Opinion
No. 1:07–CV–0388–OWW–DLB.
2011-08-31
ABARCA, Raul Valencia, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY WATER DISTRICT, Defendants.
Brett Lee Runyon, Heather Sharon Cohen, Michael Edward Lehman, Michael G. Marderosian, Marderosian, Runyon, Cercone, Lehman & Armo, Fresno, CA, Ricardo Echeverria, Shernoff Bidart Echeverria, LLP, Claremont, CA, Thomas Vincent Girardi, Girardi and Keese, Los Angeles, CA, Jack Silver, Law Office of Jack Silver, Santa Rosa, CA, for Plaintiff. Eugene Tanaka, Best Best & Krieger LLP, Walnut Creek, CA, Jeffrey Frank Oneal, Thomas S Brazier, Thomas S. Brazier, Lamore Brazier Riddle and Giampaoli, San Jose, CA, Eric Martin Steinle, Oakland, CA, Glenn Barger, Chapman, Glucksman, Dean, Roeb & Barger, Los Angeles, CA, Stephen E. Carroll, McCormick Barstow Sheppard Wayte and Carruth LLP, Scott D. Laird, Timothy Jones, John P. Kinsey, Jones Helsley PC, Fresno, CA, Donald Evan Sobelman, John F. Barg, John Frank Barg, Kathryn L. Oehlschlager, R. Morgan Gilhuly, Stephen C. Lewis, Barg Coffin Lewis and Trapp LLP San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.
Brett Lee Runyon, Heather Sharon Cohen, Michael Edward Lehman, Michael G. Marderosian, Marderosian, Runyon, Cercone, Lehman & Armo, Fresno, CA, Ricardo Echeverria, Shernoff Bidart Echeverria, LLP, Claremont, CA, Thomas Vincent Girardi, Girardi and Keese, Los Angeles, CA, Jack Silver, Law Office of Jack Silver, Santa Rosa, CA, for Plaintiff. Eugene Tanaka, Best Best & Krieger LLP, Walnut Creek, CA, Jeffrey Frank Oneal, Thomas S Brazier, Thomas S. Brazier, Lamore Brazier Riddle and Giampaoli, San Jose, CA, Eric Martin Steinle, Oakland, CA, Glenn Barger, Chapman, Glucksman, Dean, Roeb & Barger, Los Angeles, CA, Stephen E. Carroll, McCormick Barstow Sheppard Wayte and Carruth LLP, Scott D. Laird, Timothy Jones, John P. Kinsey, Jones Helsley PC, Fresno, CA, Donald Evan Sobelman, John F. Barg, John Frank Barg, Kathryn L. Oehlschlager, R. Morgan Gilhuly, Stephen C. Lewis, Barg Coffin Lewis and Trapp LLP San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: BAC DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. (PHASE 1)
OLIVER W. WANGER, District Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Defendants Merck & Co., Inc. Amsted Industries Inc., and Baltimore Aircoil Company, Inc. (collectively, “BAC Defendants”) bring this motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), or in the alternative, motion for new trial following jury verdicts in the first phase (“Phase 1”) of this multi-party, multi-phase toxic tort case.
According to Defendants, Plaintiffs either failed to present or presented insufficient evidence of exposure to contaminants which allegedly originated from a now-closed cooling tower manufacturing facility (the “BAC site”) operated by entities that were formerly owned by BAC Defendants. Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) was not met regarding the surface water and air pathways, as required under the Phase 1 Court Order Modifying Scheduling Conference Order (“Phase 1 Pretrial Order”). (Doc. 540.) BAC Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence regarding Defendants legal responsibility for release of contaminates at the BAC Site, i.e., to what extent, and when did Defendants, Merck, Amsted and BAC own, direct actions, remediate, and/or operate the BAC Site to cause contaminant releases that could be actionable.
The first phase of discovery was focused on “whether contaminants from the former [ ] BAC Site, Franklin County Water District or the April 2006 Flood have ever reached any location where plaintiffs could have been exposed to them, and if so, when such contaminants arrived, how such contaminants arrived at the location, how long they were present, and at what levels they were present.” (Doc. 540 at 1:14–1:28.)
Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Plaintiffs' rejoin that they presented “substantial evidence” at trial in the form of expert opinion and analysis to show that contaminants migrated from the BAC facility to Plaintiffs' homes and/or properties through the various pathways. Plaintiffs further argue that BAC Defendants' criticisms regarding certain expert testimony go to the weight, not admissibility of the opinion. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that corporate liability was not an issue for determination in Phase 1 and as such JMOL cannot be granted for Defendants on this issue.
