Opinion
A20-1184 A21-0285
08-03-2021
Hassan Mohamed Abdillahi, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent (A20-1184), In the Matter of: H. M. A. (A21-0285).
Hennepin County District Court File Nos. 27-CR-08-52463, 27-JX-03-071670, 27-J9-03-064726
Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
JENNIFER L. FRISCH JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Hassan Mohamed Abdillahi pleaded guilty as a juvenile to felony receiving stolen property in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2002). On October 2, 2003, the district court adjudicated Abdillahi delinquent. In a separate proceeding, Abdillahi pleaded guilty as a juvenile to felony damage to property in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1 (2002). On March 31, 2004, the district court adjudicated him delinquent. On January 1, 2004, Abdillahi turned 18.
2. In October 2008, the state charged Abdillahi as an adult with second-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2008). In June 2009, a jury found Abdillahi guilty. The district court set the matter on for sentencing and directed probation to complete a presentence investigation report (PSI).
3. The state filed a motion seeking a 367-month sentence based on "a criminal history of zero." See Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV (2008). But when the parties appeared for sentencing, the state indicated its intent to seek a 391-month sentence. Although no PSI had been filed into the record, the sentencing court noted at the hearing that it had received the PSI and discussed it "with the probation officer and with counsel." Also at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated:
Today I was informed that it was alleged Mr. Abdillahi has one juvenile history point. I am going to further research that issue. But the [c]ourt was quite diligent in going through the [r]ules with us back in chambers, as I believe the [c]ourt just became aware of this as well . . . .
4. The sentencing court imposed a sentence "for a total of 391 months" and stated that "261 months[] of that sentence shall be served in prison" with "122 months" on supervised release, totaling only 383 months.
5. Abdillahi filed a direct appeal and we affirmed. See State v. Abdillahi, No. A09-2011, 2011 WL 691623, at *9 (Minn.App. Mar. 1, 2011), review denied (Minn. May 17, 2011). He then filed a series of unsuccessful postconviction petitions and we affirmed the various denials of postconviction relief. See Abdillahi v. State, No. A12-1477, 2013 WL 2924900, at *10 (Minn.App. June 17, 2013), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2013); No. A14-1795, 2015 WL 4877721, at *6 (Minn.App. Aug. 17, 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015); No. A16-0179, 2016 WL 4069294, at *6 (Minn.App. Aug. 1, 2016), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2016); No. A17-0797, 2017 WL 5560067, at *4 (Minn.App. Nov. 20, 2017), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2018).
6. On February 23, 2015, and in relation to the second postconviction appeal, the PSI was filed and became part of the written record for the first time. The PSI calculated a single criminal-history point based on three qualifying juvenile adjudications-including the adjudications for receiving stolen property and property damage.
7. In 2020, Abdillahi filed a motion to correct his 391-month sentence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03 and requested an evidentiary hearing, arguing that his sentence was unauthorized because the district court did not find or assign a criminal-history point, he had no such criminal-history point, and his sentence therefore constituted an impermissible upward durational departure. The state disagreed and, for the first time, filed into the record a sentencing worksheet setting forth a single criminal-history point.
8. The district court found that the PSI was completed "four days before the sentencing hearing" and that "the record makes clear that the PSI was made available to Mr. Abdillahi and his attorney before the sentencing hearing," basing its finding primarily on the sentencing-hearing transcript and the date set forth on the PSI. The district court indicated it did "not know why the PSI was not filed into the court record" until February 23, 2015, and declined to find whether the sentencing worksheet was provided to the parties because the same information was contained in the PSI.
9. The district court concluded that Abdillahi was properly assigned a criminal-history point and that the 391-month sentence therefore fell within the presumptive guidelines range. It also determined that the sentencing court had mistakenly calculated a two-thirds commitment term of 261 months with a supervised-release term of 122 months. It scheduled a hearing "for the sole purpose of pronouncing an accurate sentence in regard to the amount of time Mr. Abdillahi is to serve in prison and the amount of time he is to serve on supervised release," which it calculated as "260 and 2/3 months" and "130 and 1/3 months," respectively.
10. At the hearing, Abdillahi questioned whether he was being assigned a criminal-history point for the first time and suggested he was entitled to counsel. The district court explained it was "just going to give [Abdillahi] the correct two-thirds and one-third amount of time that was pronounced incorrectly the first time." It stated the corrected prison and supervised-release terms. Abdillahi appealed.
