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Abrams v. Long Island Lighting Company

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Feb 24, 1986
117 A.D.2d 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)

Opinion

February 24, 1986

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Geiler, J.).


Order reversed, insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, motions granted, and counterclaims dismissed, insofar as they are asserted against the appellants.

It is well established that Real Property Tax Law article 7 is the exclusive method of challenging an assessment on the grounds that it is illegal, irregular, excessive or unequal (see, Real Property Tax Law § 706; Matter of Dudley v Kerwick, 52 N.Y.2d 542; Mercantile Natl. Bank v. Mayor, Aldermen Commonalty of City of N.Y., 172 N.Y. 35; People ex rel. New York Harlem R.R. Co. v. Board of Taxes Assessments, 166 N.Y. 154; Town of Harrison v. County of Westchester, 25 A.D.2d 759, mod on other grounds 18 N.Y.2d 876). While LILCO argues that it has raised a challenge to the validity of the entire Brookhaven tax rolls for certain years, based upon the Assessor's use of an improper methodology in assessing real property in Brookhaven (see, C.H.O.B. Assoc. v. Board of Assessors, 45 Misc.2d 184, affd 22 A.D.2d 1015, affd 16 N.Y.2d 779; Matter of 22 Park Place Coop. v. Board of Assessors, 102 A.D.2d 893; Zinder v. Board of Assessors, 66 Misc.2d 150, affd 38 A.D.2d 836), a fair reading of the allegations contained in LILCO's answers and counterclaims fails to support such a claim. The gist of those allegations indicates that LILCO, in reality, is challenging its specific assessment on the grounds of illegality, inequality, and excessiveness — the same grounds upon which a Real Property Tax Law article 7 proceeding is based. LILCO, in its answers and counterclaims, has failed to identify with any particularity any "method" of assessment which it is attacking. Thus, any review of the assessments would necessitate inquiry into the Assessor's mental processes, judgments, and observations, an inquiry limited to article 7 proceedings (see, C.H.O.B. Assoc. v. Board of Assessors, supra; Matter of Bertholf v. Cisco, 72 Misc.2d 901, affd 45 A.D.2d 787; Zinder v. Board of Assessors, supra; Hillside Colony v. Barbolt, 86 Misc.2d 20). "Mere allegations, unsupported by evidentiary matter, that the attack is on the methods employed rather than individual evaluations, are not enough to relieve plaintiffs of the obligation to pursue their relief via the provisions of article 7 of the Real Property Tax Law" (Samuels v Town of Clarkson, 91 A.D.2d 836, 837). We have also considered LILCO's claims that it will not be able to obtain the relief requested in a proceeding pursuant to Real Property Tax Law article 7, and we reject those claims. Mangano, J.P., Niehoff, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Abrams v. Long Island Lighting Company

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Feb 24, 1986
117 A.D.2d 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
Case details for

Abrams v. Long Island Lighting Company

Case Details

Full title:ROBERT ABRAMS, as Attorney-General of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Feb 24, 1986

Citations

117 A.D.2d 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)

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