Opinion
J-A19033-17 No. 1209 EDA 2016 No. 1210 EDA 2016
10-12-2017
1720 SANSOM STREET, LP, Appellant v. MATTHEW CORRELL 1720 SANSOM STREET, LP v. MATTHEW CORRELL, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment June 3, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division, No(s): 140500361 Appeal from the Judgment June 3, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division, No(s): 00361 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
1720 Sansom Street, LP ("Plaintiff"), appeals, and Matthew Correll ("Correll") cross-appeals, from the judgment that ultimately determined the ownership of, and boundary line between, their respective properties. We affirm.
According to Plaintiff's Complaint, by a deed recorded on December 29, 2011, Susannah H. Hall conveyed to Correll property located at 1715 Moravian Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ("the Correll Property"), for the sum of $252,000.00.
By a deed recorded on February 22, 2013, Yuko Omori ("Omori") conveyed, to Plaintiff, adjoining properties located at 1717 Moravian Street and 1720 Sansom Street in Philadelphia ("Plaintiff's Property"), for the sum of $1.00.
Omori is a limited partner of Plaintiff.
In April 2012, Plaintiff's Property was substantially damaged in a fire. After the resolution of unrelated insurance issues, Plaintiff contracted with Matthew DiPasquale, Inc. ("DiPasquale"), to commence reconstruction of Plaintiff's Property. During this reconstruction, Plaintiff discovered that a third-floor powder room on the Correll Property, with its plumbing and fixtures located on the second floor (collectively, "the Improvements"), was partially located on Plaintiff's Property. A survey conducted by Plaintiff's architect confirmed that the Improvements encroached on Plaintiff's Property by approximately 18 inches. A deck on the Correll Property ("the Deck") also was found to encroach on Plaintiff's Property.
Although Omori owned the property at the time, we will refer to her property as "Plaintiff's Property" for clarity.
A subsequent inspection by Philadelphia's Department of Licenses and Inspections determined that the Improvements were built without the issuance of a building permit.
On May 6, 2014, Plaintiff initiated the instant action by filing a Petition for a preliminary injunction and a Complaint for equitable relief based upon Correll's alleged trespass upon Plaintiff's Property. Correll counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to the Improvements by application of the consentable line doctrine, as the Improvements had been in existence for over 21 years. Correll additionally sought to quiet title to the Deck.
On February 12, 2016, after a bench trial, the trial court determined that Correll is the owner of the Deck and the Improvements. The trial court directed that Correll pay the costs of installing a permanent firewall between the Correll Property and Plaintiff's Property.
Plaintiff filed a post-trial Motion for judgment n.o.v., challenging the trial court's application of the consentable line doctrine and its denial of relief for Correll's trespass onto Plaintiff's Property. Correll filed a post-trial Motion to clarify and amend the trial court's February 12, 2016 Order. Specifically, Correll sought an amendment of the Order to reflect that the plumbing for the Improvements, located on the second floor of Plaintiff's Property, should be awarded to him, and a clarification regarding the location of the proposed firewall. Correll further challenged the requirement that he pay the costs associated with installation of a firewall between Plaintiff's Property and the Correll Property. Finally, Correll asserted that Plaintiff already had constructed a temporary firewall, and it was unclear as to what Correll was to do with that firewall.
On March 16, 2016, the trial court entered an Order amending its February 12, 2016 Order, and declaring Correll to be the legal owner of "the [D]eck and the third floor [Improvements], including the plumbing servicing it on the second floor of [the Correll Property] and extending into [Plaintiff's Property.]" Trial Court Order, 3/16/16, at ¶ 6. The trial court's Order further clarified that Correll was to construct the firewall between Plaintiff's Property and the Correll Property, "on the property line which reflects the ownership as mandated by this Order." Id. at ¶ 8. The trial court directed the parties to submit proposed reformed deeds for all of the affected properties, but stayed that portion of the Order pending appeal. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, after which Correll filed a cross-appeal of the trial court's March 16, 2016 Order. The trial court subsequently entered Judgment.
"A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the date thereof." Commonwealth v. Cooper , 27 A.3d 994, 1008 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
In its appeal, Plaintiff presents the following claims for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and exceed its equitable power when it applied the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex to determine that [Correll] is the owner of the [I]mprovements?
[2]. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to consider the post[-]trial findings of Code enforcement violations found by the municipal court?
[3]. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and exceed its equitable power when it barred Plaintiff's claims for trespass of
the [Improvements] pursuant to the application of the doctrine of laches?Brief for Appellant at 6-7 (some capitalization omitted, numbering changed).
[4]. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error of law when it denied Plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction?