11. Abdillahi then filed a motion in his juvenile cases to withdraw his guilty pleas to receiving stolen property and damage to property. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 8.02, subd. 2(B). He argued that withdrawal of his pleas was necessary to correct a manifest injustice because (1) his pleas were not knowing and intelligent and (2) his attorneys in both juvenile proceedings were ineffective for failing to fully inform him of the ramifications of pleading guilty. Abdillahi supported his motion with an affidavit and requested an evidentiary hearing.
12. On September 30, 2020, Abdillahi moved for appointment of the public defender in connection with his motion to withdraw his pleas. The state responded and urged the district court to deny the plea-withdrawal motion without an evidentiary hearing, but it did not address the motion to appoint a public defender. Abdillahi replied, in part, "Due Process and Equal Protection of the law requires this Court to grant [the] request for counsel where similarly situated individuals such as criminal defendant[]s who have the luxury of challenging their adult convictions with the assistance of counsel."
The record does not include Abdillahi's relevant motion. But the district court later found that Abdillahi made the request, the state does not challenge that finding, and the district court ruled on the request for court-appointed counsel.
13. At some point, Abdillahi requested appointment of the appellate public defender's office to represent him in connection with his receiving-stolen-property case. In correspondence dated November 12, 2020, the appellate public defender's office informed Abdillahi that it would "not be able to assist" Abdillahi because he was "well beyond the timeframe to appeal [the] adjudication" and because the "post[]conviction statute does not apply to juvenile adjudications."
14. On January 21, 2021, the district court issued an order denying Abdillahi's motions. It denied the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas and the motion for an evidentiary hearing, concluding generally (1) that Abdillahi's claims were untimely and meritless and (2) that his allegations did not warrant an evidentiary hearing.
15. Regarding Abdillahi's request for counsel in connection with his motion to withdraw the juvenile pleas, the district court stated, "Mr. Abdillahi has a right to counsel, but the Court is denying appointment of a public defender." It noted that the Hennepin County Public Defender's Office had already represented Abdillahi in the underlying adjudication proceedings and that the office terminated its representation "when juvenile court jurisdiction ended in 2003 and 2004." The district court also reasoned that it could not appoint the public defender's office because requiring a public defender to litigate an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim regarding the inefficacy of another public defender would produce a conflict of interest.
16. Abdillahi petitioned for discretionary review of the district court's order, challenging the district court's denials of his motion to withdraw his plea, his request for an evidentiary hearing, and his motion for court-appointed counsel. We granted the petition and consolidated the two appeals. After ordering and receiving supplemental briefing in the plea-withdrawal matter, we took the consolidated matters under advisement.
A20-1184: Sentencing Appeal
17. We first address Abdillahi's arguments regarding the district court's denial of his motion to correct his sentence and the corrected terms of imprisonment and supervised release. Abdillahi argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that his sentence is authorized by law, erred by denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing, and committed structural error by failing to appoint counsel when it pronounced the corrected terms of confinement and supervised release.
18. Abdillahi challenges the district court's denial of his motion to correct his sentence. Generally, he argues that his sentence is an unauthorized upward departure because (1) the sentencing court lacked the requisite information to assign a criminal- history point on the basis of the juvenile adjudications, (2) the sentencing court failed to explicitly assign a criminal-history point, and (3) the sentencing procedure violated his due-process rights.
19. We review a district court's denial of a motion to correct a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Steward v. State, 950 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. 2020). "We will reverse the district court only when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Id. at 754-55 (quotation omitted). Questions of interpretation regarding statutes, rules of criminal procedure, and sentencing guidelines are subject to de novo review. See Evans v. State, 925 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. 2019); State v. Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2012).
20. The district court "may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law." Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. "For a sentence to be unauthorized, it must be contrary to law or applicable statutes." State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2015). "A sentence based on an incorrect criminal-history score is an illegal sentence." State v. Woods, 945 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Minn.App. 2020). "[W]hen a defendant files a motion under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, to correct a sentence after the time for direct appeal has passed, the defendant bears the burden of proving that his . . . sentence was based on an incorrect criminal-history score." Williams v. State, 910 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 2018).