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
On March 8, 2007, Plaintiffs commenced this civil action against the current public entity defendants, alleging property damage caused by an April 2006 flood. (Doc. 1.) On September 13, 2007, in the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs named Merck & Co., Inc., Amsted Industries, Inc., Baltimore Aircoil Company, and Track Four, Inc. as Defendants in this action. (Doc. 35.) The eighth amended complaint was filed by Plaintiffs on March 26, 2010. (Doc. 633.) The eighth amended complaint alleges ten claims against the BAC Defendants: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1) [RCRA]; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B) [RCRA]; (3) violation of 33 U.S.C. 1311(a) [CWA]; (4) violation of 33 U.S.C. 1342(a) and (b) [CWA]; (5) negligence; (6) trespass; (7) nuisance; (8) wrongful death; (9) fraud and deceit; and (10) civil conspiracy.
2. BACKGROUND.
3. LEGAL STANDARDS.
a. Judgment as a Matter of Law.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(a) provides:
If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may:
(A) resolve the issue against the party; and
(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.
The standards governing a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 are reiterated in Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 735 (9th Cir.1994):
When confronted with a motion for judgment as a matter of law ... a trial court must scrutinize the proof and the inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in the light most amiable to the nonmovant ... In the process, the court may not consider the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the weight of evidence ... A judgment as a matter of law may be granted only if the evidence, viewed from the perspective most favorable to the nonmovant, is so one-sided that the movant is plainly entitled to judgment, for reasonable minds could not differ in the outcome ....
“[W]hen an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury's verdict.” Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993). “A reasonable jury cannot credit testimony that fails to reflect reality.” Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 2008 WL 73681, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 5, 2008). b. Motion for New Trial
A motion for new trial “may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues ... for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(a). “The grant of a new trial is ‘confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court.’ ” Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir.1990).
A new trial is necessary when the court, upon reviewing the evidence presented at trial and considering the jury's verdict, “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 556 F.3d 1075, 1087–88 (9th Cir.2009) ( quoting Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1371–72 (9th Cir.1987)). A motion for new trial may also be granted to correct an erroneous evidentiary ruling that results in substantial prejudice to a party. Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir.1995).
The grounds upon which a new trial has been granted are: (1) where the jury's verdict is so contrary to the clear weight of the evidence; (2) if the verdict is based on false evidence; or (3) if there would otherwise be a miscarriage of justice. Roy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 896 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir.1990).
“While the trial court may weigh the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, the court is not justified in granting a new trial ‘merely because it might have come to a different result from that reached by the jury.’ ” Id. quoting Wilhelm v. Associated Container Transp. (Australia) Ltd., 648 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir.1981); Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 630 (9th Cir.2007).
4. DISCUSSION
A. Exposure Via Surface Water.
The jury found that Plaintiffs could have been exposed to hexavalent chromium at a concentration of 87 ppb in the El Capitan Canal from 1969 to 2006 and in flood waters in the Beachwood neighborhood from April 2006 to the present:
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦Year of ¦How Long Chemical ¦ ¦ +----------+----------+-----------+---------+-------------------+----------------¦ ¦Pathway ¦Chemical ¦Location ¦Arrival ¦was Present ¦Concentrations ¦ +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Flood Water CR 6 Beachwood April to Present 87 ppb Neighbor-hood 2006 Canal Water CR 6 Canal 1969 1969–2006 87 ppb
(Verdicts of Trial Jury at 3) (recreation.)
1. El Capitan Canal.
Defendants assert that the jury's finding of 87 ppb of hexavalent chromium in the canal throughout the period of 1969 to 2006 is unreasonable, or alternatively, the only reasonable time span the jury could find that 87 ppb hexavalent chromium existed in the canal is from 1969 to no later than 1991.
a. Jury's Verdict Re: Canal Contamination From 1969–1991.
Over the period of 1969–1991, sampling of the pond was conducted only in January and March of 1989. These samples tested positive for both hexavalent and total chromium, which was recorded in a report by Dames & Moore titled, Phase II Soil and Surface Characterization Report (“Dames & Moore Report”). No sampling of the canal was done during this time. No other data or test evidence regarding the pond or canal was presented at trial for this time period. The absence of testing or sampling prevents any finding where contamination was present in the canal. Plaintiffs have strenuously argued that Defendants cannot benefit from their failure to test by asserting that negative inferences should be drawn against Defendants. This contention, however, does not substitute for evidence.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' have not met their burden of proof as to whether hexavalent chromium was in the canal during the period of 1969 to 1991 because no canal water sampling exists for that time period and Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Laton, “admitted that samples collected at the outlet of the pond show non-detect-to-low detect concentrations of hexavalent chromium,” citing Dr. Laton's testimony regarding the Dames & Moore Report's March 1989 sample results. (Doc. 1259 at 10:24–11:1.)