[5]. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error of law when it denied Plaintiff's request for a directed verdict?
Before addressing Plaintiff's claims, we observe that, in its Statement of Questions Involved, Plaintiff challenges the trial court's application of the de minimis doctrine. Id. at 6. In the Argument section of its brief, however, Plaintiff generally argues that the trial court improperly declared Correll to be the owner of the property encompassing the Improvements. Id. at 14. Under this heading, Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly (a) determined that Correll established a consentable boundary line; (b) determined that Correll failed to establish the requisite 21 years of adverse use; and (c) supplanted rules of law with equitable principles. See id. at 14, 25, 28. In subsection (c), Plaintiff addresses the claim set forth in his Statement of Questions Involved. Although we could deemed waived any issues not set forth in Plaintiff's Statement of Questions Involved, we will address the claims set forth in the Argument section of Plaintiff's brief. Counsel, however, is reminded of Rule of Appellate Procedure 2116(a). See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (directing that "[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.")
In its first claim, Plaintiff challenges the trial court's determination that Correll had established ownership of the Improvements and the Deck by application of the consentable line doctrine. Brief for Appellant at 14. Plaintiff contends that neither Plaintiff nor Correll recognized a new boundary line, 18 inches away from the deeded property line. Id. at 16. Plaintiff argues that the positioning of interior walls, within one's own property, is not equivalent to recognizing a boundary line. Id. at 17. Plaintiff directs our attention to evidence that Plaintiff and Correll were not aware that the Improvements were placed over the boundary line of Plaintiff's Property. Id. at 16. Plaintiff also directs our attention to testimony of owners in the parties' respective chains of title that they were unaware of any encroachment by the Improvements onto Plaintiff's Property. See id. at 18, 20 (wherein Plaintiff points out (1) Correll's testimony that he was unaware of whether the Improvements matched the description set forth in the Movarian Street Deed, (2) Hall's testimony that she had no knowledge that the Improvements had been constructed and installed beyond the Correll Property's boundary line, and (3) Dr. Peter Hunt's ("Dr. Hunt") testimony that he had no knowledge of any alterations by Correll after the time of his transfer of the property to Hall).
We keep in mind the applicable standard of review:
In equity matters, appellate review is based on a determination by the appellate court of such questions as whether (1) sufficient evidence supports the findings of the judge; (2) the factual inferences and legal conclusions based on those findings are correct; and (3) there has been an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Generally, in an appeal from a trial court sitting in equity, the standard of review is rigorous. The function of this Court on an appeal from an adjudication in equity is not to substitute its view for that of the lower tribunal; our task is rather to determine whether a judicial mind, on due consideration of all of the evidence, as a whole, could reasonably have reached the conclusion of that tribunal.Omicron Sys., Inc. v. Weiner , 860 A.2d 554, 557-58 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we are "bound by the trial court's determination concerning the credibility of witnesses and weight to be accorded the evidence." Marchetti v. Karpowick , 667 A.2d 724, 726 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted).
"Based upon a rule of repose sometimes known as the doctrine of consentable line, the existence of such a boundary may be proved either by dispute and compromise between the parties or recognition and acquiescence by one party of the right and title of the other." Moore v. Moore , 921 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2007).
"Acquiescence," in the context of a dispute over real property, denotes passive conduct on the part of the lawful owner consisting of failure on his part to assert his paramount rights or interests against the hostile claims of the adverse user. A determination of consentable line by acquiescence requires a finding 1) that each party has claimed the land on his side of the line as his own[;] and 2) that he or she has occupied the land on his side of the line for a continuous period of 21 years.... [W]hen a consentable line is established, the land behind such a line becomes the property of each neighbor regardless of what the deed specifies. In essence, each neighbor gains marketable title
to that land behind the line, some of which may not have been theirs under their deeds.Id. at 5 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The parties need not have specifically consented to the location of the line. Sorg v. Cunningham , 687 A.2d 846, 849 (Pa. Super. 1997). "It must nevertheless appear that for the requisite twenty-one years[,] a line was recognized and acquiesced in as a boundary by adjoining landowners." Plauchak v. Boling , 653 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Proof of passage of the statutory period may be shown by tacking the current claimant's tenancy to that of his predecessor. Moore , 921 A.2d at 5.
We have reviewed the parties' briefs and the certified record. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, regarding this claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 4-5. We therefore affirm on the basis of the trial court's Opinion with regard to Plaintiff's first claim of error, see id., with the following addendum.
