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Ex Parte Parakkuth et al

10839301 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2013)
Ex Parte Parakkuth et al

10 Cited authorities

  1. Verdegaal Bros., v. Union Oil Co. of Calif

    814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 138 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding reliance on non-claimed distinction between prior art method and claimed method "inappropriate" and insufficient to save the claim from inherent anticipation

  2. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness

  3. In re Bond

    910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 57 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that, since "structural equivalency ... is a question of fact," where the Board made no finding as to structural equivalency, this Court would "not reach that question in the first instance" and instead vacate and remand

  4. In re Van Geuns

    988 F.2d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 91-1088. March 10, 1993. Jack E. Haken, U.S. Philips Corp., Tarrytown, NY, argued, for appellant. Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued, for appellee. With him on the brief, was Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before ARCHER, PLAGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges. ARCHER, Circuit Judge. Johannes R. Van Geuns appeals from the September 25, 1990 decision of the Patent and Trademark Office

  5. Application of Preda

    401 F.2d 825 (C.C.P.A. 1968)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 8016. October 24, 1968. Wenderoth, Lind Ponack, A. Ponak, Washington, D.C. (John T. Miller, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND, and BALDWIN, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 7 and 8 of application serial No. 269,707

  6. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  7. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,993 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)