Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-cv-3588-AT
2022-08-30
Gabriel ARRIES, Plaintiff, v. Victor HILL, Rashawn Johnson, James Stewart, Jr., Jelani Foster, Montez Hawkins, Sydney Cannon, David Evans, Benjamin Walker, Jr., and John Does 1-2, in their individual capacities, Defendants.
Alwyn R. Fredericks, David Najeeb Krugler, Cash, Krugler & Fredericks, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Kurt G. Kastorf, Kastorf Law, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Lisa Erin McNary, Morgan & Morgan, PLLC, Alpharetta, GA, for Plaintiff. Jason C. Waymire, Williams & Waymire LLC, Buford, GA, Arash A. Sabzevari, Jack Reynolds Hancock, Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP, Atlanta, GA, Chandler Justine Emmons, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Forest Park, GA, for Defendant Victor Hill. Arash A. Sabzevari, Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants John Does 1-2. Brian R. Dempsey, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Defendant Jelani Foster. Matthew Herbert Bennett, Bennett Law Office, LLC, Griffin, GA, for Defendant David Evans.
Alwyn R. Fredericks, David Najeeb Krugler, Cash, Krugler & Fredericks, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Kurt G. Kastorf, Kastorf Law, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Lisa Erin McNary, Morgan & Morgan, PLLC, Alpharetta, GA, for Plaintiff. Jason C. Waymire, Williams & Waymire LLC, Buford, GA, Arash A. Sabzevari, Jack Reynolds Hancock, Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP, Atlanta, GA, Chandler Justine Emmons, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Forest Park, GA, for Defendant Victor Hill. Arash A. Sabzevari, Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants John Does 1-2. Brian R. Dempsey, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Defendant Jelani Foster. Matthew Herbert Bennett, Bennett Law Office, LLC, Griffin, GA, for Defendant David Evans. ORDER Amy Totenberg, United States District Judge
In February 2021, Plaintiff Gabriel Arries was arrested for misdemeanor disorderly conduct at Hartsfield-Jackson Airport and was transferred to the Clayton County Jail. Arries was in the midst of a psychological break, did not know where he was, and shouted racial epithets at the Sherriff's deputies. Allegedly angered by the racial slurs, the deputies subjected Arries to a series of punishments: forcing him to the ground and beating him (while handcuffed); carrying him via four-point hold to the showers and assaulting him a second time; placing him in a restraint chair for four hours; taking him out of the restraint chair to the shower area to beat him again; placing him back in the restraint chair for a period of time; placing him in a cell with allegedly violent inmates who were aware that Arries had been shouting racial epithets and who the sheriffs knew would pose a serious danger to him; tasing Arries after there was in fact an altercation with the other inmates; and then placing Arries in another holding cell when he had open wounds on his face and was covered in feces. Some amount of time later, jail medical staff discovered Arries and he was transported to Atlanta Medical Center where he was diagnosed with life-altering brain damage and other injuries, including: a severe traumatic brain injury, subdural hematoma, subarachnoid hemorrhage, a closed fracture of the nasal bone, and left-eye blindness. Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc 35], primarily based on qualified immunity. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND
The Court derives the factual background herein from Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which the Court presumes true for purposes of resolving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. See Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff in this action is Gabriel Arries, an individual who suffers from bipolar and mood disorder. (Amended Complaint, Doc. 32 ¶ 20.) Defendant Hill is the Sheriff of Clayton County. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendants Johnson, Stewart, Foster, Hawkins, Cannon, Evans, and Walker are or were deputies employed by the Clayton County Sheriff's Department, serving under Defendant Hill. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) Defendants John Does 1-2 are unknown Clayton County Sheriff's Department deputies. Plaintiff intends that these defendants will be substituted once their true identities are revealed through litigation. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.)
Defendants briefly move to dismiss the John Doe defendants because "fictitious party practice is not permitted in federal court." (Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 35-1 at 24.) However, at this early stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently identified the John Doe Defendants as other deputies who used excessive force against him. The law in this Circuit permits Plaintiff to join these defendants where discovery will provide the information needed to specifically identify these two deputies. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 1992); Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014). This aspect of Defendants' motion is therefore denied at this time. However, the Court DIRECTS the parties in their joint preliminary report to agree upon and identify a date by which Plaintiff shall be required to specifically identify these two John Doe Defendants.
This saga begins on February 5, 2021. That evening, Plaintiff Arries was arrested at the Hartsfield-Jackson Airport for misdemeanor disorderly conduct and transported to the Clayton County Jail. (Id. ¶ 20.) Upon arrival, the duty nurse and Defendants Johnson and Stewart were informed of Arries's bipolar and mood disorders. (Id. ¶ 21.) Arries presented as disorganized and was not aware that he was in the state of Georgia. (Id. ¶ 22.) He was allegedly non-compliant and was shouting racial epithets to the deputies. (Id. ¶ 22.) Arries was handcuffed. (Id.) A "ramp call" was initiated directing all deputies to come to the intake area, where Arries was being held. (Id.) Allegedly upset and angry that Arries had been directing racial epithets at the deputies, Defendant Johnson pinned Plaintiff to the wall and forced him to the ground, and, according to an eyewitness, other deputies struck Plaintiff in the face several times while he was handcuffed. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.)
As the Court understands it, deputies initiate a "ramp call" when they seek the assistance of other officers.
After this assault, Defendants Stewart, Hawkins, and other officers transported Arries — using a "four-point hold" — to the shower area. (Id. ¶ 27.) Once in the shower area, Defendants Stewart, Hawkins, and other officers repeatedly, maliciously, and violently struck Plaintiff while Defendant Johnson held one side of Plaintiff's handcuffs that was attached to Plaintiff's arm. (Id. ¶ 28.) Defendants Walker and Evans were also involved in this assault and "brought Arries to the ground." (Id.)
A four-point hold, or four-point restraint, involves the restraints of all four limbs. See 28 C.F.R 552.24.
As alleged, officers have offered inconsistent statements as to whether Plaintiff was compliant in this shower area or whether he attempted to strike a deputy. (Id. ¶ 29.)
