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Ex Parte Morrison et al

13569246 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 26, 2017)
Ex Parte Morrison et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek

    567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 262 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the first prong was not met when “the record developed in the infringement proceeding ..., show[ed] that the question of equivalence was a close one,” particularly in light of the intensely factual inquiry involved in the doctrine of equivalents analysis

  3. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc.

    262 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 114 times
    Affirming identification of corresponding structure as including "egg-shaped indicia having `a slight taper at the portion of each indicia situated closest to the palm of the hand, and any equivalents of such structure'"

  4. In re Fulton

    391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 81 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "a particular combination" need not "be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation"

  5. In re Gordon

    733 F.2d 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 31 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that a modification which renders the invention inoperable for its intended purpose is not obvious because it teaches away from the invention

  6. In re Kemps

    97 F.3d 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 13 times
    Upholding board's fact finding under less deferential standard of review obviated need for deciding propriety of using the APA standards

  7. Application of Sponnoble

    405 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 36 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8007. January 16, 1969. Raywood H. Blanchard, Kalamazoo, Mich., (Eugene O. Retter, George T. Johannesen, Kalamazoo, Mich., of counsel) for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., (Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND and BALDWIN, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals, affirming the examiner's rejection of the sole remaining claim in

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)