Plaintiffs' theory is significantly different and rests on a series of inferences. Plaintiffs rejoin that Dr. Laton conditioned his testimony regarding the March 1989 samples by opining that the January 1989 samples were representative, and these included a hexavalent chromium measurement of as high as 630 parts per billion (“ppb”).
Dr. Laton further testified that surface soil measurements at the BAC Site were above-standard levels for hexavalent chromium in 2006. ( See Declaration of Michael G. Marderosian [“Decl. Marderosian”], Ex. G, Rough Trial Transcript [“RT”] at 209:22–210:3, Feb. 9, 2011) [testifying to an 800 ppb hexavalent chromium surface soil sample when the remediation goal was 10 ppb.]. Plaintiffs argue that since remediation at the BAC Site was not started until 1991 and this soil sample was found even after remediation began, Dr. Laton made a reasonable scientific assumption that the soil at the BAC Site has been contaminated for the last forty years. The argument continues that, combined with Dr. Laton's testimony that the contaminated soil was being washed into the pond from 1969 on and, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a jury could reasonably find that re-contamination of the pond and canal was constantly occurring during this time period before clean-closure of the pond. Dr. Laton opined as follows:
Q. Returning to the Feinstein report.... The document says, ‘Samples collected from the outlet of the pond during the rain event at that time contained significantly lower concentrations (total chromium at 180 and hexavalent chromium not detected above 50 parts per billion) ...’
Do you agree with that?
A. I agree they had total chromium of 1490 and 630 parts per billion for hexavalent chrome [on January 20, 1989]. (Declaration of Stephen C. Lewis [“Decl. Lewis”], Ex. 5, RT at 33:1–9, Feb. 10, 2011.)
Q. Okay. And am I correct that the sample of water that was flowing out of the pond into the canal on March 15th, 1989, had no hexavalent chromium?
A. According to this sheet, yes.
Q. Do you have a doubt? I mean, when you said ‘according to this sheet.’
A. Because the January 20th, 1989 sample did have hexavalent chrome leaving.
Q. It had hexavalent chromium in January of 1989 in the pond surface waters; correct?
A. Correct. (Decl. Lewis, Ex. 4, RT at 222:7–22, Feb. 9, 2011; and see Decl. Lewis, Ex. 25) (reporting the concentration value of 630 ppb hexavalent chromium in January 1989 and low-to-non-detect in March of 1989).
Q. So prior to 2008, is it your understanding that contaminated soils still remained on this site?
A. Yes.
Q. For almost 40 years?
A. Correct.
[...]
Q. What is your understanding of the mechanism [ ] as to how those soils reached the pond?
[...]
THE WITNESS: [ ] As the water moves over the surface and entrains sediments and other chemicals it comes in contact with, and then it moves toward that drainage ditch, which ends up at a sump, which is then pumped up into the pond.
And by the evidence of the water quality that we've seen in 1988 [sic] and 1989, within the pond, obviously contamination made it to that point. (RT at 1155:16–1156:16, Feb. 9, 2011.)
Plaintiffs further argue that the jury's verdict was reasonable based on Dr. Laton's testimony that, pursuant to the Dames & Moore Report's 1989 sampling, an average of 581.8 ppb total chromium was flowing from the pond to the canal from 1969–1991. Dr. Laton opined as follows:
Q. And what was your opinion as to that range or average of chromium in that canal during that period of time between 1969 and 1991?
A. The average that I calculated was 581.8 micrograms per liter or parts per billion [of total chrome]. ( Id. at 1154:16–22.)
Because evidence was presented that hexavalent chromium is included in the total chromium value, Plaintiffs argue the jury could reasonably infer that 87 ppb of hexavalent chromium existed throughout the canal as part of the 581.8 ppb total chromium value over the entire 1969–1991 time period.
Dr. Laton further opined that this 581.8 ppb total chromium concentration was flowing unimpeded into the canal from 1969 to 1991:
[A.] There's nothing to impede flow from what's in the canal to get—what's in the pond to get into the canal. And then to migrate downstream from there.
So based upon that, I reviewed the dataset, which is only one year for the pond water quality, which ranged in values from a low of 6 to as high as 1490 micrograms per liter of total chromium. And took the average of that and just said that's a conservative value for what would be getting into that canal over that whole time frame. ( Id. at 1154:7–15) (emphasis added). From this, Plaintiffs argue, a reasonable jury could find that 87 ppb hexavalent chromium existed in the canal from 1969–1991 based on Dr. Laton's testimony.