After this assault by the showers (the second assault of the day), Defendants Johnson, Stewart, and Hawkins placed Arries in a restraint chair for approximately four hours. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) A witness observed Plaintiff to be calm in the restraint chair. (Id. ¶ 30.) After these four hours, Defendants Cannon, Walker, and other deputies took Arries out of the restraint chair and back to shower area where they again violently beat Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 31.) After this second shower assault (the third assault of the day), the deputies placed Arries back in the restraint chair. (Id.)
As described in another case in this Circuit, a "restraint chair" is a "chair equipped with belts, cuffs, and straps that prevent the inmate from moving." Shuford v. Conway, 666 F. App'x 811, 813 (11th Cir. 2016).
At some point thereafter (it is not clear how long), Defendants Evans and Foster stated that Plaintiff wanted to kill himself and therefore they wanted to place Plaintiff on suicide watch in medical holding cell 7. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 65, 67.) However, Plaintiff alleges that a witness to this incident claims that Arries never threatened suicide or indicated a desire to harm himself. (Id. ¶ 32.) Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Evans and Foster placed Arries in medical holding cell 7 because that cell contained Black inmates who had been charged with violent crimes, and who were angry that Arries had been shouting racial epithets. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 65, 67.) Thus, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Evans and Foster intentionally placed Arries in a cell where they knew or had reason to know that he would be at risk of serious harm from other cellmates. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.)
Arries was in fact at risk of harm. After being placed in holding cell 7, Plaintiff was involved in a physical altercation with other cellmates. (Id. ¶ 36.) Deputies entered the cell and Defendant Foster tased Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 37.) After tasing him, Defendant Foster placed Arries alone in a different medical holding cell with 20 open wounds on his face and covered in feces — and then left him there. (Id. ¶ 37.)
After many hours alone in the holding cell, medical staff at the jail discovered Plaintiff, who was by then unresponsive, making involuntary movements, incontinent, and still covered in feces, with facial edema and numerous lacerations. (Id. ¶ 38.) Arries was then taken to Atlanta Medical Center and diagnosed with a severe traumatic brain injury, subdural hematoma, subarachnoid hemorrhage, a closed fracture of the nasal bone, and left-eye blindness. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 69.) As alleged, Plaintiff suffered life altering brain damage as a result of the incidents at the Clayton County Jail. (Id. ¶ 48.)
In this suit, Plaintiff brings claims against the seven deputy Defendants for excessive force, deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, and deliberate indifference to a known risk of harm from other inmates under the Fourteenth Amendment, (Counts I and IV), as well as state law claims for assault, battery, and reckless conduct (Count III). Additionally, Plaintiff brings a claim for excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Hill in his supervisory capacity (Count II).
As relevant background for purposes of Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Hill, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Hill developed a pattern, policy, and custom of unreasonably placing detainees in the restraint chair and permitting the unreasonable and malicious excessive use of force by his deputies. (Id. ¶ 51.) In support, Arries attaches the Indictment brought against Hill in this district charging him with repeatedly using the restraint chair to inflict punishment on inmates. (Hill Indictment, Doc. 32-1.) Plaintiff also includes allegations of other detainees who were placed in the restraint chair for long periods, and one who was assaulted, was placed in a restraint chair, and was falsely labeled as experiencing a mental health crisis (akin to Plaintiff's allegations of his being falsely labeled as suicidal). (Am. Compl. ¶ 55.) The Court lays out the appropriate legal standard and then discusses the claims below.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that the facts alleged fail to state a "plausible" claim for relief. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citing Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003).
A claim is plausible where the plaintiff alleges factual content that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A plaintiff is not required to provide "detailed factual allegations" to survive dismissal, but the "obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" that supports the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim even if it is "improbable" that a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts and even if the possibility of recovery is extremely "remote and unlikely." Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that all of Plaintiffs substantive claims should be dismissed because each of the Defendants is shielded by qualified immunity. The Court first outlines the governing standard for qualified immunity and then applies that standard to the federal claims in this case. The Court then assesses Defendants' argument that they are entitled to official immunity as to the state law claims.
A. Standard for Qualified Immunity
The judicially created doctrine of qualified immunity "shields a government official from liability unless he violates 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Piazza v. Jefferson County, Ala., 923 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996)). Officers asserting qualified immunity bear the initial burden of establishing that they were acting within their discretionary authority. Id. (citing Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007)). Here, it is undisputed that Defendants were acting within their discretionary authority.
Accordingly, the burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff "to show that (1) the officer[s] violated a constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Id. (citing Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)). To be "clearly established" a legal principle must be "settled" and "clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule that the plaintiff seeks to apply." Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589-90, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018)). A right may be clearly established by (1) case law with analogous facts, (2) "a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law," or (3) "conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated." Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2009). Any case law must come from a "materially similar case" already decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest state court in the state in which the case arose. Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2012). The Court may consider the two prongs — whether there was a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established — in either order. Id. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if Arries fails to establish either prong. Id.
B. The Excessive Force Claim Against the Deputies
The Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees against the use of excessive force by their jailors. Piazza, 923 F.3d at 952; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ("For under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.") Unlike a prisoner bringing an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, a pretrial detainee raising a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim "needn't prove an officer's subjective intent to harm but instead need show only that 'the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.' " Id. (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015)). Thus, "if force used against a pretrial detainee is more severe than is necessary to subdue him or otherwise achieve a permissible governmental objective, it constitutes 'punishment' and is therefore unconstitutional." Id.
The determination of whether an officer's use of force was "objectively reasonable" necessarily turns on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). "A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. In so doing, a court must also "account for the 'legitimate interests [stemming from the government's] need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained." Id. (quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861). This includes "appropriately deferring to policies and practices that, in the judgment of jail officials, are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and maintain institutional security." Id. (cleaned up).
In 2015 in Kingsley, the Supreme Court provided a non-exhaustive list of considerations relevant to determining the reasonableness or unreasonableness of force used, including: (1) the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; (2) the extent of the plaintiff's injury; (3) any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; (4) the severity of the security problem at issue; (5) the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and (6) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466. Both before Kingsley and since, the Eleventh Circuit has reiterated a key principle in pretrial detainee excessive force cases: "because force in the pretrial detainee context may be defensive or preventative — but never punitive — the continuing use of force is impermissible when a detainee is complying, has been forced to comply, or is clearly unable to comply." Piazza, 923 F.3d at 953. Accordingly, "a single punch to a non-resisting detainee constitutes excessive force." Quinette v. Reed, 805 F. App'x 696, 705 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008)) cert. denied — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 2700, 210 L.Ed.2d 870 (2021).
