Opinion
No. 2:20-cv-00199-JRS-MJD
2023-05-05
Bradley Joseph PRUCHA, Plaintiff, v. TJ WATSON Warden, et al., Defendants.
Bradley Joseph Prucha, Coleman, FL, Pro Se. J. Taylor Kirklin, Lara K. Langeneckert, United States Attorney's Office, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants T.J. Watson, Todd Royer, Kevin Wasson, Mr. Klink, Ruggeri, Officer Marshall, Dodge, Rupska, M. Kimberley, Bondurant, J.W. Cox, M. Underwood, McCoy, Schmalansee, Michael Carvajal.
Bradley Joseph Prucha, Coleman, FL, Pro Se. J. Taylor Kirklin, Lara K. Langeneckert, United States Attorney's Office, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants T.J. Watson, Todd Royer, Kevin Wasson, Mr. Klink, Ruggeri, Officer Marshall, Dodge, Rupska, M. Kimberley, Bondurant, J.W. Cox, M. Underwood, McCoy, Schmalansee, Michael Carvajal.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JAMES R. SWEENEY II, JUDGE
Bradley Prucha is a hearing-impaired inmate in custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") who brought this civil rights action under the Rehabilitation Act and the theory of individual liability recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) ("Bivens"). In his second amended complaint, Mr. Prucha challenges the accommodations provided to him when he was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana ("FCC Terre Haute").
Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 222. Since Mr. Prucha filed his complaint on April 13, 2020, two critical events have occurred. First, the United States Supreme Court further limited the ability of federal courts to extend an implied damages remedy pursuant to Bivens in Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 213 L.Ed.2d 54 (2022). Second, Mr. Prucha was transferred to another BOP facility, United States Penitentiary-Coleman II ("USP Coleman"), in the autumn of 2022. Because of these two events, Mr. Prucha no longer has an avenue for relief in this action. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and final judgment shall enter.
I.
Standard of Review
Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, which is a way of resolving a case short of a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any of the material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Pack v. Middlebury Comm. Sch., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A "genuine dispute" exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Material facts" are those that might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014).
II.
Procedural Background
Mr. Prucha filed his original complaint on April 13, 2020. Dkt. 1. After screening Mr. Prucha's second amended complaint, dkt. 126, now the operative complaint, this Court allowed two categories of claims to proceed:
(1) Rehabilitation Act claims against the Director of the BOP Michael Carvajal in his official capacity, in which Mr. Prucha alleges that the BOP failed to adequately train staff regarding accommodations to hearing disabled inmates; andDkt. 148 at 4.
(2) Individual liability claims against about a dozen current and former BOP staff, under the theory recognized in Bivens, based on allegations of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment relating to Mr. Prucha's claims that "he requires an inmate helper to ensure he is aware of announcements," "a vibrating alarm clock," "an assistive listening device," and "a cell in close proximity to audio announcements."
Many claims have been dismissed as a result of the defendants' motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, dkt. 99, and Mr. Prucha's motions to voluntarily dismiss certain defendants, dkts. 197 and 243. The remaining defendants are BOP Director Colette Peters in her official capacity, former FCC Terre Haute warden T.J. Watson in his official capacity, and individual capacity defendants Gregory BonDurant, Jason Cox, Melissa Kimberley, Chris McCoy, Todd Royer, Andrew Rupska, Jonathan Schmalensee, Michael Underwood, and Kevin Wasson.
Ms. Peters became the BOP Director in August 2022. Bureau of Prisons, "About Our Agency," available at https://www.bop.gov/about/agency/bio_dir.jsp (last visited Apr. 14, 2023). Director Peters is automatically substituted as the official-capacity defendant, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
On July 28, 2022, the Court granted in part Mr. Prucha's motion for preliminary injunction and ordered the official capacity defendants to facilitate the acquisition of a vibrating alarm clock. Dkt. 168. The Court concluded that Mr. Prucha had shown a likelihood of success that the lack of alarm clock had denied him access to programming in violation of the Rehabilitation Act because, without the alarm clock, Mr. Prucha consistently failed to wake up in time for breakfast. Id. at 4-5 (citing Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012)). The defendants notified the Court that the alarm clock was received at USP Terre Haute as of August 8, 2022. Dkt. 179.
In autumn 2022, Mr. Prucha learned that he was being transferred to another facility. Dkt. 175. By the end of October 2022, Mr. Prucha had been transferred to USP Coleman, where he resides at this time. Dkt. 212.
III.