21. "[W]hen the defendant has been convicted of a felony, the court shall, before sentence is imposed, cause a presentence investigation and written report to be made to the court . . . ." Minn. Stat. § 609.115, subd. 1(a) (2020). The district court shall also "cause a sentencing worksheet to be completed to facilitate the application of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines." Id., subd. 1(e) (2020); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 1(b)(4) (requiring that PSI comply with section 609.115, subdivision 1, and that PSI include sentencing worksheet). "Whenever a person is convicted of a felony, the court, upon motion of either the defendant or the state, shall hold a sentencing hearing." Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 1 (2020). "Prior to the hearing, the court shall transmit to the defendant or the defendant's attorney and the prosecuting attorney copies of the presentence investigation report." Id.; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 1(b)(5). "If the defendant contests the existence of or factual basis for a prior conviction in the calculation of the defendant's criminal history score, proof of it is established by competent and reliable evidence, including a certified court record of the conviction." Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 9 (2020).
22. A presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines is determined according to the severity level of the offense of conviction and the defendant's criminal-history score. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.C (2008). Intentional second-degree murder is a severity-level-eleven offense. Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV. An offender "is assigned one point for every two [felony] offenses committed . . . as a juvenile" if (1) findings were made by the district court pursuant to an admission, (2) the offenses involved separate behavioral incidents or separate victims, (3) the offenses occurred after the offender's fourteenth birthday, (4) the offender was not yet 25 at the time of the offense of conviction, and (5) not more than one point is assigned for offenses that do not carry a presumptive term of imprisonment. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.B.4(a)-(e) (2008). At the time of Abdillahi's offense, the presumptive sentence for second-degree murder with a criminal-history score of zero ranged from 261 months' imprisonment on the low end to 367 months on the high end. Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV. But with a criminal-history score of one, the presumptive term of commitment ranged from 278 months to 391 months. Id.
23. We reject Abdillahi's claim that the sentencing judge lacked the requisite information to impose a sentence based on an existing criminal-history point. The district court found that (1) the PSI was completed four days before the sentencing hearing, (2) the PSI calculated a criminal-history score of one, (3) the PSI was provided to the parties and the sentencing court before the sentencing hearing, and (4) the parties discussed the PSI with the sentencing court before the hearing. Abdillahi challenges the district court's findings as clearly erroneous and contends that the PSI is fraudulent. A district court's findings are clearly erroneous if there is no reasonable evidence to support the findings. State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 515 (Minn. 2013). But here, the record readily supports the district court's findings. The sentencing court ordered a PSI, the authoring probation officer attended the sentencing hearing, the parties at the sentencing hearing acknowledged discussing the PSI, defense counsel acknowledged at the sentencing hearing the allegation of a "juvenile history point," the state sought a "top-of-the-box" sentence of 391 months, and defense counsel argued against a 391-month sentence, characterizing the duration as "obviously . . . within the Guidelines" and the "high end of the box."
24. We likewise reject Abdillahi's claim that his sentence is an upward departure simply because the sentencing court did not explicitly assign a criminal-history point on the record. Abdillahi fails to cite any authority requiring a sentencing court to specifically assign criminal-history points on the record, especially where a defendant fails to "contest[] the existence of or factual basis for a prior [juvenile adjudication] in the calculation of [his] criminal history score." See Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 9; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 1(B)(6)(d). He instead cites authorities standing for the broader proposition that a criminal-history score must be accurately calculated. E.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596 (2007) (stating "a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range").
25. Abdillahi raises various due-process arguments. He claims that he was denied notice of, and an opportunity to rebut, the bases for his criminal-history score and that the later-filed PSI and sentencing worksheet are insufficient to establish his criminal-history score. We question whether these arguments actually aim to demonstrate that the sentence is unauthorized by law. But even assuming that the arguments are properly raised in support of a Rule 27.03 motion, the arguments fail because the district court's findings that the PSI was completed before sentencing, provided to counsel before sentencing, and discussed with counsel before sentencing are not clearly erroneous. These findings undermine the bases for Abdillahi's arguments: that the PSI on record is fraudulent, that the PSI was not available to defense counsel, and that the bases for the criminal-history point were unknown to defense counsel. Further, despite indicating that he was going to "further research" the issue of Abdillahi's "juvenile history point," defense counsel did not seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing in order to conduct further research or later challenge the bases for the criminal-history point. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 1(B)(6)(c)-(d).
26. Abdillahi also contends that the sentencing procedure improperly relieved the state of its burden to establish his criminal-history score by a preponderance of the evidence. Although the state bore the initial burden of establishing Abdillahi's criminal-history score by a preponderance of the evidence, see Williams, 910 N.W.2d at 743, the time to hold the state to its burden has long since passed. At the time of his Rule 27.03 motion, Abdillahi bore the burden of demonstrating that his criminal-history score was incorrectly calculated. See Williams, 910 N.W.2d at 743 . He did not do so.
