, or a foreclosure action against the premises to satisfy his judgment lien or security interest after the settlement or distribution. "The requirement that, in order to establish aggrievement, the interest which is adversely affected be `direct' is of long-standing and unbroken lineage. See Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 321, 439 A.2d 349 (1981); Beard's Appeal, 64 Conn. 526, 533, 30 A. 775 (1894)." Id., 19-20. Jaser v. Fischer, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 98-0418196S (March 1, 2000, Thompson, J.) 2000 Ct.Sup. 3438. "The same logic and public-policy line drawing that the court undertakes in Urrata with regard to § 45a-186 should apply to claims against a fiduciary's probate bond under § 45a-144. As the defendant rightly points out, it would be incongruous to find that a different aggrievement standard applies to the two statutes. Otherwise, a disgruntled creditor who fails in an appeal under § 45a-186 could simply restyle his claim as a breach of fiduciary duty under the probate bond and file suit under § 45a-144. A creditor of an heir should not be allowed to circumvent the aggrievement standard set down in Urrata by filing a claim against the probate bond under § 45a-144. The plaintiff here is not "aggrieved" within the meaning of § 45a-144." Jaser v. Fischer, supra, 3448.
Therefore, for all of the above reasons, the court finds that the plaintiff in this matter has no standing to bring this action.
The defendant is seeking attorneys fees. It is generally accepted that the court has the inherent authority to assess attorneys fees when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexaciously, dilatory, or for oppressive reasons. Maris v. McGrath, 269 Conn. 834, 835-36 (2004). This court does not find such, therefore, no costs are assessed against the plaintiff.