Factual Background
Because the defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
A. Mr. Prucha's Hearing Condition
Mr. Prucha has suffered from hearing loss since the age of nine after his eardrums were perforated. Dkt. 222-4 at 3, 7, 11; dkt. 222-3 at 1. As a result, "voices sound small, distant and distorted[,]" particularly in crowded settings. Dkt. 223-3 at 1. Mr. Prucha explained at his deposition that "[a]s long as one person is talking and it's more treble, [he] understand[s] most of it." Dkt. 222-1 at 68. He watches a person's face when he or she talks in order to understand, and if the speaker turns away, he has difficulty understanding what he or she is saying. Id. at 69-70.
B. Mr. Prucha's Hearing-Related Medical Care at USP Terre Haute
After being convicted of numerous federal offenses, Mr. Prucha arrived at FCC Terre Haute in August 2016. Id. at 78; dkt. 222-2. Upon his arrival, the BOP assigned Mr. Prucha a medical duty status that identified him as hearing impaired. Dkt. 222-4; dkt. 222-5. Mr. Prucha was referred for an assessment from an audiologist. Dkt. 222-1 at 82; dkt. 222-6.
During an appointment in November 2016, the audiologist examined Mr. Prucha's ears and documented that he had "moderate to profound hearing loss" in his right ear and "moderate-severe to profound mixed hearing loss" in his left ear. Dkt. 222-6 at 1. The audiologist observed that Mr. Prucha exhibited "[e]xcellent speech discrimination" in both ears. Id.
While housed at FCC Terre Haute, the BOP arranged for Mr. Prucha to undergo multiple surgeries on his ears. Dkt. 222-1 at 71. As a result of these surgeries, his hearing has improved in both ears. Id. at 70-71. The first surgery was on his left ear in August 2017. Dkt. 222-7. This surgery improved Mr. Prucha's hearing in that ear, dkt. 222-8, though some of the improvements were obviated when Mr. Prucha got ear infections that he attributed to lack of an appropriate post-operative care plan, dkt. 222-3 at 2.
In January 2018, the BOP offered Mr. Prucha an operation on his right ear, but he refused it due to concerns about a lack of post-operative care plan. Dkt. 222-11; dkt. 222-1 at 99.
At an August 2019 appointment with an audiologist, Mr. Prucha was offered hearing aids. Dkt. 221-1 at 100; dkt. 222-14. He asked the doctor what he recommended—surgery or hearing aids—and the doctor recommended surgery. Dkt. 221-1 at 100. Mr. Prucha declined to receive hearing aids because he thought it was an "either/or" option. Id. at 100-01.
Mr. Prucha received surgery on his right ear in May 2022. Id. at 71. At the time of his deposition, he said it was "possible" that he would no longer need a vibrating alarm clock or an inmate helper as a result of his improved hearing from the surgeries, but he was not sure because he was not housed in general population at the time. Id. at 72.
C. Mr. Prucha's Requested Accommodations
Before his incarceration, Mr. Prucha wore hearing aids and used a vibrating alarm clock to wake himself up. Id. at 78. These items were "sufficient to meet [his] needs" with respect to problems related to his hearing loss. Id.
Relevant to this action, Mr. Prucha sought four accommodations at FCC Terre Haute: (1) a vibrating alarm clock; (2) an inmate helper; (3) an assistive listening device; and (4) a cell in close proximity to audio announcements. The alarm clock was needed to help him wake up in time for breakfast. Id. at 74-75. This was so even if he had hearing aids because it is physically uncomfortable to sleep with hearing aids in. Id. at 54. The inmate helper and cell location mattered because Mr. Prucha often had difficulty hearing announcements related to inmate movement, meals, and other important matters. Id. at 108-09, 139, 234-35. The assistive listening device would have helped with announcements when his helper was not around, and he could have participated in more educational programming. Id. at 66-67, 110-11.
Mr. Prucha had various inmate helpers from October 2016 until January 2018. Id. at 87-88. Some of the inmate helpers did not work out due to personality issues or because they were transferred, but ultimately Mr. Prucha could not find anyone willing to be his helper because the pay was reduced from $19.20 a month to $5.25 a month. Dkt. 222-22 at 12-16.
Mr. Prucha requested that the BOP provide him with an "assistive listening device" or other headphones from an outside vendor. Dkt. 222-1 at 76; dkt. 222-3 at 3-4. In July 2017, Health Services informed Mr. Prucha that there were headphones available from the commissary that would allow him to hear in excess of 110 decibels, making his request for a purchase from an outside vendor unnecessary. Dkt. 222-23; dkt. 222-5 at 4. Health Services also noted that Mr. Prucha was scheduled for surgery, which would render the amplification device unnecessary, but reiterated that "if [Prucha] receive[d] an order from a BOP doctor at this facility or from the ENT specialist stating [that he] required an amplification device for daily use, then the [H]ealth Service Department will purchase it." Dkt. 222-23 at 1. No medical professional has ever told Mr. Prucha that he needed an assistive listening device. Dkt. 222-1 at 73.