Defendants rejoin that the jury's canal finding cannot be justified because Dr. Fendorf's “unrebutted” testimony concerning chromium valance conversion defeats Plaintiffs' argument and Dr. Laton had no basis to estimate that from one year of data observation, twenty-two years of contamination was present. Defendants assert that Dr. Fendorf's analysis proves that no above-standard levels of hexavalent chromium could have reached the canal, particularly because Dr. Laton refused to consider the degree of valance reduction of the chromium leaving the pond. Plaintiffs respond first, that Dr. Fendorf's testimony was successfully challenged—i.e., Dr. Fendorf's theory was not presented or established as a matter of law.
Dr. Fendorf's direct examination established:
[T]he bacteria [in the pond] directly take[s] hexavalent chromium to trivalent chromium.... And seeing the pond ... in terms of its vegetation and so on [w]e could see that it was reducing. (RT at 105:15–17, Feb. 10, 2011.)
Any chromium that's coming out into, discharging into El Capitan Canal [ ] I would expect to have converted to trivalent chromium dominantly. ( Id. at 107:21–23.)
Dr. Fendorf's cross-examination, in relevant part, shows:
‘Question: So in your work in this case, what did you do to determine the existence of anaerobic conditions in the soil?
Answer: I didn't do an extensive analysis ... I was charged with looking at whether there might be conditions and to explain the conditions that could lead to this. What I did do is I went out to the site, I dug two soil pits.'
[...]
Q. But enable [sic] to determine if there were anaerobic conditions in areas where hexavalent chromium were used, no samples were dug in those areas?
A. No samples were dug ...
[...]
Q. So the bottom line is this. You can't really tell this jury if there were really anaerobic conditions that existed on this site where the chemicals were used; can you?
A. Where they were used, no, I can't. I can't say that. (Decl. Marderosian, Ex. U, RT at 173:25–174:8; 175:18–21; 196:13–16, Feb. 10, 2011.) Plaintiffs' question on cross-examination was “where” the chemicals were “used” in the retort, not where the chemicals were “released,” which includes the drop pad, pond (sump) and its connection to the canal. This misdirection in the question negates any meaningful effect to the Fendorf answer, which is not impeaching about the anaerobic effects in the pond and canal. Dr. Fendorf's testimony invokes an indisputable scientific principle applicable to valance reduction of chromium.
Plaintiffs argue the jury was instructed that they may reject the testimony of an expert like Dr. Fendorf. ( See Decl. Marderosian, Ex. I [jury instruction no. 13].) Jury instruction number 13 states:
Some witness, because of education or experience, are permitted to state opinions and the reasons for those opinions.
Opinion testimony should be judged just like any other testimony. You may accept it or reject it, and give it as much weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness's education and experience, the reasons given for the opinion, and all the other evidence in the case.
If the expert witnesses disagreed with one another, you should weigh each opinion against the others. You should examine the reasons given for each opinion and the facts or other matters that each witness relied on. You may also compare the experts' qualifications.
Id.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that it appears the jury did weigh each expert opinion. The jury found 87 ppb of hexavalent chromium, which Plaintiffs argue could have taken Dr. Fendorf's conversion theory into account since Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Laton, testified to a hexavalent chromium level in the pond of 630 ppb and an average total chromium level of 581.8 ppb. In other words, because Dr. Laton testified to 630 ppb hexavalent chromium and 581.8 ppb total chromium and the jury's verdict of 87 ppb hexavalent chromium is significantly lower then either of these values, the jury must have taken Defendants' conversion theory into account.
Plaintiffs finally argue that Defendants' witness Ms. Kretsinger and Regional Board representative Mr. Austin admitted the pond was contaminated prior to 1991:
Q. Is it your opinion that the pond was not contaminated with hexavalent chromium between 1969 and 1991?
A. No. That is incorrect. (RT at 79:8–10, Testimony of Ms. Kretsinger, Mar. 15, 2011.)
[Q.] Now, here, in this report, it is reported to the senator that, ‘From the early 1960s to mid 1991, wood treatment operations at the BAC site discharged hexavalent chromium. This hexavalent chromium polluted soil and groundwater. In addition, hexavalent chromium was released off-site through storm water discharges to an adjacent irrigation canal.’
Now, is that a true statement?
A. That's correct.
Q. So you told the senator that the pollutants from the BAC site entered the pond and then went off site through the storm water discharges to this—to this irrigation canal, the El Capitan; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And, in fact, isn't it true that you told the residents at the meeting in 2009, that the contamination got into the canal. Do you remember that?
