Opinion
2023-CP-00900-COA
11-12-2024
RENO FENELLI SIGGERS APPELLANT v. MISSISSIPPI PAROLE BOARD APPELLEE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RENO FENELLI SIGGERS (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KIMBERLY PINE TURNER KIANA LAFAYE FOSTER ROY A. NOWELL
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/20/2023
TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT HON. CHARLES E. WEBSTER TRIAL JUDGE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
RENO FENELLI SIGGERS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KIMBERLY PINE TURNER KIANA LAFAYE FOSTER ROY A. NOWELL
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.
BARNES, C. J.
¶1. Reno Siggers was convicted of murder in 1995 and sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The Mississippi Parole Board (Board) granted Siggers conditional parole in 2011. In 2018, Siggers was charged with simple domestic violence and aggravated domestic violence, which resulted in the revocation of his parole. On March 11, 2020, he was released, but a year later, he was again arrested and charged with aggravated domestic violence, and he tested positive for marijuana. Siggers v. State, No. 2023-CP-00324-COA, 2024 WL 3946514, *1-2 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug 27, 2024). Siggers's parole was revoked on June 8, 2021, for a technical violation (use of drugs) and the failure to abide by the law (domestic violence charges). The Board held a parole hearing on September 22, 2021, and denied Siggers parole. "Special Instructions" from the Board's hearing action form noted, "At next hearing, come before the Board with a clean record." The Board held another parole-eligibility hearing on May 25, 2022. The Board denied Siggers's parole and set his next hearing for February 25, 2025.
Siggers has appealed the trial court's revocation of his parole in separate proceedings. See Siggers v. State, No. 2023-CP-00324-COA, 2024 WL 3946514 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug 27, 2024); Siggers v. State, 352 So.3d 667 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022); Siggers v. State, 342 So.3d 1213 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022).
¶2. On July 12, 2022, Siggers filed a "Show Cause Motion Pursuant to Rule 8 of the [Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure]" with the circuit court, seeking to compel the Board to show cause why his parole was denied at his 2022 parole hearing and "set off" for hearing until 2025. Siggers claimed since the Board advised him after the 2021 hearing that he should come before the Board at the next hearing "with a clean record," this "special instruction" was tantamount to a contractual agreement that if he appeared with a clean record, the Board would grant him parole. Siggers filed a supplemental motion to show cause on August 9, 2022, arguing that the Board "breached the contract to release [Siggers] if the special instruction was met[.]" He also claimed that the denial of his parole was retaliatory "due to his filing numerous motions and complaints" against the Board.
"A 'set off' in parole terminology is the period of time an inmate who has been denied parole must wait before his parole is reconsidered." Way v. Miller, 919 So.2d 1036, 1038 n.1 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Brown-Bey v. Hyman, 649 A.2d 8, 8 n.1 (D.C. Ct. App. 1994)).
¶3. On July 20, 2023, the circuit court dismissed Siggers's motion to show cause because the court "has no jurisdiction in this cause." Discussing the Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling in Cotton v. Mississippi Parole Board, 863 So.2d 917, 921 (¶11) (Miss. 2003), the circuit court held that the Board has "'absolute discretion' to determine who is entitled to parole within the boundaries of factors" outlined in Mississippi Code Annotated section 477-3 (Rev. 2023). The court also found no evidence of any "agreement" between the Board and Siggers that he would be granted parole; so the court concluded that Siggers "failed to state a claim sufficient for the circuit court to assert jurisdiction."
In May 2023, Siggers had filed a motion for entry of default, asserting that the Board failed to file an answer or other pleading in the action, and the circuit clerk entered a default against the Board on May 2, 2023. (The Board notes in its appellee's brief that "the Board was not served with a copy of [Siggers's motion to show cause] in accordance with Rule 4, [Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure] or pursuant to a Certificate of Service.") Siggers then filed a petition for mandamus with the Mississippi Supreme Court in July 2023. Because the circuit court had since ruled on Siggers's motion to show cause, the supreme court dismissed the petition for mandamus as moot.
¶4. Siggers appeals the court's ruling, arguing that (1) the Board's decision to set off his next hearing until 2025 was "unconstitutional"; (2) the Board's "special instruction created a presumption that parole w[ould] be granted and that this in turn created a legitimate expectation to release once Siggers fulfilled his end of the bargain and/or did what was required by the special instruction"; (3) he suffered an equal-protection violation as a "Class of One"; and (4) the Board denied his parole as retaliation. Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court's order of dismissal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5. A circuit court's jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Mangum v. Miss. Parole Bd., 76 So.3d 762, 765 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). "Likewise, 'this Court reviews the trial court's dismissal of a lawsuit based on a question of law under a de novo standard of review.'" Id. at 765-66 (¶6) (quoting Rochell v. State, 36 So.3d 479, 481 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)).