Plaintiff contends that a consentable line has not been recognized above a properties' surface. Brief for Appellant at 21. However, a property owner's "interest in exclusive possession is not limited to the surfaces; it extends above and below." Jones v. Wagner , 624 A.2d 166, 169 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citations omitted). As stated above, the consentable line doctrine is a rule of repose that may be used to determine a property's boundary line(s). Moore , 921 A.2d at 4. We can find no case law limiting application of the doctrine to surface rights only. Consequently, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding a consentable line above the surface of the property.
Plaintiff also claims that Correll failed to satisfy the 21-year statutory requirement for application of the consentable line doctrine. Brief for Appellant at 25. At trial, Omori testified that she and her husband acquired Plaintiff's Property on October 27, 1994. N.T., 10/1/15, at 117. Omori explained that she subsequently deeded Plaintiff's Property to Plaintiff, of which she is a limited partner. Id. at 118. Omori stated that she never gave anyone permission to use a portion of Plaintiff's Property, while she owned it. Id. at 135. Omori explained that she used the third floor of her property, up to the wall dividing Plaintiff's Property from the Correll Property, from 1997 to 2006. Id. at 148. During her ownership, Omori believed that she owned up to the wall on the east and west side of Plaintiff's Property. Id. at 165.
Omori's husband died on December 14, 1995. --------
James Campbell ("Campbell"), Plaintiff's expert architect, testified that in February or March 2013, he was asked by Omori to "come over to take a look at a fire-damaged building" on Plaintiff's Property. N.T., 10/2/15, at 27. Campbell stated that as part of that work, he engaged surveyor David Landrecht ("Landrecht") to survey the property. Id. at 35. Landrecht testified that he surveyed Plaintiff's Property on February 6, 2014. N.T., 8/30/15, at 65. Landrecht acknowledged a "common wall" between the Correll Property and Plaintiff's Property. Id. at 73.
Dr. Hunt, an oral surgeon, testified that he owned the Correll Property from September 4, 1987 to 2004. N.T., 6/17/14, at 20. According to Dr. Hunt, the third-floor bathroom existed at the time he purchased the Correll Property. Id. at 12-13. Dr. Hunt further testified that he made no changes to the bathroom during his period of ownership. Id. at 14, 17. In addition, Dr. Hunt testified that the third-floor bathroom existed at the time he sold the Correll Property to Susannah Hall ("Hall"), Correll's predecessor in title. Id. at 15. Dr. Hunt confirmed that the Correll Property included the Deck, at the time of his purchase, and on the date that he conveyed the Correll Property to Hall. Id. at 15-16. Dr. Hunt testified that he used the bathroom and the Deck during his period of ownership. Id. at 17.
Hall confirmed that the Improvements and the Deck existed at the time she purchased the Correll Property. N.T., 10/6/15, at 58. Although Hall renovated the Improvements by installing bathroom tile, she did not move the walls or plumbing, and retained the same sink and toilet. Id. at 62. Hall performed some work on the Deck, but did not expand the Deck's size. Id. at 63. Hall used the Improvements and Deck during her ownership of the Correll Property. Id. at 63-64. Hall sold the Correll Property to Correll on December 9, 2011. Id. at 63. During her period of ownership, Hall considered the Improvements and the Deck to be owned by her. Id. at 64, 66.
Suzin Kline ("Kline"), a real estate agent, testified that she represented the seller of the Correll Property during the sale to Hall, and from Hall to Correll. Id. at 72. According to Kline, the listing for the Correll Property included a reference to the Improvements as a "one-half bath." Id. at 74. When Hall purchased the Correll Property, Kline personally observed the Improvements. Id. at 76. The listing for the Correll Property also included a reference to the Deck. Id. at 77.
Finally, Correll testified as to his belief that, at the time he purchased the Correll Property, "when I walked through with my realtor, I believed [that] all [of] the property within the house, as well as the [D]eck, was considered to be my property." N.T., 10/5/15, at 120. Correll testified to his belief that the other side of the wall of the Improvements was Plaintiff's Property. Id. at 148-149. Correll also acknowledged his use of the Improvements and the Deck throughout his ownership of the Correll Property. Id. at 151-52.
Thus, the evidence supports the trial court's findings that each party has (1) claimed the land on their respective sides of the Improvements and the Deck as their own; and (2) occupied their respective side of the line for a continuous period of 21 years. See Moore , 921 A.2d at 5.
Plaintiff, in his first claim, also argues that Correll failed to satisfy the 21-year statutory period because there was no obvious presence of a boundary line, so as to allow Correll's possession to tack onto that of his predecessors in title. See Brief for Appellant at 25, 26-27. Plaintiff contends that there was only a "hidden" boundary line in the air space above an alley. Id. at 27.