A. Yes. (RT at 192:13–193:6, Testimony of Mr. Austin, Feb. 18, 2011; see also Decl. Marderosian, Ex. E, Briefing for Senator Dianne Feinstein Former Baltimore Aircoil Company Cleanup Site, Jan. 15, 2009 [“Feinstein Report”] [“From the early 1960s to mid 1991, wood treatment operations at the BAC site discharged hexavalent chromium. This hexavalent chromium ... was released off-site through storm water discharges to an adjacent irrigation canal.”].)
Plaintiffs' evidence includes scientific inferences based on an extremely small amount of data, but it is still “tied to the facts of the case.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Plaintiffs' mantra throughout trial was that BAC Defendants' failure to sample and test through the years “hid” the historical concentrations in the pond and canal. Based on the only sampling evidence presented, Dr. Laton opined that re-contamination was occurring via surface soil washing into the pond which flowed unimpeded into the canal at an average concentration of 581.8 ppb total chromium. The jury was told that part of this total chromium value could contain hexavalent chromium. Plaintiffs correctly argue that Dr. Fendorf's conversion theory was not proved as a matter of law and, nonetheless, the jury could have given some weight to Dr. Fendorf's theory based on the verdict.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable conclusion is one which is consistent with the jury's verdict. Some evidence supports Dr. Laton's opinion that hexavalent chromium was being released from the pond into the canal. This evidence supports the jury's verdict on the canal water pathway for 1969–1991. The extent of aerobic reduction of hexavalent chromium remains a mystery. The parties had four years and approximately six days of Daubert hearings to prepare for these issues. Plaintiffs' evidence on canal waters through 1991 meets the sufficient evidence requirement based on the totality of the BAC Site operation from 1969–1991. Defendants' motion is DENIED as to the finding that hexavalent chromium in the canal from 1969–1991.
Defendants' motion for new trial is also DENIED. Although a very limited amount of quantitative evidence was presented “[d]oubts about the correctness of the verdict are not sufficient grounds for a new trial.” Landes Constr. Co., 833 F.2d at 1372. The court must be “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”. Id. ( citing Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520 (1944)). To justify a new trial, the errors must be “so prejudicial as to require a new trial which would be likely to produce a different result.” O'Dell v. Hercules Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir.1990); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. For the 1969–1991 time period, taking all Plaintiffs' evidence into account, including Defendants' own expert witness who admitted she believed the pond was or could be contaminated during that time period, the court would simply be substituting a different view of the evidence for that of the jury. The record does not create a “firm conviction” that the jury was mistaken.
b. Jury's Verdict Re: Canal Contamination From 1992–2006.
Defendants argue that there is no evidentiary basis for the jury's finding that 87 ppb hexavalent chromium existed in the canal after 1991 for the following reasons: First, the pond was “clean closed” and any contaminates it may or may not have emitted would have ceased. ( See RT at 135:18–21, Feb. 18, 2011; Decl. Lewis, Ex. 7 [“[A]s far as the Water Board was concerned, the contaminated sediments in the pond had been adequately excavated and disposed of properly.”]; Decl. Lewis, Ex. 21 [1992 Letter from Regional Water Quality Control Board (“RWQCB”) stating “BAC–Pritchard has complied with its environmental remediation obligations with respect to the storm water pond.”] ).
Second, the only pond sampling data presented demonstrates only below-standard levels of total chromium from 1992– 2007, aside from one above-standard sample, in January 1994:
+------------------------------------------------+ ¦ ¦Storm Water ¦Storm Water ¦ +-------+-----------------+----------------------¦ ¦Date of¦Discharge Total ¦Entering Site ¦ +-------+-----------------+----------------------¦ ¦Sample ¦Chromium (µ/L) ¦Total Chromium (µ/L) ¦ +------------------------------------------------+
07–Dec–92 20 24–Jan–94 87 09–Apr–94 20 06–Dec–94 24 20–Mar–95 26.4 18–Dec–95 28.2 05–Mar–96 30.7 02–Jan–97 23.8 10–Dec–97 13.4 12–Jan–98 19.8 23–Feb–98 10.6 19–Jan–99 35.2 08–Feb–99 13.8 09–Mar–99 28.5 18–Jan–00 24.1 14–Feb–00 11.85 11–Jan–01 24.8 05–Mar–01 3.8 02–Jan–02 16.2 15 20–Feb–02 37.2 39.3 20–Feb–03 4.5 10.4 14–May–03 4.6 51 11–Oct–07