DISCUSSION
¶6. In the case cited by the circuit court, Cotton v. Mississippi Parole Board, several inmates had filed a complaint claiming that the Board abused its discretion in denying them parole. Cotton, 863 So.2d at 918 (¶1). The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, noting the Board's "exclusive authority to grant or deny parole." Id. at 920 (¶6). On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court found two justifications for the circuit court's dismissal: (1) there was no "statutory mandate granting circuit courts jurisdiction over appeals concerning the denial of parole"; and (2) the plaintiffs failed to state a constitutional claim "sufficient for the circuit court to assert jurisdiction." Id. at 920-21 (¶¶10-11).
¶7. Thus, "it is the Parole Board, not the courts, that has exclusive authority over the grant or denial of parole." Smith v. State, 363 So.3d 787, 789 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Willard v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 212 So.3d 80, 83 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)). Our Court has also recognized that a circuit court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a parole board's decision to set off a prisoner's parole-eligibility hearing date. State v. Montgomery, 229 So.3d 739, 741 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Drankus v. State, 215 So.3d 1000, 1001 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). This Court has expressly held, "Prisoners have no constitutionally recognized liberty interest in parole." Willard, 212 So.3d at 84 (¶12) (quoting Hopson v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 976 So.2d 973, 975 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). Thus, "[b]ecause defendants possess 'no liberty interest in obtaining parole in Mississippi, they cannot complain of the denial of parole based on an allegation of a denial of due process, abuse of discretion, or consideration of false or improper factors.'" Id. at (¶13) (quoting Mangum, 76 So.3d at 768-69 (¶17)). We therefore find no error in the circuit court's ruling that it lacked authority to review the Board's May 2022 decision to deny parole and to set off Siggers's parole hearing.
¶8. We further agree with the circuit court's determination that Siggers failed to show any "agreement" by the Board that he would be granted parole. The Board's action lacked the elements of an enforceable agreement, in that it was not in the form of a definite promise and lacked consideration. Additionally, as the Board argues, Siggers was not entitled to "presumptive parole" under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-18 (Rev. 2023), as he claims, "because he was convicted of crimes of violence." Section 47-7-18 states that "[n]o inmate convicted of a . . . crime of violence as defined by Section 97-3-2 . . . shall be released on parole without a hearing before the Parole Board as required by Section 47-7-17." Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-18. As this Court noted in Edmond v. Miller, 942 So.2d 203 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), "Mississippi Code Annotated Section 47-7-3 (Supp. 2005), in conjunction with Section 47-7-17 (Rev. 2004), places matters of parole within the discretion of the Parole Board." Id. at 205 (¶8).
A valid contract requires "(1) two or more contracting parties, (2) consideration, (3) an agreement that is sufficiently definite, (4) parties with legal capacity to make a contract, (5) mutual assent, and (6) no legal prohibition precluding contract formation." McGhee v. Young, 138 So.3d 259, 262 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-2(1)(b)-(c) (Rev. 2020).
¶9. With regard to Siggers's claims that the denial of his parole was unconstitutional, the Mississippi Supreme Court held in Cotton, "Although it is recognized that Mississippi courts have a duty to hear and adjudge cases concerning constitutional issues despite a statutory mandate, that duty only arises when certain criteria are met." Cotton, 863 So.2d at 921 (¶11). We agree with the circuit court's finding that Siggers "failed to state a claim [in his motion] sufficient for the circuit court to assert jurisdiction."
In Cotton, the inmates alleged that they "had been denied equal protection and subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by the Parole Board's repeated denial of parole." Cotton, 863 So.2d at 919 (¶4). "They argued that the factors utilized by the Parole Board were arbitrary and incapable of change, therefore effectively they were being denied the chance to even seek parole." Id. Because the inmates' claim was an appeal "to the circuit court for a determination as to their parole eligibility," the supreme court declined to address the merits because "the circuit court lacked jurisdiction." Id. at 921(¶12) & n.3.
¶10. Siggers contends that he suffered an equal-protection violation because he was treated differently from several other inmates who had been paroled to a non-violent detainer. For a prisoner to prevail on an equal-protection claim, he has to show that he was a "class of one" and "intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Suddith v. Univ. of S. Miss., 977 So.2d 1158, 1173 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). We find Siggers fails to establish that he is a member of a suspect class or how the other inmates named in his brief were "similarly situated." See Mack v. State, 943 So.2d 73, 77 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (finding no error, as the prisoner failed to provide "specific examples to show that his treatment [was] not equal to the parole treatment received by other inmates" or "to point out even one incident of a similarly[]situated inmate receiving the parole that ha[d] been denied to [him]").
¶11. Lastly, concerning Siggers's claim that the Board denied his parole in retaliation, this Court had held that "[a] prisoner must allege more than his personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation, and mere conclusory allegations of retaliation will not be enough to withstand a proper motion for dismissal of the claim." Wilson v. Edwards, 202 So.3d 275, 279 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1999)). Rather, "a prisoner 'must produce direct evidence of motivation or, the more probable scenario, allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.'" Id. (quoting Jones, 188 F.3d at 325). We find nothing in the record to support Siggers's claim.
¶12. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order dismissing Siggers's show-cause motion.
¶13. AFFIRMED.
CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR.
WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.