As our Supreme Court has explained,
"where a boundary line, or corner, is actually located is a question for the trier of fact." Corbin v. Cowan , 716 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa. Super. 1998) (resolving dispute regarding location of common boundary line and ownership rights of dirt road) (emphasis added), quoting Plott v. Cole , 377 Pa. Super. 585, 547 A.2d 1216, 1219 (Pa. Super. 1988); see also Plauchak [,] ... 653 A.2d [at] 675 (noting "location of ... [a] boundary line is a matter for the trier of fact" in action in ejectment and/or to quiet title regarding location of boundary line and ownership of property surrounding boundary line) (emphasis in original)....Starling v. Lake Meade Prop. Owners Ass'n , 162 A.3d 327, 352-53, (Pa. 2017) (emphasis omitted).
The evidence supports the trial court's finding that Correll established the existence of a consentable line for the requisite 21-year period. As set forth above, Omori testified that she believed that Plaintiff owned up to the wall on the east side of Plaintiff's Property. N.T., 10/1/15, at 148, 165. Hall, Dr. Hunt, and Correll each testified that they believed that they owned, and continually used, the Improvements and the Deck throughout their periods of ownership. N.T. (Correll), 10/5/16, at 120; N.T. (Hall), 10/6/15, at 63-64, 66; N.T. (Dr. Hunt), 6/17/14, at 12-13, 15-17. Thus, Correll established the existence of a consentable line, the location of which was left to the trial court, as finder of fact, to decide. See Starling , 162 A.3d at 352-53. Because the evidence supports the findings of the trial court, as fact-finder, and its legal conclusions are sound, we cannot grant Plaintiff relief on this contention. See Omicron Sys , Inc., 860 A.2d at 557-58.
Under his first claim of error, Plaintiff additionally argues that the trial court improperly replaced "rules of law with equitable principles[.]" Brief for Appellant at 28 (capitalization omitted). Plaintiff contends that the trial court's "sua sponte application of the de minimis doctrine exceeded the trial court's equitable power." Id. According to Plaintiff, the doctrine had no place in this litigation, and the trial court improperly used this doctrine "in place of finding that [Correll] had legally established ownership by consentable line." Id. at 32. Plaintiff directs our attention to testimony regarding water damage to Plaintiff's Property, purportedly caused by the flashing on the pole attaching the Deck to Plaintiff's Property. Id. at 33-34. Plaintiff argues that this damage is not trifling or immaterial. Id. at 37.
Our review discloses that, although the trial court found that the encroachment was de minimis, the trial court additionally determined that Correll had established a consentable line by recognition and acquiescence. See Trial Court Order, 3/16/16, at ¶¶ 3 (finding in favor of Correll as to Count III of Correll's Counterclaim for quiet title based upon the consentable line doctrine), 6 (finding that Correll owns the Improvements and Deck); see also Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 5-7 (determining that Correll met the required 21-year period of possession for application of the consentable line doctrine). Because we discern no error or abuse of discretion as to this determination, we need not address Plaintiff's challenge to the characterization of the encroachment as de minimis. However, even if we were to address this claim, we would affirm on the basis of the trial court's Opinion with regard to this issue. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 4-5.
As to Plaintiff's assertion that the trial court improperly "replaced rules of law with equitable principles," see Brief for Appellant at 28, we point out that Plaintiff sought equitable relief from the trial court. We cannot conclude that the trial court erred by applying equitable principles to Plaintiff's claim for equitable relief.
In its second claim of error, Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of laches to bar Plaintiff's claim for trespass as to a support post of the Deck. Brief for Appellant at 38. According to Plaintiff, Correll suffered no prejudice caused by Plaintiff's alleged delay. Id. at 40.
"The doctrine of laches is an equitable bar to the prosecution of stale claims and is the practical application of the maxim that those who sleep on their rights must awaken to the consequence that they have disappeared." Fulton v. Fulton , 106 A.3d 127, 131 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Laches arises when a party's position or rights are so prejudiced by length of time and inexcusable delay, plus attendant facts and circumstances, that it would be an injustice to permit presently the assertion of a claim against him." In re Estate of Moskowitz , 115 A.3d 372, 380 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The question of whether laches applies is a question of law; thus, we are not bound by the trial court's decision on the issue." Fulton , 106 A.3d at 131.
Laches bars relief when the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to promptly institute the action to the prejudice of another. Thus, in order to prevail on an assertion of laches, respondents must establish: a) a delay arising from petitioner's failure to exercise due diligence; and, b) prejudice to the respondents resulting from the delay.Id. (citation omitted).