Another longstanding principle important to any evaluation of excessive force claims — and one Defendants repeat in briefing — is that each defendant's actions must be evaluated individually. Because § 1983 "requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation, each defendant is entitled to an independent qualified-immunity analysis as it relates to his or her actions and omissions." Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotation omitted) (reversing the denial of summary judgment and remanding to the district court to conduct individualized analysis of whether each defendant is entitled to qualified immunity). But see Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting defendants' argument that "the force administered by each defendant in this collective beating must be analyzed separately to determine which of the defendants' blows, if any, used excessive force").
With this framing in mind, the Court turns to whether the force used by each of the Deputy Defendants was objectively unreasonable — i.e., "whether it was excessive in relation to [its] purpose." Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398, 135 S.Ct. 2466.
To refresh, Plaintiff Arries alleges that the deputy Defendants collectively engaged in the following acts of force, all while he was either handcuffed, compliant, in the midst of a mental health episode, unable to resist, or only minimally non-compliant:
• striking him numerous times after the "ramp call" and carrying him with a four-point restraint hold;
• violently assaulting him in the shower area;
• placing him in the restraint chair for four hours;
• taking him out of the restraint chair and to the shower area to beat him again;
• placing him back in the restraint chair for some time;
• intentionally placing him in a dangerous cell where he was involved in a confrontation with other inmates;
• tasing him; and then
• leaving him with serious face injuries and lying in feces for hours in another cell.
The specific allegations against each defendant are as follows:
| Defendant | Paragraph in Compl. | Actions, omissions, and knowledge alleged |
| Johnson | ¶¶ 21, 22¶ 25¶ 28¶¶ 30, 31 | • Was informed of Plaintiff's bipolar and mood disorder, knew Plaintiff was not aware he was in Georgia• Pinned Plaintiff to wall and forced him to ground during ramp call (while other officers struck him) while he was handcuffed• Held Plaintiff down in shower area, while holding Johnson's handcuffs• After shower beating, restrained Plaintiff in restraint chair for 4 hours |
| Stewart | ¶¶ 21, 22¶ 27¶ 28¶¶ 30, 31 | • Was informed of Plaintiff's bipolar and mood disorder, knew Plaintiff was not aware he was in Georgia• Carried Plaintiff to shower area after he was beaten at ramp call using 4-point hold• In shower area, repeatedly, maliciously, violently struck Plaintiff while Johnson held him down• After shower beating, restrained Plaintiff in restraint chair for 4 hours |
| Foster | ¶¶ 37, 68¶¶ 65-67 | • Tased Plaintiff after Plaintiff was in altercation in medical cell 7, causing Plaintiff to defecate on himself - then placed Plaintiff in medical holding cell 20 with open wounds on his face and while covered in feces• Placed Plaintiff in medical cell 7 with other violent inmates with the intention of causing Plaintiff harm and in violation of Clayton County Jail procedures |
| Hawkins | ¶ 27¶ 28¶¶ 30, 31 | • Carried Plaintiff to shower area after he was beaten at ramp call using 4-point hold• In shower area, repeatedly, maliciously, violently struck Plaintiff while Johnson held him down• After shower beating, restrained Plaintiff in restraint chair for 4 hours |
| Cannon | ¶ 31 | • After 4 hours in restraint chair, took Plaintiff to shower area (second time) and repeatedly, maliciously, and violently struck Plaintiff and forced him to ground and then forced him back in restraint chair |
| Evans | ¶ 28¶¶ 32, 65-67 | • Participated in first assault in shower after ramp call - "took [Plaintiff] to the ground"• Asserted that Plaintiff wanted to kill himself and placed him in medical holding cell 7, in violation of Clayton County Jail procedures |
| Walker | ¶ 28¶ 31 | • Participated in assault in shower after ramp call - "took [Plaintiff] to the ground"• After 4 hours in restraint chair, took Plaintiff to the shower area and repeatedly, maliciously, and violently struck Plaintiff and forced him to the ground and then forced him back in restraint chair |
In assessing each defendant's assertion of qualified immunity, the Court begins with Defendant Johnson. At this stage, the Court looks only to the allegations in the Complaint and takes them as true. As alleged, Johnson pinned Plaintiff to the ground in the intake area so that other deputies could beat him while Plaintiff was handcuffed and in retribution for Plaintiff using racial slurs. Johnson also held Plaintiff down in the shower area during another beating, again while holding on to one of Plaintiff's handcuffed arms. Then, Johnson placed Plaintiff in a restraint chair for four hours. Plaintiff acknowledges that he was allegedly shouting racial slurs during the intake process. However, again, he was handcuffed and also experiencing a mental health episode, which Johnson knew. There is no indication that Johnson sought to "temper or to limit the amount of force." Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466.
As this is before the Court pre-discovery, the facts are not clear on many specific details, including whether Plaintiff was fully handcuffed in the shower, handcuffed on one hand only, or not handcuffed.
Considering that Plaintiff was handcuffed, unarmed, placed in a four-point restraint, and severely beaten, and also considering the number of deputies on site, the "severity of the security problem" was low and there was little to no threat to Johnson during all three of his uses of force. Id. See also Piazza, 923 F.3d at 955 (finding use of force excessive where the severity of the problem and corresponding risk to officers was, from the outset, "exceedingly minimal," despite the plaintiff's non-compliance and emphasizing that the plaintiff had no dangerous weapon, only a shower curtain); see also Shuford v. Conway, 666 F. App'x 811 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding that actions of rapid response team in jail were unconstitutional where the team inter alia regularly placed compliant inmates in restraint chair for hours at a time). Undoubtedly, Plaintiff's ultimate injuries — a life-altering traumatic brain injury, among other conditions — were terribly severe. See Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the plaintiff's serious injuries of multiple rib fractures, back injuries, and lacerations to scalp requiring hospitalization weighed in favor of finding force excessive rather than de minimis). Thus, based on the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Kingsley, Johnson's three instances of using force against Plaintiff were "excessive in relation to [their] purpose." Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398, 135 S.Ct. 2466. While Defendant Johnson may, after discovery, identify facts that tip the balance in the other direction — that is, facts that demonstrate that Plaintiff posed a safety or security threat or that Johnson sought to temper his use of force — at this stage, the force used by Johnson was unconstitutional as pled.
