Opinion
24-CV-0558 (LTS)
04-15-2024
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order dated February 12, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the complaint. On August 5, 2023, and/or, August 6, 2023, Plaintiff was treated at Defendant Harlem Hospital for gunshot wounds. He alleges that the Hospital “discharged [him] with broken bones.” (ECF 1, at 4.) He indicates that he “now has severe permanent damage to his foot from gunshot wound.” (Id. at 5.)
The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise.
Plaintiff also alleges that police officers from the 25th Precinct of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) “interrogat[ed] Plaintiff under duress . . . by moving Plaintiff from cell to cell without proper medical attention knowing Plaintiff had gunshot wounds that were not treated for.” (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff seeks $15,000,000.00 in compensatory damages.
DISCUSSION
A. 25th Precinct
Plaintiff's claims against the 25th Precinct must be dismissed because a precinct is not an entity that has the capacity to be sued. See Orraca v. City of New York, 897 F.Supp. 148, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he 25th Precinct is a subdivision of the Police Department without the capacity to be sued.”). To the extent the Court were to construe the claims against the precinct as brought against the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), such claims also must be dismissed because the NYPD cannot be sued, pursuant to the New York City Charter. See N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”). The Court therefore dismisses the claim against the 25th Precinct because it is a nonsuable entity and construes the claim involving the police as one brought against the City of New York.
B. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff brings a claim against Harlem Hospital, which is operated by New York City Health + Hospitals (“H+H”). The Court construes these allegations as asserting a claim against H+H, which provides health services to individuals at Harlem Hospital. “[H+H] and its employees are state actors for purposes of Section 1983.” Mejia v. NYC Health & Hosp. Corp., No. 16-CV-9706, 2018 WL 3442977, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2018). Plaintiff also asserts claims against the City of New York concerning the NYPD's alleged interrogation practices and failure to provide medical care. The claims against H+H and the City of New York are analyzed as claims brought against a municipality.
H+H is a public benefit corporation created under New York State law and has the capacity to be sued, N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 7384(1), 7385(1).
When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.” (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978))); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011).
In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
A plaintiff may satisfy the policy or custom requirement by alleging one of the following: “(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the those who come into contact with the municipal employees.” Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F.Supp.2d 261, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted).
Finally, unless the plaintiff claims that the defendants has violated one of his constitutional rights, a plaintiff cannot assert a claim of municipal liability. See Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
Plaintiff does not state a claim of municipal liability against the City of New York or H+H. The claims against the City, concerning the alleged interrogation by police officers while Plaintiff was “under duress” and the officers' alleged failure to provide Plaintiff medical attention (ECF 1, at 4), do not include enough facts to show a constitutional violation. For example, it is unclear when and where Defendants “mov[ed] Plaintiff from cell to cell” (ECF 1, at 4), when they denied him medical care, or when he received treatment at Harlem Hospital. Because the timeline of events Plaintiff provides does not include dates and times, the Court cannot assess whether any NYPD officer violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, and subsequently, whether a City policy, custom, or practice caused any constitutional harm.
As for Plaintiff's claims against H+H, Plaintiff states that the hospital released him with “broken bones” and that he now suffers a permanent injury. These allegations do not suggest that any H+H employee violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights - rather, these allegations suggest that Plaintiff may be asserting a state law claim of negligence or medical malpractice. As Plaintiff does not allege an underlying constitutional violation with respect to the care he received at Harlem Hospital, he cannot state a municipal liability claim against H+H.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid claim against the City of New York and/or H+H, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
A. Leave to Name Individual Defendants
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his claims. If Plaintiff intends to bring claims against individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights, he must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Police Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 5, 2023.”
Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Statement of Claim
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint. If Plaintiff names the City of New York and/or H+H, he must allege facts suggesting that their policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional injury of which Plaintiff complains.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 24-CV-0558 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. No summons will issue at this time.
The Court dismisses from the complaint the 25th Precinct because it is not an entity that has the capacity to be sued.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.
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