Mr. Prucha's cell assignment changed at various times while he was at FCC Terre Haute. Dkt. 222-2. Several cells were too far away for Mr. Prucha to hear announcements. Dkt. 222-1 at 140-50. As a result, he often missed breakfast. Id.
Mr. Prucha submitted a request to purchase a special alarm clock in April 2018. Dkt. 222-27. Dr. William Wilson believed the clock was not necessary because of Mr. Prucha's surgery and his ability to hear staff during conversations. Id. But in July 2018, Associate Warden Cox sent a memorandum to FCC Terre Haute staff advising them that Mr. Prucha could get a vibrating clock. Dkt. 222-28. Mr. Prucha received a functioning vibrating alarm clock on August 6, 2018. Dkt. 222-1 at 133-34. He possessed it continuously until August 30, 2021. Id. at 134. When he was placed in restrictive housing, the clock was taken away. Id. No one could find his clock after Mr. Prucha was released from the SHU. Dkt. 142 at 3. Mr. Prucha received a replacement clock pursuant to this Court's order granting his motion for preliminary injunction in August 2022. Dkt. 179.
D. Mr. Prucha's Alleged Injuries and Bases for Personal Liability
Without accommodations, Mr. Prucha often missed breakfast. Dkt. 222-1 at 150; dkt. 126 at 15. Mr. Prucha also felt he was denied access to religious, psychological, and educational services. Dkt. 222-1 at 56. For example, he attended a seminar, but he could not hear the presentation. Id. at 66. He did not move closer to the speaker because he did not want to draw attention to his hearing disability since generally only other inmates on his unit are aware of his disability. Id. at 66-67.
Whenever Mr. Prucha missed breakfast, he "just fe[lt] really weak." Dkt. 222-1 at 1. Mr. Prucha lost weight as a result of missing breakfast, dkt. 126 at 71, though the weight loss never resulted in him being underweight as defined by the National Institute of Health, dkt. 222-31.
In order to make up for his lost meals, Mr. Prucha opened an illicit "store" at FCC Terre Haute, wherein he would trade pictures of models to other inmates in exchange for food. Dkt. 222-1 at 16, 22. Mr. Prucha began his store so that he could stop worrying about trying to get to breakfast. Id. at 135. Eventually, he received a conduct report, and his store was shut down. Id. at 173.
Mr. Prucha believes that the individual defendants are liable due to the delay in him receiving a vibrating alarm clock (either by delaying providing him with a catalog to select an appropriate clock or by delaying the processing of his payment), for failing to select appropriate inmate helpers or pay them enough money, and for failing to provide him with an appropriate cell assignment or assistive listening device. Dkt. 222-1 at 186-88 (discussing Bondurant); 188 (Cox); 193-94 (Kimberly); 198-99 (McCoy); 199-200 (Royer); 205-09 (Rupska); 209-10 (Schmalensee); 210-11 (Underwood); 211-18 (Wasson).
IV.
Discussion
For the following reasons, Mr. Prucha's claims under the Rehabilitation Act and Bivens fail.
A. Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.To succeed on a Rehabilitation Act claim, Mr. Prucha must show that "(1) he is a qualified person (2) with a disability and (3) the [Bureau of Prisons] denied him access to a program or activity because of his disability." Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672).
The parties dedicate much of their briefing to whether Mr. Prucha was a qualified person on account of his surgeries and improved hearing, and whether the BOP's accommodations were reasonable. Dkts. 223 at 15-19; 234 at 15-26; 235 at 4-7. But Mr. Prucha's Rehabilitation Act claims are now moot due to his transfer to another BOP facility.
Mr. Prucha sought money damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief in his amended complaint due to the lack of accommodations at FCC Terre Haute. Dkt. 126 at 23-26. But Congress did not waive the federal government's sovereign immunity as to money damages claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192-97, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996); Houck v. United States of America, 17-CV-474-JPG, 2017 WL 2733905, at *6 (S.D. Ill. June 22, 2017) (noting that while federal prisoners may assert claims under the Rehabilitation Act arising from their incarceration in a federal prison, "the remedies available to a federal prisoner-plaintiff are limited to declaratory and/or injunctive relief; money damages are not available.") (citing Lane and other cases). And any claim for injunctive or declaratory relief for the lack of accommodations at FCC Terre Haute is now moot in light of Mr. Prucha's transfer to USP Coleman. See generally Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670 n.3 ("In his complaint Jaros also demands injunctive relief, but his release from Vandalia has mooted that prospect."); Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[W]hen a prisoner who seeks injunctive relief for a condition specific to a particular prison is transferred out of that prison, the need for relief, and hence the prisoner's claim, become moot."); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 2006) (transfer to another prison mooted claims for both injunctive relief and declaratory relief).