Defendants' argument throughout the briefing that Defendants exhibited only de minimis force is not well taken. The severity of Plaintiff's injuries indicate that the force used was significant. And the Court is not required to assess each punch on a blow-by-blow basis. Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002). Besides, the Court notes that, it was clear well before the events of this case that "a single punch to a non-resisting detainee constitutes excessive force." Quinette v. Reed, 805 F. App'x 696, 705 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008)) cert. denied — U.S. —, 141 S.Ct. 2700, 210 L.Ed.2d 870 (2021). Beyond this, the authority Defendants rely on for this de minimis argument is distinguishable — and also unhelpful to their positions. In Vinyard v. Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit found that the force used by the officer in grabbing the plaintiff's arm and bruising her and then using pepper spray in her face, all because she was screaming at him from the back of the patrol car, was unconstitutionally excessive. 311 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002). Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2000) and Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997) both involved a minimal push or shove to the plaintiff during an arrest, and nothing close to the amount of force alleged in this case.
With that, the Court must determine if the law was clearly established such that Johnson had "fair warning" that his conduct, as alleged, was unconstitutional. Piazza, 923 F.3d at 955. Without question, it is clearly established law in this Circuit that "[w]hen jailers continue to use substantial force against a prisoner who has clearly stopped resisting — whether because he has decided to become compliant, he has been subdued, or he is otherwise incapacitated — that use of force is excessive." Id. (quoting Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008)) abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley, 576 U.S. 389, 135 S.Ct. 2466, ("Once a prisoner has stopped resisting there is no longer a need for force, so the use of force thereafter is disproportionate to the need"). This broad constitutional principle is well settled. See Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding force used excessive where inmate was non-compliant but had been restrained and posed no threat, and denying qualified immunity) ("Long before the defendants acted, the law was clearly established that correctional officers could not use force maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm"). See also Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 327 (11th Cir. 1987) (establishing that a constitutional violation "occurs in the context where prison officers continue to employ force or other coercive measures after the necessity for such coercive action has ceased"); Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1576 (11th Cir. 1991).
Here, there are no allegations that Arries was actively resisting when he was held down by Johnson at the ramp call, or taken into the shower area, or when he was placed in the restraint chair. Indeed, the Complaint alleges that a witness found him to be calm during the time of the restraint chair. Again, while discovery may uncover additional facts, at this stage, the law gave Johnson clear warning that his conduct — holding down and initiating the beating of a handcuffed and mentally unwell detainee, twice, and placing him in a restraint chair for four hours — violated the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, Johnson is not entitled to qualified immunity.
The analysis is materially the same for Defendants Stewart and Hawkins. Both Stewart and Hawkins allegedly struck Plaintiff — repeatedly, maliciously, and violently — while Johnson held him down in the shower area. Moreover, both were also present at the ramp call and, particularly as to Defendant Stewart who was involved with Plaintiff's intake from the start, it is a reasonable inference that they were involved in the first assault at intake as well. Both deputies were involved in placing Plaintiff in the restraint chair for four hours despite his lack of noncompliance at that point. As reasoned above in connection with Defendant Johnson, under the factors identified in Kingsley, these instances of force used against Arries were excessive in relation to their purpose, and therefore were unconstitutional. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398, 135 S.Ct. 2466. And like Defendant Johnson, Defendants Stewart and Hawkins had fair warning that this conduct — using this level of force for the purpose of causing harm against a restrained and/or minimally resistant detainee — was unconstitutional. Piazza, 923 F.3d at 955 (collecting cases). They are therefore not entitled to dismissal based on qualified immunity.
The Court next moves on to Defendants Cannon and Walker. Both allegedly removed Plaintiff from the restraint chair (again, where he was alleged to be "calm") and took him to the shower area (the second time), where they repeatedly, maliciously, and violently struck Plaintiff and forced him to the ground. Both Defendants Cannon and Walker then allegedly brought Plaintiff back to the restraint chair and placed him in the chair again for an unidentified amount of time. Walker was also allegedly involved in the first assault in the shower area (the second assault of the day). Based on these allegations, the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used drastically weighs in favor of finding Cannon and Walker's force excessive. As noted above, Plaintiff was severely injured and — at this stage without discovery as to any medical causation issues — it is a reasonable inference that the violent, repeated blows to the head in the shower area doled out by Cannon and Walker caused and/or contributed to Plaintiff's severe injuries. No allegations indicate that these officers sought to limit the amount of force they used; rather, the allegations are that this was an imposition of sadistic punishment. As Arries was alleged to have been calm after four hours in the restraint chair, there was no security threat. Considering the Kingsley factors, the force was therefore unconstitutionally excessive. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466. For the reasons stated already, the law was clearly established to put Defendants Cannon and Walker on notice that their alleged malicious beating of a subdued detainee was unconstitutional, and they are not entitled to qualified immunity. Piazza, 923 F.3d at 955 (collecting cases).
Finally, the Court considers Defendants Evans and Foster's circumstances. The first allegation against Defendant Evans is that he participated in the first of the two assaults that occurred in the shower area. As to this use of force, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that this instance of force was excessive and therefore unconstitutional, as reasoned above. Similarly, Plaintiff has established that Evans was on notice that the malicious beating of an unresisting detainee was unconstitutional. Piazza, 923 F.3d at 955 (collecting cases).
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Evans and Foster essentially concocted the assertion that Plaintiff was suicidal for purpose of placing Plaintiff in a dangerous environment where Defendants Evans and Foster knew Plaintiff would be seriously injured at the hands of other inmates. The Court addresses these allegations of failure to protect in connection with Count IV, below.
