Opinion
No. 99 C 3239
February 10, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Elsa Acevedo, administrator of the estate of Bernardino Acevedo (the "decedent"), brings this eighteen count amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against Viola S. Gardner, Shaya Gardner-Hayum, Sgt. Staton J. Robinson, Officer Patrick S. Brakie, Officer E. Meyers, Sergeant L. Warnock, Officer Frank Amato, Officer Mark Ziemkowski, Sergeant A.J. Martin, Officer C. Taylor, Sergeant F. Lofton, Officer Janis Coutee, Sergeant E. Arnold, Officer Robert Cassidy, Officer Darlene Gander, Lieutenant Gus Paleologos, Sergeant Lalia Cossom ("correctional officers"), Executive Director Ernesto Velasco, Superintendent Dennis Drahos, Sheriff Michael F. Sheahan, John Doe, and the County of Cook.
Counts I and II allege civil fights violations under § 1983 against the correctional officers in their individual capacities for deliberate indifference to decedent's medical needs.
Counts III and IV allege civil rights violations under § 1983 against Executive Director Velasco, Superintendent Drahos and the County of Cook for failure to establish adequate procedures for medical treatment of pretrial detainees.
Counts V and VIII allege wrongful death and Survival Action claims against the correctional officers in their individual capacities for willful and wanton failure to provide adequate medical treatment to the decedent.
Counts VI, VII, IX and X allege wrongful death and Survival Action claims against the County of Cook and Executive Director Velasco, Superintendent Drahos and the correctional officers in their official capacities for willful and wanton failure to provide adequate medical treatment to the decedent.
Counts XI and XII allege state law claims and civil rights violations under § 1983 against Executive Director Velasco, Superintendent Drahos and Sheriff Sheahan for inadequate and unreliable procedures for medical care of pretrial detainees at Cook County Jail.
Count XIII, XIV, XV and XVI allege wrongful death and Survival Action claims against Sheriff Sheahan, Executive Director Velasco and Superintendent Drahos and the correctional officers in their official capacities for willful and wanton failure to provide medical treatment to the decedent.
Count XVII and XVIII allege wrongful death and Survival Action claims against John Doe, a Cook County Correctional Medical Technician and the County of Cook for negligence in the diagnosis and treatment of the decedent and for failure to transfer the decedent to a hospital.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Counts III, IV, VI, VII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII and XVIII. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is denied with respect to Counts XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI. Defendants' motion is granted with respect to Counts III, IV, VI, VII, IX, X, XVII and XVIII.
FACTS
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff. Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996). According to the amended complaint, filed on September 13, 1999, the decedent was a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Jail in September of 1998. Over the course of six days, the decedent and other prisoners repeatedly informed correctional officers that the decedent was suffering from severe abdominal pains and in need of immediate medical attention. The decedent eventually lost consciousness and was pronounced dead on September 20, 1998. It was determined that the decedent had been suffering from peritonitis throughout his stay in the Cook County Jail and died from that illness.
DISCUSSION Counts III, IV, VI, VII, IX, X
The County of Cook has moved to dismiss Counts III, IV, VI, VII, IX and X, arguing that the County is not liable for the conduct of correctional officers under either § 1983 or state law because it does not control or otherwise set the policy of the Cook County Sheriff's Department in relation to the custody of inmates at Cook County Jail.
It is clear under Illinois law that the Cook County Jail and the Cook County Department of Corrections are solely under the supervision and control of the Sheriff of Cook County. Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill.2d 519, 640 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 1994). The Sheriff of Cook County is an independently elected official and acts independently from the County Board. Id. The County of Cook has no authority to control the Sheriff of Cook County or his officers and cannot be held liable for any actions relating to the operation and supervision of the Cook County Jail. See Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1989); Conway v. Cook County, 1999 WL 14497 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1999); Degenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, 18 F. Supp.2d 848 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
Accordingly, the County's motion to dismiss Counts III, IV, VI, VII, IX and X is granted.
Counts XVII and XVIII
Counts XVII and XVIII allege negligence on the part of Cook County and John Doe, a Correctional Medical Technician employed by the County, for their failure to properly diagnosis and treat the decedent. Additionally, the Counts allege negligence in the defendants' failure to have the decedent transferred to a hospital or treated by a doctor.