The party asserting laches as a defense must present evidence demonstrating prejudice from the lapse of time. Such evidence may include establishing that a witness has died or become unavailable, that substantiating records were lost or destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation that the opposing party has waived his claims.Estate of Moskowitz , 115 A.2d at 380 (quoting Fulton , 106 A.3d at 131 (internal citations omitted)).
Here, Correll testified that a critical reason for his purchase of the Correll Property was the Deck. N.T., 10/5/15, 147. According to Correll, "it was a big asset to me to have an outdoor space and eating area since my kitchen is ... very small and not suitable for entertainment." Id. Correll also testified that he would not have purchased the Correll Property had the Deck not been included as part of the property. Id. Contrary to Plaintiff's claim, Correll presented evidence of prejudice due to the lapse of time.
In its second claim, Plaintiff also argues that the trial court improperly barred Plaintiff's claim for trespass by a water diverter from the Correll Property. Brief for Appellant at 41. Plaintiff asserts that the water diverter violated the Philadelphia Property Maintenance Code, as it resulted in the concentration of water drainage to Plaintiff's Property. Id.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Plaintiff's claim of trespass based upon the water diverted from the Correll Property. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 8-9. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as expressed in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis as to Plaintiff's contention in this regard. See id.
In its third claim of error, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by denying its request for a permanent injunction. Brief for Appellant at 44. According to Plaintiff, the trial court's failure to enjoin Correll from maintaining the Deck's post on Plaintiff's Property violates the Philadelphia Property Maintenance Code. Id. at 45.
Our review of the record discloses no abuse of discretion or error in the trial court's determination of the parties' respective property rights. The extent to which the Deck complies with or violates the Philadelphia Property Maintenance Code was/is the subject of a municipal court proceeding. Any violations, and potential remedies to correct violations, are properly before the municipal court for determination. Finally, we agree with the trial court's determination that "[i]t would be improper to import, after the close of evidence and completely out of context, the findings of another court as to another matter." Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 5 n.4. Consequently, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief on this claim.
In its fourth claim of error, Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly denied its Motion for a directed verdict. Brief for Appellant at 47. According to Plaintiff, Correll failed to sufficiently describe the land in controversy, such that the trial court could afford Correll the relief sought. Id. at 47-48.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 9. We agree with the reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on this basis as to Plaintiff's fourth claim. See id.
In its fifth claim, Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly refused to consider the post-trial findings of the municipal court as to code violations by Correll. Brief for Appellant at 52. Plaintiff contends that this newly discovered evidence was relevant to Correll's "unclean hands." Id.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 5 n.4. We agree with the trial court's determination, and affirm on this basis as to Plaintiff's fifth claim. See id.
We next address the following claims raised by Correll:
1) Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in ordering [Correll] to construct and pay the costs of installing a permanent firewall between [Plaintiff's Property and the Correll Property,] when the [trial c]ourt's ruling was against the weight of the evidence insofar as there was no evidence presented at trial that [the Correll Property] was cited for violation of any City of Philadelphia codes regarding the fire separation [between the properties]?
2) Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in ordering [Correll] to construct and pay the costs of installing a permanent firewall between [Plaintiff's Property and the Correll Property] by failing to consider [that the] existing condition of the properties were such that the City of Philadelphia would even require a firewall to be constructed by [Correll]?
3) Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in ordering [Correll] to construct and pay the costs of installing a permanent firewall between [Plaintiff's Property and the Correll Property,] since it was beyond the scope of relief requested by [Plaintiff] in its Complaint?
4. Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in its order by failing to specify that [Correll] did not construct the [Improvements] and the plumbing servicing [them] had been in existence for more than forty years?
5. Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in ordering [Correll] to construct and pay the costs of installing a permanent firewall between [Plaintiff's Property and the Correll Property] when facts at trial established that [Plaintiff], through its agents, removed material from the wall between [Plaintiff's Property and the Correll Property] which could have sufficed as a firewall, and therefore[,] Correll should not be forced to bear the costs of erecting a firewall when any damage to [Plaintiff's Property] was caused by [Plaintiff]?
6. Whether the Court erred by failing to specify in its [O]rder that [Correll] is only required to install and pay the costs of installing a firewall on [Correll's] side of the property line[,] as determined by the [trial court] in its [O]rder of March 16, 2016,
not on [Plaintiff's] side of the property line, if the City of Philadelphia deems it necessary?Brief for Cross-Appellant at 6-7.
In its Opinion, the trial court succinctly addressed each of these issues, and concluded that they lack merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 10-12. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as expressed in its Opinion, and affirm on the basis of the trial court's Opinion with regard to each of Correll's claims. See id.
Accordingly, we affirm the Judgment entered by the trial court.
Judgment affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/12/2017
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