Opinion
2011-04-5
347 CENTRAL PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC, respondent, v. PINE TOP ASSOCIATES, LLC, et al., appellants.
Hofheimer Gartlir & Gross, LLP, New York, N.Y. (David L. Birch and Zachary Grendi of counsel), for appellants Pine Top Associates, LLC, Bob Lord, and Mauro Valentine. Melito & Adolfsen, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Ignatius John Melito and John H. Somoza of counsel), for appellant Stephen Brotmann.
Hofheimer Gartlir & Gross, LLP, New York, N.Y. (David L. Birch and Zachary Grendi of counsel), for appellants Pine Top Associates, LLC, Bob Lord, and Mauro Valentine. Melito & Adolfsen, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Ignatius John Melito and John H. Somoza of counsel), for appellant Stephen Brotmann.
Benowich Law, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Leonard Benowich of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, the defendants Pine Top Associates, LLC, Bob Lord, and Mauro Valentine appeal, and the defendant Stephen Brotmann separately appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (DiBella, J.), entered December 30, 2009, which denied their separate motions to dismiss the complaint as time-barred pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) insofar as asserted against each of them.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable by the appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
“In order for a plaintiff to maintain a civil action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must show: ‘(1) the commencement of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff, (2) at the insistence of the defendant, (3) without probable cause, (4) with malice, (5) which action was terminated in favor of the plaintiff, and (6) to the plaintiff's injury’ ” ( Furgang v. Adwar, LLP v. Fiber–Shield Indus., Inc., 55 A.D.3d 665, 665, 866 N.Y.S.2d 250, quoting Felske v. Bernstein, 173 A.D.2d 677, 678, 570 N.Y.S.2d 331;see Berman v. Silver, Forrester & Schisano, 156 A.D.2d 624, 549 N.Y.S.2d 125). The prior judicial proceeding is “to the plaintiff's injury” if it resulted in interference with the plaintiff's person or property ( see Purdue Frederick Co. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 40 A.D.3d 285, 286, 836 N.Y.S.2d 28;Oceanside Enters. v. Capobianco, 146 A.D.2d 685, 537 N.Y.S.2d 190). A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) “will fail if, taking all facts alleged as true and according them every possible inference favorable to the plaintiff, ‘the complaint states in some recognizable form any cause of action known to our law’ ” ( Sheroff v. Dreyfus Corp., 50 A.D.3d 877, 877–878, 855 N.Y.S.2d 902, quoting Shaya B. Pac., LLC v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, 38 A.D.3d 34, 38, 827 N.Y.S.2d 231). Under the circumstances alleged herein, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the complaint adequately stated a cause of action alleging malicious prosecution. Moreover, contrary to the defendants' contention, the complaint does not sound only in a cause of action alleging slander of title ( see Fink v. Shawangunk Conservancy, Inc., 15 A.D.3d 754, 756, 790 N.Y.S.2d 249;Alexander v. Scott, 286 A.D.2d 692, 693, 730 N.Y.S.2d 254;Sopher v. Martin, 243 A.D.2d 459, 462, 663 N.Y.S.2d 83;Brown v. Bethlehem Terrace Assoc., 136 A.D.2d 222, 224, 525 N.Y.S.2d 978;see also Casa de Meadows Inc. [ Cayman Is.] v Zaman, 76 A.D.3d 917, 922, 908 N.Y.S.2d 628;Pelc v. Berg, 68 A.D.3d 1672, 1674, 893 N.Y.S.2d 404;35–45 May Assoc. v. Mayloc Assoc., 162 A.D.2d 389, 389–390, 557 N.Y.S.2d 41;cf. Plot Realty LLC v. DeSilva, 45 A.D.3d 312, 847 N.Y.S.2d 1).
The Supreme Court also properly denied those branches of the defendants' separate motions which sought to dismiss the complaint as time-barred ( see CPLR 3211[a][5] ). A malicious prosecution cause of action is governed by a one-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 215 [3] ). Here, the cause of action accrued in May 2009 when the underlying civil action was dismissed in its entirety, and thus “terminated in favor of the plaintiff” ( Felske v. Bernstein, 173 A.D.2d at 678, 570 N.Y.S.2d 331;see Berman v. Silver, Forrester & Schisano, 156 A.D.2d at 625, 549 N.Y.S.2d 125;see also Purdue Frederick Co. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 40 A.D.3d at 286, 836 N.Y.S.2d 28;Wildwood Estates v. Lebert, 276 A.D.2d 481, 713 N.Y.S.2d 702;Oceanside Enters. v. Capobianco, 146 A.D.2d 685, 537 N.Y.S.2d 190). Accordingly, the commencement of this action in July 2009 was timely.
The defendants' remaining contentions are improperly raised for the first time on appeal and, in any event, are without merit.