Opinion
No. 99 C 7821.
May 11, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff A.B., a minor, has filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, Chicago Police Officers Christine Zinchuk and Jennifer Wydra and the City of Chicago. A.B. alleges that on September 9, 1999, he was improperly seized by Defendant Officers and searched and abused by Officer Zinchuck. He seeks recovery against the City on a failure-to-train theory.
The City has moved to dismiss. The City argues that Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a claim for municipal liability under the Monell doctrine, see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because the complaint alleges only a single instance of misconduct on the part of Officers Zinchuk and Wydra. Citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) and Gray v. Dane County, 854 F.2d 179, 183 (7th Cir. 1988), the City urges that a single incident of unconstitutional activity is insufficient to establish a municipal custom or practice for purposes of Monell.
Plaintiff insists his complaint is adequate under the liberal federal notice pleading standards. He notes that there is no heightened pleading standard for § 1983 plaintiffs, Leatherman v. Tarrant City Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165 (1993), and cites two post-Leatherman cases in which the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal on motion of complaints seeking to impose municipal liability based on a single incident of wrongdoing. In Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1997), for example, plaintiff alleged that the municipality had a policy of putting officers on the street to enforce traffic laws without adequate training or supervision and that one of the officers involved in an altercation with plaintiff continually referred to his instruction book during the incident. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that plaintiff's allegations of inadequate training or supervision "come close to the level of boilerplate vagueness" but held they were adequate under Leatherman. Similarly, in Sledd v. Lindsay, 102 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1996), plaintiff alleged a "code of silence," claiming that disciplinary complaints against police officers almost never resulted in corrective action, and that police officers believed their misconduct would never be investigated. Such allegations were sufficient, together with statistics involving other incidents, to state a claim against the city. Plaintiff here contends his allegations are similarly sufficient. In addition, he argues that the court ought not dismiss the City because it would ultimately seek to "duplicate the discovery already completed once it is brought back into the case." (Plaintiff's Response to the City of Chicago's Motion to Dismiss Count II, at 7.)
The City points out that the majority of judges in this district have rejected the notion that a single incident of unconstitutional activity constitutes a municipal custom or practice. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sandidge, 87 F. Supp.2d 832 (N.D.Ill. 1999) (Aspen, C.J.), Janowitz v. City of Chicago, 1999 WL 731691 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 30, 1999) (Williams, J.); Bandari v. City of Chicago, 99 C 5889 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 29, 2000) (Kocoras, J.). To the extent that Plaintiff believes these decisions are inconsistent with the result reached by the Seventh Circuit in Lanigan and Sledd, this court notes that Plaintiff's allegations in this case are less detailed than those presented in either of those cases. Lanigan involved specific reference to training in traffic law enforcement and an allegation that the offending officer relied on his training manual in carrying out the alleged violation of plaintiff's rights. The Sledd complaint included statistics involving other incidents and investigation of complaints of excessive force against other police officers. In the case before this court, the only allegation that supports a municipal liability claim is paragraph 35 of the complaint, which reads in full as follows:
35. Upon information and belief, the City of Chicago received notice of the defendant officers' violations of both police procedures and constitutional safeguards as afforded by the Fourth Amendment, among other constitutional provisions, prior to the subject incident.
In this court's view, this allegation affords no notice to the City concerning the types of violations of which it purportedly was notified. The reference to "the Fourth Amendment, among other constitutional provisions," suggests (implausibly) that the City's awareness of any violations of any Constitutional guarantees by any officers is sufficient to state a claim that the City is liable under Monell for the alleged unlawful seizure and personal assault alleged here. Most problematic, even this very sketchy allegation is made only "upon information and belief."
The court concludes this allegation is insufficient to state a policy or practice claim against the City of Chicago and grants the City's motion to dismiss without prejudice. If discovery establishes a basis for Plaintiff to amend his complaint sufficiently, he is welcome to do so. The court does not share Plaintiff's concern that such a development would generate a request from the City that discovery be reopened; its police officers remain in the case as Defendants and presumably will be pursuing appropriate discovery against Plaintiff. A municipal liability claim would not require reopening that discovery. Obviously, the court would deem any timeliness defense to an amended complaint waived by the City's filing of this motion.
Defendant City's motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 6-1) is granted without prejudice.