In its motion, the County claims immunity from these claims under the Tort Immunity Act ( 745 ILCS 10/6-105 and 106(a)). Section 6-105 of the Tort Immunity Act provides immunity to local public entities and public employees who have failed to make a physical examination or failed to make an adequate examination for purposes of treatment. Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 306 Ill. App.3d 392, 714 N.E.2d 1010 (1st Dist. 1999). Section 106(a) provides that local public entities and public employees are not liable for injury resulting from diagnosing or failing to diagnose that a person is afflicted with a physical illness or for failure to prescribe for physical illness.
Plaintiff contends that defendants' failure to transfer the decedent to a hospital or have him treated by a doctor falls outside the scope of these provisions of the Tort Immunity Act. The failure to have the decedent treated, however, flows directly from defendants' failure to properly diagnose the decedent. Defendants are clearly not liable for injuries resulting from such a failure. Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 306 Ill. App.3d 392, 714 N.E.2d 1010 (1st Dist. 1999). Plaintiff's request that this Court ignore the majority holding in Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook is unpersuasive. Accordingly, the County's motion to dismiss Counts XVII and XVIII is granted.
Claims Against Individual Defendants in Their Official Capacities Contained in Counts XI through XVI
In Counts XI through XVI, plaintiff sues Sheriff Sheahan, Superintendent Drahos, Executive Director Velasco and correctional officers in their official capacities. Plaintiff's claims against the individuals in their official capacities are redundant because suits against an individual in his official capacity are actually suits against the governmental entity.Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). As stated above, the Cook County Jail is solely under the control of the Office of the Sheriff of Cook County. Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill.2d 519, 640 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 1994). All of the official capacity claims are actually claims against the Sheriff of Cook County. Dadian v. Village of Wilmette, 1999 WL 299887, at *3 (N.D.Ill. May 4, 1999); Tabor v. City of Chicago, 10 F. Supp.2d 988, 991 (1998). The court therefore dismisses plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities contained in Counts XI through XVI.
Counts XI and XII
Defendant Sheriff of Cook County argues that plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutional injury caused by the execution of an official government policy, practice or custom, as required under § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Service City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Under the federal rule of notice pleading, all that is required is a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics and Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. at 168, 113 S.Ct. at 1163 (1993). The plaintiff may plead conclusions, so long as the defendant is provided with at least minimal notice of the claim. Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 153-54 (7th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff has claimed the constitutional violation as deliberate denial of medical care to the decedent. Plaintiff claims in her complaint that this violation and the resulting injury to the decedent resulted from the known inadequacy and unreliability of the policies and procedures that the Cook County Sheriff's Department had instituted for the medical care of pretrial detainees in the Cook County Jail. This is certainly sufficient to inform the defendant of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 153. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss Counts XI and XII is denied.
Counts XIII, XIV, XV and XVI
Defendant Sheriff of Cook County has moved to dismiss Counts XIII, XIV, XV and XVI, arguing that the Cook County Sheriff's Department is not responsible for medical services in the Cook County Jail. One wonders if the irony of this argument was intended. As defendants themselves point out, the legislature has provided that the Cook County Jail and the Cook County Department of Corrections are solely under the supervision and control of the Cook County Sheriff, acting as warden of the jail. Moy, 159 Ill.2d at 527, 640 N.E.2d at 929. The sheriff appoints the superintendent of the jail and is responsible for his conduct and training. Id. The Department of Corrections is created within the office of the Sheriff. Id. Further, the sheriff is responsible for hiring and training all personnel necessary to operate and maintain the jail. Ill. Rev. State. 1989, ch. 75, par. 103.
Whether the medical personnel in the Cook County Jail are actually employed through Cook County and Cermak Medical Services is irrelevant. Plaintiff does not seek to make the sheriff liable for the actions of Cermak Medical Services or its personnel. Plaintiff's allegations in these counts rests on the premise that Sheriff Sheahan is responsible for establishing adequate policies and procedures to ensure treatment for serious medical emergencies in the Cook County Jail. Monell v. Department of Social Service City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Defendants' responsibility in this area is clear under Illinois law. Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill.2d 519, 640 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 1994).
Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss Counts XIII, XIV, XV and XVI is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied as to Counts XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XVI. The defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to Counts II, III, IV, VI, VII, IX and X and as to the official capacity claims contained in Counts XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XVI. Plaintiff is ordered to file an amended complaint on or before March 1, 2000, conforming to this opinion, and defendants shall file their answer thereto on or before March 21, 2000. This matter is set for a report on status March 22, 2000 at 9:00 a.m.