Summary
In 35 Park Ave. Corp. v Campagna (48 N.Y.2d 813, 814), the Court of Appeals held that a cause of action to rescind a lease is governed by the six year statute of limitations, which appears in CPLR 213.
Summary of this case from Poledar Realty, Inc. v. ChristOpinion
Argued October 12, 1979
Decided November 20, 1979
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, SIDNEY H. ASCH, J.
Sidney A. Wolff and Matthew J. D'Emic for appellant.
John J. Flynn, III, for respondents.
MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs. The cause of action to rescind the lease between plaintiff corporation as landlord and defendants as tenants, interposed more than six years after the execution of the lease, is time barred (see CPLR 213). Plaintiff's reliance on section 235-c of the Real Property Law, enacted in July, 1976 after this action was commenced, is misplaced. That section, which provides that a court may grant relief from an unconscionable lease or clause, does not revive a claim already time barred. An intent on the part of the Legislature to effect so drastic a consequence must be expressed clearly and unequivocally (Hopkins v Lincoln Trust Co., 233 N.Y. 213, 215). The proviso in the amendment (L 1976, ch 828, § 2), making section 235-c effective immediately and "applicable to all leases, regardless of when executed", at best is ambiguous and does not indicate an intention to resurrect a cause of action predicated on unconscionability (see Beary v City of Rye, 44 N.Y.2d 398, 413). No such intention can be discerned from the isolated comment of the Assemblyman, quoted by the dissent, expressing concern about the possible implications of the statute. Indeed, the act was designed simply to codify the common-law doctrine of unconscionability and make clear that the defense is available in the landlord-tenant context (see Governor's Memorandum on Approval of L 1976, ch 828, McKinney's 1976 Session Laws of New York, pp 2447-2448).
Nor is there any merit to plaintiff's alternative theory that an unconscionable lease constitutes a continuing wrong. The execution of the unconscionable lease is the event giving rise to a claim, notwithstanding that its effect may last the life of the lease. Thus, plaintiff's cause of action accrued at the execution of the lease. The question of whether a defense of unconscionability would be available beyond the limitation period is not in issue here (see CPLR 203, subd [c]).
I cannot agree that the language of section 2 of chapter 828 of the Laws of 1976 making it "applicable to all leases, regardless of when executed" (emphasis supplied), is ambiguous. The underscored words certainly encompass leases more than six years old, which the majority now holds beyond the reach of the statute because barred by limitations.
If the language itself is not clear enough, the Assembly debate supplies any deficiency. Urging defeat of the bill, Assemblyman Lo Presto gave as one of his reasons: "Second of all, which I am deeply concerned about, is the constitutionality of this provision wherein it affects all leases made, not of this date, not thirty days hence, not as of September 1, but all leases, no matter when executed. They could have been executed twenty years ago." (Emphasis supplied.) Despite that argument, the bill became law. In view of that argument and the fact that limitations if applicable would permit it to affect no lease more than six years old, the conclusion must be that the Legislature has, indeed, intentionally revived an issue that would otherwise be barred.
Assemblyman Lo Presto's fears as to constitutionality are not well founded. The Legislature may constitutionally revive a claim barred by limitations except when the effect of the lapse of time has been to invest the holder of property with title to it (Chase Securities Corp. v Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304; Campbell v Holt, 115 U.S. 620; Gallewski v Hentz Co., 301 N.Y. 164; Robinson v Robins Dry Dock Repair Co., 238 N.Y. 271, dsmd 271 U.S. 649; Barrett v Wojtowicz, 66 A.D.2d 604; Matter of Strang, 117 App. Div. 796; see Electrical Workers v Robbins Myers, 429 U.S. 229; House v Carr, 185 N.Y. 453), the more so when, as in a case of unconscionability, it can be said that justice so requires (Gallewski v Hentz Co., supra; Robinson v Robins Dry Dock Repair Co., supra). I would, therefore, reverse and reinstate the first cause of action.
Chief Judge COOKE and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES and WACHTLER concur in memorandum; Judge MEYER dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judge FUCHSBERG concurs.
Order affirmed.