27. Notably, Abdillahi did not argue in his Rule 27.03 motion and does not argue on appeal that the relevant juvenile adjudications did not qualify for inclusion in his criminal-history score at the time of sentencing. He therefore failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that his sentence was based on an incorrect criminal-history score. See id. at 740.
28. Based on his mistaken claim that the sentencing court did not impose a sentence based on a criminal-history point, Abdillahi suggests that the district court assigned a criminal-history point for the first time when it denied his Rule 27.03 motion. He misconstrues the district court's analysis. The district court analyzed the adjudications under Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.B.4(a)-(e) merely to demonstrate that Abdillahi "was correctly assigned a criminal history point based on his qualified juvenile offenses" (emphasis added) despite Abdillahi's failure to carry his burden.
29. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Abdillahi's motion to correct his sentence.
30. Abdillahi also argues that the district court abused its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to correct his sentence. But Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, "does not expressly require a hearing." State v. Masood, 739 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn.App. 2007). And nothing in Abdillahi's affidavits demonstrated that his juvenile adjudications did not qualify for inclusion in his criminal-history score; he merely made the conclusory assertion that he "did not have a felony point" at the time of sentencing. We discern no abuse of discretion.
31. Finally, Abdillahi contends that the district court committed structural error by holding the August 5, 2009 sentencing hearing without first appointing counsel. We review de novo whether the district court violated a defendant's right to counsel. State v. Slette, 585 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Minn.App. 1998). Defendants have a constitutional right to counsel in criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. The right to counsel extends to each critical stage of a proceeding, which are trial-like confrontations in which counsel could assist the defendant with legal issues and meeting the state as an adversary. State v. Maddox, 825 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn.App. 2013). Sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1205 (1977). "The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error." Maddox, 825 N.W.2d at 147 (quotation omitted).
32. The right to counsel did not extend to the August 5 hearing because it was not a critical stage of the proceedings. The district court expressly limited the scope of the hearing to pronouncing corrected durational terms of confinement and supervised release and made no change to the overall pronounced sentence term. The hearing was not a trial- like proceeding in which counsel could have aided Abdillahi in addressing legal issues and meeting the state as an adversary. See id. at 144. The district court did not commit structural error by failing to appoint counsel.
A21-0285: Plea-Withdrawal Appeal
33. Abdillahi contends that Minnesota's lack of "procedures or avenues . . . for indigents to access counsel on a first review challenging their juvenile guilty pleas" violates the Minnesota Constitution's equal-protection clause because "Minnesota provides explicit avenues and procedures for indigents to access counsel on a first review challenging their adult guilty plea."
34. As a threshold matter, the state urges us to deem Abdillahi's argument forfeited because he did not raise the argument in the district court. It is true that we generally do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Steward, 950 N.W.2d at 756. But Abdillahi did argue to the district court that "Due Process and Equal Protection of the law" required the appointment of counsel "where similarly situated individuals" have counsel. And he cited Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2006), for the proposition that the "right to assistance of counsel . . . extends to first review through collateral proceeding[s]." Although Abdillahi's equal-protection argument on appeal challenges the lack of "procedures or avenues . . . for indigents to access counsel on a first review challenging their juvenile guilty pleas," the argument aligns with the theory presented to the district court. Further, the forfeiture doctrine is discretionary. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) ("At the court's discretion, it may deviate from this rule when the interests of justice require consideration of such issues and doing so would not unfairly surprise a party to the appeal."). There is no unfair surprise to the state here, and the interests of justice warrant our consideration where the right implicated is the right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel in the proceeding underlying the appeal.
35. We turn next to the merits of Abdillahi's claim that the district court erred by failing to appoint counsel. The Minnesota Constitution provides, "No member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land . . . ." Minn. Const. art. I, § 2. The individual asserting an equal-protection violation bears the initial burden of demonstrating that he has been "treated differently from others to whom [he] is similarly situated in all relevant respects." State v. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d 338, 347 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). If the individual carries his initial burden, we determine the appropriate level of scrutiny and consider whether equal-protection principles are violated. See id. at 348. "We review alleged violations of equal protection de novo." Id. at 347.
36. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions recognize the right to the assistance of counsel "[i]n all criminal prosecutions." U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I § 6; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1. This right extends, with limited exceptions, to juveniles in delinquency-adjudication proceedings. See In re Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-36, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1447-48 (1977); Minn. Stat. § 260B.163, subd. 4(a) (2020). Individuals convicted of crimes have the right to counsel on first review through either a direct appeal or a postconviction proceeding. Deegan, 711 N.W.2d at 97-98. Juveniles have the right to counsel on direct appeal from a delinquency adjudication. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 21.02; Minn. Stat. § 611.25 (2020).