After Plaintiff was placed in medical cell 7 with the other allegedly dangerous inmates and was involved in an altercation with those inmates, Defendant Foster entered the cell and tased Plaintiff, causing him to defecate on himself. In seeking dismissal, Defendants argue that Foster's use of the taser was "presumably" justified for institutional safety and to break up the altercation. (Mot., Doc. 35-1 at 10.) But, as Plaintiff points out, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot make inferences and presumptions in favor of the Defendants. Without an evidentiary record, the Court cannot assume that Foster was objectively reasonable in tasing Plaintiff. Based on the facts as alleged, at the time he was tased, Plaintiff had just been assaulted by multiple other cellmates, after he had already suffered three prior severe beatings at the hands of deputies and been subject to a four-point hold and hours in the restraint chair. And, it is alleged that Foster — the deputy who tased Plaintiff — had intentionally placed him in medical cell 7 to subject him to injury from other inmates. Under the circumstances, it is unlikely that Arries posed a serious security problem or a threat to the officers or even the other cellmates. Further, there is no allegation that Foster made any effort to temper the use of a taser. The extreme severity of Plaintiff's injuries (which, by the time of the tasing, had likely become more obvious) bears repeating. While discovery might bring forth an alternative story, as it stands, Foster's use of force would be excessive and unconstitutional. Based on the legal authority outlined above, it is clearly established law that tasing an unresisting detainee violates that inmate's constitutional rights. See Piazza, 923 F.3d at 955 (which itself involved the unconstitutional use of a taser). Foster is not entitled to qualified immunity at this early stage under the circumstances alleged.
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, each of the deputy Defendants is alleged to have personally assaulted, tased, held down, or otherwise physically injured Plaintiff Arries in some manner. Taking the allegations as true, each of these uses of force was unreasonably excessive under the circumstances. Further, established law placed the Defendants on notice that their conduct (again as alleged) was unconstitutional. None of the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings. The Court turns next to Count II.
C. Defendant Hill's Supervisory Liability
"The standard by which a supervisor can be held liable for the actions of [ ] subordinate[s] is 'extremely rigorous.' " Piazza, 923 F.3d at 957 (citing Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003)). Supervisors cannot be held liable for unconstitutional acts of subordinates based on respondeat-superior or vicarious liability principles. Id. (citing Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)). Where, as here, there are no allegations of the supervisor's personal participation (at least with respect to this Plaintiff), "supervisory liability is permissible only if there is a 'causal connection' between a supervisor's actions and the alleged constitutional violation." Id. (citing Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360).
Plaintiff can establish the requisite causal connection where a "history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so," or where a supervisor's "custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights." Shuford v. Conway, 666 F. App'x 811, 818 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Keith v. DeKalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 2014)). Deliberate indifference to constitutional rights requires (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence. Id. (citing Keith, 749 F.3d at 1047). In attempting to establish supervisory liability either through a failure to prevent widespread abuse or through a custom or policy permitting such abuse, "a plaintiff must point to multiple incidents" or "multiple reports of prior misconduct." Piazza, 923 F.3d at 957 (internal citations omitted). "A single incident of a constitutional violation is insufficient" to prove policy or custom. Id. As with all pleadings, conclusory assertions that a policy or custom existed are insufficient. Smith v. Owens, 625 F. App'x 924, 927 (11th Cir. 2015).
Here, Arries alleges that Victor Hill developed a custom and policy of unreasonably placing detainees in the restraint chair and permitting the unreasonable and malicious excessive use of force by his deputies. (Am. Compl. ¶ 51.) Plaintiff alleges that Hill not only tolerated these abuses but personally participated in them in the context of other detainees. (Id. ¶ 52.) As specific support, Plaintiff relies first on the Indictment of Victor Hill, which is attached to the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 32-1.) The Indictment details specific allegations that Hill personally ordered four different inmates to be strapped to the restraint chair for hours, even though they posed no danger to any officers or to jail security, all for the sake of punishment for various alleged wrongdoing. (See generally, Doc. 32-1.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that a former whistle-blowing employee of the Clayton County Jail has attested to the regular mistreatment of inmates including through excessive violence. (Am. Compl. ¶ 53.)
Plaintiff also provides allegations as to another specific example: in 2014, a detainee complained that a senior officer instructed two of his colleagues to assault her, even though she posed no threat. This 2014 detainee also complained that she was subsequently dumped in a cell while visibly injured (like Arries) and was falsely labeled as experiencing a mental health crisis. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55-56.)
Plaintiff also asserts that Victor Hill regularly received complaints such as this one from 2014 onward and that — instead of stopping these abuses — he condoned, ratified, and authorized deputies to use excessive force including the use of the restraint chair. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 58.) Beyond these specific allegations, there are numerous other cases in this district where other plaintiffs allege that Defendant Hill participated or condoned conduct similar to the conduct alleged in the present case. See, e.g., Howell v. Hill, No. 1:20-cv-2662-WMR, Doc. 29 (N. D Ga. Feb. 19, 2021) (denying Hill's motion to dismiss complaint that alleged that Hill directed and condoned his deputies' actions of: strapping a detainee in restraint chair in a suicide cell for 6 hours despite that detainee was compliant and not suicidal, and, after allowing the detainee to shower, returning the detainee to another suicide cell with 5 other men, all while he had a torn gown, and was therefore exposing himself); Bonney v. Hill et al., 1:-22-cv-834-MHC, Doc. 1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2022) (complaint alleging that Hill ordered deputies to strap plaintiff into restraint chair and that deputies left plaintiff in chair for 8 hours, forcing him to urinate on himself); Whitaker v. Hill et al., 1:21-cv-3781-AT-JSA, Doc. 13 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2021) (complaint alleging that deputy brutally assaulted plaintiff while plaintiff was handcuffed, after which plaintiff was placed in restraint chair for at least 4 hours and then subjected to segregation and three days of nutraloaf, the latter as ordered by Hill).
Nutraloaf is "an amalgamated food product used for punishment" of inmates. See Jones v. Hill, 2020 WL 7664773, at *8 (N.D.).
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficiently numerous and specific for the Court to find that Arries has adequately alleged that Hill, at the very least, had subjective knowledge of a pattern of employee conduct creating a risk of serious inmate harm, that he disregarded that risk, and that his conduct was more than grossly negligent. Shuford v. Conway, 666 F. App'x 811, 818 (11th Cir. 2016) (denying summary judgment to sheriff where there was evidence, based on past allegations of detainees, of a history of widespread abuse in connection with officers' unconstitutional use of the restraint chair to punish inmates). Defendant Hill is not entitled to the dismissal of Count II.
D. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need and Deliberate Indifference to a Risk of Serious Harm
Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim (Count IV) is subject to the same two-step qualified immunity analysis as his excessive force claim. Because Arries was a pretrial detainee and not a prisoner, his constitutional right to be protected from a substantial risk of serious harm arises under Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, n.4 (11th Cir. 1995). Deliberate indifference claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are, however, evaluated by the same standard as similar claims under the Eighth Amendment. Id.; Patel v. Lanier County, Ga., 969 F.3d 1173, 1188 (11th Cir. 2020). In Count IV, Plaintiff primarily alleges that the deputies were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; however, he also alleges that at least two of the deputies were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm that other inmates would inflict. The Court addresses these theories in turn.
To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need under the Fourteenth Amendment, Arries must adequately allege that (1) he had an objectively serious medical need; (2) the deputies acted with subjective deliberate indifference to that medical need; and (3) he suffered an injury caused by the Defendants' wrongful conduct. Patel, 969 F.3d at 1188 (citing Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007)). As to the first element, a serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Taylor v. Hughes, 920 F.3d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 2019). This medical need must be one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm. Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). As to the second element, a defendant is deliberately indifferent to a plaintiff's serious medical need when he "(1) has subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregards that risk; and (3) acts with more than gross negligence." Patel, 969 F.3d at 1188 (cleaned up).
As the Court noted in Patel, there is a tension within the Eleventh Circuit's precedent regarding whether the minimum standard for culpability requires "more than gross negligence" or "more than mere negligence." See id. at n.10. (comparing cases). Of this tension, the Eleventh Circuit explained that these competing articulations "may well represent a distinction without a difference because . . . the Supreme Court itself has likened the deliberate-indifference standard to 'subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.' Accordingly, no matter how serious the negligence, conduct that can't fairly be char acterized as reckless won't meet the Supreme Court's standard." Id. (adding emphases) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)).
Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff's ability to establish that he had an objectively serious medical need, but rather contend that the Complaint does not sufficiently allege that each Defendant was deliberately indifferent to that serious medical need. (Mot. Doc. 35-1 at 15-17.) The Court again conducts the defendant-by-defendant assessment, as required.
For good measure, according to the allegations, from after the initial assault, Arries's need for medical care was so obvious that a lay person would recognize the need for a doctor's attention.
As alleged, Defendant Johnson was aware of Plaintiff's bipolar and mood disorders, and was plainly aware of Plaintiff's injuries after the first two assaults (the first, after the ramp call; the second, in the shower area) because Johnson participated in those assaults. See Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2005) (inferring that officers were aware of inmate's unconscious condition because they were in close proximity and observed him when they carried him to cell), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015). Plaintiff alleges that after the first assault — in the intake area, after the ramp call — Arries had "suffered visible injuries that would have been readily apparent to any Defendant who observed him" and that his need for medical treatment was obvious at that point. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) And, as has been well established, Arries ultimately suffered serious and lifelong brain injuries. The extent of Plaintiff's injuries at each stage, after each of the various assaults, is a highly fact-specific inquiry and is not well-suited for disposition at this early stage.
Taking the allegations as true, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that (1) Johnson had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm because he observed Arries's head injuries and knew that Arries had been beaten twice and then placed in a restraint chair for four hours; (2) Johnson disregarded that risk of harm when he failed to summon medical assistance despite his knowledge of the risk; and (3) Johnson's total failure to seek out medical care, required to treat injuries Johnson himself caused by his own alleged violent acts, was reckless and constitutes more than gross negligence. Indeed, it would be improper for the Court to determine without record evidence as to how Plaintiff appeared after the first two assaults — e.g., whether he was bleeding from his head, how responsive or non-responsive he was — that Johnson did not have knowledge of a risk of serious harm, as Defendants urge the Court to do. To find as much would be to make inferences in Defendants' favor. At this juncture, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Johnson violated Arries's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when he was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.
The next question is this: did clearly established law put Johnson on notice that his actions violated the constitution?
It is a broad, clearly established constitutional principle that "[t]he knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional refusal to provide that care has consistently been held to surpass negligence and constitute deliberate indifference." Patel, 969 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F. 2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)). "This broad principle has put all law-enforcement officials on notice that if they actually know about a condition that poses a substantial risk of serious harm and yet do nothing to address it, they violate the Constitution." Id. (emphasis in original). Where the circumstances alleged are "stark and simple," reliance on this broad principle is all that is required. Id. at 1191 ("This is not a case in which a law-enforcement officer provided inadequate aid, the reasonableness of which can be fairly disputed. Here . . . [the deputy] provided no timely aid — he was confronted with a serious medical need and did nothing.")
Moreover, it is also clearly established that officers violate the constitution when they use force against an inmate that causes him obvious harm and then "ignore without an explanation a prisoner's serious medical condition that is known or obvious to them." Danley, 540 F.3d at 1312 (finding that officers were deliberately indifferent to medical need when they subjected inmate to extensive pepper spray, left him in cell for 20 minutes despite his suffering, allowed him to shower for 2 minutes — an insufficient time to cleanse him of the pepper spray — and then placed him back in a cell, still suffering for 13 more hours). See also Bozeman, 422 F.3d at 1273 (finding that officers were deliberately indifferent to serious medical need when, after severely assaulting inmate, they waited 14 minutes to call for medical help despite knowing that inmate was unconscious/not breathing and provided "no explanation — medical or non-medical —" for failing to call for medical assistance or administer CPR) ("[W]e conclude that the Officers were fairly warned by our case law and that the Officers' total failure to address [plaintiff's] medical need during the fourteen-minute period violated [the plaintiff's] constitutional rights, which violation should have been obvious to any objectively reasonable officer.").