Because Mr. Prucha's Rehabilitation Act claims are moot, the official capacity defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
B. Eighth Amendment Claims
Mr. Prucha claims that the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to his health and safety by failing to provide him his requested accommodations. In light of the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Egbert, 142 S. Ct. 1793, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
i. Applicable Law
There is no Congressional authority to award damages against federal officials who violate the Constitution while acting under color of federal law. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017). Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held in Bivens that it had authority to create "a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment" against federal narcotics officers who allegedly handcuffed the plaintiff and threatened his family while arresting him. 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. That implied authority was subsequently extended twice: first to a former congressional staffer alleging sex discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), and second to the estate of a federal prisoner alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment where prison staff failed to provide him medical attention for an asthma attack for many hours, resulting in his death, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16, n. 1, 24, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). But these "three cases—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson—represent the only instances in which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself." Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1855.
In the past four decades, the Court has declined to create any new contexts for Bivens claims. Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1799-1800 (listing cases). "[E]xpanding Bivens is not just 'a disfavored judicial activity,' id. at 1803 (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857), it is an action that is impermissible in virtually all circumstances." Silva v. United States, 45 F.4th 1134, 1140 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing Egbert at 1803-07; id. at 1809-10 (Gorsuch, J. concurring in the judgment)).
To determine whether a Bivens remedy is available to a plaintiff suing a federal actor, the Court makes a two-step inquiry. First, it asks whether the claim presents a new Bivens context by determining whether "the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the Supreme Court]." Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1864. Second, if the claim presents a new Bivens context, the Court then asks whether there are any special factors that counsel hesitation about granting the extension. Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1803. In applying the second factor, a district court "faces only one question: whether there is any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress is better suited to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed." Id. at 1805 (cleaned up). Additionally, "a court may not fashion a Bivens remedy if Congress already has provided, or has authorized the Executive to provide, 'an alternative remedial structure.' " Id. at 1804 (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858). And this is true even if the individual plaintiff alleges he does not have access to the alternative remedy. Id. at 1807 ("[W]hether a given remedy is adequate is a legislative determination that must be left to Congress, not the federal courts.").
ii. Application of Ziglar and Egbert to Mr. Prucha's Eighth Amendment Claims
The Court must first determine whether Mr. Prucha's claims arise in a new context. Although Mr. Prucha brings Eighth Amendment claims like the plaintiff in Carlson, the context is different because it involves accommodations for a chronic hearing disability, not the actions of staff in the midst of a medical emergency. See Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1805 (finding Fourth Amendment excessive force claim arose in a new context because federal agent was a border patrol agent rather than a narcotics officer); Hernandez v. Mesa, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743, 206 L.Ed.2d 29 (2020) ("A claim may arise in a new context even if it is based on the same constitutional provision as a claim in a case in which a damages remedy was previously recognized."); and Washington v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. CV 5:16-3913-BHH, 2022 WL 3701577, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2022) (finding federal inmate's Bivens action related to ongoing medical treatment for his blindness presented new context in light of Egbert). The Court finds that Mr. Prucha's Eighth Amendment claims related to accommodations for his hearing disability present a new context.
The Court proceeds to the special factors analysis. That analysis is brief, as it will usually be in light of Egbert. Once the Court finds any reason to defer to Congress—or any alternative remedy, even if the plaintiff alleges it is inadequate—the analysis is complete.
Alternative remedies are available to Mr. Prucha. The BOP's administrative remedy process, 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq., provides inmates with the ability to seek formal review of an allegation of inadequate accommodations for a disability. Additionally, Mr. Prucha may still bring claims for injunctive relief in federal court, as he successfully did here. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1862 (observing that the ability to pursue injunctive relief for abuses in the prison setting is a special factor); Washington, 2022 WL 3701577 at *8 (noting that availability of injunctive relief "is a sharp contrast with Carlson, where the injury was fatal and it was therefore 'damages or nothing' ") (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1862). Thus, Mr. Prucha's Bivens claims against the defendants are foreclosed by the availability of these alternative remedies, and the individual defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1806.
Because of the availability of other remedies, the Court does not discuss the other special factors presented by the defendants.
IV.
Conclusion
The defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [222], is granted. All deadlines related to trial are vacated. The clerk is directed to substitute Colette Peters for Michael Carvajal as a defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
Final judgment shall issue by separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.