37. Generally, individuals who are financially unable to obtain counsel in criminal prosecutions are entitled to court-appointed counsel at public expense. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796 (1963); Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(1)-(2); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 3.02, subd. 1. By statute, various categories of persons financially unable to obtain counsel are entitled to the appointment of a public defender, including, in relevant part: (1) "a person charged with a felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor"; (2) a person seeking first review of a felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor conviction either in a direct appeal or postconviction proceeding; (3) a minor ten years of age or older charged with a gross misdemeanor or felony; and (4) a juvenile appealing from a delinquency adjudication. Minn. Stat. §§ 260B.163, subd. 4(b)(1), 611.14(1)-(2), (4), 611.25, subd. 1 (2020).
38. Abdillahi's argument concerns the lack of clear authority governing the appointment of counsel for an indigent individual seeking first review of the validity of a juvenile guilty plea in a postdisposition proceeding. He contends that he is similarly situated to an indigent postconviction petitioner who would be entitled to court-appointed counsel when seeking first review through a postconviction proceeding. See Minn. Stat. §§ 590.05, 611.14(2) (2020). The state concedes that "[a] similarly situated adult would be entitled to appointed counsel, and although the law does make some distinctions between adult criminal proceedings and juvenile delinquency proceedings, such a distinction may not be appropriate in this context."
39. We first observe that the district court determined that Abdillahi "ha[d] a right to counsel" and that the state does not challenge that determination. Accordingly, the issue of whether Abdillahi had a constitutional right to counsel in connection with his postdisposition motion to withdraw his guilty plea is not before us and we express no opinion as to the merits of the determination by the district court.
40. Despite its determination that Abdillahi had the right to counsel in connection with the postdisposition proceedings, the district court denied Abdillahi's motion for counsel by concluding that it could not appoint a public defender because the public defender's office had already ended their representation and the appointment of a public defender would produce a conflict.
41. We think it is unnecessary to address whether the failure to appoint counsel violates Abdillahi's right to equal protection because the district court improperly narrowed its consideration of appointment of counsel to the appointment of a public defender, failing to account for our well-settled authority that the constitutional right to counsel is not coextensive with the statutory right to representation by a public defender.
42. "Although the right to counsel is constitutional, the right to representation by a public defender is statutory." State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2009) (citations omitted). "The statutory right to state public defender representation does not necessarily include every person who has a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel." Morris v. State, 765 N.W.2d 78, 84 (Minn. 2009). Here, despite determining that Abdillahi had a right to counsel, the district court suggested that Abdillahi "could hire his own counsel or find counsel that would represent him at no charge." But "[w]here counsel is constitutionally required and there is no statutory right to a public defender, the district court exercises its inherent authority to appoint private counsel." State v. Randolph, 800 N.W.2d 150, 154 (Minn. 2011) (emphasis added).
43. Here, the district court apparently accepted that Abdillahi was financially unable to obtain counsel. The parties do not dispute that fact on appeal. The district court further determined that Abdillahi had the right to counsel in the postdisposition proceeding. But a determination of an indigent movant's ineligibility for representation by a public defender is not dispositive because, even absent statutory authority, the district court is obligated to exercise its inherent authority to appoint private counsel. See id.
44. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by denying Abdillahi's motion for court-appointed counsel and erred by denying his plea-withdrawal and evidentiary-hearing motions without first appointing counsel. We reverse and remand for the district court to exercise its inherent authority to appoint private counsel for Abdillahi in accordance with Randolph. Id. at 159-60. If no attorney is available to serve on a pro bono basis, the state shall bear the burden of paying an appointed attorney's reasonable fees incurred in connection with the postdisposition proceedings. See id. at 162.
45. We do not reach and express no opinion regarding the merits of the district court's underlying decision denying Abdillahi's motions for an evidentiary hearing and plea withdrawal. Abdillahi was not afforded the assistance of counsel in connection with those motions. On remand, the district court shall appoint counsel, allow Abdillahi to renew his motions with the assistance of counsel, and decide the case in a manner not inconsistent with this order opinion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's July 16, 2020 order denying Abdillahi's motion to correct his sentence is affirmed.
2. Abdillahi's August 5, 2020 sentence is affirmed.
3. The district court's order denying Abdillahi's motions for court-appointed counsel, an evidentiary hearing, and plea withdrawal is reversed and remanded.
4. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.