Applying this legal authority, Johnson was clearly on notice that his actions — in totally failing to address Arries's serious medical and head injuries that he himself caused or contributed to — violated Arries's constitutional rights. Discovery may reveal that Johnson did not in fact have subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. But, at this stage, the Complaint has sufficiently alleged that he did have such knowledge. Accordingly, Defendant Johnson is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
Having undergone a thorough analysis as to Defendant Johnson, the Court can more quickly address the other deputies, as most of the same arguments and case law apply. Defendants Stewart and Hawkins are in essentially the same position as Defendant Johnson. They both, as alleged, carried Arries via four-point hold after the first assault and then beat him violently in the shower area before placing him the restraint chair for hours. Like Johnson, they both had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm to Arries because they participated in two assaults and observed him in the aftermath. Both failed to take any action, i.e., summoning medical assistance or even checking to determine if Arries's serious head injuries required medical treatment. Moreover, instead of seeking medical treatment, they subjected Plaintiff to additional force by placing him in the restraint chair — a "chair equipped with belts, cuffs, and straps that prevent the inmate from moving," Shuford, 666 F. App'x at 813. As a result, Arries ultimately suffered serious injuries. This conduct rises to the level of conscience-shocking behavior surpassing mere negligence. For the reasons stated above, Stewart and Hawkins were on notice that their failures to seek medical treatment, or even check on the health status of Plaintiff, under the circumstances alleged, violated Plaintiff's clearly established rights.
Defendants Cannon and Walker can also be reasonably charged with having subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm because they retrieved Plaintiff from the restraint chair (again, after four hours) and violently beat him again by the showers (the second assault at the showers). Moreover, Defendant Walker had been involved in the first assault in the intake area and was likely aware that this was in fact the third assault Arries had suffered that day. There is no indication that Cannon or Walker did anything to seek medical treatment or assess Arries's medical status. Rather, they placed him back in the belts, cuffs, and straps of the restraint chair. This sufficiently alleges a Fourteenth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Based on the foregoing authority, Cannon and Walker were on notice that their actions and inactions violated Plaintiff's clearly established rights.
Defendant Foster allegedly tased Arries after Arries had been beaten up by other inmates and then placed Arries in another cell with 20 open wounds on his face and covered in feces. Some hours later, medical stuff found Arries "unresponsive, making involuntary movements, incontinent, still covered in feces, with facial edema and lacerations." (Am. Compl. ¶ 38.) Having observed Plaintiff be assaulted by other cellmates, having tased Plaintiff himself, and having seen that Plaintiff had over 20 open wounds on his face, Foster had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. Foster did not seek aid and instead left Plaintiff in a cell where he was found in the above-described condition, and later diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries and brain bleeds. These allegations sufficiently allege that Foster was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical need in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law clearly placed Foster on notice that his actions in dropping Plaintiff in an empty cell while in such a condition, instead of seeking medical treatment for Plaintiff, was unconstitutional. Patel, 969 F.3d at 1190; Bozeman, 422 F.3d at 1273. Foster is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Finally, Defendant Evans. Evans was aware of the first assault in the shower area because he participated in it (this was the second assault generally). He did not check to determine whether Plaintiff needed medical treatment at that time, despite the allegations that Arries had "suffered visible injuries that would have been readily apparent to any Defendant who observed him" and that his need for medical treatment was obvious at that point. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) Later, after Arries had been assaulted a second time in the shower area and placed in the restraint chair twice, for many hours, Evans — instead of sending Plaintiff to the infirmary for medical care — placed Plaintiff in a dangerous cell where he was likely to be (and then was) assaulted again. Based on these allegations, Evans had subjective knowledge of a serious medical need, intentionally ignored that need and instead placed Arries in danger of further harm. This is sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The law was clearly established, via the broad principles articulated above, that doing nothing in response to a serious medical need (let alone placing an inmate at additional risk) violates the constitution.
In addition to protecting inmates from officers' deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, the Fourteenth Amendment also protects pretrial detainees from a substantial risk of serious harm at the hands of other inmates. See Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582, n.4; Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the standards under the Fourteenth Amendment are identical to those under the Eighth for purposes of a failure to protect claim). Jail and prison officials have a duty to "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates," and in particular to "protect [inmates] from violence at the hands of other [inmates]." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F. 2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[I]t is well settled that [an] inmate has a constitutional right to be protected . . . ; from physical assault by other inmates.")
"Deliberate indifference in the context of a failure to prevent harm has a subjective and objective component, i.e., a plaintiff must show both 'that the defendant actually (subjectively) knew that an inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm' and 'that the defendant disregarded that known risk by failing to respond to it in an (objectively) reasonable manner.' " Bowen v. Warden Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014)). However, not every injury suffered by an inmate at the hands of another translates to constitutional liability. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970). To successfully state a claim premised on failure to prevent harm, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that: (1) a substantial risk of serious harm existed; (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk, i.e., they subjectively knew of the risk and also disregarded it by failing to respond in an objectively reasonable manner; and (3) there was a causal connection between the defendants' conduct and the constitutional violation. Id. A plaintiff is not required to establish that the defendant intended that other inmates would harm the plaintiff, just that the defendants knew of a substantial risk that the other inmates would cause the plaintiff harm. Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1102.
As to the first element, in determining whether a substantial risk of serious harm existed, the Court uses an objective standard. Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099. Here, Arries alleges specific facts supporting that there was a risk he would be seriously harmed by other inmates in medical holding cell 7 because the cell contained Black inmates who were aware that Plaintiff had been shouting racial epithets and that at least one individual had gang affiliation and was charged with violent crimes. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-35.) These allegations are sufficient to establish the first element of substantial risk of serious harm. See Bugge v. Roberts, 430 F. App'x 753, 759-60 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding fact question as to substantial risk of serious harm where plaintiff presented evidence that gangs operated in dormitories and there was a threat of racial violence); Rodriguez v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 508 F.3d 611, 621-22 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of substantial risk of serious harm from other inmates where he was former gang member who had been threatened with violence for renouncing his membership); De Veloz v. Miami-Dade County, 756 F. App'x 869, 877 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding that placing a female in male detention facility posed unreasonable risk of serious harm). Cf. Milledge v. Fla. Dept. of Corrections Secretary, 760 F. App'x 741, 744 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding that plaintiff failed to state claim where there was "no allegation or indication that the two inmates were involved with rival gangs or had any issues related to race, debt, romance, or anything else that might render one an excessive danger to another" and where the two had already been housed together for a month, without issue).
