336 U.S. 613 (1949) Cited 774 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding "[i]t is clear that failure to prove a conspiracy among A, B and C does not preclude a conviction on a count that A aided Y in committing a substantive offense."
Holding that a statute criminalizing membership in an organization offends due process if it "impermissibly imputes guilt to an individual merely on the basis of his associations and sympathies, rather than because of some concrete personal involvement in criminal conduct"
In State v. Otto, 102 Idaho 250, 629 P.2d 646 (1981), the defendant appealed from a conviction of attempted first degree murder, this Court reversed on the basis that solicitation of a person to commit a murder did not amount to an attempt, a decision with which I did not agree. But I did agree with the propriety of the Court advising the defendant and the state that the Court has sua sponte raised that issue which able defense counsel had not, and both parties briefed and argued the point before the Court reached its decision.
Holding that "petitioner's conviction for aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine is one for violating a law relating to traffic in narcotic drugs"
Explaining the former distinction between aiders and abettors — those present and assisting in commission of the crime — and accessories before the fact — those counseling, encouraging, or inciting its commission but not present
In Cherry v. State, 18 Md. App. 252, 258, 306 A.2d 634 (1973), we adopted the view of common law solicitation set forth in Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes (7th ed., 1967), namely, that the crime "consists of the accused person's parol or written efforts to activate another to commit a criminal offense."
Holding that after defendant did everything she was supposed to do to accomplish the purpose of the murder for hire contract by making partial payment and advising of when and where murder should be conducted, she was beyond the sphere of mere solicitation or preparation