As to the second element, Arries has alleged that Defendants Evans and Foster were subjectively aware that placing Plaintiff in medical cell 7 would cause him serious harm. "Whether a [jail] official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence." Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1100 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation omitted). "[A] factfinder may conclude that a [jail] official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45, 114 S.Ct. 1970). Here, Plaintiff adequately alleges that Defendants Foster and Evans subjectively knew that placing Plaintiff in medical cell 7 would cause him serious harm and that, in deciding to go forward and place him in that cell anyway, Foster and Evans disregarded that risk and did not act in an objectively reasonable manner. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65-67.) Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that this placement was not only reckless but intentional. Moreover, Arries alleges that — given his mental health conditions and episode, his lack of criminal history, and his misdemeanor charge — the decision to place him in a cell with a violent offender violated Clayton County's Sheriff Department inmate classification guidelines. (Id. ¶ 66.) These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the second element.
Finally, the Court turns to the issue of causation. The critical question for causation is whether the defendants were in a position to take steps that could have averted the incident but failed to do so. Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 622. As the individuals who intentionally ordered that Plaintiff be placed in medical cell 7, Defendants Foster and Evans were plainly in a position to avert the incident and failed to do so. Accordingly, as alleged, Defendants Foster and Evans subjectively knew that placing Plaintiff in medical cell 7 would put Plaintiff at risk of serious harm and deliberately disregarded that risk, thereby causing Arries harm when he was beaten up by other inmates. This is sufficient to state a constitutional violation for failure to protect under the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the time of this incident, the law was clearly established that placing a detainee amongst other inmates that the defendant knows are a danger to the plaintiff — whether because of race, gender, gang affiliation, or the known violence of the cell mate — violates the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1102 ("Prior to the conduct in this case, this Court already clarified that a prison guard violates a prisoner's [constitutional] right when that guard actually (objectively and subjectively) knows that one prisoner poses a substantial risk of serious harm to another, yet fails to take any action to investigate, mitigate, or monitor that substantial risk of serious harm."); Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 621 (finding that, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, evidence was sufficient to establish constitutional violation where defendants knew of threat to plaintiff from former gang and did not reasonably respond to that risk).
For the reasons above, none of the deputies are at this stage entitled to qualified immunity in connection with Plaintiff's claim that Defendants manifested total indifference to his medical needs. Defendants may of course reassert their qualified immunity after discovery, at summary judgment. At that stage, Plaintiff will be required to point to evidence that each of the deputies had subjective knowledge of a serious risk of harm to Arries at the time they interacted with him such that their failure to obtain medical treatment was more than grossly negligent. Needless to say, this is a high bar and one Plaintiff must be prepared to meet with record evidence. Similarly, Defendants Foster and Evans are not entitled to qualified immunity under Plaintiff's failure to protect theory based on the allegations that they intentionally placed Plaintiff amongst other inmates that posed a unique danger to him.
E. State Law Official Immunity
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff's state law claim for assault, battery, and reckless conduct should be dismissed because they are entitled to official immunity.
"Under Georgia law, a public officer or employee may be personally liable only for [1] ministerial acts negligently performed or [2] acts performed with malice or an intent to injure." Grammens v. Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 697 S.E.2d 775, 777 (2010) (internal quotation omitted). The parties agree that the Defendants here were performing discretionary, not ministerial acts. Therefore, Defendants can be liable on the state law claims only if they acted with "actual malice" or "actual intent to cause injury." Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 520 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1999). Actual malice requires a "deliberate intention to do wrong." Id. A "deliberate intention to do wrong" means "the intent to cause the harm suffered by the plaintiff." Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 647 S.E.2d 54, 59 (2007). Further, the phrase "actual intent to cause injury" means "an actual intent to cause harm to the plaintiff, not merely an intent to do the act purportedly resulting in the claimed injury." Kidd v. Coates, 271 Ga. 33, 518 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1999) (quoting Frame v. Boatmen's Bank, 782 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)). Often, whether the defendant acted with actual malice is a fact question for the jury. City of Atlanta v. Shavers, 326 Ga.App. 95, 756 S.E.2d 204, 207 (2014); Coffman v. Battle, 786 F. App'x 926, 933 (11th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that "a jury can infer actual malice based on an officer's conduct").
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations of actual malice are conclusory. The Court, however, finds that there are enough factual allegations of actual malice to survive the motion to dismiss as to all of the deputy Defendants. As recounted above, each officer is alleged to have personally engaged in violence against Plaintiff — for most of them, via multiple instances of force — because he was spouting racial slurs. Further, much of the violence occurred when Plaintiff was handcuffed or posed no real risk to the deputies or other inmates. The assaults had extreme consequences, including a traumatic brain injury, a hematoma, hemorrhage, a fracture of the nasal bone, and left-eye blindness. These allegations are sufficient to allege actual malice under Georgia law. See Harper v. Perkins, 459 F. App'x 822, 828 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court's denial of motion to dismiss based on official immunity where plaintiff alleged that defendants knew and intended that the use of their taser on plaintiff would incapacitate him and that he would suffer serious consequences as a result); Coffman, 786 F. Appx at 933-34 (holding that a jury could infer from defendant's conduct that he acted with actual malice when he twice tased the plaintiff while the plaintiff was secured to a restraint chair); Quinette v. Reed, 805 F. App'x 696, 707 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding that, given allegations in the complaint, there was "no question" that defendant intended to cause harm to plaintiff when he applied force against a non-resistant detainee, and thus was not entitled to official immunity) cert. denied, — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 2700, 210 L.Ed.2d 870 (2021).
In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Foster and Evans intentionally placed Plaintiff in a dangerous cell in order to subject him to harm at the hands of other inmates. These allegations are sufficiently specific to colorably establish that Foster and Evans had the requisite "intent to cause the harm suffered by" Arries when he was assaulted by other inmates, Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d at 59, thereby meeting the standard for alleging malice.
Under the circumstances alleged in the Complaint, Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the protection afforded by official immunity at this stage. As with their qualified immunity arguments, however, Defendants may of course reassert this immunity at summary judgment based on a full record.
Because Plaintiff's substantive claims are not subject to dismissal, neither is his claim for Attorney's Fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Complaint outlines a series of brutal assaults against a plaintiff who was suffering a mental break. The consequences of these assaults were undoubtedly grave. The allegations are sufficient to withstand Defendants' request for dismissal based on qualified and official immunity at this stage of the case. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 35] is therefore DENIED.
The parties are ORDERED to submit their joint preliminary report and discovery plan and exchange initial disclosures within 14 days of this Order. Defendants SHALL file their answers within 21 days of the date of this Order and discovery SHALL commence on that date.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of August 2022.